Juvenile Justice Case Compendium

Facts: The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for violating a DVPO and a Level 1 disposition was entered. The adjudication order was signed by the judge on March 13, 2024, and filed with the clerk on March 18, 2024. The disposition order was entered on March 15, 2024. The juvenile appealed based on the gap in time between entry of the orders and the sufficiency of findings in the order of disposition.

Opinion:

The trial court has authority to enter a disposition order after making a determination of delinquency.

While it is better practice for the adjudication order to be fully entered prior to entry of the disposition order, entry of the disposition order before entry of the adjudication order is not error. The trial court has authority to enter a disposition order after making a determination of delinquency. In this case the trial court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent, and the adjudication order was signed before the disposition order was entered. Entry of the disposition order before entry of the adjudication order was not error.

Failure to make express written findings regarding all the factors in G.S. 7B-2501(c) in the disposition order was not error.

The order included that the trial court accepted and considered the family data sheet, risk and needs assessment, disposition tally sheet, and public safety when drafting the order. It appears from the record that the statutory factors were considered by the trial court.

Facts: The juvenile ran away from his mother’s house, was found by his mother and her boyfriend while walking down a road, and the boyfriend held the juvenile until the police arrived. The juvenile kicked, bit, scratched, spat on, and hit the boyfriend in the face with gravel while being held down. He was adjudicated delinquent for simple assault of the mother’s boyfriend and placed on probation with special conditions that included a change in parental custody. The disposition order incorporated the contents of the predisposition report, risk assessment, and needs assessment by reference. It also included findings that stated

“Based on the risk and needs assessment reports submitted by the department of juvenile justice, the court finds that the juvenile has a pre-screen risk score of 41, which is high, a full assessment needs score of 74, which is moderate, and full assessment strengths score of 43, which is high moderate.”

The custody change was contained in a separate “Juvenile Order” which did not contain any findings. The juvenile appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss and by failing to state sufficient findings of fact in the dispositional order.

Opinion:

The trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss. Self-defense did not apply because the juvenile was not without fault in provoking, or engaging in, or continuing the difficulty.

Testimony from the mother and the mother’s boyfriend included that the juvenile kicked, hit, and threw gravel on the boyfriend. The juvenile also testified that he hit and kicked the boyfriend. The juvenile asserted that he engaged in this conduct in self-defense. Self-defense applies only when the juvenile is without fault in provoking, or engaging in, or continuing a difficulty with the other person. The juvenile was not without fault in this case because he was running away from home after a dispute with his mother and was found at night walking down a road. The boyfriend’s action of holding the juvenile down to stop him from going further was reasonable for the juvenile’s protection. The juvenile also asserted that his high blood sugar level at the time of the incident was relevant to whether he had the intent needed for an assault adjudication. However, the juvenile did not present any evidence related to that assertion at trial.

The findings of fact in the dispositional order were insufficient.

There is conflicting caselaw regarding whether documents incorporated by reference in the dispositional order are part of the findings in a dispositional order used to show that the court considered all five statutorily required considerations contained in G.S. 7B-2501(c) (1) seriousness of offense; 2) need to hold the juvenile accountable; 3) protection of public safety; 4) degree of culpability based on the specific circumstance; and 5) rehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile as indicated by a risk and needs assessment). This court followed the older line of cases which prioritizes substance over form and allows for consideration of the documents incorporated by reference in the dispositional order.

Even considering the predisposition report, risk assessment, and needs assessment that were incorporated by reference in the dispositional order, the findings in the dispositional order were insufficient. The written findings only reiterated the risk and needs assessment scores. The findings in the dispositional order did not adequately address the five factors required by G.S. 7B-2501(c).

There were insufficient findings to support the order changing custody of the juvenile.

There was a custody order in place, outside of the delinquency proceeding, related to the juvenile. The trial court entered a supplemental custody order, altering that underlying order, during the delinquency disposition. That supplemental custody order did not contain any findings of fact to support a change in custody. Additionally, a trial court cannot enter an order modifying a custody order sua sponte, as was done in this case.

A trial court is authorized to change custody as a dispositional alternative in a delinquency case when the change in custody would protect the public and meet the needs and best interests of the juvenile based on the five required factors for consideration contained in G.S. 7B-2501(c). Because there were no findings made to support the change in custody, the case was remanded for the trial court to consider evidence that would support entering a new custody order.

* This is an unpublished opinion

Facts: The juvenile admitted to violating his probation by removing his electronic monitoring device. The court did not receive a predisposition report or a risk and needs assessment before entering a new disposition as a result of the violation. The court also did not review the comprehensive clinical assessment (CCA) before entering the new disposition. The court entered a Level 3 disposition.

Opinion:

Order of disposition entered without a predisposition report or a risk and need assessment

The court is allowed to proceed with the dispositional hearing when the court makes a written finding that a predisposition report is not needed. G.S. 7B-2413. In this case, the court order included that “[t]he [c]ourt did not receive a predisposition report or a [r]isk and [n]eeds assessment prior to disposition being entered per [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-2413. That is why none of the above boxes are checked.” Exact statutory language is not needed if the evidence and findings make the court’s basis for the order clear. In this case it was clear that the court proceeded without a predisposition report because the report was not available and not needed.

Failure to consider the comprehensive clinical assessment

The juvenile was not prejudiced by the error. The juvenile had a pattern of behavior that included failing to comply with the terms of probation and failure to comply with evaluations. He was denied admittance to at least two psychiatric residential treatment facilities because of his refusal to comply with any evaluation. The court counselor stated that the juvenile was sabotaging his own CCA. There is no reasonable possibility that a different result would have occurred if the court had considered the care review team’s recommendations.

Required findings regarding dispositional factors

The dispositional order was required to contain findings of fact to show that it considered the factors required in G.S. 7B-2501(c). The findings in the order were sufficient in regard to four of the factors and included:

The fifth factor is the rehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile. The court presumed, without deciding, that the court did not sufficiently address this fifth factor. However, the omission of the predisposition report or risk and needs assessment was not prejudicial.

Facts: The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for communicating a threat to commit mass violence on educational property because he told a group of students “that he was going to shoot up the school.” Slip op. at 2. The prosecutor requested that disposition be continued for seven days and to hold the juvenile in secure custody during that time. The prosecutor explained that the request to hold the juvenile in secure custody was based on the juvenile’s history of repeated pattern of communicating threats. The juvenile’s attorney was ready to proceed with disposition, did not object to the continuance of the disposition hearing, and objected to holding the juvenile in secure custody pending disposition. The court continued disposition as requested by the prosecutor and ordered that the juvenile be held in secure custody pending disposition.

Opinion:

True threat analysis

Limitations on speech are constitutional when that speech constitutes a true threat. Whether speech is a true threat depends on how the reasonable hearer would objectively understand the statement and how the person who makes the statement subjectively intended the statement to be understood. A true threat is “an objectively threatening statement communicated by a party which possesses the subjective intent to threaten a listener or identifiable group.” (quoting State v. Taylor, 379 N.C. 589, 605 (2021)). Slip op. at 8. In determining whether a true threat occurred, the “court must consider (1) the context in which the statement was made, (2) the nature of the language the defendant deployed, and (3) the reaction of the listeners upon hearing the statement, although no single factor is dispositive.” (quoting State v. Taylor, 379 N.C. at 600-01). Slip op. at 8-9. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023), held that a true threat requires that the person making the statement has some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of their statements and that a mental state of recklessness is sufficient.

One student who testified that she heard D.R.F. make the threat was scared enough that she reported it to the school resource officer. A second student testified that he heard the threat and it made him feel sick to his stomach, that D.R.F. sounded serious, and that he did not hear anyone laugh in response to the statement. A third student testified she heard a student respond to the statement by saying that they would bring the guns. When this student then learned of D.R.F.’s statement, she was also scared. This evidence supports that the statement was objectively threatening.

Evidence that D.R.F. had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of his statement included that: he made the statement while in a group of students during school hours; the statement could be overheard by the students who testified; the statement was made in a serious tone; and D.R.F. had previously threatened one of the students who testified by making a video of himself blowing the other student’s brains out. There was sufficient evidence of a true threat.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The offense of communicating a threat to commit mass violence on educational property does not require that the threat is directed only at the person or people threatened. Communication of the threat to a person or group is required, but that person or group do not have to be the target of the threat. The State’s proof that the statement was made to a group in a manner that could be overheard by other students was sufficient evidence of the offense.

Secure custody pending disposition

The juvenile’s Notice of Appeal was filed from the adjudication order. That adjudication order contained the ruling continuing disposition and placing D.R.F. in secure custody pending disposition. The issue of placing the juvenile in secure custody pending appeal was therefore preserved for appeal.

While the seven days in secure custody were already served, the issue is reviewable on appeal as an issue that is capable of repetition, yet evading review.

Good cause as defined in G.S. 7B-2406 is required to continue a hearing. This includes time needed to receive additional evidence, reports, or assessments requested by the court; to receive other information needed in the best interests of the juvenile; and to allow for expeditious discovery. Extraordinary circumstances are required to justify a continuance under any other circumstances. Because none of these criteria were met in this case, there was not good cause to continue the dispositional hearing. The sole purpose for the use of secure custody pending disposition was to punish D.R.F. The court abused its discretion in continuing disposition and placing D.R.F. in secure custody. There was no legitimate purpose in aid of disposition. The portion of the adjudication order that continued disposition and placed D.R.F. in secure custody is vacated.

Facts: The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent and the court ordered a Level 1 disposition. The findings in the dispositional order stated, “Based on the evidence, the [trial court] make [sic] the following findings of fact: [Annie] appeared in court late. Her counsel and adoptive mother were present. The [trial court] had to withdraw a secure custody order after [Annie] appeared in court late. The adoptive mother stated that she had no contact with [Annie] for an extended period of time and there were allegations of [Annie] being involved in drug activity. The adoptive mother has other juveniles in her home and refuses for [Annie] to return to her home until she is enrolled in some type of drug counseling. It is impossible to do this instantaneously, therefore, [Annie] is left without a place to go. Additionally, counsel for [Annie] indicated that [Annie] is unwilling to return to the adoptive mother’s home. Pursuant to statute, the [trial c]ourt changes custody of [Annie[ from [her] adoptive mother to Rockingham County Department of Social Services.” Slip op. at 6.

Opinion: The dispositional order was deficient in that the written findings did not adequately address the factors in 7B-2501(c). Incorporating reports is not sufficient to meet the requirements of G.S. 7B-2501(c). In addition, the other findings contained in the order related only to the juvenile’s living situation and did not relate to the offenses in the petition. They do not address the juvenile’s culpability. Designation of the offense as a Class 1 misdemeanor shows only that the court knew the classification of the offense and does not, alone, show that the court considered the seriousness of the offense. A more deferential reading of the order would make the requirement that the trial court make written findings meaningless. The written findings did not show that the trial court considered the factors in G.S. 7B-2501(c). The disposition is vacated and the case remanded for a new disposition hearing and entry of an order that includes the required findings.

Facts: The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for simple assault related to an incident on a school bus. The court received a predisposition report, risk and needs assessments, and a full YASI narrative assessment and entered a Level 1 disposition. The order was entered on the preprinted Juvenile Level 1 Disposition Order form. The boxes indicating that the court received, considered, and incorporated by reference the report and assessments were checked.  The section entitled “Other Findings” was left blank.

Opinion: The trial must make oral and written findings showing that it considered the five factors mandated for consideration at disposition as contained in G.S. 7B-2501(c). This is true even when the information regarding the statutory factors is in the reports given to the court. The “Other Findings” section of the form must be filled with the trial court’s findings regarding the five factors in G.S. 7B-2501(c).

Facts: The juvenile petition alleging sexual battery stated, “the juvenile did unlawfully, willfully engage in sexual contact with [B.A.] by touching [her] vaginal area, against the victim[’]s will for the purpose of sexual gratification.” On appeal following adjudication, the juvenile alleged that the petition was fatally defective for failing to allege the necessary element of force. The Court of Appeals agreed that the allegations in the petition were fatally defective in their failure to allege an application of force to the victim’s body sufficient to overcome any resistance the victim might make.

Opinion: Juvenile petitions serve essentially the same function as criminal indictments and are generally held to the same standards. Contemporary pleading requirements remove unnecessary technicalities of common law pleading requirements. Indictments need only satisfy statute and constitutional purposes (sufficiency to prepare a defense and protect against double jeopardy). The law evolved from requiring elemental specificity in the pleading to the requirement in G.S. 15A-924 that an indictment alleges facts supporting each essential element of the offense. Magic words are not required. All that is required is that the petition contains factual elements supporting the elements of the offense charged. Hyper-technical scrutiny of juvenile petitions is not required. They only need to clearly identify the crime being charged.

It is not possible to “engage in nonconsensual sexual contact with another person without the application of some force, however slight.” (Slip op. at 12, internal quotations omitted). Force was clearly inferable in the petition by alleging that the juvenile touched the victim’s vaginal area without her consent. The petition therefore contained the factual allegations necessary to support each element of misdemeanor sexual battery and complied with the statutory requirements. There was no jurisdictional defect resulting from the failure to explicitly include the element of force in the petition.

Facts: Brian, age 15, was adjudicated undisciplined in April of 2021. He was given a contempt warning in open court following adjudication. A second order issued by the court on the date of the adjudication included that Brian was to attend school daily; have no unexcused absences, tardies, or suspensions; and complete all assigned schoolwork. This order included that Brian verbally acknowledged that he understood that violation of the conditions could result in being held in contempt. The related dispositional order, entered in June of 2021, placed Brian on protective supervision and required him to attend school regularly, among other things. It also provided that the contempt warning provided after adjudication remained in effect. A delinquency petition was filed in August of 2021 alleging that Brian had three unexcused absences and therefore was in contempt of the court order. Brian filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that G.S. 7B-2505, read together with G.S. 7B-2503, did not allow for the trial court to pursue a delinquency action following an undisciplined adjudication and that pursuit of a delinquency adjudication was therefore a due process violation. The trial court denied the motion, Brian admitted to indirect contempt, and he was placed on probation for six months.

Opinion: G.S. 7B-1501(7)(a) states that a juvenile [between the ages of 10 and 16] is delinquent if they commit indirect contempt, as defined in G.S. 5A-31. Under G.S. 5A-31, a juvenile commits indirect contempt when they engage in willful disobedience of, resistance to, or interference with a lawful court order and when that occurs outside the presence of a court. Indirect contempt by a juvenile can only be adjudged and sanctioned through a delinquency proceeding, as provided in Subchapter II of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes. Brian committed indirect contempt when he violated his undisciplined disposition by failing to attend school regularly. He was put on notice several times that such a violation would result in being held in contempt. The undisciplined dispositional alternatives in the Juvenile Code ceased to control the dispositional alternatives once Brian was held in indirect contempt. It was proper for the trial court to find Brian delinquent as a result of the contempt and in light of the trial court’s multiple contempt warnings. The trial court did not err in dismissing the motion to dismiss.

Facts: A petition was filed alleging that the juvenile committed extortion by obtaining a digital image of a victim, without her knowledge or consent, in which she was in only her bra and underwear. The petition also alleged that the juvenile used the image to obtain food from the school cafeteria while threatening to expose the image if the victim refused to buy the food or do what the juvenile asked of her. The petition did not name the victim. The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent and the court entered a Level 1 disposition. On appeal the juvenile asserted that 1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petition was fatally defective in that it failed to name the victim, 2) the juvenile’s motion to dismiss should have been granted because the crime of extortion requires threat of unlawful physical violence and the juvenile did not make such a threat, 3) there was a fatal variance between the threat alleged in the petition and the proof at the adjudication hearing, 4) the written findings in the adjudication order were insufficient, and 5) the disposition order was insufficient in its failure to contain findings of fact to demonstrate that the court considered all the required factors in G.S. 7B-2501(c).

Opinion:

No Fatal Defect in the Petition

Juvenile petitions are generally held to the same standards as criminal indictments in that they must aver every element of the offense with sufficient specificity to clearly apprises the juvenile of the conduct being charged. Like an indictment, a fatally deficient petition fails to evoke the jurisdiction of the court. Central to the offense of extortion is the wrongfulness of the method by which the juvenile seeks to obtain something of value. Slip op. at ¶ 23. A charging instrument charging extortion need only aver the material elements of the offense, which are 1) that a wrongful demand was made with 2) the intent to demand something of value. Slip op. at ¶ 24. The petition in this case sufficiently alleged each of these elements. It was not necessary to specifically name the victim.

Threat Element of Extortion Does not Require Threat of Unlawful Physical Violence

Assuming, without holding, that G.S. 14-118.4 is an anti-threat statute, the court holds that First Amendment jurisprudence does not limit the application of this statute to threats of unlawful physical violence. Slip op. at ¶ 31. The definition of a true threat, as provided in State v. Taylor, 379 N.C. 589, 2021-NCSC-164, does not require that a threat includes unlawful physical violence. There is no constitutional rule that threats are protected speech unless they threaten unlawful physical violence. Slip op. at ¶ 34. The State was not required to prove that the juvenile threatened unlawful physical violence.

No Fatal Variance Between Petition and Evidence

The essential element of extortion is that the juvenile used a wrongful threat to obtain something of value. The precise identification of what that thing of value was is not material, as long as the State proves that the juvenile obtained or attempted to obtain something of value. Slip op. at ¶ 40. The specific language in the petition alleging that the juvenile sought to obtain food from the cafeteria was unnecessarily specific and therefore surplusage. The fact that the evidence showed that the juvenile asked the victim to do his homework and the petition alleged that he asked her to obtain food from the cafeteria did not create a fatal variance.

Insufficient Written Findings in the Adjudication Order

G.S. 7B-2411 requires that, at a minimum, the court state in a written adjudication order that the allegations in the petition have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Language on the pre-printed form used, stating that “The following facts have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: . . ,”  followed by a finding that states, “[a]t the hearing before the judge, the juvenile was found to be responsible for extortion in violation of 14-118.4,”is insufficient to satisfy this statutory requirement. Only a conclusory statement that the juvenile was responsible for the offense is insufficient. The trial court must affirmatively state the burden of proof in its written findings without regard to the pre-printed language on the form. The case is remanded for the court to make the necessary written findings in the adjudication order.

Insufficient Written Findings in the Dispositional Order

The dispositional order incorporated the predisposition report and the juvenile’s risk and needs assessment by reference. There were no written findings related to the factors the court is required to consider under G.S. 7B-2501(c) when ordering a disposition. The order is therefore insufficient. Because the adjudication order is vacated, this disposition order is also vacated. However, the insufficiency of the disposition order provides an independent ground for vacating the disposition order. On remand, the trial court may hold a new dispositional hearing to hear additional evidence needed to appropriately consider the factors required by G.S. 7B-2501(c).

Facts: Jake appeared in Wake County District Court and admitted to breaking or entering a motor vehicle. The transcript of admission provided that the most serious disposition was a Level 2 disposition. The court also informed Jake that the most serious disposition he could face was a Level 2 disposition. The case was transferred to Cumberland County District Court for disposition. The Cumberland County District Court ordered a Level 3 disposition.

Opinion:  The acceptance of a juvenile admission must be knowing and voluntary, as it is tantamount to acceptance of a guilty plea. Pursuant to G.S. 7B-2407(a)(6), the court must inform the juvenile of the most restrictive disposition on the charge before accepting the admission. When the court plans to impose a disposition level higher than the level contained in the transcript of admission, the juvenile must be given the chance to withdraw the plea and be granted a continuance. In re W.H., 166 N.C. App. 643 (2004). Because the court entered a disposition level higher than the disposition level contained in the transcript of admission and Jake was not given the chance to withdraw his admission, his admission was not knowing and voluntary. The transcript of admission is vacated and the adjudication and disposition orders are reversed.

Facts: K.N.H. was on Level 2 probation and, after making an admission to possession of a handgun and entering an Alfrod plea for attempted common law robbery, the court issued a supplemental order for conditions of probation which included that K.N.H. “submit to [e]lectronic [m]onitoring for 90 days and comply with all conditions set forth by the [c]ourt [c]ounselor.” The juvenile court counselor told K.N.H. and his parent that K.N.H. would have to be with his parent at any time he was allowed to have time outside his home while on electronic monitoring. This condition was never provided to K.N.H. in writing. The court subsequently found that K.N.H. willfully violated his probation conditions by failing to remain with a parent the entire time he was on approved time out of his house. The court then committed K.N.H. to the YDC for an indefinite period of time, without stating the maximum potential term of commitment.

 Opinion:

Written condition of probation: The court complied with the statutory requirements for imposing electronic monitoring (G.S. 7B-2510(b)(4)) by specifically ordering the juvenile to be placed on electronic monitoring. The statute does not require the inclusion of the precise terms and conditions or rules of electronic monitoring imposed by the court counselor in the dispositional order. Criminal law that requires written statements of probation conditions does not apply in delinquency cases because it is not included in the Juvenile Code. Requiring the court to define the specific terms and conditions of each dispositional alternative or condition of probation when not mandated by statute conflicts with the goals of the Juvenile Code to provide a broad range of alternatives and would interfere with the court’s power to delegate certain tasks to third parties involved in the juvenile’s dispositional plan. The court “properly ordered electronic monitoring and appropriately delegated the task of supervision of the electronic monitoring to K.N.H.’s court counselor.” ¶ 34. The order on motion for review is affirmed.

Failure to state potential maximum term of commitment at disposition: This issue is not moot despite the fact that K.N.H. already completed his term of commitment at the YDC. K.N.H. was released to post-release supervision and it is not clear to the court if he remains in that status. Because K.N.H could potentially experience adverse consequences while on post-release supervision or face other potential adverse consequences, the issue is not moot. The court erred in its failure to state the precise duration of the disposition as required by G.S. 7B-2512(a). However, K.N.H. failed to show any prejudice to him as a result of that error. The disposition and commitment order is therefore affirmed.

Facts: The court accepted the juvenile’s admission to disorderly conduct without making any of the inquiries required by G.S. 7B-2407.

Opinion: The court’s acceptance of the juvenile’s admission without making any of the inquiries and statements required by G.S. 7B-2407 is reversible error.

NOTE: this is an unpublished opinion.

Facts: The juvenile, Walter, was adjudicated delinquent for felony breaking and entering and breaking and entering a motor vehicle after making admissions to both offenses. During the colloquy prior to making the admission, the judge asked Walter, “[y]ou also understand you have the right to ask witnesses questions during a hearing? Walter replied “yes.” The adjudication was entered on an Arraignment Order and Transcript of Admission by Juvenile form. The court wrote “based upon the juvenile’s admission and the evidence presented by the DA, the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile is adjudicated delinquent.” The court subsequently committed Walter to the YDC and detailed Walter’s delinquency, history of criminal acts, and violent and aggressive behavior in the Disposition and Commitment order.

Opinion:

Delinquency Admission:

Walter asserted that the warning required to be provided by the court per G.S. 7B-2407(a)(4), “Informing the juvenile that by the juvenile's admissions the juvenile waives the juvenile's right to be confronted by the witnesses against the juvenile;” was not provided prior to his admission. The court found that the court asked Walter the questions from Form AOC-J-410 nearly verbatim and that the trial court gave a broader explanation of his confrontation rights than the exact language in the statute. The statute does not require that the exact statutory language be used. Instead, it requires that the court “orally and clearly inform the juvenile of his rights.” Slip op, at ¶ 24. Walter did not show any error, prejudice, or violation of his confrontation right.

Walter’s rights were protected by the court and his admission was knowing and voluntary. The court addressed all six prongs required by G.S. 7B-2407(a), broke down the language so Walter could better understand and respond affirmatively to each question, and fully informed him of his rights. Walter then expressly agreed to take the plea offer and admit responsibility and he signed the Form AOC-J-410.

Reliance on non-persuasive authority:

Walter relied on an unpublished opinion to assert that the adjudication order was insufficient. The nonbinding conclusion in an unpublished opinion does not impose a requirement for factual findings in adjudication orders.

Adjudication Order:

The court is not required to use the AOC form Adjudication Order. The court’s order met all of the requirements of G.S. 7B-2411. It “was written, indicated the date of the offenses, the felony classification of the offenses, and the date of adjudication. The trial court’s order contained factual findings including the juvenile’s affirmative admission of responsibility to the charges of felony breaking and entering and felony breaking and entering of a motor vehicle.” Slip op. at ¶ 35.

 Disposition Order:

The trial court made findings of fact as required by G.S. 7B-2501(c), including naming the offenses that Walter admitted to and noting an escalation in ongoing criminal activity, checking box nine of the disposition order, referencing Walter’s increasingly aggressive and assaultive behaviors towards himself and others, finding that the court made several attempts to work with Walter, noting an increase in violent behavior and flight despite effective interventions and placements, discussing additional time afforded to the juvenile prior to disposition to give him time to comply, listing Walter’s admissions and AWOLs and placement and court dates, and referencing some progress as after recent service provision. The trial court also relied on 12 reports from organizations that has worked with Walter in the past. There was no abuse of discretion at disposition.

• Facts: A student reported that the juvenile had given him Adderall. The juvenile stated that he had given the student an ibuprofen. A petition charging the juvenile with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (G.S. 90-95(a)(1)) was filed. The petition stated that the juvenile delivered “1 orange pill believed/told to be Adderall[.]” Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver a controlled substance and placed on probation under a level 1 disposition.

• Opinion: Juvenile petitions serve essentially the same function as criminal indictments and are subject to the same requirement that they aver every element of a criminal offense, with sufficient specificity that clearly apprises the juvenile of the charged conduct. A fatally deficient petition fails to evoke the jurisdiction of the court. The offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver has three elements: (1) possession of a substance; (2) the substance must be a controlled substance; and (3) there must be intent to sell or distribute the controlled substance. The petition cannot be based on a guess about whether the substance was a controlled substance or not. This petition only stated that the juvenile delivered something that was believed to be, and the State was told, was a controlled substance. The identification of the controlled substance is a crucial element of the offense. It is unclear whether a controlled substance was involved at all in this matter. The adjudication and disposition orders are vacated because the petition failed to properly allege the offense. The court also noted that, while additional issues raised on appeal do not need to be addressed, the lay testimony of the SRO regarding identification of the pill would not be competent evidence to identify the controlled substance. Expert witness testimony, based on a scientifically valid chemical analysis, is required to establish that a pill is a controlled substance.

• Facts: Zane, a guest at J.D.’s house for a sleepover, awoke to find his pants pulled down and J.D. behind him. J.D. also had his pants down and was engaged in a thrusting motion behind Zane. Zane testified that he believed someone was holding his legs and that he felt J.D.’s privates on his butt, although he did not feel penetration. Two other boys, Dan and Carl, were also present for the sleepover. Dan videotaped some of the incident on his phone. J.D. can be heard on the video telling Dan not to record the incident. At the end of the video, J.D. gives what may have been a thumbs up. The video was distributed by Dan to two others. J.D. was adjudicated delinquent for committing first-degree forcible sexual offense and second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor. Prior to disposition, J.D. admitted to attempted larceny of a bicycle in a separate incident. The trial court entered a Level 3 disposition, committing J.D. to a YDC.
• Second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor:  The trial court erred as a matter of law by denying J.D.’s motion to dismiss the charge of second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor. There is agreement that the recording was made by Dan and not J.D. The state relied on the theory of acting in concert as to J.D.’s culpability. There was insufficient evidence as to a common plan or purpose between J.D. and Dan. The evidence tended to show that J.D. did not want to be recorded, as he told Dan he didn’t want it recorded. If the hand gesture at the end of the video was a thumbs up, evidence of acting in concert requires more than mere approval. Adjudication for this charge is vacated.
• First-degree forcible sexual offense: This offense requires that the juvenile engaged in a sexual act with another person by force and against the will of the other person. A sexual act requires penetration, however slight. The victim unambiguously testified that penetration did not occur. The statements of the other children who were present and the video footage only suggest that penetration could have occurred. That is not enough to overcome the victim’s testimony regarding lack of penetration. Following J.D.’s motion to dismiss, the state conceded that there was not evidence of penetration. The trial court erred in denying J.D.’s motion to dismiss this charge and the adjudication is vacated.
• Attempted larceny: Presence at the crime scene coupled with the juvenile’s possession of tools used to commit the crime were sufficient evidence for the trial court to accept the juvenile's transcript of admission. There was no error in accepting the admission to attempted larceny. The initial disposition was based on the adjudications that are now vacated. The matter cannot be remanded for a new disposition based on adjudication of this offense because the juvenile turned 18 and there is therefore no longer juvenile jurisdiction in the matter.

Dissent

• Justice Newby agreed with the majority in that acceptance of the respondent’s admission was acceptable and that the evidence was insufficient to support the adjudications for second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and first-degree forcible sexual offense. However, the evidence was sufficient to support the lesser included offense of attempted first-degree forcible sexual offense and the case should therefore have been remanded for entry of an amended adjudication against the respondent for attempted first-degree sexual offense.

• Facts: The juvenile was originally placed on three months of protective supervision after admitting to allegations in an undisciplined petition. The juvenile subsequently admitted to allegations of indirect contempt for violations of her undisciplined disposition and was placed on a Level 1 delinquency disposition that included twelve months of probation. As the term of probation was scheduled to expire, the State requested a six-month extension of probation on a motion for review. The trial court extended the juvenile’s probation for six months. The order extending probation did not include any written findings or conclusions.
• Opinion: G.S. 7B-2510(c) requires the court to find that the extension of probation is necessary either to protect the community or to safeguard the welfare of the juvenile. The court must make written findings supporting these statutory factors when extending a juvenile’s probation. Use of an outdated form may have impacted the court’s failure to make the necessary written findings. Because there was information before the trial court that could have supported the necessary findings of fact, the case is reversed and remanded for entry of a new order.

• Facts: E.A. was adjudicated delinquent for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and malicious conduct upon a government official and ordered to probation supervision under a Level 2 disposition. At a subsequent hearing on a motion for review, probation was revoked and E.A. was committed to a youth development center. This new disposition was ordered after the court received and considered a predisposition report, a risk assessment, and a needs assessment. The predisposition report referred to a clinical assessment completed by Haven House in which E.A. was diagnosed with conduct disorder and intensive outpatient services were recommended.
• Grounds for appellate review:  While proper notice of the appeal was not given, the facts of the case are worthy of treating EA’s brief as a writ of certiorari pursuant to Appellate Rule 21. In addition, the State did not raise this jurisdictional issue in its brief and resulting prejudice to the State is not contemplated.
• Mandatory referral to the area mental health services director: As established in In re E.M., __ N.C. App. __, disc. review denied, __ N.C. __, (2019), G.S. 7B-2502(c) mandates that the trial court refer a juvenile to the area mental health services director for appropriate action when faced with any amount of evidence that the juvenile is mentally ill. This statute envisions the area director’s involvement in the disposition and responsibility for arranging an interdisciplinary evaluation and mobilizing resource to meet the needs of the juvenile. The State conceded and the court agrees that EA’s case is indistinguishable from E.M. The evidence before the trial court presented EA as being mentally ill. Failure to refer him to the area mental health services director is reversible error. The dispositional order is vacated and remanded for referral to the area mental health services director.

• Facts: Zane, a guest at J.D.’s house for a sleepover, awoke to find his pants pulled down and J.D. behind him. J.D. also had his pants down and was engaged in a thrusting motion behind Zane. Zane testified that he believed someone was holding his legs and that he felt J.D.’s privates on his butt, although he did not feel penetration. Two other boys, Dan and Carl, were also present for the sleepover. Dan videotaped some of the incident on his phone. J.D. can be heard on the video telling Dan not to record the incident. At the end of the video, J.D. gives a thumbs up. The video eventually ended up on Facebook. J.D. was adjudicated delinquent for committing first-degree forcible sexual offense and second-degree exploitation of a minor. Prior to disposition, J.D. admitted to attempted larceny of a bicycle in a separate incident. The trial court entered a Level 3 disposition, committing J.D. to a YDC, and denied J.D.’s request to be released pending his appeal.
• Second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor:  The evidence was insufficient to support this charge as a matter of law. There was no evidence that J.D. took an active role in the production or distribution of the video, as required for this offense. There is no evidence that J.D. acted with Dan as part of a common plan or purpose. Instead, the evidence shows that J.D. did not want to be filmed as he explicitly told Dan to stop. There is no evidence that J.D. wanted the video to be made or that he was the one who distributed it. Adjudication for this charge should be vacated.
• First-degree forcible sexual offense: This offense requires that the juvenile engaged in a sexual act with another person by force and against the will of the other person. A sexual act requires penetration, however slight. The victim specifically testified that penetration did not occur. The circumstantial evidence provided by the video cannot overcome the direct testimony of the victim. Therefore, the evidence was not sufficient to show that penetration occurred. The trial court erred in denying J.D.’s motion to dismiss this charge.
• Attempted larceny: There was not a sufficient factual basis for J.D.’s admission to this offense. There was not a showing of intent to steal, or assist others in stealing, the bicycle. The adjudications for attempted larceny should be vacated.
• Right of confrontation:  While J.D.’s attorney failed to object to the entry of out-of-court statements made by Dan and Carl during adjudication, the issue is still properly before the court on appeal because G.S. 7B-2405 requires the court to protect the rights of juveniles during a delinquency hearing, including the right of confrontation. The right to appeal is preserved when a trial court acts contrary to a statutory mandate and the juvenile is thereby prejudiced.

The out-of-court statements by Dan and Carl were used to overcome the testimony of the victim indicating that penetration did not occur. The State referenced the statements numerous times in closing statements. The additional evidence provided in these statements, that penetration occurred, was prejudicial to J.D.’s defense. The State failed to prove that admission of this testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

• Disposition errors: The disposition and commitment orders did not contain adequate written findings. The trial court did not adequately explain its decision to ignore the evaluations and recommendation by the court counselor and CHA, which both recommended a Level 2 disposition. It also did not explain how its findings satisfied the five factors required by G.S. 7B-2501(c).
• Confinement pending appeal: The trial court’s order that only recited allegations made by defense counsel and the State does not satisfy the requirement that the court list compelling reasons for continuing J.D.’s confinement while the appeal was pending, as required by G.S. 7B-2605. There were also no compelling reasons stated on the Appellate Entries form.

Dissent

• First-degree forcible sexual offense: Penetration can be proved by circumstantial evidence alone. The video provides such circumstantial evidence through the position and proximity of J.D. and Zane and J.D.’s constant thrusting motion. J.D.’s own statement is also evidence of penetration, as he stated that he had a semi-erect penis, it was pressing against Zane’s anus, and he was thrusting. He also described the incident as “intercourse.” The trial court appropriately weighed this evidence against Zane’s testimony and found that at least slight penetration occurred. It is not the job of the appellate court to re-weigh the evidence. Zane’s testimony also provided sufficient evidence that J.D. acted with force and against Zane’s will. Finally, the tone of the conversation on the video between Dan and J.D. as well as the nature of their actions on the video support the inference that J.D. was aided and abetted by Dan. There was sufficient evidence to deny the motion to dismiss this charge.
• Sexual exploitation of a minor: The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, supports an inference that J.D. acted in concert with Dan in recording the incident. J.D.’s tone, the position of the cell phone, and J.D.’s action of giving a thumbs up at the end of the recording all support the inference that J.D. had knowledge and approved of the recording and that he was working with Dan to make the video.
• Right of confrontation: Based on the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, inclusion of the statements of Dan and Carl suggesting that penetration occurred does not justify a new hearing. The trial court based its determination that penetration occurred on the video and J.D.’s own statements and not on these statements.
• Attempted larceny admission: the recitation of facts that the bicycle was stolen by two boys and with bolt cutters, J.D. was found with two boys matching the description of the boys who stole the bike, J.D. admitted to knowing about the larceny, and the bolt cutters used in the larceny were found in J.D.’s possession laid a sufficient factual basis for accepting J.D.’s admission to the larceny.
• Disposition order: the trial court made multiple findings of fact that addressed all of the five factors required to be addressed in orders of disposition under G.S. 7B-2501. Adequate evidence was provided to support those findings. The trial court’s choice between a Level 2 or Level 3 disposition should only be disturbed on a showing that the decision was manifestly unsupported by reason. Evidence of J.D.’s good behavior does not support the conclusion that the trial court’s decision to impose a Level 3 disposition was unreasonable.
• Confinement pending appeal: While compelling reasons are required to justify denial of a juvenile’s release pending appeal, those reasons do not need to be verbose. The trial court’s written acknowledgement that J.D. had a lack of structure in the home, continued with delinquent behavior following this adjudication, and that he was to remain at the YDC for the protection of the public was sufficient.

• Facts: The juvenile was committed to a Youth Development Center under a Level 3 disposition that resulted from a violation of his probation. This appeal was based on the district court’s denial of a request for a continuance made by the juvenile’s attorney at the review hearing. The attorney requested a continuance because he had just met his client that afternoon and a potential witness was not available to testify. The court denied that request and ordered the Level 3 disposition.
• Opinion: The appeal is dismissed as moot because the juvenile reached the age of 18 and was discharged from the Youth Development Center while the appeal was pending. As a result, the subject matter of the appeal ceased to exist. While the briefing period for the appeal concluded prior to the juvenile’s eighteenth birthday, the juvenile did not file a supplemental brief addressing mootness or presenting any collateral consequences of the disposition order.

Facts: Police responded to B.W.’s home following a call alleging that a juvenile was using drugs and alcohol there. B.W. answered the door and the detective smelled the odor of marijuana and observed B.W. to have red, glassy eyes. B.W. denied using marijuana. The police heard commotion in the home and a second person appeared on the front steps from inside the home and stated that there was a male inside the house. The police then conducted a protective sweep of the home. During that sweep, the police saw a bag of marijuana in plain view on a mattress in an attic space on the third floor of the house. B.W.’s father then returned home and signed consent for the police to search the house. The police seized the bag of marijuana during this second search of the home. They also found a backpack containing men’s clothing in the same third floor attic area and a cell phone that did not belong to B.W. B.W. was charged with resisting, delaying, and obstructing a public officer (“RPO”) and possession of a schedule VI controlled substance. B.W. was found not responsible for the RPO charge and the court set a subsequent date for adjudication of the possession charge. B.W. was found responsible for both possession and RPO on this subsequent date. The appeal raised three arguments:

• The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the seized marijuana;
• The trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the possession offense; and
• The record contained a clerical error regarding the RPO offense.

Opinion: The State did not put forth substantial evidence of the possession charge. Possession requires substantial evidence of actual or constructive possession. The State did not allege actual possession in this case. Constructive possession requires a showing of intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over the contraband. Because B.W. did not have exclusive control over the residence, there must be other incriminating circumstances, such as:

• proximity to the contraband,
• indicia of control over the location, and
• other incriminating circumstances.

No evidence was provided to show that B.W. was in the third floor attic space, in proximity to the marijuana. The backpack and cell phone found in that space did not belong to B.W. and therefore do not support proximity. There was also no evidence that B.W. had control over the attic space. While the police testified that the bonus room adjacent to the attic appeared to be a female’s room and B.W. is female, there was no evidence regarding who else lived in the home. It is possible that another female household member resided in that room. Finally, red, glassy eyes and the odor of marijuana, in the absence of proximity and control, are not sufficient to prove constructive possession. The trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence regarding the possession charge is therefore reversed.

The court did not need to address the motion to suppress given that the possession charge is dismissed.

The trial court made a clerical error when it stated that B.W. was responsible for the RPO charge when she had previously been found not responsible for that charge. Because the motion to dismiss the other charge is granted in this decision, the case is not remanded for correction of the clerical error. Instead, in the interest of judicial efficiency, the judgment finding B.W. responsible for the RPO offense is vacated.

The trial court erred in failing to advise the juvenile of his right against self-incrimination before he testified and incriminated himself during an adjudication hearing. The juvenile was charged with assault on a government employee after allegedly throwing a milk carton at a teacher and hitting her in the face with it. Defense counsel called the juvenile as a witness and, on direct examination, the juvenile admitted to throwing the milk carton at the teacher out of frustration and intending to hit her with it. After closing arguments, the trial judge informed the juvenile that he had forgotten to advise him of his right against self-incrimination prior to his testimony and asked if the juvenile understood that right. Pursuant to the plain language of G.S. 7B-2405, there is an affirmative duty on the trial court to protect the enumerated rights set forth in that statute, including the privilege against self-incrimination. In re J.R.V., 212 N.C. App. 205 (2011). This includes at least some colloquy between the trial court and the juvenile to ensure that the juvenile understands his right against self-incrimination before choosing to testify. The trial court committed error in asking whether the juvenile understood his right against self-incrimination after he had already testified. This was not harmless error because his testimony was incriminating and prejudicial.  

• Facts: The incident occurred at school and began with the juvenile throwing a chair in the cafeteria. The School Resource Officer (SRO) testified that no one was hit by the chair, nor did he see anyone who could have been hit by the chair. After throwing the chair the juvenile ran from the cafeteria and the SRO followed him. The SRO came up quietly behind the juvenile and grabbed him. The juvenile yelled “no” and cursed, and subsequently explained that he had been playing with his brother in the cafeteria. He was adjudicated delinquent for disorderly conduct and resisting a public officer.
• Opinion: The evidence, even when considered in the light most favorable to the State as required on appeal, did not support adjudication on either charge. Disorderly conduct requires evidence of a public disturbance in which the juvenile engaged in 1) fighting; 2) other violent conduct; or 3) conduct creating the threat of imminent fighting or other violence. G.S. 14-288.4(a)(1). The evidence was not sufficient to establish fighting, violence, or the imminent threat thereof. “Throwing a single chair with no other person nearby and without attempting to hit another person and without hitting even any other item in the cafeteria is not disorderly conduct as defined by North Carolina General Statue § 14-288.4(a)(1).” Slip. Op. at 7. Adjudication for resisting a public officer requires: “(1) that the victim was a public officer; (2) that the defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the victim was a public officer; (3) that the victim was discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office; (4) that the defendant resisted, delayed, or obstructed the victim in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office; and (5) that the defendant acted willfully and unlawfully, that is intentionally and without justification or excuse.” Slip Op. at 8. Evidence did not show that the juvenile knew or had reasonable grounds to know that the person grabbing him was a public officer, that the juvenile resisted, delayed, or obstructed the SRO, nor that the juvenile acted willfully and unlawfully, as testimony established that the SRO intentionally snuck up behind the juvenile and the juvenile merely cursed and quickly returned to calm.

• Facts: The juvenile, who was already on probation, encouraged another youth to pull the fire alarm of a middle school on the last day of school. Evidence presented during adjudication included that the juvenile asked the other youth to pull the alarm four different times during at least two classes before the other youth pulled the alarm. Chaos followed as students attempted to exit the school. The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for disorderly conduct. 
• Opinion:
  • Sufficiency of the Evidence: While counsel for the juvenile made a motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence, counsel proceeded to present evidence on behalf of the juvenile after that motion was denied. Counsel did not renew the motion at the close of all evidence, failing to preserve the issue for appeal. The Court declined to review this argument pursuant to Rule 2 because there was sufficient evidence for each element of the criminal offense. Manifest injustice cannot exist and suspension of appellate rules pursuant to Rule 2 is not justified when there is sufficient evidence of each element of the offense. This issue is dismissed.
  • Sufficiency of Adjudication Order: The adjudication order was sufficient to comply with G.S. 7B-2411. It included: identification of disorderly conduct as the type of offense; offense date; and date the petition was filed. It also included: delinquency hearing as the type of proceeding; judge’s signature; date; proof of filing; ; a description of the specific conduct; and the conclusion of law indicating delinquency.
  • Dispositional Considerations: The trial court must consider each of the five factors listed in G.S. 7B-2501(c) when crafting a disposition. This holding resolves the conflict created by In re D.E.P. ___ N.C.App. ___ (Febraury 7, 2017) which diverged from a previous line of cases in holding that there is not a need for finding of facts regarding all five factors listed in G.S. 7B-2501(c), including factors which are irrelevant to the case or regarding which no evidence was presented. When two lines of cases conflict, the older line of cases is controlling. Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611 (2014). The older line of cases on this issue (In re Ferrell, 162 N.C. App. 175 (2004); In re V.M., 211 N.C. App. 389 (2011); In re K.C., 226 N.C. App. 452 (2013); and In re G.C., 230 N.C. App. 511 (2013)) hold that all five factors enumerated in the statute must be considered when developing a disposition and that is therefore the controlling law. Two required factors, the seriousness of the offense and the degree of culpability of the juvenile, were not addressed in this dispositional order. Remanded for further findings of fact to address these two factors.
  • Improper Delegation of Authority: The trial court properly selected community dispositions that are allowable under G.S. 7B-2506, appropriately leaving day-to-day implementation to the court counselor. 
  • Clerical Error: Failure to check the appropriate box in the conclusions of law section on the pre-printed adjudication order form was clerical error. An error in the supplemental order regarding the date that twelve months of probation would terminate was clerical error. Remanded for correction of both clerical errors.

• Facts: The juvenile pushed a printer and computer off his teacher’s desk, causing damage to the printer. He made a motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s evidence, asserting that there was no evidence that the owner of the property was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. The motion was denied and the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for injury to personal property. He was classified as a Level 2 offender and given a disposition of 10 days in detention.  
• Opinion: During the motion to dismiss at trial, counsel for the juvenile twice acknowledged that the Board of Education was properly identified as a corporate body that can own property. The issue was also not raised by the juvenile at trial and, therefore, cannot be raised on appeal. The argument regarding whether the Board of Education was an entity capable of owning property was therefore not properly before the court. The evidence clearly showed that the school supplied computers and printers to teachers and they were therefore the property of the school. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss on these grounds. An outdated preprinted disposition form was used by the court. While the court could have properly ordered the juvenile, as a Level 2 offender, to up to 14 days of intermittent confinement under G.S. 7B-2506(20), the old version of the form did not contain that option. Instead, the only intermittent confinement option on the form allowed for only up to five days of confinement pursuant to G.S. 7B-2506(12). The box next to this option was checked with a handwritten notation of “10 days detention.” The trial court was required to impose at least one Level 2 disposition found in G.S. 7B-2506 (13)–(23). G.S. 7B-2508(d). Failure to do so was reversible error. Remanded for resentencing at which time the court may order up to five days of detention pursuant to G.S. 7B-2506(12) and must impose at least one of the mandatory dispositional alternatives in G.S. 7B-2506(13)-(23).

On remand from the NC Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Saldierna, __ N.C. __, 794 S.E.2d 474 (2016), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying the juvenile’s motion to suppress and vacated his convictions because the waiver of his statutory and constitutional rights during a custodial interrogation was involuntary.

Facts: The juvenile, age 16, was arrested for his alleged involvement in recent burglaries of Charlotte area homes. The arresting officers took him to a police station where a detective provided him with copies of a Juvenile Waiver of Rights Form in both English and Spanish and read the English version to him. The juvenile initialed the waiver on the English version of the form but then immediately asked, “Um, can I call my mom,” and the interrogating officer allowed the juvenile to use her cell phone. The juvenile was unable to reach his mother and returned to the booking area where the interrogation resumed. During the interrogation, he confessed. The juvenile moved to suppress his confession on the ground that it was obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda and G.S. 7B-2101, which the trial court denied.

Waiver of Rights: Because the juvenile’s waiver of rights was not made knowingly, willingly, and understandingly, the trial court erred by denying the juvenile’s motion to suppress. Emphasizing that “the totality of the circumstances must be carefully scrutinized” when evaluating waivers by juveniles, the court concluded that the trial court’s findings lacked such scrutiny. Also, the trial court’s findings that the juvenile understood the interrogating officer’s questions and statements regarding his rights were not supported by the evidence. The juvenile was 16-years-old with an 8th grade education and his primary language was Spanish. Although he could write in English, he had difficulty reading it and understanding it as spoken. The interrogation occurred in the booking area of the Justice Center in the presence of three officers, and there was no evidence the juvenile had any prior experience with law enforcement officers or understood the consequences of speaking with them. Also, the transcript of the recorded interrogation contains several “unintelligible remarks or non-responses by defendant” which do not confirm that he understood what was being asked. Despite the “express written waiver” form executed by the juvenile, the court declined to “give any weight to recitals, like the juvenile rights waiver form signed by defendant, which merely formalized constitutional requirements.” The court explained,

[t]o be valid, a waiver should be voluntary, not just on its face, i.e., the paper it is written on, but in fact. It should be unequivocal and unassailable when the subject is a juvenile. The fact that the North Carolina legislature recently raised the age that juveniles can be questioned without the presence of a parent from age fourteen to age sixteen is evidence the legislature acknowledges juveniles’ inability to fully and voluntarily waive essential constitutional and statutory rights.

Furthermore, the juvenile’s request to call his mother immediately after signing the waiver stating that he was giving up his rights “shows enough uncertainty, enough anxiety on the juvenile’s behalf, so as to call into question whether, under all the circumstances present in this case, the waiver was (unequivocally) valid.”

In a disorderly conduct case, the adjudication was reversed where the petition was not signed by a juvenile court counselor nor marked as “Approved for filing.” A petition alleging delinquency that does not include the signature of a juvenile court counselor (or other appropriate State representative) and the language “Approved for Filing” fails to invoke the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The legislature, by enacting the Juvenile Code, imposed specific requirements that must be satisfied before a district court obtains jurisdiction in juvenile cases. G.S. 7B-1703(b) provides that before a juvenile petition alleging delinquency may be filed, it must contain the signature of a juvenile court counselor, the date, and the words “Approved for Filing.” No prior cases have addressed whether the signature and “Approved for Filing” language are prerequisites to jurisdiction in a delinquency case. However, the court held in In re Green, 67 N.C. App. 501 (1984), that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a petition alleging abuse and neglect where the petition was not signed and verified by the petitioner, as required by the Juvenile Code. Based upon this precedent, the petition in this case was fatally defective and failed to invoke subject matter jurisdiction. The court declined to extend the holding of In re D.S., 364 N.C. 184 (2010), to recognize the noncompliance with the signature and “Approved for Filing” language as non-jurisdictional errors. D.S. held that the timelines imposed by G.S. 7B-1703(b) for filing a juvenile petition are not prerequisites to subject matter jurisdiction. However, extending D.S. in this context would conflict with a statutory purpose of the Juvenile Code – “to provide an effective system of intake services for the screening and evaluation of complaints.” G.S. 7B-1500. The court counselor’s signature and approval of the petition is the only indication on the face of a petition that a complaint was properly screened and evaluated.

Concurring Opinion. The concurring opinion found that even if the petition was not fatally defective, the adjudication and disposition orders would need to be reversed because there was no evidence of disorderly conduct. The juvenile was the victim of an assault by another student who walked up to him and punched him the face as he stood in the hallway waiting for school to begin. The juvenile fell to the floor and unsuccessfully tried to stand as the other student kept punching him but threw one or two punches at his attacker before school officials broke up the fight. A behavioral specialist, who witnessed the entire incident, escorted the juvenile to his office and heard him utter “profanity” as they walked down the hallway. When he instructed the juvenile to stop “cursing,” he stopped. The adjudication of delinquency was based entirely on this use of “profanity.” However, there is no evidence that anyone other than the behavioral specialist heard the profanity or of the particular words the juvenile used. Disorderly conduct at school under G.S. 14-288.4(a)(6) requires both an intent to cause a disturbance and an actual disturbance of school instruction. Here, the juvenile’s “profanity” was a response to an attack by another student, not an intent to disturb the educational process, and no actual disturbance occurred. Moreover, both the adjudication and disposition orders failed to contain the necessary findings required by the Juvenile Code.

The trial court was not required by G.S. 7B-2512 to make findings of fact that addressed each of the G.S. 7B-2501(c) factors and did not abuse its discretion in ordering a Level 3 commitment based on the juvenile’s repeated violations of probation.

Disposition Order Findings. The court held that prior appellate decisions finding reversible error based on a trial court’s failure to make written findings on the G.S. 7B-2501(c) factors resulted from a mischaracterization of the holding in In re Ferrell, 162 N.C. App. 175 (2004), and subsequent repetition of this error. In Ferrell, the court set aside the portion of a disposition order that transferred custody of the juvenile from his mother to his father. The opinion in Ferrell cited the requirements of G.S. 7B-2501(c) and G.S. 7B-2512 in finding that the disposition order contained insufficient findings to support the transfer of custody. However, Ferrell did not involve any consideration of the court’s determination of the appropriate disposition level nor did it discuss the extent to which a disposition order must reference the factors set out in G.S. 7B-2501(c). Nonetheless, in a later published opinion, In re V.M., 211 N.C. App. 389, 391-92 (2011), the court reversed a disposition order, stating “we have previously held that the trial court is required to make findings demonstrating that it considered the [G.S.] 7B-2501(c) factors in a dispositional order[,]” and cited Ferrell as the relevant authority. The court noted that although this mischaracterization of Ferrell has been repeated in several cases, Ferrell did not actually decide the issue of the trial court’s duty to make findings referencing the G.S. 7B-2501(c) factors, nor did V.M. As a result, the court concluded that its decision does not overrule any decision of a prior panel of the Court of Appeals. Finally, although the trial court was not required to make written findings that referenced all of the factors in G.S. 7B-2501(c), the trial court’s findings indicated that it did in fact consider these factors.

Level 3 Commitment Order. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering a Level 3 Disposition and Commitment Order where the evidence showed the juvenile had multiple probation violations, the trial court continued him on probation several times, and the trial court had warned the juvenile at his last probation violation hearing that if he failed to comply with probation again, he would be sent to training school.

The 16-year-old defendant’s request to call his mother at the beginning of the police interrogation was not a clear invocation of his right to consult a parent or guardian before being questioned. After the interrogating officer read defendant his Miranda and juvenile warnings, defendant initialed and signed a Juvenile Waiver of Rights form indicating that he desired to answer questions without a lawyer, parent, or guardian present. He then asked, “Um, can I call my mom,” and the interrogating officer allowed defendant to use her cell phone to make the call. Defendant did not reach his mother but spoke to someone else and then returned to the booking area where the interrogation resumed. During the interrogation, defendant confessed. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress his statement on grounds that it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights and his juvenile rights under G.S. 7B-2101. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order, concluding that although the defendant’s request to call his mother was ambiguous, interrogating officers had a duty to clarify whether the juvenile was invoking his statutory rights before proceeding with the interrogation. Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court noted that a juvenile’s statutory right to parental presence during a custodial interrogation is analogous to the constitutional right to counsel. In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court held that in order to invoke the right to counsel during an interrogation, the defendant must do so unambiguously and officers have no duty to clarify ambiguous statements. The N.C. Supreme Court has previously applied Davis to an interrogation involving a juvenile defendant and concluded that law enforcement officers were not required to cease questioning when the defendant made an ambiguous statement implicating his right to remain silent. See State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364 (2000). Thus, the Davis analysis applies to juvenile interrogations, and without an unambiguous, unequivocal invocation of the juvenile’s statutory rights, officers have no duty to ask clarifying questions or cease questioning. Here, the defendant simply asked to call his mother and gave no indication that he wanted her present for his interrogation. Therefore, defendant’s statutory rights were not violated. Because the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that defendant’s rights were violated, it did not consider whether defendant knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his rights, as required by G.S. 7B-2101(d) for defendant’s confession to be admissible. Therefore, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider the validity of defendant’s waiver.

Dissenting Opinion: In her dissent, Justice Beasley found that the juvenile’s request to call his mother was an unambiguous invocation of his statutory right to have a parent present during custodial interrogation. Assuming the request was ambiguous, she agreed with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that officers must ask clarifying questions when a juvenile is attempting to invoke his or her rights, noting that children are more vulnerable during interactions with the police due to their immaturity and inability to fully understand their rights. Her dissent also emphasized that the legislature attempted to afford juveniles greater protection in G.S. 7B-2101(a)(3) than the rights afforded by Miranda, and thus, Miranda precedent should not control the analysis related to a juvenile’s right to have a parent present.

The defendant’s mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a murder he committed at age seventeen violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under Miller v. Alabama. In 1999, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for a felony murder conviction that resulted from his involvement in a disputed drug deal that occurred when he was 17-years old. In 2012, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief challenging his life sentence based on the recent decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for a juvenile offender violates the Eighth Amendment). In 2013, the trial court vacated defendant’s life sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing based on its conclusion that Miller applied retroactively to defendant’s sentence. The state sought appellate review and before the appeal was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court filed an opinion in Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), holding that Miller announced a new substantive rule that applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. In a supplemental brief filed by the state in response to Montgomery, the state argued that defendant was not entitled to resentencing under Miller and Montgomery because defendant’s sentence “is not really life imprisonment without parole.” Instead, the state argued that because G.S. 15A-1380.5 (repealed effective December 1, 1998), applies to defendant’s offenses and entitles him to a review of his sentence by a superior court judge after 25 years, he received a sentence of life imprisonment “with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the only effect of the review permitted by the statute is that a judge must recommend to the governor or a designated agency whether or not the defendant’s sentence should be altered or commuted and that the possibility of alteration or commutation of the sentence is “deeply uncertain” given the minimal guidance on the circumstances that might support such a result. The Court also concluded that “[G.S.] 15A-1380.5 does not address the central concern of Miller – that a sentencing court cannot treat minors like adults when imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” The permissible remedies for a Miller violation, parole consideration and resentencing, contemplate that a reviewing body will consider whether the juvenile offender has matured during the juvenile’s term of imprisonment. Nothing in G.S. 15A-1380.5 requires a reviewing judge to consider this factor. Because defendant’s sentence is unconstitutional under Miller, the trial court’s order vacating that sentence and ordering a new sentencing hearing is affirmed.

In an attempted robbery case, the trial court did not err by denying the 16-year-old defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to a police officer outside the presence of his parent. After executing an arrest warrant, officers placed defendant in custody and transported him to a local precinct where he was interrogated by a police detective. Prior to interrogating defendant, the detective read defendant his Miranda and juvenile rights from a “Juvenile Waiver of Rights” form. The bottom of the form contained two separate checkboxes specifying either that the juvenile elected to answer questions: (1) in the presence of a lawyer, parent, guardian, or custodian, or (2) without a lawyer, parent, guardian, or custodian present. In the first checkbox, the detective filled in the name of defendant’s mother as the person who was present with defendant during the questioning. No blank spaces were filled in the second checkbox which contained the waiver of rights. The juvenile placed his initials beside each right listed on the form and next to the first checkbox, erroneously indicating that his mother was present. The appellate court found there was evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact that defendant did not request the presence of his mother and that his initial beside the first checkbox was merely an error. These findings support the trial court’s conclusion that defendant did not invoke his right to have his mother present during questioning. The court also rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the detective failed to clarify an ambiguous invocation of his statutory right to have a parent present, as required by State v. Saldierna, __ N.C. App. __, 775 S.E.2d 326, disc. review allowed, 368 N.C. 356 (2015). Because the Court of Appeals’ decision in Saldierna is currently pending review by the N.C. Supreme Court pursuant to the state’s petition for discretionary review, the issue is still unsettled. Moreover, the court found that Saldierna is inapplicable because defendant did not make a statement, ambiguous or otherwise, invoking his right to have a parent present in this case.

In a first-degree statutory rape case, the superior court lacked original subject matter jurisdiction for three out of four counts of first-degree statutory rape where no evidence showed that the defendant was at least 16-years-old at the time of the offenses. All four indictments alleged that the offenses occurred between “January 1, 2011 and November 30, 2011.” The state argued defendant was at least 16 during the relevant time period because the arrest warrants erroneously listed his birth date as 9/14/1994. However, defendant was actually born on 9/14/1995 and did not turn 16 until September 14, 2011. The evidence established that only the fourth offense occurred after defendant’s 16th birthday. Neither party, including defendant’s trial counsel, recognized the error regarding his age. Over a dissent, the court found jurisdiction was proper as to the fourth offense, which occurred in November 2011, even though the indictment alleged periods of time during which defendant was both 15 and 16. The court noted that temporal specificity requirements for indictments in cases involving sexual assaults on children are relaxed and that the defendant could have requested a special verdict or moved for a bill of particulars for more specificity as to the allegations. The dissent would have found that the superior court lacked jurisdiction for all four offenses because defendant was under age 16 during over 75% of the time period alleged in the indictments. Referring to the mistake as a “travesty of justice,” the dissent stated that the assertion of jurisdiction over defendant as an adult based on a mistake as to his age was a jurisdictional error that “irrevocably changed the course of his prosecution.”

There was substantial evidence identifying the juvenile as the perpetrator of a misdemeanor larceny such that the trial court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss. On October 16, 2013, at approximately 5:30 p.m., three African-American males stole the victim’s iPhone from her table at a Wendy’s restaurant and then ran away. The victim chased after them and encountered a man, Mr. Wall, who had just driven past three African-American males down the street. Mr. Wall drove back to the same location and saw the males again, and they ran. Both the victim and Mr. Wall reported to police officers that the juvenile was wearing a red jacket and that another suspect was wearing gray. Mr. Wall identified the juvenile and one of his companions in a showup later that same day, and the victim identified the juvenile at the adjudication hearing. When the juvenile was apprehended, he was wearing a red hoodie jacket and had a Wendy’s spoon in his back pocket, along with two Wendy’s receipts that were time-stamped 5:29 p.m. and 5:33 p.m., despite his denial that he had been at Wendy’s that day.

The trial court erred by sentencing defendant to life without parole for a murder committed when defendant was 16 because the trial court’s one-page order failed to comply with the statutory mandate to “include findings on the absence or presence of any mitigating factors” under G.S. 15A-1340.19C(a). When sentencing a minor for a murder not based solely upon the felon murder rule, the trial court must consider “all the circumstances of the offense and the particular circumstances of the defendant” and include findings of fact on “the absence or presence of any mitigating factors.” The appellate court found that the trial court’s order made cursory but adequate findings as to some of the statutory factors but failed to address several others, including the defendant’s rehabilitative potential which is a significant factor. The court also noted that if no evidence is presented as to a particular factor, the trial court’s order should so state and indicate that, as a result, that factor was not considered.

The trial court’s disposition order did not violate G.S. 7B-2513(a), which authorizes a maximum commitment period that does not exceed the maximum possible sentence that any adult could receive for the same offense, without consideration of prior record levels or the existence or nonexistence of aggravating and mitigating factors under structured sentencing. G.S. 7B-2513(a) provides that “[n]o juvenile shall be committed to a [YDC] beyond the minimum six-month commitment for a period of time in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment for which an adult in prior record level VI for felonies or in prior conviction level III for misdemeanors could be sentenced for the same offense[.]” In this case, the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for the Class I felony of breaking or entering a motor vehicle, for which an adult could be sentenced to a maximum of 21 months in the presumptive range or a maximum of 24 months in the aggravated range. The juvenile was committed for an indefinite period of at least 6 months, but not to exceed his 18^th birthday, resulting in a maximum commitment period just short of 24 months. On appeal, he argued that because G.S. 7B-2513(a) does not explicitly reference the maximum aggravated term for an adult, his maximum possible commitment should be limited to the maximum presumptive term for an adult in a prior record level VI, based on the rule of lenity. The appellate court rejected this argument, relying on its holding in In re Carter, 125 N.C. App. 140 (1987), that former G.S. 7A-652 (the predecessor to G.S. 7B-2513(a)) authorized a maximum commitment equivalent to the maximum possible sentence that any adult could receive for the same offense. The court said that its rationale for the holding in Carter – maintaining “judicial flexibility” in juvenile dispositions – applies equally to G.S. 7B-2513(a).

***In a footnote, the court noted that a juvenile’s commitment may, nonetheless, be extended beyond the maximum adult sentence when the Division of Juvenile Justice determines that an extension is necessary to continue the juvenile’s plan of care or treatment. A juvenile must receive written notice of the extension at least 30 days prior to the juvenile’s scheduled release date and may request a hearing to contest the extension. See G.S. 7B-2515.

The trial court did not err by denying the juvenile’s motion to dismiss an assault petition. The juvenile, a Sixth grade student, was charged with simple assault and disorderly conduct at school arising from his behavior during a charity volleyball game in the school gymnasium. The juvenile was seated in the bleachers near two other boys who were “getting ready to fight.” When a teacher tried stop the altercation, the juvenile waved her off and told her “no, don’t stop it, go away.” Another teacher saw the juvenile’s actions and told him to come down from the bleachers, so they could talk outside. After repeated requests, the juvenile angrily stood up and left the gym but “body checked” a bystander on his way out. In the hallway, outside the gym, the juvenile shouted obscenities at two teachers who tried to intervene. An SRO physically removed the juvenile from the hallway and escorted him to the main office. The court held there was sufficient evidence of the juvenile’s intent to support the assault adjudication, including testimony that: there was “plenty of room” for the juvenile to walk around the bystander, she had to steady herself to keep from falling when the juvenile “body checked” her, and the juvenile angrily stormed off the bleachers and “ran right over her.”

Relying upon a recent decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court, the court held that the trial court did not err by revoking the juvenile’s probation based solely upon the admission of hearsay evidence. See State v. Murchison, 367 N.C. 461 (2014) (holding that, since the formal Rules of Evidence do not apply in probation revocation hearings, the trial court did not err by revoking the defendant’s probation and activating his suspended sentence based solely on hearsay evidence). Also, the trial court’s failure to advise the juvenile about the consequences of testifying at his probation revocation hearing did not affect the validity of the probation revocation because the holding of In re J.R.V., 212 N.C. App. 205 (2011) (requiring the trial court to advise a juvenile of his right against self-incrimination under G.S. 7B-2405(4), if the juvenile chooses to testify at his own adjudication hearing) applies only to adjudication hearings.

In a sex offense case, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a dispositional hearing after the juvenile appealed the adjudication order under G.S. 7B-2602, which allows a juvenile to appeal the adjudication order when no disposition has been entered within 60 days. Unless a statute provides otherwise, an appeal stays further proceedings in the trial court until the cause is remanded by mandate of the appellate court.

(1) Two juvenile petitions alleging first-degree sex offense under G.S. 14-27.4(a)(1) and two petitions alleging crime against nature under G.S. 14-177 provided sufficient notice because the allegations followed the statutory language of both offenses. The petitions charging first-degree sex offense allege the juvenile “did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously . . . [e]ngage in a sexual act with [M.H.], a child under the age of thirteen (13) years,” identifying M.H. by his full name and stating that the “victim was 7.” One petition further alleges that the “juvenile performed fellatio on victim,” while the other alleges that the “victim performed fellatio on juvenile.” The petitions charging crime against nature allege the juvenile “did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously . . . commit the abominable and detestable crime against nature with [M.H.],” identifying M.H. by his full name and stating that the “victim was 7.” Likewise, one petition alleges that the “juvenile performed fellatio on victim,” while the other alleges that the “victim performed fellatio on juvenile.” The State was not required to identify the particular sex acts involved or describe the manner in which they were performed, and if the juvenile required more detail about whether the petitions alleged the same or multiple acts of fellatio, the juvenile should have moved for a bill of particulars. (2) The court rejected the juvenile’s argument that the two petitions alleging the victim performed fellatio on the juvenile were defective because the victim was the “actor.” First-degree sex offense and crime against nature do not require that the accused perform a sex act on the victim but rather that he “engage[] in a sexual act with” the victim.

In an assault case, the trial court did not err by allowing the alleged victim of the assault to testify that the juvenile’s expression was “very defiant” when he “body checked” her after exiting the bleachers in the school gymnasium. The court rejected the juvenile’s argument that the testimony was an impermissible opinion regarding the juvenile’s intent. Instead, the challenged testimony was an opinion regarding the juvenile’s demeanor, which is admissible in criminal trials. Evidence of the juvenile’s demeanor was relevant and admissible under Rules 401 and 402 because it was based upon the witness’s personal observations of the juvenile at the time of the incident, and it helped to explain the surrounding circumstances.

Where the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent in three separate sessions of juvenile court that occurred on January 5, 2012, November 29, 2012, and December 3, 2012, which were all calendared for disposition on March 4, 2013, the trial court was not required to consolidate the offenses for disposition pursuant to G.S. 7B-2508(h). That statute only requires the consolidation of offenses that are adjudicated during a single session of juvenile court.

The court rejected the State’s argument that the juvenile’s appeal of the trial court’s order placing him in secure custody pending his transfer to an out-of-home placement was moot on the ground that the issue is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” An order is reviewable under this exception to the general rule prohibiting the judicial system from addressing moot issues when (1) the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. The secure custody order in this case is an inherently temporary measure that is likely to recur in the future. As a result, the court addressed the merits of the appeal.

The trial court did not err by ordering, under G.S. 7B-1903(c), that the juvenile be held in secure custody pending his transfer to an out of home placement. (1) G.S. 7B-1906(g), which requires a written order with appropriate findings of fact regarding the evidence relied upon and the purposes for continued custody, applies to secure custody following an initial accusation of delinquency, rather than when the trial court orders secure custody pending disposition or pending an out of home placement under G.S. 7B-1903(c). (2) There was ample justification for the court’s decision to place the juvenile in secure custody pending his out of home placement, including the juvenile court counselor’s recommendation, which was based on the juvenile’s school suspensions, anger-related difficulties, and disobedience at home, as well as the testimony of the juvenile, the juvenile’s mother, and a school resource officer.

The evidence was sufficient to sustain a juvenile’s adjudication as delinquent for driving with no operator’s license under the corpus delicti rule. The thirteen-year-old juvenile admitted that he drove the vehicle. Ample evidence, apart from this confession existed, including that the juvenile and his associates were the only people at the scene and that the vehicle was registered to the juvenile’s mother.

The court exercised its authority to suspend the appellate rules, under Rule 2, to review the juvenile’s adjudications of sexual battery and simple assault because the juvenile did not move to dismiss at the close of all the evidence. Because the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile’s adjudication, it reviewed the appeal to prevent “manifest injustice” to the juvenile.

The evidence was insufficient to adjudicate the thirteen-year-old juvenile delinquent for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Although the evidence showed that the juvenile was operating a motor vehicle registered to his mother, there was no evidence that he was using the vehicle without his mother’s consent.

The trial court erred by denying the juvenile’s motion to modify the disposition order based upon the erroneous calculation of the juvenile’s delinquency history level. Because the trial court never extended the juvenile’s probation, it expired on June 13, 2012, which precluded the assignment of the two additional points for the juvenile’s probation status at the time of the offense, which occurred in August, 2012. [Prior to the expiration of the juvenile’s probation, a motion for review was filed alleging the juvenile violated his probation, but the juvenile failed to appear for that hearing. At the adjudication hearing on the August 2012 offense, the juvenile admitted he violated his probation, as alleged in the earlier motion for review, but his probation was not extended.] The court rejected the State’s argument that by assigning the two additional points and entering a Level 3 disposition, the trial court had implicitly and retroactively extended the juvenile’s probation. In the absence of this error, the trial court had no authority to impose a Level 3 disposition and commit the juvenile to a YDC. The court reversed and remanded for entry of a new disposition order.

The evidence was insufficient to adjudicate the thirteen-year-old juvenile delinquent for reckless driving under G.S. 20-140(b). The evidence showed that the juvenile was driving a vehicle registered to his mother at the time of the wreck and that the vehicle that he was driving collided with a utility pole. However, there was no evidence showing that the collision resulted from careless or reckless driving. The court concluded that the “mere fact that an unlicensed driver ran off the road and collided with a utility pole does not suffice to establish a violation of [G.S.] 20-140(b).”

The juvenile’s appeal of an order denying his release from a youth development center was not rendered moot by his release from YDC during the pendency of the appeal because there were adverse collateral consequences, such as the fact that his release date and the commencement of his post-release supervision were delayed by several months.

A 13-year-old juvenile who made an incriminating statement to an officer during roadside questioning at the scene of an automobile accident was not in custody. An officer saw the juvenile and two others leaving the scene of an accident involving a car that crashed into a utility pole. The officer stopped the boys and after several minutes of conversation the juvenile, age 13, admitted that he had been driving the car, which belonged to his mother. The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, operating a motor vehicle without being properly licensed, and operating a motor vehicle in a reckless manner. On appeal the juvenile argued that his Miranda rights had been violated and that his statement to the officer was involuntary. Noting that under J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011), a reviewing court must take into account a juvenile’s age if it was known to the officer or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, the court nevertheless concluded that the juvenile was not in custody. The fact that he was legally required to remain at the scene of an accident and provide identifying information did not mean that he was in custody or that his 5^th Amendment rights were violated.

A 14-year-old juvenile was not “in custody” when officers questioned him in his backyard with his parents nearby inside the house. Law enforcement officers saw the juvenile standing across the street from a home into which shots had been fired. When asked, the juvenile denied shooting at the house. Officers spoke with the juvenile’s parents and then asked the juvenile if he would speak with them. A plain-clothes detective and uniformed officer spoke with the juvenile outside his house for about five minutes. The parents were invited to join them but stayed in the house and told the juvenile to talk to the officers and “tell the truth.” The juvenile admitted shooting at the house. The officers did not give the juvenile a Miranda warning. The juvenile was charged with damaging both personal and real property. The trial court denied the juvenile’s motion to suppress his oral statements. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s findings supported the conclusion that the juvenile was not in custody when he made the statements. Facts the court considered included that the juvenile was 14; the officers asked whether he would talk with them and did not say he had to; the questioning occurred outdoors at the juvenile’s home during the day; the juvenile’s parents were nearby and could have gone outside with the juvenile; the officers talked with the juvenile for only about five minutes; the officers stood arms-length from the juvenile and made no move to touch him; and there was no physical restraint or indication of coercion. Facts that did not suffice to render the juvenile “in custody” included that: the juvenile was very much a suspect in the shooting; his parents told him to talk to the officers and “tell the truth”; and the officers were armed and one was in uniform. The court rejected the notion that fact that the juvenile’s parents told him to be honest with the officers compelled a different conclusion.

The trial court erred by denying the juvenile’s motion for release from his YDC commitment. Following adjudications of delinquency for possession of a firearm by a minor and carrying a concealed weapon, the trial court committed the juvenile to a youth development center (YDC) for a maximum period of six months. Approximately 30 days prior to the expiration of the juvenile’s commitment period, the juvenile’s treatment team notified his father by telephone of its plan to extend the juvenile’s commitment. One week later, the Division of Juvenile Justice formally approved an extension of the juvenile’s commitment period for up to six months and mailed written notice to the juvenile’s parents. The juvenile filed a motion for release from his commitment based on the Division’s failure to provide written notice of the proposed extension to the juvenile and his parents at least 30 days prior to the expiration of his scheduled release date, as required by G.S. 7B-2515. The trial court denied the motion, and the juvenile appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the oral notice the Division provided to the juvenile’s father was insufficient to comply with the plain language of G.S. 7B-2515(a), which “clearly and unambiguously” requires written notice be provided to the juvenile and his parents at least 30 days in advance of the juvenile’s scheduled release date. The error was not harmless because the lack of sufficient notice directly impacted the juvenile’s ability to contest the proposed extension of his commitment, as provided in G.S. 7B-2515(c). The trial court’s order was reversed and remanded for the juvenile to be given credit toward his one-year period of post-release supervision for the additional time he was committed beyond his initial six-month maximum commitment.

The trial court did not err by entering a disposition order without making written findings demonstrating that it considered the factors listed in G.S. 7B-2501(c). Although the initial disposition order did not contain any such findings, the Chief District Court Judge filed an amended disposition order with written findings that closely tracked the oral findings of the presiding judge and sufficiently addressed these factors.

The court upheld the juvenile’s adjudication for simple assault. At adjudication, a female classmate of the male juvenile testified that the juvenile “grabbed and squeezed her butt” in class when she went to shelve a book. The juvenile testified that he accidentally touched her butt, when picking up a pencil, but did not squeeze it. The court affirmed the adjudication for simple assault, based on the juvenile’s having touched the classmate without her consent. The court noted that where a battery has occurred, an assault may be proven by a finding of either assault or battery on the victim. When the evidence discloses an actual battery (unlawful touching of another without consent), as it did here, whether the victim is put in fear is irrelevant.

An officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot to justify an investigatory seizure that occurred when the officer was investigating an alleged larceny of missing cash and observed the juvenile trying to swallow something green. The officer asked A juvenile’s incriminating statement to an officer at the scene of an automobile accident was not involuntary due to the fact that he was required by G.S. 20-166(c) to remain at the scene and provide his name and other identifying information “to the nearest peace officer.” The court rejected the juvenile’s argument that his statement was involuntary, citing California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (a hit and run statute requiring the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident to stop at the scene and give his name and address did not violate the Fifth Amendment). Further, there was no indication of coercive conduct by the officer.

In a first-degree murder case, the defendant was not entitled to a hearing regarding the admissibility of his juvenile records under G.S. 7B-3000(f) before the State could cross-examine a witness about whether she knew of the defendant’s prior juvenile adjudications. The testimony of defendant’s mother that defendant was not a violent person opened the door to cross-examination about his prior crimes under Rule 404(a)(1). Defendant argued that because his prior crimes were juvenile adjudications, the trial court was required to hold an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of his juvenile records. The Court of Appeals held that G.S. 7B-3000(f) was inapplicable because it concerns the use of juvenile court “records,” and the State did not seek to introduce any portion of the defendant’s juvenile record. The State’s questions on cross-examination inquired only of defendant’s mother’s knowledge of his prior adjudications. Further, G.S. 7B-3000(f) mentions the use of juvenile records under Rule 404(b), and not Rule 404(a)(1).

The Court of Appeals rejected the juvenile’s argument that G.S. 7B-1702 should be strictly construed to require, in every case, that the court counselor interview the juvenile and the alleged victim unless it is impossible to do so. The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for simple assault and common law robbery. When the complaint was filed with juvenile services, the juvenile was already on probation, a law enforcement officer had investigated the case and interviewed the alleged victim, and the victim had made a written statement about the event and twice identified the juvenile in a photographic line-up. After talking with the complaining officer, but without interviewing the juvenile or the alleged victim, the court counselor approved the complaint for filing as a petition. On appeal, the court noted that the addition to the statute of the phrase “if practicable,” in 1998, gave court counselors more flexibility in how they evaluate whether a petition should be filed. That wording means that the statute requires the suggested interviews only when additional evidence is needed in order to evaluate the matter according to the DJJDP intake factors. Here, additional information was not required and the court counselor complied with G.S. 7B-1702 in assessing the complaint and approving it for filing.

There was sufficient evidence of common law robbery and simple assault under the principle of “acting in concert” where State’s evidence showed the victim was robbed of his iPod by a group of boys after school, the victim twice identified the juvenile in a photo lineup as one of the assaulters and testified that the juvenile had patted him down, a co-defendant testified that the juvenile walked behind the victim during the incident, and the victim’s statement vividly described how he was “beat up” by a group of boys, which included the juvenile.

The trial court did not err by denying the 17-year-old juvenile defendant’s motion to suppress his statement. Two plain-clothes detectives driving an unmarked car picked defendant up from his home and drove him 2 miles away where they questioned him about recent burglaries. Defendant rode in the front seat of the patrol car, and the detectives told him he was free to leave at any time and did not touch him. However, detectives showed defendant reports of the break-ins and told him that he would not be arrested “that day,” if he was cooperative. Defendant confessed. The appellate court held that the totality of the circumstances showed defendant was not in custody because he voluntarily spoke and rode with the officers, who said he was free to leave any time. Although defendant was 2 miles from home when he confessed, he sat in the front seat, and the encounter lasted under 2 hours. Defendant’s age did not alter the conclusion that he was not in custody where he was 17 and 10 months old at the time of the encounter.

The trial court erred by denying the juvenile’s motion to dismiss the petition for second degree sex offense under G.S. 14-27.5 because the State failed to prove the element of force. The juvenile instigated and engaged in various sexual activities with other boys around his age. While the boys may have participated willingly initially, when they tried to say “no,” the juvenile threatened to disclose their secrets (e.g., bedwetting) and the sexual conduct. He did not inflict or threaten physical harm. The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for the offense of indecent liberties between minors, three counts of second degree sexual offense, and three counts of crimes against nature. On appeal the juvenile challenged only the second degree sexual offense adjudications, arguing that the state failed to prove either actual or constructive force, a necessary element of the offense. The court held that coercion by threatening to disclose other children’s embarrassing secrets and their sexual conduct was not sufficient to establish constructive force. Except when the abuse is by a parent (or someone in a comparable relationship to a child), the “force” element of second degree sex offense requires proof of either actual or threatened physical harm. When a parent uses his position of power to force his child to engage in sexual acts, proof of neither actual nor threatened physical harm is required, because the threat is inherent in the relationship. That kind of relationship did not exist in this case.

The trial court erred by failing to inform the juvenile of the most restrictive disposition on the charge before accepting his admission to possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver. The court was required to inform the juvenile personally of the most restrictive possible disposition under G.S. 7B-2407. Relying on a transcript of admission or on the juvenile’s consultation with his or her attorney is not sufficient. The court also remanded the case for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the denial of the juvenile’s motion to suppress.

There was sufficient evidence of common law robbery and simple assault under the principle of “acting in concert” where State’s evidence showed the victim was robbed of his iPod by a group of boys after school, the victim twice identified the juvenile in a photo lineup as one of the assaulters and testified that the juvenile had patted him down, a co-defendant testified that the juvenile walked behind the victim during the incident, and the victim’s statement vividly described how he was “beat up” by a group of boys, which included the juvenile.

Although the juvenile’s attorney did not move to dismiss the petitions alleging indecent liberties between children and second degree sex offense at the close of the evidence, the court exercised its authority under Rule 2 to review the juvenile’s arguments regarding the insufficiency of the evidence. Rule 2 permits an appellate court to “suspend or vary the requirements or provisions” of the appellate rules to prevent “manifest injustice.” The Court of Appeals noted that our appellate courts have regularly invoked Rule 2 to address challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction in criminal cases.

The trial court erred by denying the juvenile’s motion to dismiss the charge of assault by pointing a gun because an airsoft gun was not a “gun” within the meaning of G.S. 14-34, which does not penalize individuals for pointing imitation firearms at another person. The evidence showed that while another child held an “airsoft pump action imitation rifle,” the juvenile pulled the trigger and a pellet hit and injured another child. The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for the offense of assault by pointing a gun, under G.S. 14-34. The juvenile asserted on appeal that the airsoft gun, which shot plastic pellets using a pump action mechanism, was not a “gun” for purposes of G.S. 14-34. (The parties agreed that it was neither a “firearm” nor a “pistol.”). The Court of Appeals applied “general principles of statutory construction,” consulting dictionary definitions and the treatment of the term “gun” in appellate court decisions, to conclude that the term refers to “devices ordinarily understood to be firearms.” Because the term “gun” in G.S. 14-34 is ambiguous, the “rule of lenity” requires interpreting it narrowly. The court noted that there were other offenses for which the juvenile might have been adjudicated delinquent.

A one-week difference between the date of offense alleged in the petition for indecent liberties between children and the date shown by the evidence did not require a dismissal where the variance was slight and did not prevent the juvenile from presenting an adequate defense. The petition alleged the offense occurred on November 14, 2008, and the evidence showed that it occurred the weekend of November 7-9, 2008.

The trial court did not err when it announced its adjudication and disposition decisions immediately following the transfer hearing and its decision not to transfer. The trial court, after a two-day hearing, found probable cause for attempted first-degree sex offense. At a later date the court conducted a transfer hearing at which it heard additional evidence from the State and the juvenile. In closing arguments, the two sides requested different dispositional alternatives. Immediately after that hearing, the court announced that it retained jurisdiction, found beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile was delinquent for attempted first-degree sex offense, and committed the juvenile to a youth development center. On appeal, the juvenile argued his right to due process was violated because the trial court failed to conduct a separate adjudication hearing.  The Court of Appeals held the trial court did not err when it announced its adjudication and disposition decisions immediately following the transfer hearing because the statutorily mandated protections were afforded to the juvenile throughout the proceedings. Conducting all three hearings in one proceeding was not error, so long as the juvenile’s rights set out in G.S. 7B-2405 were protected. There was no indication in this case that any of those rights was violated, and the juvenile did not indicate that there was other evidence he would have presented and or show any prejudice

The Court of Appeals rejected the juvenile’s argument that after commitment, all decisions about services, privileges, or punishments are to be made by the Division of Juvenile Justice, not the trial court. Following his admission to first-degree rape, the juvenile was committed to a youth development center for an indefinite period, although the disposition order indicated that the juvenile was to “[r]emain in YDC for the maximum time allowed by law,” which was age 21. The order also required the juvenile, among other things, to receive a sex-offender specific evaluation and treatment. Almost 3 years later, the Division filed a motion seeking clarification as to whether the juvenile could participate in an off-campus work program and have home and overnight visits. At a hearing the court heard witnesses from the Division, a minister who knew the juvenile’s case, and the juvenile’s mother. The State opposed allowing any of the privileges that were the subject of the motion. The trial court ordered that the juvenile (i) could work off campus, but only if he would not be around anyone age 25 or younger; (ii) could have no home or overnight visits; and (iii) could participate in YDC outings if there were direct supervision at all times. On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that when a juvenile is committed for first-degree rape, jurisdiction continues until the juvenile reaches age 21 or the court terminates jurisdiction, whichever is earlier, and that commitment does not terminate the trial court’s jurisdiction. The court also cited In re Doe, 329 N.C. 743 (1991), in which the state supreme court discussed the “necessary functional overlap” of the legislative and judicial branches inherent in the Juvenile Code. Thus, the trial court can enter orders relating to the terms of the juvenile’s commitment, such as privileges and punishment, without violating the separation of powers doctrine. The court also held that the trial court clearly considered the dispositional factors set out in G.S. 7B-2501 and did not abuse its discretion.

Although the court did not follow the statutory procedure for conducting a disposition hearing, it complied in substance if not in form, and the juvenile failed to show how the disposition might have been different if the court had followed the correct procedure. Immediately after the juvenile’s transfer hearing, the court announced that it retained jurisdiction, found beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile was delinquent for first degree sex offense, and committed the juvenile to a youth development center. The juvenile made no objection and gave oral notice of appeal. On appeal, the juvenile argued the trial court failed to conduct a dispositional hearing before entering a disposition. The Court of Appeals agreed with the juvenile that the trial court failed to follow Juvenile Code procedures for conducting a disposition hearing. However, while the trial court held a more abbreviated proceeding than contemplated by the Juvenile Code, the record showed the court received and considered a predisposition report. Thus, the trial court complied with the requirements of the Juvenile Code in substance. The juvenile also failed to object to the disposition and did not show that he was prejudiced.

The petition alleging larceny from the “Crossings Golf Club” should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it did not allege that the club was a corporation or other legal entity capable of owning property.

The court’s failure to make written findings to support its oral denial of the juvenile’s release pending appeal required remand. Although the issue may have become moot due to the passage of time, the court noted that it must vacate the order and remand for the trial court state its compelling reasons for denying release. Also, the court stated that “this error by the trial court has no effect on the juvenile’s adjudication or disposition.”

The trial court’s “dismissal” of the case at disposition did not result in a dismissal of the underlying adjudication. After an adjudication of delinquency for resisting an officer, the juvenile was in court for disposition on that charge and for a hearing on a motion to revoke his post-release supervision from a youth development center. The court revoked post-release supervision and, “as a disposition” in the resisting an officer case, dismissed that case. The juvenile appealed. The trial court’s dismissal of the case at disposition did not have the effect of erasing the underlying adjudication. Therefore, the juvenile’s appeal was properly before the court, because appealing the disposition of dismissal was the only way for the juvenile to appeal the adjudication. The juvenile had an interest in appealing the adjudication because it could affect his “delinquency history” in a subsequent proceeding.

The trial court’s “dismissal” of the case at disposition did not result in a dismissal of the underlying adjudication. After an adjudication of delinquency for resisting an officer, the juvenile was in court for disposition on that charge and for a hearing on a motion to revoke his post-release supervision from a youth development center. The court revoked post-release supervision and, “as a disposition” in the resisting an officer case, dismissed that case. The juvenile appealed. The trial court’s dismissal of the case at disposition did not have the effect of erasing the underlying adjudication. Therefore, the juvenile’s appeal was properly before the court, because appealing the disposition of dismissal was the only way for the juvenile to appeal the adjudication. The juvenile had an interest in appealing the adjudication because it could affect his “delinquency history” in a subsequent proceeding.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering a Level 2 disposition because it was within the range of statutorily permitted dispositions. The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for simple assault and sexual battery, for conduct on a school bus. He had one prior adjudication for simple assault for similar conduct. The trial court indicated that it was required to enter a Level 2 disposition (and also could enter a Level 1 disposition), and ordered a Level 2 disposition. The juvenile argued on appeal that because the disposition chart authorized the court to enter a Level 1 or a Level 2 disposition, the trial court erred by concluding that it was required to enter a Level 2 disposition without first considering a Level 1 disposition. Because the disposition ordered by the court was authorized by the Juvenile Code’s dispositional provisions, the appellate court would not disturb it unless it was “manifestly unsupported by reason,” and that was not the case here.

The Court of Appeals rejected the juvenile’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in entering a disposition order by improperly considering punishment as a purpose of the Juvenile Code, instead of considering the factors in G.S. 7B-2501(c). At a motion for review hearing, the trial court heard testimony related to the Division’s request for the juvenile to have home and overnight visits and work off-campus during his commitment to a YDC. Afterwards, the trial judge stated that one goal of juvenile court is rehabilitation but twice stated that punishment was also a goal of the court. The trial court’s order provided that the juvenile (i) could work off campus, but only if he would not be around anyone age 25 or younger; (ii) could have no home or overnight visits; and (iii) could participate in YDC outings if there were direct supervision at all times. The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge’s statements reflected that he had considered the dispositional factors in G.S. 7B-2501(c) and noted that the trial court ultimately balanced the importance of protecting the public safety with the juvenile’s rehabilitative needs.

The failure of the adjudication order to state findings that were made “beyond a reasonable doubt,” although stated in open court, required remand. The court noted that the “Juvenile Adjudication Order” entered by the trial court contained a blank space for the court to state its findings of fact which the court found to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The court failed to use this space and made no written findings at all. Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the adjudication order and remanded for the trial court to make the requisite findings.

There was sufficient evidence to support an adjudication of delinquency for indecent liberties between children committed by a 13-year-old juvenile against a 3-year-old victim where the juvenile told the victim his penis “taste like candy,” so the victim would lick it. The element of a “purpose to arouse or gratify sexual desires” may not be proven by the act itself. However, it may be shown by “evidence of the child’s maturity, intent, experience, or other factor, indicating his purpose in acting. In this case, the juvenile’s age and maturity, as well as the age disparity between him and the victim, coupled with the inducement of the victim and evidence that he had previously engaged in prior sexual activity with a 4-year-old was sufficient to establish the element of a sexual purpose.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the juvenile’s adjudication for assault on a government officer because the trial court failed to make the statutorily mandated findings in its adjudicatory order, which did not address the allegations in the petition. At a minimum, G.S. 7B-2411 requires the trial court to state in a written order that “the allegations in the petition have been proved [beyond a reasonable doubt].” The statute also requires that the order include the date of offense, the misdemeanor or felony classification of the offense, and the date of adjudication. In this case, the order did not even summarily aver that the allegations in the petition had been proved. The form used by the trial court to enter its order contained a large blank space for the court to state its findings. Rather than address any allegations in the petition, the trial court wrote a fragmentary collection of words and numbers in that space, which indicated that an offense occurred and that the juvenile was “responsible.” These “findings” were insufficient to comply with the statute.

An anonymous tip - that two juveniles were walking with a gun - did not provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop where no evidence corroborated the tipster’s knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The anonymous call was “two juveniles in Charlie district . . . walking, supposedly with a shotgun or a rifle in an open field behind a residence.” An officer who went to the field to investigate saw two juveniles, neither carrying firearms, who ran when he called out to them. The court of appeals held that the juvenile’s detention and arrest were not justified. The court reversed the juvenile’s adjudication for resisting a public officer.

The trial court did not err by denying the 17-year-old juvenile defendant’s motion to suppress his statement because he voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to have a parent present during questioning about a robbery and murder when he stated that he only wanted his mother present for questioning related to other charges for which he was already in custody, and not the new charges of robbery and murder. The defendant, a 17-year-old juvenile, was already in custody on unrelated charges at the time he was brought to an interview room for questioning. When the defendant invoked his right to have his mother present during questioning, the detectives ceased all questioning. After the detectives had trouble determining how to contact the defendant’s mother, they returned to the room and asked the defendant how to reach her. The defendant then asked them when he would be able to talk to them about the new charges (robbery and murder) and explained that the detectives had “misunderstood” him when he requested the presence of his mother for questioning. He explained that he only wanted his mother present for questioning related to the charges for which he was already in custody, not the new crimes of robbery and murder. Although the defendant initially invoked his right to have his mother present during his custodial interrogation, he thereafter initiated further communication with the detectives; that communication was not the result of any further interrogation by the detectives. The defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights.

The evidence was sufficient to support the court’s adjudication of a juvenile as delinquent for possession of a weapon on school grounds in violation of G.S. 14-269.2(d) where evidence showed that, while on school grounds, the juvenile possessed a 3/8-inch thick steel bar forming a C-shaped “link” about 3 inches long and 1½ inches wide, the link closed by tightening a ½-inch thick bolt and the object weighed at least one pound, and the juvenile could slide several fingers through the link so that it could be held securely across his knuckles and used as a weapon. The trial court found that the juvenile possessed a “steel link from a chain which is equivalent in appearance and use to metallic knuckles.” The statute specifically lists metallic knuckles as weapons, and a box for that type weapon is on the form petition but was not checked.

The NC Supreme Court held that the statutory time limits in G.S. 7B-1703 for the filing of juvenile petitions are not jurisdictional. On 9/25/07 the court counselor received a complaint about an incident that occurred at school, involving the juvenile’s touching a female student with an object several times. On 10/10/07 the counselor filed a petition based on the complaint, alleging simple assault. On 11/15/07 the court counselor received a second complaint relating to the same incident, and the next day the counselor filed a second petition alleging sexual battery. The trial court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent for both offenses. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the second, sexual battery, petition because it was untimely filed, reasoning that receipt of a second complaint about the same incident could not be the basis for a second petition based on that incident, thus extending the time within which a petition could be filed. The court did not discuss what constituted the “complaint.” The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the second petition was timely filed because it was filed the day after a new “complaint” was received. The Juvenile Code, when it says “after the complaint is received,” means after the court counselor receives a written, sworn document alleging acts of delinquency. When the initial complaint did not allege a sexual battery, the court counselor could not file a petition alleging that offense based on that complaint. Further, nothing in the Juvenile Code indicates a legislative intent for the time limits in G.S. 7B-1703 to relate to subject matter jurisdiction. While interpreting them that way might serve the Code’s purpose of expediting juvenile cases, it would be contrary to other purposes of the Code.