AGENDA Basic School for Magistrates: Summer 2015

JULY **27-31, 2015** Chapel Hill, N.C. **Room 2401**

MONDAY, July 27

9:00	Welcome
	Dona Lewandowski, School of Government
9:15	Remarks
	Judge M. Warren, Interim Director, Administrative Office of the Courts
9:35	Welcome to the Job!
10:30	Intro to Law & Judicial Process
11:45	Lunch at SOG
12:30	Small Claims Procedure
5:15	Adjourn

Tuesday, July 28

9:00	Revisiting Yesterday
9:15	Actions to Recover Personal Property
10:45	Legal Issues in Domestic Violence
12:30	Lunch at SOG
1:15	Understanding Domestic Violence
	Chief District Court Judge J. Corpening, District 5
3:45	Ethics
4:45	Contempt
5:15	Adjourn

Wednesday, July 29

Revisiting Yesterday
Contracts
Lunch at SOG
Contracts, continued
Landlord-Tenant Law
Adjourn

As a general rule, breaks will be provided every 45 minutes, alternating between 5 and 15 minutes in length. Unless otherwise specified, the instructor for all sessions is Dona Lewandowski.

Thursday, July 30

 8:30 Review for Test (attendance optional)
 9:00 Involuntary Commitment (IVC) Mark Botts, School of Government
 12:40 Lunch at the SOG
 1:25 Landlord-Tenant Law, continued
 4:15 NCAOC Language Access Services for Magistrates Brooke Crozier, Courts Program Specialist II, Administrative Office of the Courts
 5:30 Adjourn

Friday, July 31

8:45	Revisiting Yesterday
9:00	AOC: Handling Money
	Tony McKinney, Acting Field Accounting Manager, Administrative Office of the Courts
10:15	The Struggle Toward Fairness: Avoiding Bias
11:45	Marriage
12:30	Lunch at SOG
1:15	Evaluations & Test

Week I: Magistrate CLE hours: 1965 minutes = 32.75 hours

Total NC Bar CLEs covered by the School of Government for both weeks: 12 hours (9.5 General and 2.5 Ethics)

As a general rule, breaks will be provided every 45 minutes, alternating between 5 and 15 minutes in length. Unless otherwise specified, the instructor for all sessions is Dona Lewandowski.

Basic School for Magistrates UNC School of Government Chapel Hill, NC July 27-31, 2015

EVALUATION

SESSION EVALUATION

MONDAY, JULY 27, 2015

Intro to Law and Judicial Process

Dona Lewandowski, School of Government

Please rate your instructor's teaching:	instructor's teaching: Strongly		Neither	Strongly Agree	
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	N	А	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
<i>Please rate the session content:</i> The session content is important for my professional development.	Strongly Disagree SD		Neither N	A	Strongly Agree SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too difficult About ri		ght	Too easy	

Please share any additional comments about the instructor's teaching and the session's content. If you indicated that you were dissatisfied with one or more aspects of the instructor's teaching or the session's content, we are particularly interested in learning how we can do better in the future:

Small Claims Procedure:

Dona Lewandowski, School of Government

	Strongly	/			Strongly
Please rate your instructor's teaching:		е	Neither	Agree	
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
	Strongly				Strongly
Please rate the session content:	Disagre	е	Neither		Agree
The session content is important for my professional development.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too difficult About rig		ght	Too easy	

TUESDAY, JULY 28, 2015

Actions to Recover Personal Property

Dona Lewandowski, School of Government

Please rate your instructor's teaching:	Strongly Disagre		Neither		Strongly Agree
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
	Strongly				Strongly
Please rate the session content:	Disagre	е	Neither		Agree
The session content is important for my professional development.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too difficult A		About ri	ght	Too easy

Please share any additional comments about the instructor's teaching and the session's content. If you indicated that you were dissatisfied with one or more aspects of the instructor's teaching or the session's content, we are particularly interested in learning how we can do better in the future:

Legal Issues in Domestic Violence

Dona Lewandowski, School of Government

Please rate your instructor's teaching:	Strongly Disagree	Neither		Strongly Agree	
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
	Strongly				Strongly
Please rate the session content:	Disagre	e	Neither		Agree
The session content is important for my professional development.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too difficult		About ri	ght	Too easy

Understanding Domestic Violence

Chief District Court Judge J. Corpening, District 5

	Strongly	y			Strongly
Please rate your instructor's teaching:	Disagre	e	Neither	Agree	
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
	Strongly			Strongly	
Please rate the session content:	Disagre	e	Neither		Agree
The session content is important for my professional development.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too difficult		About ri	ght	Too easy

Please share any additional comments about the instructor's teaching and the session's content. If you indicated that you were dissatisfied with one or more aspects of the instructor's teaching or the session's content, we are particularly interested in learning how we can do better in the future:

Ethics

Dona Lewandowski, School of Government

	Strongly				Strongly
Please rate your instructor's teaching:	Disagree N		Neither		Agree
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
	Strongly				Strongly
Please rate the session content:	Disagree N		Neither		Agree
The session content is important for my professional development.	SD	D	Ν	A	SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too difficult		About ri	ght	Too easy

Contempt

Dona Lewandowski, School of Government

Strongly	/			Strongly	
Disagree		Neither		Agree	
SD	D	Ν	Α	SA	
SD	D	Ν	Α	SA	
SD	D	Ν	Α	SA	
SD	D	Ν	А	SA	
Strongly			Strongly		
Disagre	е	Neither		Agree	
SD	D	Ν	А	SA	
Too difficult Ak		About ri	ght	Too easy	
	Disagree SD SD SD SD Strongly Disagree SD	SD D SD D SD D SD D SD D Strongly Disagree SD D	DisagreeNeitherSDDNSDDNSDDNSDDNStronglyDisagreeNeitherSDDN	DisagreeNeitherSDDNASDDNASDDNASDDNAStronglyDisagreeNeitherSDDNA	

Please share any additional comments about the instructor's teaching and the session's content. If you indicated that you were dissatisfied with one or more aspects of the instructor's teaching or the session's content, we are particularly interested in learning how we can do better in the future:

WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 2015

Contracts

Dona Lewandowski, School of Government

Please rate your instructor's teaching:	Strongly Disagree		Neither		Strongly Agree
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
	Strongly			Strongly	
Please rate the session content:	Disagre	2	Neither		Agree
The session content is important for my professional development.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too difficult		About ri	ght	Too easy

Landlord-Tenant Law

Dona Lewandowski, School of Government

Please rate your instructor's teaching:	Strongly Disagre		Neither		Strongly Agree
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
	Strongly	,			Strongly
Please rate the session content:	Disagre	е	Neither		Agree
The session content is important for my professional development.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too d	ifficult	About ri	ght	Too easy

Please share any additional comments about the instructor's teaching and the session's content. If you indicated that you were dissatisfied with one or more aspects of the instructor's teaching or the session's content, we are particularly interested in learning how we can do better in the future:

THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2015

Involuntary Commitment

Mark Botts, School of Government

	Strongly	/			Strongly
Please rate your instructor's teaching:	Disagre	е	Neither		Agree
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA

Please rate the session content:	Strongly Disagre		Neither		Strongly Agree
The session content is important for my professional development.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Тоо с	lifficult	About ı	ight	Too easy

Landlord-Tenant Law Continued

Dona Lewandowski, School of Government

Strongly	/			Strongly
Disagre	е	Neither		Agree
SD	D	Ν	А	SA
SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
SD	D	Ν	А	SA
SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Strongly	,			Strongly
Disagre	е	Neither		Agree
SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Too d	ifficult	About ri	ght	Too easy
	Disagre SD SD SD SD Strongly Disagre SD	SD D SD D SD D SD D Strongly Disagree	DisagreeNeitherSDDNSDDNSDDNSDDNStronglyDisagreeNeitherSDDN	DisagreeNeitherSDDNASDDNASDDNASDDNAStronglyDisagreeNeitherSDDNA

Please share any additional comments about the instructor's teaching and the session's content. If you indicated that you were dissatisfied with one or more aspects of the instructor's teaching or the session's content, we are particularly interested in learning how we can do better in the future:

NCAOC Language Access Services for Magistrates

Brooke Crozier, Administrative Office of the Courts

	Strongly				Strongly
Please rate your instructor's teaching:	Disagre	е	Neither		Agree
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
	Strongly	/			Strongly
Please rate the session content:	Disagre	е	Neither		Agree
The session content is important for my professional development.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too d	ifficult	About ri	ght	Too easy

FRIDAY, JANUARY 30, 2015

AOC: Handling Money

Tony McKinney, Administrative Office of the Courts

Please rate your instructor's teaching:	Strongly Disagree		Neither		Strongly Agree
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
	Strongly				Strongly
Please rate the session content:	Disagree	•	Neither		Agree
The session content is important for my professional development.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too di	fficult	About ri	ght	Too easy

Please share any additional comments about the instructor's teaching and the session's content. If you indicated that you were dissatisfied with one or more aspects of the instructor's teaching or the session's content, we are particularly interested in learning how we can do better in the future:

The Struggle Toward Fairness: Avoiding Bias

Dona Lewandowski, School of Government

	Strongly	/			Strongly
Please rate your instructor's teaching:	Disagre	е	Neither		Agree
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
	Strongly	,			Strongly
Please rate the session content:	Disagre	е	Neither		Agree
The session content is important for my professional development.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too d	ifficult	About ri	ght	Too easy

Marriage

Dona Lewandowski, School of Government

Please rate your instructor's teaching:	Strongly Disagree		Neither		Strongly Agree
The instructor presented the material clearly.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
The instructor was knowledgeable and well-prepared.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
The instructor's pace was appropriate.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
Overall, the session was skillfully done.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
<i>Please rate the session content:</i> The session content is important for my professional development.	Strongly Disagree SD		Neither N	A	Strongly Agree SA
Was the content appropriate for your level of knowledge?	Too di	fficult	About ri	ght	Too easy

Please share any additional comments about the instructor's teaching and the session's content. If you indicated that you were dissatisfied with one or more aspects of the instructor's teaching or the session's content, we are particularly interested in learning how we can do better in the future:

COURSE EVALUATION

Course Content

Please rate the usefulness and length of each session:

	Usefu	ulness	S		
	Keep Session	Omit Session	Too Short	Just Right	Too Long
Introduction to Law & Judicial Process					
Small Claims Procedure					
Actions to Recover Personal Property					
Legal Issues in Domestic Violence					
Understanding Domestic Violence					
Ethics					
Contempt					
Contracts					
Landlord-Tenant Law					
Involuntary Commitment					
Landlord-Tenant Law Continued					
NCAOC Language Services for					
Magistrates					
AOC: Handling Money					
The Struggle Toward Fairness:					
Avoiding Bias					
Marriage					

Are there any topics that we should add to the course?

	Strongly				Strongly
Please rate the course content:	Disagree		Neither		Agree
The course (as a whole) will be useful to me.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA
The course materials will be useful to me.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA

Please share any additional comments about course content. If you indicated that you were dissatisfied with one or more aspects of course content, we are particularly interested in learning how we can do better in the future:

	Strongl	V			Strongly
Please rate the logistics of the course:	Disagre	е	Neither		Agree
Registering for the course was simple and straightforward.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
Before attending the course, I received appropriate and	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
timely information about course logistics.					
The room set-up was appropriate for this class.	SD	D	Ν	Α	SA
On-site School of Government staff was informed and helpful.	SD	D	Ν	А	SA

Please share any additional comments about course logistics. If you indicated that you were dissatisfied with one or more logistical aspects of the course, we are particularly interested in learning how we can do better in the future:

May we contact you about your comments? If so, please provide an email address. Please note that we will not share this data nor will we correlate personal information with results.

Please enter your email address:

TAB: General



Mission

The mission of the School of Government is to improve the lives of North Carolinians by engaging in practical scholarship that helps public officials and citizens understand and improve state and local government.

Values

Consistent values for more than 75 years have built a legacy of trust with North Carolina's public officials:

- Nonpartisan
- Policy-neutral
- Responsive

How We Serve North Carolina

As the largest university-based local government training, advisory, and research organization in the United States, the School of Government offers up to 200 courses, seminars, and specialized conferences for more than 12,000 public officials each year.

Faculty members respond to more than 100,000 phone calls and e-mail messages each year on routine and urgent matters and also engage in long-term advising projects for local governing boards, legislative committees, and statewide commissions.

In addition, faculty members annually publish approximately 50 books, periodicals, and other reference works related to state and local government. Each day that the General Assembly is in session, the School produces the *Daily Bulletin*, which reports on the day's activities for members of the legislature and others who need to follow the course of legislation.

History


Established in 1931 as the Institute of Government, the School provides educational, advisory, and research services for state and local governments. The School of Government is also home to specialized centers focused on information technology, environmental finance, and civic education for youth.

School of Government faculty members have made notable contributions to North Carolina government:

- Study to reorganize state government
- Study of the state's court system
- North Carolina Constitutional Commission
- Local Government Study Commission
- Open Meetings Study Commission
- NC Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission
- Governor's Crime Commission on Juvenile Crime and Justice

Support for the School of Government

Operating support for the School of Government's programs and activities comes from many sources, including state appropriations, local government membership dues, private contributions, publication sales, course fees, and service contracts. Visit www.sog.unc.edu or call 919.966.5381 for more information on the School's courses, publications, programs, and services.



SOG FACULTY BIOGRAPHIES

Mark Botts (919) 962-8204

botts@sog.unc.edu

- Mark Botts joined the School of Government in 1992. Prior to that, he served judicial clerkships with the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the US District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Botts' publications include *A Legal Manual for Area Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Boards in North Carolina.* Mark holds a B.A. from Albion College and a J.D. from the University of Michigan, School of Law.
- Areas of Interest: Mental health law, including involuntary commitment procedures; legal responsibilities of area boards; client rights (especially confidentiality)

Shea Riggsbee Denning (919) 843-5120

denning@sog.unc.edu

Shea Denning joined the School of Government in 2003. Prior to that, she was an assistant federal public defender for the Eastern District of North Carolina and practiced law with the firm of King and Spalding in Atlanta, Georgia. Denning began her career as a law clerk to the Honorable Malcolm J. Howard, US District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina. She is a member of the North Carolina State Bar. Denning earned an AB with distinction in journalism and mass communication and a JD with high honors, order of the coif, from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Shea specializes in motor vehicle law and the criminal laws and procedures associated with this subject area, including the law of search and seizure and the rules of evidence. She teaches and consults with judges, prosecutors, public defenders, magistrates and others. In 2011, she was awarded the Albert and Gladys Coates Term Professorship for Faculty Excellence.

Areas of interest: Motor vehicle law; district court judge education

Alyson Grine 919.966.4248

agrine@sog.unc.edu

Alyson A. Grine has served as the Defender Educator at the UNC School of Government since 2006, focusing on criminal law and procedure and indigent defense education. Prior to 2006, she worked for five years as an assistant public defender in Orange and Chatham counties. She served as a judicial clerk for Chief Justice Henry Frye of the NC Supreme Court in 2000 and for Judge Patricia Timmons-Goodson of the NC Court of Appeals in 1999. She received the Albert and Gladys Hall Coates Teaching Excellence Award for 2012–2014. She is co-author of the *North Carolina Defender Manual, Volume I;* the *North Carolina Juvenile Defender Manual;* and *Raising Issues of Race in North Carolina Criminal Cases,* for which she received the Margaret Taylor Writing Award in 2015. Grine earned a BA with distinction and a JD with honors from UNC-Chapel Hill, and an MA in Spanish from the University of Virginia.

Areas of interest: Indigent defense education; criminal law and procedure

Dona Lewandowski (919) 966-7288

lewandowski@sog.unc.edu

- Dona Lewandowski joined the faculty of the Institute of Government in 1985 and spent the next five year writing, teaching, and consulting with district court judges in the area of family law. In 1990, following the birth of her son, she left the Institute to devote full time to her family. She rejoined the School of Government in 2006. Lewandowski holds a B.S. and an M.A. from Middle Tennessee State University and a J.D. with honors, Order of the Coif, from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. After law school, she worked as a research assistant to Chief Judge R.A. Hedrick of the NC Court of Appeals.
- Areas of Interest: Magistrates' issues (non-criminal law), including small claims law and procedure, ethics, marriage, and magistrate personnel matters, including appointment and removal.

Jamie Markham (919) 843-3914

markham@sog.unc.edu

- Jamie Markham joined the School of Government faculty in 2007. His area of interest is criminal law and procedure, with a focus on the law of sentencing, corrections, and the conditions of confinement. Markham earned a bachelor's degree with honors from Harvard College and a law degree with high honors, Order of the Coif, from Duke University, where he was editor-in-chief of the *Duke Law Journal*. He is a member of the North Carolina Bar. Prior to law school, Markham served five years in the United States Air Force as an intelligence officer and foreign area officer. He was also a travel writer for Let's Go Inc., contributing to the Russia and Ukraine chapters of *Let's Go: Eastern Europe*.
- Areas of Interest: Criminal law and procedure, especially community corrections and sentencing law

John Rubin (919) 962-2498

rubin@sog.unc.edu

- John Rubin joined the School of Government in 1991. Prior to that, he practiced law in Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles. At the School he specializes in criminal law and indigent defense education. He has written several articles and books on criminal law, including the *North Carolina Defender Manual*, and he designs and teaches in numerous training programs each year for indigent defenders. He is a frequent consultant to the Office of Indigent Services, which is responsible for overseeing and enhancing legal representation for indigent defendants and others entitled to counsel under North Carolina law. He is the 2008 recipient of the Albert and Gladys Coates Term Professorship for Faculty Achievement. Rubin earned a B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley and a J.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Areas of Interest: Criminal law and procedure; public defender training; evidence; indigent defense; domestic violence; subpoenas.

Jessica Smith (919) 966-4105

smithj@sog.unc.edu

Jessica Smith joined the Institute of Government in 2000. Prior to that, she practiced law at Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C. She also clerked for U.S. District Judge W. Earl Britt in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina and for Senior U.S. Circuit Judge J. Dickson Phillips Jr. in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. At the School of Government, Smith teaches and consults with judges and other public employees involved in the criminal justice system. In 2006, she received the Albert and Gladys Hall Coates Term Professorship for Teaching Excellence. In 2013, she was named by the Chancellor as a W. R. Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Professor, one of the University's highest academic honors. Smith earned a BA, cum laude, from the University of Pennsylvania and a JD, magna cum laude, Order of the Coif, from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where she was managing editor of the *Law Review*.

Areas of Interest: Criminal law and procedure; evidence

Jeff Welty (919) 843-8474

welty@sog.unc.edu

Jeff Welty specializes in criminal law and procedure, including search and seizure issues and prosecutor assistance. Prior to joining the School of Government, he practiced law in Durham and was a Lecturing Fellow at Duke Law School. He earned his JD, with highest honors, at Duke, where he served as executive editor of the *Duke Law Journal*.

Areas of Interest: Criminal law and procedure; evidence; prosecutor training; police attorneys



FIELDS OF EXPERTISE

July 2015

This resource list is updated regularly and is available online at www.sog.unc.edu/node/1553.

ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY (CHILDREN) Sara DePasquale 919.966.4289 • sara@sog.unc.edu ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION (ADULTS) Aimee N. Wall 919.843.4957 • wall@sog.unc.edu ADMINISTRATIVE LAW **Richard B. Whisnant** 919.962.9320 • whisnant@sog.unc.edu ADOPTION Sara DePasquale 919.966.4289 · sara@sog.unc.edu **Meredith Smith** 919.843.2986 • meredith.smith@sog.unc.edu **AFFORDABLE HOUSING** C. Tyler Mulligan 919.962.0987 • mulligan@sog.unc.edu Kara A. Millonzi 919.962.0051 • millonzi@sog.unc.edu Marcia Perritt 919.962.6841 • mperritt@sog.unc.edu **AIRPORT AUTHORITIES** Kara A. Millonzi 919.962.0051 • millonzi@sog.unc.edu ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW **Michael Crowell** 919.966.4438 • crowellm@sog.unc.edu ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION John B. Stephens 919.962.5190 • stephens@sog.unc.edu ANIMAL CONTROL Aimee N. Wall 919.843.4957 • wall@sog.unc.edu ANNEXATION, MUNICIPAL Frayda S. Bluestein 919.966.4203 • bluestein@sog.unc.edu ATTORNEYS, CITY OR COUNTY Frayda S. Bluestein 919.966.4203 · bluestein@sog.unc.edu Kara A. Millonzi 919.962.0051 • millonzi@sog.unc.edu **BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE** John Rubin 919.962.2498 • rubin@sog.unc.edu Jessica Smith 919.966.4105 • smithj@sog.unc.edu

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Location:	NC Judicial Center 901 Corporate Center Drive Raleigh, NC. 27607-5045	
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ALEXANDER	22A	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	Christi Stark	
ALLEGHANEY	23	Brent Sheppard	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	
ANSON	16C	Bruce Saburn	Takeeta Tyson	
ASHE	23	Brent Sheppard	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	
AVERY	24	Brent Sheppard	Christi Stark	
BEAUFORT	2	Cashie Phillips	Scott Havenook	
BERTIE	6	Cashie Phillips	Meredith McSwain	
BLADEN	13	Kim Whitfield	Takeeta Tyson	
BRUNSWICK	13	Kim Whitfield	Takeeta Tyson	
BUNCOMBE	28	DeShield Greene	Brent Sheppard	
BURKE	25	Brent Sheppard	Christi Stark	
CABARRUS	19A	Bruce Saburn	Paul Reinhartsen	
CALDWELL	25	Brent Sheppard	Christi Stark	
CAMDEN	1	Cashie Phillips	Scott Havenook	
CARTERET	3B	Sherry Rackley	Scott Havenook	
CASWELL	9A	Joe Privette	Meredith McSwain	
CATAWBA	25	Brent Sheppard	Christi Stark	
СНАТНАМ	15B	Krystal Tart	Faith Taylor	
CHEROKEE	30	DeShield Greene	Paul Reinhartsen	
CHOWAN	1	Cashie Phillips	Scott Havenook	
CLAY	30	DeShield Greene	Paul Reinhartsen	
CLEVELAND	27B	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	Bruce Saburn	
COLUMBUS	13	Kim Whitfield	Takeeta Tyson	
CRAVEN	3B	Sherry Rackley	Scott Havenook	
CUMBERLAND	12	Kim Whitfield	Ashley Confroy	
CURRITUCK	1	Cashie Phillips	Scott Havenook	
DARE	1	Cashie Phillips	Scott Havenook	
DAVIDSON	22B	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	Christi Stark	
DAVIE	22B	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	Christi Stark	
DUPLIN	4	Kim Whitfield	Sherry Rackley	
DURHAM	14	Joe Privette	Meredith McSwain	
EDGECOMBE	7	Krystal Tart	Ashley Confroy	
FORSYTH	21	, Christi Stark	Rebecca Saleeby	
FRANKLIN	9	Ashley Confroy	Joe Privette	
GASTON	27A	Bruce Saburn	Paul Reinhartsen	



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GRANVILLE	9	Ashley Confroy	Joe Privette	
GREENE	8	Faith Taylor	Scott Havenook	
GUILFORD	18	Rebecca Saleeby	Christi Stark	Meredith McSwain
HALIFAX	6A	Cashie Phillips	Meredith McSwain	
HARNETT	11A	Krystal Tart	Sherry Rackley	
HAYWOOD	30	DeShield Greene	Paul Reinhartsen	
HENDERSON	29B	DeShield Greene	Paul Reinhartsen	
HERTFORD	6B	Cashie Phillips	Meredith McSwain	
НОКЕ	16A	Bruce Saburn	Takeeta Tyson	
HYDE	2	Cashie Phillips	Scott Havenook	
IREDELL	22A	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	Christi Stark	
JACKSON	30	DeShield Greene	Paul Reinhartsen	
JOHNSTON	11B	Krystal Tart	Sherry Rackley	
JONES	4	Kim Whitfield	Sherry Rackley	
LEE	11A	Krystal Tart	Sherry Rackley	
LENOIR	8	Faith Taylor	Scott Havenook	
LINCOLN	27B	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	Bruce Saburn	
MACON	30	DeShield Greene	Paul Reinhartsen	
MADISON	24	Brent Sheppard	Christi Stark	
MARTIN	2	Cashie Phillips	Scott Havenook	
MCDOWELL	29A	Brent Sheppard	Paul Reinhartsen	
MECKLENBURG	26	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	Bruce Saburn	Paul Reinhartsen
MITCHELL	24	Brent Sheppard	Christi Stark	
MONTGOMERY	19B	Krystal Tart	Meredith McSwain	
MOORE	19D	Krystal Tart	Meredith McSwain	
NASH	7	Krystal Tart	Ashley Confroy	
NEW HANOVER	5	Kim Whitfield	Takeeta Tyson	
NORTHHAMPTON	6B	Cashie Phillips	Meredith McSwain	
ONSLOW	4	Kim Whitfield	Sherry Rackley	
ORANGE	15B	Krystal Tart	Faith Taylor	
PAMLICO	3B	Sherry Rackley	Scott Havenook	
PASQUOTANK	1	Cashie Phillips	Scott Havenook	
PENDER	5	Kim Whitfield	Takeeta Tyson	
PERQUIMANS	1	Cashie Phillips	Scott Havenook	
PERSON	9A	Joe Privette	Meredith McSwain	
PITT	3A	Sherry Rackley	Cashie Phillips	
POLK	29B	DeShield Greene	Paul Reinhartsen	
RANDOLPH	19B	Krystal Tart	Meredith McSwain	



NCAOC Court Services Division County/Prosecutorial District Field Assignments / July 2015

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RICHMOND		Bruce Saburn	Takeeta Tyson	
ROBESON	16B	Kim Whitfield	Meredith McSwain	
ROCKINGHAM	17A	Rebecca Saleeby	Christi Stark	
ROWAN	19C	Rebecca Saleeby	Paul Reinhartsen	
RUTHERFORD	29A	Brent Sheppard	Paul Reinhartsen	
SAMPSON	4	Kim Whitfield	Sherry Rackley	
SCOTLAND	16A	Bruce Saburn	Takeeta Tyson	
STANLY	20A	Bruce Saburn	Paul Reinhartsen	
STOKES	17B	Rebecca Saleeby	Christi Stark	
SURRY	17B	Rebecca Saleeby	Christi Stark	
SWAIN	30	DeShield Greene	Paul Reinhartsen	
TRANSYLVANIA	29B	DeShield Greene	Paul Reinhartsen	
TYRRELL	2	Cashie Phillips	Scott Havenook	
UNION	20B	Bruce Saburn	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	
VANCE	9	Ashley Confroy	Joe Privette	
WAKE	10	Ashley Confroy	Joe Privette	Takeeta Tyson
WARREN	9	Ashley Confroy	Joe Privette	
WASHINGTON	2	Cashie Phillips	Scott Havenook	
WATAUGA	24	Brent Sheppard	Christi Stark	
WAYNE	8	Faith Taylor	Scott Havenook	
WILKES	23	Brent Sheppard	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	
WILSON	7	Krystal Tart	Ashley Confroy	
YADKIN	23	Brent Sheppard	Dori Wynter-Mitchell El	
YANCEY	24	Brent Sheppard	Christi Stark	



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NC Judicial College Website http://www.sog.unc.edu/programs/judicialcollege

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NC Magistrate's Association Website

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Administrative Office of the Courts' (AOC) Website www.nccourts.org

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School of Government's *On The Civil Side* Blog http://civil.sog.unc.edu/

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Please Confirm Subscription

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Click on the Yes, subscribe me to this list link and that will verify your subscription.

DUE TO THE CONSTANTLY CHANGING BUDGET POLICIES, expect substantial delays in processing your reimbursement as well as the potential for changes in coverage. If you have any questions you should contact Lynn Holder at the AOC at the number below.

Lynn Holder Accounting Specialist II 901 Corporate Center Dr PO Box 2448 Raleigh, NC 27602 919.890.1010

The Administrative Office of the Courts will reimburse magistrates attending the Basic School as follows:

Breakfast	\$ 8.20
Lunch	\$ 10.70
Dinner	\$ 18.40
Lodging (actual cost, up to)	\$ 65.90
Total Daily Rate	\$ 103.20
Travel mileage	Check with your supervisor or AOC to determine the current rate

To obtain reimbursement for qualifying expenses, you will need to submit **AOC-A-25**, which is available from your clerk of superior court, or which may be downloaded from <u>www.nccourts.org</u> (click on "Forms" and then type in "AOC-A-25"). You will find a copy following this memo.

After completing the form, send it to your Chief District Court Judge, who is your supervisor, for his or her signature before mailing the completed form to Raleigh. (The mailing address is shown in the instruction box at the top of the form.) Make a copy of the form to keep with your records.

MEALS:

You do not need to attach receipts for meals to your reimbursement form.

On Mondays you may claim breakfast if you had to leave home before 6 a.m. and on Fridays you may claims dinner if you arrive home after 8:00 p.m.

NOTE: If meals are provided by the School of Government you cannot claim them.

If you are commuting daily, you are not entitled to recover any meal expenses except you may claim \$8.20 for breakfast if you left before 6:00 a.m. and may claim \$18.40 for dinner if you return to your duty station after 8:00 p.m.

ROOM:

The actual cost of your daily room rate is reimbursed up to a maximum of \$65.90, plus actual tax. **The original itemized hotel receipt** (not a photocopy) must be attached to the reimbursement form. The itemized hotel receipt must show each day's total and tax separately. Your receipt must show a "0" balance owed.

NOTE: You can request an itemized receipt when you checkout of the hotel.

TRAVEL:

NOTE: Because of the constantly changing mileage policies you should check with your supervisor or AOC to determine the current rate.

Magistrates who are located 35 miles or less from the school are expected to commute daily and will be reimbursed at the current rate of mileage.

Click The Box Above To Calculate The Total Cost

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AOC-A-25, Rev. 7/13 © 2013 Administrative Office of the Courts

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Basic School: Small Claims Review

I. Procedure

- A. Small Claims Action
 - i. Summary Ejectment, \$ Owed, or Return of Personal Property
 - ii. \$10,000 or less
 - iii. At least one defendant must reside in county

B. Service of Process

- i. Personal service by sheriff
- ii. Certified mail, return receipt requested
- iii. Voluntary appearance
- iv. (SE cases only: Service by posting)

C. Counterclaim

- i. Must be filed with clerk prior to time case is set for trial
- ii. Written
- iii. For \$10000 or less

D. Continuance*

- i. Both parties agree: allowed
- ii. Motion by one party: allow only for good cause shown
- E. Failure to appear
 - i. By defendant: Take plaintiff's testimony just as usual
 - ii. By plaintiff: dismiss with prejudice
- F. Amendment of complaint
 - i. Freely allowed
 - ii. Usually only issue is whether defendant has sufficient notice
- G. Voluntary dismissal (without prejudice)
 - i. Plaintiff has the right to take a voluntary dismissal at any time before conclusion of plaintiff's evidence
- H. Entering judgment
 - i. May reserve judgment for up to 10 days*
 - ii. Party may give notice of appeal in open court, or by seeing clerk
- I. Clerical errors: judge may correct without notice to parties
- J. Rule 60(b) motions to set aside judgment for excusable neglect
 - i. Must be authorized by CDCJ to hear these motions
 - ii. Requires notice to other party and hearing
 - iii. If motion by defendant, must also show meritorious defense

*Special rule for summary ejectment.

- II. Torts:
 - A. In negligence cases In North Carolina, contributory negligence is a complete defense.
 - B. Conversion is an intentional tort, in which the plaintiff proves:
 - i. Plaintiff is the owner or lawful possessor of property;
 - ii. Defendant wrongfully took or wrongfully retained that property;
 - iii. Conversion, sometimes referred to as "forced sale," entitles the plaintiff to recover the fair market value of the property at the time and place of conversion as well as interest on that amount.

III. Contracts

- A. Bargained-for exchange
- B. Contracts by minors
 - i. Voidable at the option of the minor
 - ii. Exception: contracts for necessaries
- C. Statutes of limitation
 - i. Contracts for the sale of goods: 4 years
 - ii. Other contracts: 3 years
 - iii. Contracts under seal: 10 years
 - iv. NOTE: Partial payment on account starts statute running over again. A creditor who accepts partial payment of a debt does not waive the right to bring an action for the remainder of a debt.
- D. Contracts that must be in writing
 - i. Contracts for the sale of goods for \$500 or more
 - ii. Retail installments sales contracts
 - iii. Security agreements
- E. Terms of a contract
 - i. Parole evidence rule: Evidence of contract terms in the form of conversation between the parties is not allowed to change or contradict a written contract, unless
 - a. That evidence is offered to clarify a term that is vague or unclear, or
 - b. The evidence is of a modification of the written contract that occurred after the written contract was completed.
 - a. Implied terms: In contracts for the sale of goods, there is an implied term (called an implied warranty of merchantability) that the goods will be fit for the ordinary purpose for which they are used, assuming the seller is someone who sells these goods in the ordinary course of business.
- F. Parties to a contract
 - 1. Husband and wife do not have authority to bind each other to contracts, unless one is acting as an agent for the other. Marriage =agency.
 - 2. An agent <u>does</u> have authority to enter a contract on behalf of the principal.
 - 3. Under the theory of joint and several liability, a creditor having a contract with two debtors has the option of suing either or both for the entire amount due.

- IV. Actions to recover personal property
 - A. By a non-secured party: Requires evidence identical to conversion claim, plus evidence that defendant is in possession of property, but remedy is return of personal property, along with cost of repairing damage to property and for loss of use.
 - B. By a secured party:
 - i. SP must prove
 - a. Security agreement
 - i) Written
 - ii) Signed
 - iii) Dated
 - iv) Contains a description of the property.
 - b. Default by defendant
 - c. Defendant is in possession of property.

NOTE: Amount of underlying debt is not relevant.

- ii. Retail Installment Sales Act
 - a. Applies to consumer credit purchases in which seller finances purchase
 - b. Seller allowed to take security interest only in property sold, or in property previously sold by same seller and not yet paid off.
 - c. Attempt to take security interest in other property is void.
 - d. FIFO rule applies to allocation of payments when several goods bought from same seller.

V. Summary Ejectment

- A. Procedure
 - i. Property manager may sign complaint, but owner must be listed as plaintiff
 - ii. Service by posting? No money judgment
 - iii. Judgment on the pleadings available if all requirements satisfied
- B. Grounds
 - i. Breach of lease condition (forfeiture clause?)
 - ii. Failure to pay rent (demand/10-day wait/tender)
 - iii. Holding over
 - a. Lease ends when it says it ends
 - b. Month to month: 7 days
 - c. Week to week: 2 days
 - d. Year to year: 30 days
 - e. Special rule for mobile home lots: 60 days
 - iv. Criminal activity
- C. Consumer Protection Laws
 - i. Late fees (maximum amount, agreed-to in lease, at least 5 days late)

- ii. No self-help eviction
- iii. Security deposit
- iv. Residential Rental Agreements Act

LL has duty to keep premises in safe and habitable condition and make all repairs

TAB: Welcome to the Job!

Welcome to the Job!

The office of magistrate has a history dating back to 12th Century England, when King Richard assigned knights the duty of keeping "the King's peace." While the office of Justice of the Peace was a prestigious and honorable one for centuries, it was abolished in North Carolina in 1962 due to corruption, widespread lack of professionalism, and general disrepute. The old justice of the peace was replaced by the newly-created office of magistrate, sharing many of the same responsibilities but lacking the factors that eventually led to the downfall of the justice of the peace.

A Constitutional Office

For each county, the senior regular resident Judge of the Superior Court serving the county shall appoint from nominations submitted by the Clerk of the Superior Court of the county, one or more Magistrates who shall be officers of the District Court. The initial term of appointment for a magistrate shall be for two years and subsequent terms shall be for four years. The number of District Judges and Magistrates shall, from time to time, be determined by the General Assembly. . . . Vacancies in the office of Magistrate shall be filled for the unexpired term in the manner provided for original appointment to the office, unless otherwise provided by the General Assembly.

NC Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 10.

Qualifications

(a) In order to be eligible for **nomination or for renomination** as a magistrate an individual shall be a **resident of the county** for which he is appointed.

(b) To be eligible for nomination as a magistrate, an individual shall have at **least eight** years' experience as the clerk of superior court in a county of this State or shall have a four-year degree from an accredited senior institution of higher education or shall have a two-year associate degree and four years of work experience in a related field, including teaching, social services, law enforcement, arbitration or mediation, the court system, or counseling. The Administrative Officer of the Courts may determine whether the work experience is sufficiently related to the duties of the office of magistrate for the purposes of this subsection. In determining whether an individual's work experience is in a related field, the Administrative Officer of the Courts shall consider the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities for the office of magistrate. G.S. 7A-171.2.

Appointment

The procedure established in the NC Constitution for appointment as a magistrate has been criticized as involving "too many cooks." That procedure is set out in G.S. 7A-171(b) as follows:

Not earlier than the Tuesday after the first Monday nor later than the third Monday in December of each even-numbered year, the clerk of the superior court shall submit to the senior regular resident superior court judge of the district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1(a) in which the clerk's county is located the names of two (or more, if requested by the judge) nominees for each magisterial office for the county for which the term of office of the magistrate holding that position shall expire on December 31 of that year. Not later than the fourth Monday in December, the senior regular resident superior court judge shall, from the nominations submitted by the clerk of the superior court, appoint magistrates to fill the positions for each county of the judge's district or set of districts.

G.S. 7A-171: Term of Office

(a1):The initial term of appointment for a magistrate is two years and subsequent terms shall be for a period of four years. The term of office begins on the first day of January of the odd-numbered year after appointment. The service of an individual as a magistrate filling a vacancy as provided in subsection (d) of this section does not constitute an initial term. For purposes of this section, any term of office for a magistrate who has served a two-year term is for four years even if the two-year term of appointment was before the effective date of this section, the term is after a break in service, or the term is for appointment in a different county from the county where the two-year term of office was served.

• • •

(c) If an additional magisterial office for a county is approved to commence on January 1 of an odd-numbered year, the new position shall be filled as provided in

subsection (b) of this section. If the additional position takes effect at any other time, it is to be filled as provided in subsection (d) of this section.

(d) [Upon] a vacancy in the office of magistrate . . . the senior regular resident superior court judge shall appoint from the nominations received a magistrate who shall take office immediately and shall serve until December 31 of the even-numbered year, and thereafter the position shall be filled as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

Were you appointed to

____ an empty position,

_____a newly-created position,

_____ a vacancy (meaning the previous office-holder did not serve out the full-term)

When did your term of office begin?

When does your term of office end?

If you are reappointed, will your next term be for two years or for four years?

Supervision

The chief district judge . . . has administrative supervision and authority over the operation of the district courts and magistrates in his district. These powers and duties include, but are not limited to, the following:

(4) Assigning matters to magistrates, and consistent with the salaries set by the Administrative Officer of the Courts, prescribing times and places at which magistrates shall be available for the performance of their duties; however, the chief district judge may in writing delegate his authority to prescribe times and places at which magistrates in a particular county shall be available for the performance of their duties to another district court judge or the clerk of the superior court, or the judge may appoint a chief magistrate to fulfill some or all of the duties. . . , and the person to whom such authority is delegated shall make monthly reports to the chief district judge of the times and places actually served by each magistrate.

G.S. 7A-146.

Note: Counties vary widely in procedures related to vacation leave for magistrates.

Training & Education

Magistrates are required to satisfactorily complete Basic School in order to be eligible for reappointment. G.S. 7A-171.2.

In addition, magistrates are required to attend at least 12 hours of training approved by the AOC for **continuing education credit** each biennium. (A biennium begins on January 1st each odd-numbered year and ends on December 31st of each even-numbered year.)

Most opportunities for continuing education credit for magistrates are offered by the AOC and the SOG. The AOC provides extensive training opportunities related to technology for magistrates; additional information and class schedules are available through the AOC intranet. In addition, the following regularly scheduled events are designed specifically to address magistrates' educational needs:

Spring and Fall Conferences

Jointly sponsored by the AOC, SOG, and the NC Magistrates' Association. (Each conference provides 12 hours of continuing education credit.)

Judicial College Seminars

Consisting of 2-3 days of intensive small-group instruction, these seminars are offered annually on the topics of involuntary commitment, introduction to holding small claims court, and advanced small claims law. In addition, a Judicial College Seminar on a criminal law topic is offered each November, with the topics alternating between Advanced Criminal Procedure and DWI. (The November 2014 seminar will be the DWI seminar.) Course announcements and registration information are sent out to magistrates by email well in advance of each course.

One-Day Regional Civil Seminars

Conducted each fall in 4-5 locations throughout the state. These seminars focus exclusively on small claims law and provide 6 hours of continuing education credit.

There are numerous other training opportunities for magistrates offered by a wide variety of providers. <u>Note that training offered by providers other than AOC and</u> <u>SOG must be approved in advance for continuing education credit</u>; students should

carefully consult AOC policy, available on AOC intranet, concerning requirements for credit approval, and/or contact James Gray at AOC (<u>James.F.Gray@nccourts.org</u>; 919-890-1110).

Duties of the Office

The NC Magistrates' Association summarizes the duties a magistrate may be authorized to perform as follows:

Accept guilty pleas, admission of responsibility and enter judgment for Infractions Handle misdemeanor and infractions for cases involving alcohol, boating offenses, state park/recreational areas, littering offenses, and wildlife offenses (e.g., hunting, fishing, etc.) Accept written appearances, waivers of trial or hearing and guilty pleas and, in appropriate cases, enter judgment and collect fines, penalties and costs Issue arrest warrants Issue search warrants Grant bail or set release conditions (non-capital offenses) Hear and enter judgments on worthless checks (<\$2000.00) Conduct initial appearances Serve as Child Support Hearing Officers Conduct small claims court in cases involving up to \$10,000 Administer oaths Provide punishment for direct criminal contempt Take depositions and examination before trial Issue subpoenas and capiases Take affidavits for verification of pleadings Assign years allowances to surviving spouses and children Perform marriage ceremonies Take acknowledgment of written contract or separation agreement Accept applications for involuntary commitments Conduct hearing for driver license revocations Validate vehicle towing by law enforcement Validate impounding of vehicles in certain DWI/DWLR charges Issue temporary domestic violence protection orders in certain emergency conditions

http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/magistrate/AboutUs/authority.htm

Removal from Office

The grounds for removing a magistrate from office are "the same as for a judge" *G.S.* 7A-173(a).

The grounds for removing a judge from office are:

- (1) willful misconduct in office,
- (2) willful and persistent failure to perform the judge's duties,
- (3) habitual intemperance,
- (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
- (5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.

G.S. 7A-376(b).

While the grounds for removing a magistrate from office are identical to those for removing a judge, the procedures are quite different. In the case of judges, complaints are considered by The Judicial Standards Commission, which in turn makes recommendations to the North Carolina Supreme Court, based on a written ethical code enacted by that Court termed the Code of Judicial Conduct. By contrast, neither the Commission nor the Supreme Court is involved in considering complaints against magistrates, <u>although the Code of Judicial Conduct itself has indirect application as a primary source of determining whether particular conduct is "prejudicial to the administration of justice."</u>

The procedure for removing a magistrate from office is set out in G.S. 7A-173. The first step occurs when a sworn written complaint is filed with the clerk of superior court. The next step requires the chief district court judge to examine the charges in order to determine whether the allegations, "if true, constitute grounds for removal." The final step in the statutory process is a public hearing conducted by a superior court judge; upon finding that grounds for removal exist, the judge is required to remove the magistrate from office.

TAB: Intro to Law & Judicial Process

INTRODUCTION TO LAW & JUDICIAL PROCESS

What is "the rule of law?"

WHERE DOES LAW COME FROM?

STATUTES

§ 42-46. Authorized fees.

(a) In all residential rental agreements in which a definite time for the payment of the rent is fixed, the parties may agree to a late fee not inconsistent with the provisions of this subsection, to be chargeable only if any rental payment is five days or more late. If the rent:

- Is due in monthly installments, a landlord may charge a late fee not to exceed fifteen dollars (\$15.00) or five percent (5%) of the monthly rent, whichever is greater.
- (4) Any provision of a residential rental agreement contrary to the provisions of this section is against the public policy of this State and therefore void and unenforceable.

CASES

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

671

FRIDAY v. UNITED DOMINION REALTY TR., INC.

[155 N.C. App. 671 (2003)]

REBECCA M. FRIDAY, PLAINTIPF V. UNITED DOMINION REALTY TRUST, INC., T/A AND D/B/A NORTHWINDS APARTMENTS, DEFENDANT

No. COA02-283

(Filed 21 January 2003)

"We hold that although Northwinds only charged and Ms. Friday only paid a \$30 late fee each time her rent was late, the \$31 late fee provision of the Northwinds lease agreement is contrary to the provisions of G.S. § 42-46(a) and therefore void and unenforceable as against North Carolina public policy."

A NOTE ON FINDING LEGAL RESOURCES:

Every magistrate should be able to locate a state statute or appellate case, given the citation. **The statute above** is identified by the citation GS 42-46. Let's take a closer look.

G.S. is an abbreviation standing for ______.

Can you guess what NCGS stands for? _____

What about N.C. Gen. Stat.? _____

In the citation GS 42-46, "42" is the chapter number in the General Statutes. An excerpt from the Table of Contents for the General Statutes shows you this chapter in context:

- Chapter 41 Estates
- Chapter 41A State Fair Housing Act.
- Chapter 42 Landlord and Tenant
- Chapter 42A Vacation Rental Act.
- Chapter 43 Land Registration.
- Chapter 44 Liens.
- Chapter 44A Statutory Liens and Charges.
- Chapter 45 Mortgages and Deeds of Trust.
- Chapter 45A Good Funds Settlement Act.
- Chapter 46 Partition.
- Chapter 47 Probate and Registration.

In the citation GS 42-46, "46" identifies the particular section of law within Chap. 42:


rticle 5 - Residential Rental Agreements. [RTF] [FDF]	
 § 42-38. Application. [RTF] [PDF] 	
 <u>§ 42-39. Exclusions.</u> [RTF] [PDF] 	
 § 42-40. Definitions. [RTF] [PDF] 	
 § 42-41. Mutuality of obligations. [RTF] [PDF] 	
 § 42-42. Landlord to provide fit premises. [FTF] [PDF] 	
 § 42-42.1. Water Conservation. [RTF] [PDF] 	
 § 42-42.2. Victim protection - nondiscrimination. [RTF] [PDF] 	
 § 42-42.3. Victim protection - change locks.[RTF] [PDF] 	
 § 42-43. Tenant to maintain dwelling unit. [FTF] [PDF] 	
• § 42-44. General remedies, penalties, and imitations. [RTF] [PDF]
 § 42-45. Early termination of rental agreement by military personal 	sonnel. (RTF) (PDF)
• § 42-45.1. Early termination of rental agreement by victims of	domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking. [RTF] [PDF]
§ 42-45.2. Early termination of rental agreement by military ar	
6 42-46 Authorized fees (PTE) (PDE)	

§ 42-46. Authorized fees. [RTF] [PDF]

Statutes are easy to find online; just go to

<u>http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/Statutes/Statutes.asp</u>. Using the official website makes it more likely that you're reading the current version of the statute.

The North Carolina Court System



The citation for **the case shown above** is

FRIDAY V. UNITED DOMINION REALTY, INC., 155 N.C. APP. 671 (2003).

What does N.C. App. stand for?
What is the plaintiff's name?
What sort of entity is the defendant?
When was the case decided?

STATE V. KNOLL, 422 N.C. 535 (1988)

This citation has an important difference. What is it?

If you are interested in reading court opinions as they're handed down, you can go to <u>www.nccourts.org</u> and click on "opinions" in the column on the right. If you're VERY eager, you can sign up there to be notified of new cases as soon as they're filed. If you're looking for a case and have only the name or what it's about, sometimes GOOGLE is your best bet.

	Civil Law	Criminal Law
Who brings the action?		
What is the term for above?		
How does it begin?		
For what purpose?		
Does D have right to attorney?		
Can D refuse to testify?		
What are the consequences?		


	Civil Law	Criminal Law
Who brings the action?	Private party	The State
What is the term for above?	Plaintiff	State, or Prosecution
How does it begin?	Files complaint	Criminal process
For what purpose?	Compensation for injury, to enforce civil right	Punishment, deterrence
Does D have right to attorney?	Not usually	Usually
Can D refuse to testify?	No	Yes
What are the consequences?	\$\$, sometimes coercive order	Jail, fine, or death

HOW JUDICIAL OFFICIALS MAKE DECISIONS


Before we allow a defendant to use the force of law to take away property belonging to another, we require every plaintiff to establish specific facts. We call these facts



Only after a plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to prove each individual element do we require a defendant to either rebut the evidence against her, or introduce additional evidence establishing an affirmative defense.



I am not responsible for your injury, because one of your essential elements is not true:



Even if everything you say is true, I'm STILL not responsible for your injury, because

DUE PROCESS: THE HEART OF YOUR JOB

No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.


U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment.

Put this in your own words: _____

Use this space to identify factors having the strongest influence on litigant satisfaction:


TAB: Small Claims Procedure

SMALL CLAIMS PROCEDURE



IS IT A SMALL CLAIMS CASE?

The law authorizes you to decide



ASSIGNED BY YOUR DCJ

The law authorizes your chief district court judge to assign a case to small claims court if it otherwise meets the definition of a small claims case and if at least one defendant lives in the county.

AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY RULES

- If the plaintiff is asking for money, the amount must be
 \$_______ or less.
- 2. The amount in controversy is determined as of the time
- 3. The plaintiff must ask for ______ of the amount he's entitled to for this particular claim. In other words,
- 4. If the plaintiff is asking for return of personal property, the amount in controversy is
- 5. In summary ejectment actions in which the landlord is seeking only possession, the amount in controversy requirement

CERTAIN KINDS OF CASES ONLY

What is the principal relief sought?

Summary Ejectment Money Owed Return of Personal Property

Not Coercive Judgment Not Action to Recover Real Property

HAS DEFENDANT BEEN SERVED?

-Service (or a legal substitute) is required before a judge has authority to decide a case.

-If the summons indicates the defendant was served, the presumption is that service was accomplished.

-If defendant files an answer before trial challenging personal jurisdiction, a district court judge must rule on that motion before the magistrate may proceed with the case.

-Service is not required if defendant makes a voluntary appearance, either by filing an answer or motion in the case, or if the defendant appears at trial.

-Special rule for service in summary ejectment actions: service by posting is sufficient to accomplish service of process allowing entry of judgment awarding possession only. Service by posting is NOT sufficient for award of money damages.

Problem: When you call a case for trial, you notice that defendant has not been served. Plaintiff is present in court, but defendant is not present. What should you do?

Same facts, but defendant is present. What should you do?



When a judge grants a continuance, s/he is agreeing that the trial will be delayed. There are four factors to consider: (1) Whether a continuance in the particular fact situation is governed by a specific legal provision; (2) whether the parties agree; (3) The reason for the continuance; (4) The overall fairness of the trial.

If the parties agree to a continuance, the court almost always grants it. Exception: _____

General Rule: a continuance may be granted on request of a party or upon the judge's own motion. Except for the rare case in which a continuance is mandatory, it should be granted only for good cause shown. Whether good cause exists lies within the sound discretion of the judge.

One example of a situation involving Factor #1 above occurs when service of process occurred so close in time to the trial date as to fall short of the legal requirements for minimum notice. Under GS 7A-214, in actions other than for summary ejectment, "if the time set for trial is earlier than five days after service of the magistrate summons, the magistrate shall order a continuance." For discussion of this rule and recommending specific applications depending upon various factual circumstances, see *Service of Civil Process: 2009 Legislation* on p. ____ in the Appendix.

In no other area of small claims law is the issue of time between filing the case and enforcing a judgment the focus of such intense attention as it is in summary ejectment. There are two statutes related to continuances in these cases. GS 42-29 addresses the "minimum notice" concern by requiring the sheriff to serve the defendant at least two days prior to trial. While the statute does not directly address the consequences of service less than two days before trial, a clear implication of the statute, particularly in light of the minimum 5-day period in all other cases, is that the courts are likely to find service less than 2 days before an eviction hearing inadequate to meet due process standards. Accordingly, magistrates confronted with this situation are well-advised (and arguably required) to grant a continuance. (The memo cited above discusses application of this rule at some length.) In 2013 the General Assembly again took up the subject of continuances in summary ejectment actions. The new law states:

If either party in a small claim action for summary ejectment moves for a continuance, the magistrate shall render a decision on the motion in accordance with Rule 40(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The magistrate shall not continue a matter for more than five days or until the next session of small claims court, whichever is longer, without the consent of both parties. Note particularly that this new provision applies only to actions for summary ejectment, and that a continuance for longer than five days is permissible if the parties agree.

Note that the statutes requiring minimum notice to small claims defendants as well as the 2013 law discussed above were enacted subsequent to the publication of <u>Small</u> <u>Claims Law</u>, and that resource is thus an incomplete statement of current law.

Your County's Continuance Policy:

AMENDING THE COMPLAINT



Plaintiffs are allowed to change – "amend" — their complaints even after trial begins, so long as the defendant has adequate notice and time to prepare a response. A small change — such as correcting the spelling of a name — requires little notice, while a significant change, such as asking for money instead of personal property, may require a continuance. When an amendment changes or adds a defendant, it may be necessary to amend the summons as well, and plaintiff may have to serve the new defendant. An amendment can literally be handwritten on the complaint, and should be noted in the judgment.



WHO SHOWED UP

General Rule #1:	A party may represent herself in small claims court, or she may be represented by an attorney.
General Rule #2:	The plaintiff in a lawsuit must be the <i>real party in interest</i> —the person who has actually suffered injury.

EXERCISE: SHOULD YOU MAKE AN EXCEPTION?

- 1. Patsy Plaintiff is elderly and intimidated by the very thought of coming to court, so she brings her grandson Gary with her to present her evidence. Can Gary present the case, so long as Patsy is there to testify?
- 2. Patsy Plaintiff is still intimidated, so she brings her grandson with her, but this time she's prepared to prove that Gary has a power of attorney. Does a power of attorney authorize Gary to present her case in small claims court?


3. Larry Landlord lives in Louisiana, and he pays Michael Manger to act as his rental agent. Michael files a summary ejectment action against Tommy Tenant (Michael v. Tenant). Can Michael present the case? Can you enter judgment in favor of Michael?

4.

Event No default judgment in small claims court. Plaintiff must introduce enough evidence to demonstrate that each essential element of the case is probably true.

- Plaintiff always testifies first.
- Defendant has a right to ask questions, but often will choose simply to tell his or her story instead.
- Defendant does not have to introduce evidence (and actually may not even be present) unless plaintiff has produced enough evidence to win, <u>assuming you believe that evidence to be true</u>. This is called establishing a *prima facie* ("on first appearance") case.
- If plaintiff establishes a *prima facie* case, defendant has an opportunity to produce evidence either contradicting an element of plaintiff's case or establishing some affirmative reason plaintiff should not win.
- Defendant has the burden of proof on affirmative defenses.
- ✤ Magistrate decides degree of formality in courtroom.

NOTES:



POINTS TO REMEMBER IN MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT EVIDENCE

Distinguish between <u>the decision to admit evidence</u> and <u>the decision about the weight you</u> <u>give to evidence</u>. In general, evidence is admissible and entitled to consideration if it is *relevant* to an issue in the case and *reliable* (that is, likely to be true).

Why?

- Small claims court is not subject to review on appeal in the same way other trial courts are, so whether evidence does or does not become part of the record is not relevant in the same way.
- Small claims cases never involve juries, and so the legal principles governing consideration of evidence that apply to trials before the judge without a jury are more relevant than are the rules used in jury trials.

Unless evidence is objected to, or unless you, the judge, feel that the evidence is such that it might improperly bias your decision, it should be freely admitted – and given appropriate weight.

When evidence is objected to, it is appropriate to rule on the objection by admitting the evidence but pointing out that its weight is to be determined.

When an attorney repeatedly objects—or when you anticipate that this may happen – it is proper to instruct the attorney to hold objections until the close of the evidence, at which point the attorney may be allowed to present arguments about its weight and admissibility.

What you might say:

"As you know, we are about to conduct a trial before the judge without a jury, and one of the parties is not represented by an attorney, which is often the case in this court. My policy in such situations is to be lenient in allowing evidence to be offered, so that parties may testify without interruption. At the close of the evidence, I will hear any argument the parties would like to offer about evidence that you believe I should not consider. After hearing your argument, I will carefully consider all the relevant admissible evidence and determine what weight I will give it before arriving at my decision."

Factors to consider in assessing credibility:

Motive to lie	Corroborating evidence	Person in best position to observe
Demeanor	Ability to provide details	Which version seems more likely?

A Note on Dealing With Attorneys

 \sim Remember that attorneys have a different role, and thus a different agenda, than you in your role as a judge.

~Don't expect that an attorney will necessarily approve of or agree with your decisions, or the way you run your courtroom. Be respectful and polite, but be prepared to be assertive if necessary in maintaining control of the courtroom.

~ Like everyone else, attorneys vary in skill and ability. Don't assume that an attorney is more knowledgeable than you about the law, and don't accept general proclamations about what "the law says" at face value.

~ Let attorneys know that you will not rule in their favor unless they explain their argument clearly, in a way that everyone in the courtroom can understand. Communicate that you won't be intimidated into ruling favorably by a complicated jargon-laden legal argument made quickly and without regard for your ability to understand. This is an appropriate requirement, and one that an advocate should anticipate and respect.

~Never hesitate to require an attorney to establish the truth of his or her contentions by supplying a copy of a case or statute, granting a brief continuance if necessary for the attorney to obtain a copy or for you to read it carefully. Insist that copies of cases and statutes be complete, and specifically ask whether the law provided is current as of the date of trial if you have any reason to be doubtful.

~Be aware of procedural errors frequently made by attorneys unused to small claims practice.

~Particularly when confronted with an attorney who is disruptive or insists on interrupting the testimony of the unrepresented party, be prepared to cite GS Ch. 8C, Rule 611, which provides:

The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.

~Similarly, when confronted with an attorney who objects to your questioning of parties or contends that your participation is inappropriate because you are "helping," be prepared to cite Rule 614, which says

... The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called.... The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or a party.

Four Rules of Evidence You Should Know

Business records exception to hearsay rule

Writing or records of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge are admissible if kept in the regular course of business and if it was the regular course of business to make that record, unless the source information or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

G.S. 8-45: Verified statement of account

In an action on an account for goods sold, rents, services rendered, or labor performed, or any oral contract for money loaded, a verified itemized statement of the account is admissible into evidence and is deemed correct unless disputed by the defendant.

Verified: Accompanied by an affidavit from a person who (1) would be competent to testify at trial; (2) has personal knowledge of the particular account, or of the books and records of the business in general; and (3) swears that the account is correct and presently is owed by defendant to plaintiff.

Itemized: Describes each item with price and item number, if there is one.

Best Evidence Rule (paraphrased)

When an action by a party is based on a right created by a written contract, and the content of that contract is in dispute, the party must either produce the contract or adequately explain why he is unable to do so.

Parole Evidence Rule


When contract is in writing, parties may not introduce evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreement that varies the terms of the written contract

Note that the rule has no application in two circumstances:

(1) When the evidence is offered to assist the court in determining the meaning of an ambiguous term in the contract; and

(2) when the evidence offered relates to an oral agreement taking place <u>after</u> the written contract and thus in support of an allegation that the written contract was subsequently modified by a later oral agreement.

COUNTERCLAIM



- 1. Must be filed in clerk's office before time the case is set for trial. Law requires defendant to pay court costs just as though he'd filed a small claims case.
- 2. Plaintiff is entitled to continuance if necessary to prepare a defense.
- 3. May not exceed \$10,000.
- 4. Treated just as though you're hearing two cases back-to-back.
- 5. Requires modification of judgment form.

NOTES:



- DGL/SOG/2013 -

ENTERING JUDGMENT

When a judge announces her decision at the close of the evidence, she is said to be *entering judgment*. There are no particular words that must be used, but all good judgments have some common qualities:

--The magistrate makes it clear that the time for presenting evidence is over, and that she is now ready to announce her decision. For example, "Mrs. Smith, do you wish to say anything further? Mr. Jones, how about you? I find that both parties have completed introducing evidence in this case, and I am ready to make my decision. Having heard and considered all of the evidence, I am going to rule as follows: . . . "

--The magistrate clearly identifies who wins. For example, "I am going to rule in favor of the plaintiff, Mrs. Smith, in this matter." (By using the party's name, the magistrate avoids confusion about which party is "the plaintiff.")

--The magistrate briefly summarizes the facts and states the reason for her decision. For example: "Mrs. Smith, I find that you had a lease agreement with Mr. Jones which required him to pay \$400 rent on the first of each month. I find that he has not paid the rent for May and June, and that under the terms of the lease his failure to pay gives you, the landlord, the right to obtain possession of the rental property."

--The magistrate clearly states the result. "Mr. Jones, I am entering a judgment which gives possession of the apartment to Mrs. Smith, and which requires you to move out of the apartment immediately. You have the right to appeal this judgment to district court and, if you want to appeal, you must give notice of that to me or the clerk within 10 days. Mrs. Smith, after ten days have passed, if Mr. Jones is not out of the apartment, you may ask the clerk to begin the procedure to enforce this judgment."

--The magistrate gives both parties a chance to ask questions.

See p. 21 for a handout some magistrates use at this point: *What Happens After Small Claims Court.*

Sometimes a magistrate does not want to enter judgment immediately. The law allows a magistrate to delay entering judgment for up to 10 days (*"reserving judgment"*). What are some reasons a magistrate might decide to reserve judgment?

1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	

The AOC-CVM Judgment forms have instructions at the bottom for reserving judgment.

* NOTE: In 2013 the General Assembly amended G.S. <u>7A-222(b)</u> to restrict the availability of reserving judgment in summary ejectment cases. In these cases, the magistrate may reserve judgment only if the parties agree, or if the case is complex, and the latter instance, only for a maximum of 5 business days.

APPEAL

G.S. 228 provides that "After final disposition before the magistrate, the sole remedy for an aggrieved party is appeal for trial de novo before a district court judge or a jury."

"De novo" means "new": an appeal from small claims court means that the parties will have a new trial before a district court judge.

Here are some important things to know about appeal:

An "aggrieved party" has 10 days from entry of judgment to give notice of appeal.

"Entry of judgment" occurs when the judgment is filed with the clerk.

Rule 6 (see p. 29) controls how days are counted.

Notice of appeal may be given in either of two ways: in open court or by filing written notice in the clerk's office.

Unless a party qualifies as an indigent, he must pay costs of appeal within 20 days or else have the appeal dismissed (10 days if the action is for summary ejectment).

The law does not permit enforcement of any judgment during the notice of appeal period (10 days in small claims cases). At the end of the 10-day period, enforcement of a money judgment is automatically stayed while the appeal is pending. This is not the case in an appeal from a judgment awarding possession of personal or rental property but there is a procedure by which the defendant in such a case may arrange a stay, available through the clerk's office.

SETTING ASIDE YOUR JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60

Magistrates in some districts have been authorized by their chief district court judges to "set aside" —or erase —a judgment, so that it is not longer valid. This ability to set aside a judgment is powerful and must be used carefully and according to certain specific rules.


A motion to set aside a judgment (sometimes referred to as a *Rule 60 motion*) may be brought before an authorized magistrate only for mistake or excusable neglect by the party seeking relief. (There are other grounds besides mistake and excusable neglect, but those motions must be heard by a district court judge.) If one party makes a Rule 60 motion, all parties must be given notice of the motion and an opportunity to attend the hearing on the motion.

In deciding whether to grant a motion to set aside a judgment, the magistrate must consider many factors, including the importance of judgments being final so that people can rely on them. A party seeking to interfere with that finality must be able to show that there was a really good reason for their neglect or mistake. If the moving party is the defendant, an additional showing is required: that granting the motion will not be a waste of time, in that if they are given another chance, there is a reasonable possibility that the eventual decision would be to their benefit (sometimes called "*a meritorious defense*").

Example: Plaintiff files an action for money owed, but the defendant does not appear on the day of trial. Fifteen days later, when the plaintiff takes the first steps toward enforcing his judgment, the defendant files a Rule 60 motion asking that you set aside the judgment. At the hearing, the defendant shows that service of process was accomplished by leaving a copy of the complaint and summons with his wife, who died suddenly later that day. Defendant asserts that he never received actual notice of the legal action against him, and you find this believable. When you inquire about plaintiff's allegations, defendant admits that he owes the money, but asks for additional time to pay in light of his present stressed financial situation. Has defendant demonstrated excusable neglect? Probably. Nevertheless, his motion to set aside the judgment should be denied because he has failed to demonstrate any possibility that he would prevail in a new trial—he has no defense against the claim.

A note about clerical errors: A magistrate has authority to correct a clerical error in the judgment even if neither party requests it. A clerical error occurs when the written judgment contains a mistake that causes it NOT to reflect the actual decision of the magistrate—essentially, a mistake in writing. Examples include transposing numbers, misspelling the name of a party, or writing down the wrong date. It is extremely important that the magistrate not confuse an error of law or judgment with a clerical error—the former is far more serious and receives much different treatment.

NOTES:



WHAT HAPPENS AFTER SMALL CLAIMS COURT

Location of Clerk's Office:

Notice to Both Parties

If you are either the plaintiff (the person suing) or defendant (the person being sued) and are unhappy with the decision of the magistrate, you may appeal the case to district court. You may appeal either by telling the magistrate at the trial that you want to appeal or by filing a written request with the clerk of court within 10 days after the magistrate ruled in your case. If you want to file a written request, ask the clerk to give you a copy of form AOC-CVM-303, which is the notice of appeal form. If you give written notice of appeal to the clerk, you must also send a copy of the form to the opposing parties in your case.

Whether you appeal in open court or file a written appeal, you MUST PAY \$150 court costs to the clerk. These costs must be paid within 20 days of the magistrate's ruling, unless you are a tenant appealing from judgment in a summary ejectment action, in which case the costs must be paid within 10 days of the magistrate's ruling. If you cannot pay the appeal costs, you may be able to qualify to file your appeal as an indigent. If you are a tenant appealing an eviction and you want to continue to live at the premises until the case is heard on appeal, you will be required to pay past due rent to the clerk and to sign an undertaking that you will pay rent into the court as it becomes due to keep the judgment from being carried out. If you meet the requirements for appeal as an indigent, you may be excused from the requirement that you pay past due rent in order to remain on the premises while the appeal is pending.

If one party appeals, there will be a completely new trial before a district court judge. (In some cases, the matter may be assigned first to an arbitrator. If that occurs contact the clerk to have the procedure explained to you.) The clerk will notify both parties of the trial date (usually by mailing the trial calendar), and both must appear at that time. If you are the defendant and don't appear at trial, the plaintiff will probably win the case. Both parties should bring all your evidence and witnesses to the trial. The trial before the district court judge will be more formal than the one before the magistrate; therefore, you may wish to consider hiring an attorney to represent you.

Notice to Plaintiff (Party Suing)

If you won your case, your judgment against the defendant is good for 10 years. Before the end of the 10 years, you may bring another lawsuit to extend the judgment an additional 10 years. If you have won a money judgment, it becomes a lien against any land owned by the defendant, which means the defendant cannot sell that land without paying your judgment. Just because you have a judgment does not mean that you will be able to collect it. The defendant must have enough property to enable the sheriff to sell the property to satisfy the judgment. You may try as many times in the 10-year period as you wish to collect the judgment.

If you have won a judgment that the defendant owes you money, the court cannot try to help you collect that money unless you have given the defendant an opportunity to claim his or her exemptions. "Exemptions" is a legal term referring to a judgment debtor's right to shelter certain property from being seized and sold to satisfy a judgment. After the judgment is rendered, you must get two forms (Notice of Rights and Motion to Claim Exempt Property) from the clerk. You must serve these on the defendant. The back of the Notice of Rights tells you how to serve the forms. If you have not heard anything from the defendant within 20 days after you have served the Notice of Rights form tells you what you have to bring to the clerk. If the defendant responds to your notice and claims exemptions, you may either (1) agree with the exemptions claimed and ask the clerk to issue an execution for non-exempt property or (2) object to the

claimed exemptions and have the district court judge determine the exempt property. After the district judge determines the defendant's exemptions, you may ask the clerk to issue an execution for all nonexempt property. You will have to pay \$55 to have an execution issued--\$25 for the court and \$30 for the sheriff. Those costs will be added to the judgment to be repaid by the defendant. An execution is an order to the sheriff to seize and sell property of the defendant to satisfy the judgment. If you know of any property that belongs to the defendant, you should attach to the execution a description of the property and where it may be found to help the sheriff. The sheriff will sell any property that can be found and turn the proceeds over to the clerk of court, who will then turn the money over to you.

If the defendant pays all or part of the money owed to you directly, you MUST go to the clerk's office and indicate how much you have been paid.

If you have a judgment ordering the defendant to turn personal property over to you and if the defendant has not turned it over within 10 days after the magistrate enters the judgment, you may ask the clerk to issue a writ of possession to the sheriff. The cost to you for having the writ issued is \$25, plus \$30 for the sheriff. The sheriff will then try to recover the property from the defendant and turn it over to you. You may be asked to advance the costs of having the sheriff pick up the property.

If you are a landlord and have a judgment for eviction and the tenant fails to leave the premises within 10 days after the judgment was rendered, you may pay \$25 and have the clerk issue a writ of possession to the sheriff. The sheriff will then remove the defendant from the premises. You will have to pay the sheriff \$30. You may be asked to advance the costs of removing the tenant's property and one month's storage costs or you may request the sheriff, in writing, to lock the premises and you will then be responsible for handling the tenant's property in the manner required by the law.

If the defendant won a judgment against you on a counterclaim, read the section below for defendants.

Notice to Defendant (Party Being Sued)

If a judgment is entered against you stating that you owe the plaintiff money and you want to pay the amount owed, it would be safer to pay the money to the clerk of court rather than to the plaintiff. If you do pay the plaintiff directly, make sure he or she notifies the clerk so the judgment won't continue to be listed against you. If you cannot or do not pay the judgment, the plaintiff will serve a notice of rights on you, telling you that you must claim your exemptions or they will be waived. It is very important that you respond to that notice. Exemptions are property the law allows you to keep from being taken from you to pay off judgments against you. If you fail to claim your exemptions, the sheriff will be able to seize and sell any property you own. If you fail to claim your exemptions when notified, you may ask the clerk to set aside your waiver if you have the grounds. Also, even if you have waived your statutory exemptions, you may go to the clerk any time up until the proceeds of the sale of your property have been distributed to the plaintiff and request your constitutional exemptions. The judgment is good against you for 10 years and may be extended for another 10 years. It becomes a lien against any land you own now or buy later until it is satisfied.

If you have a judgment against you to turn personal property over to the plaintiff, you may not prevent the property from being turned over to the plaintiff unless the plaintiff is a finance company and the judgment against you is to recover household goods that you listed as collateral in a security agreement with the finance company and the finance company did not lend you the money to buy those goods. In that case, the finance company must give you notice of your right to claim exemptions as described in the paragraph above and you may keep the household goods from being repossessed by claiming them as exempt.

If you are a tenant and have an eviction judgment against you, you will have to leave the premises. If you do not leave voluntarily, the sheriff may forcibly evict you and remove and store your belongings for you or may leave them with the landlord who may dispose of them in the manner allowed by the law. You will be held responsible for the costs of moving you out.

If you won a counterclaim against the plaintiff in which you were awarded money, read the section for plaintiffs to see what to do.

Statutes of Limitation

Most intentional torts:	3 years
Negligence actions:	3 years
Contract for services:	3 years
Contract for sale of goods:	4 years
Contracts under seal:	10 years

Contracts Required to be Written

Contract for the sale of land.

Lease for more than 3 years.

Promise to pay the debt of another.

Retail consumer credit installment contract.

Contract for the sale of goods for \$500 or more.

Security agreement.

Attorneys' Fees

Examples of authorizing statutes below. See Small Claims Law, pp. 91-94 for important restrictions.

- G.S. 6-21.2: Plaintiff is suing to collect a debt and written agreement between parties contains provision for attorneys' fees. Notes, conditional sales contracts.
- G.S. 6-21.3: Action on a check.
- G.S. 25A-21: Actions involving consumer credit sales contracts.
- G.S. 25-9-615(a)(1): Actions arising out of repossession of collateral.

Service of Civil Process: 2009 Legislation

The 2009 General Assembly enacted into law two bills governing service of process in small claims cases, each of them in apparent response to the fact that defendants in these cases sometimes have little time to prepare for trial.

Service of Process in Summary Ejectment Actions

The first new law, SL 2009-246, amends GS 42-29, governing service of summons in summary ejectment actions. As many of you know, small claims procedure in these cases is geared toward minimizing the time a landlord must wait for trial on the landlord's claim for possession of rental property. Existing law requires a law enforcement officer who receives a summons for service to mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the tenant "no later than the end of the next business day or as soon as practicable." GS 42-29 goes on to state that the office <u>may</u> attempt to telephone the defendant within five days after summons is issued, to arrange for service. In cases in which tenants are not served in this manner, the law requires the officer—before the end of this five-day period-- to go to the defendant's home to attempt service. S.L. 2009-246 adds to this provision a requirement that the officer's visit occur at least two days prior to trial (excluding legal holidays). If service is not accomplished at the time the officer visits, existing law directs the officer to "affix copies to some conspicuous part of the premises claimed" (service by posting).

This law imposes a requirement on law enforcement officers charged with serving civil process, rather than on magistrates who hear small claims cases. Further, the new law does not address the consequences of non-compliance. As a result, questions have arisen about what *a magistrate* should do when a summary ejectment action appears on the small claims docket and the defendant was served less than two days before trial. The question may come up in any of several contexts. First, the magistrate may call the case and learn that both parties are present in court. Because the General Assembly's intention was to provide tenants with additional time to prepare for trial, it is clear that the magistrate must grant the defendant's request for a continuance, for at least as long as necessary to allow for two days notice. The law provides that in calculating time periods, the first day is not to be counted. Accordingly, if the defendant is served on Monday, the magistrate must grant a defendant's request for a continuance if the trial is held on Tuesday. The case may be heard, however, on Wednesday (two days after service), and a magistrate may choose to grant an even longer continuance if that seems appropriate.

A second question arises on these facts if the tenant does not request a continuance (which is likely to happen in cases in which the tenant is unaware of the new two-day rule). The answer to this question is not specified in the statute. In light of clearly expressed legislative intent, however, the magistrate should, at a minimum, inform the defendant that she or he is entitled to two days notice before being forced to appear in court and defend against the lawsuit. If the tenant expresses a clear affirmative desire to proceed with the hearing, a magistrate may consider that as a valid waiver of the tenant's rights and hear the case that day. In the absence of a knowing waiver, however, I do not believe the magistrate should hear the case, given clear legislative intent to the contrary. If a magistrate hears the case that day after finding waiver by the defendant, the best practice would be to note the waiver in the judgment. By doing this, the magistrate will preserve for the record the fact that the tenant's right to minimum notice was observed.

The next question arises when the plaintiff is present in court, but the defendant is not. If service was made sooner than two days prior to trial, my opinion is that the magistrate should continue

the case on the magistrate's own motion. Given that the purpose of the amendment is to allow adequate time for a defendant to receive notice of an upcoming trial, it is of particular concern that the defendant may not appear for trial *because* of inadequate notice. This is particularly true in cases in which service is accomplished in some substituted manner, such as by handing a copy to defendant's spouse or by posting. In these cases, there is a real possibility that defendant may be completely unaware that a trial is scheduled. Even when service is made directly on defendant, however, the notice may have been inadequate to permit the defendant to arrange to attend court the next morning. Magistrates may want to confer with their clerks about the mechanism for notifying both the clerk's office and the parties when a case is continued for this reason.

A harder question arises when neither party appears for trial. In the typical case, of course, a magistrate dismisses the plaintiff's lawsuit with prejudice for failure to prosecute. But what if the plaintiff has called to inquire about service and has been informed that service was accomplished later than was required by law? A plaintiff might decide that an appearance is unnecessary because the trial is certain to be postponed. One might argue that in this situation the plaintiff had no intention of "failing to prosecute." On the other hand, the justice system has long taken the position that when a case is scheduled for trial, a plaintiff must either appear for trial or seek a continuance. A plaintiff who does neither has no legal right to object if the case is dismissed. (And if a defendant does appear and waives the right to a continuance, a magistrate should strongly consider dismissing the action with prejudice, given the effort the defendant has made to comply with the demands of the summons.) Absent legislative or appellate court guidance, a magistrate is left to consult with colleagues and perhaps the chief district court judge about how such cases should be handled.

Service of Process in Non-Summary Ejectment Small Claims Cases

The second legislative amendment related to service of process in small claims cases also raises questions. S.L. 2009-629 amends GS 7A-214, the statue governing the time within which a small claims action must be heard. That statute provides that small claims actions are to be scheduled for trial no later than 30 days after the complaint is filed. The new law inserts a sentence stating that the magistrate "shall order a continuance" in small claims actions other than summary ejectment actions when service is accomplished less than five days before trial. GS 7A-214 goes on to say that the time set for trial may be changed if all parties agree. The statute concludes with the familiar sentence authorizing a magistrate to grant continuances "for good cause shown."

Again, legislative concern that defendants have adequate time in which to prepare for trial is apparent in this amendment. The law prior to amendment allowed a defendant to be served on Monday afternoon and the trial to be held at 9:00 AM on Tuesday. In this situation, the defendant was left to hope that the plaintiff would agree to a continuance or, failing that, that the magistrate might find such short notice "good cause" for a continuance. In fact, many magistrates might have reasoned that no good cause existed as a matter of law, given that all statutory time limits and procedural rules had been observed. With this background, the General Assembly's desire to guarantee defendants at least five days notice is certainly understandable. The new time limit is consistent with the existing rule applicable to motions filed in district and superior court: GS 1A-1, Rule 6(d) requires that in all such motions, the other party must be given at least 5 days notice before the matter is heard.

The questions that arise with this law relate to the mandatory aspect of the statutory language. When both parties appear for trial and the defendant seeks a continuance, the way is clear: a magistrate is required to grant a continuance. The same is true if the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not; again, the defendant's very absence tends to support the concern that she or he may not have received adequate notice that a trial date was looming. The mandatory language of the statute makes clear that the defendant is not required to ask for a continuance—the "default setting," so to speak, is a continuance whenever the defendant has not received the required notice. The statute does not

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indicate how long the continuance should be, but the underlying legislative intent suggests that the continuance should be long enough to allow the defendant at least five days to prepare for trial.

As we discussed in reference to the new law applicable to summary ejectment actions, a more challenging legal question is presented by the situation in which the defendant appears and asks to waive his or her statutory right to a continuance. It is common for parties to a lawsuit to waive various rights in the course of trial, and there is generally no obstacle to them doing so, provided that the waiver is made knowingly. It is easy to imagine that many defendants, aware that they have no defense to the plaintiff's claims, might wish to dispose of the case quickly, rather than be forced to travel twice to the courthouse. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a good reason for denying defendants the right to make this choice. This question is made difficult only by the mandatory language of the statute: "the magistrate <u>shall</u> order a continuance." When one considers the absurdity of ordering a continuance in the face of objections from--and to the detriment of--both parties, however, it seems reasonable to read this language as requiring a continuance <u>unless waived by the defendant</u>. The same reasoning arguably applies to the situation in which the plaintiff fails to appear and the defendant appears. Because the right to a continuance—and the ability to waive that right—belongs to the defendant, it seems entirely justified to expect plaintiffs to either attend court or risk losing their case in the event the defendant appears and waives continuance.

Once again, the most perplexing aspect of the new law is presented when neither party appears. Should the magistrate dismiss the action with prejudice based on plaintiff's failure to prosecute? On the one hand, it makes little sense to continue a case out of concern for a defendant having adequate time to prepare when the result without the protective amendment would be to dismiss the action entirely— a result likely to be welcomed even more enthusiastically by defendants. On the other hand, the statutory language is mandatory, and the defendant is not present to make a knowing waiver of his or her right to a continuance. It seems likely that different counties—and different magistrates—will adopt different policies about the proper way to handle this situation. Whatever the policy, though, it should be one that is applied consistently, so that all parties are able to make decisions about their actions based on legal consequences that are predictable.

Counting time

A final issue raised by both new laws concerns calculating time. GS 1A-1, Rule 6, sets out the general rule for calculating time in civil matters. That provision states that the first day of the time period is not included, and the last day is included (unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, in which case the time period runs over to the next day when the courthouse is open and doing business). **In cases in which the time period is less than seven days,** however, Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are not included. The result is that small claims actions, other than those for summary ejectment, may be heard no earlier than one week after service of process (i.e., if service is accomplished on Monday, the case may be heard no sooner than the following Monday). The new law applicable to summary ejectment actions specifically requires that service be accomplished "at least two days prior to the day the defendant is required to appear to answer the complaint, excluding legal holidays." Previous versions of the bill had excluded "weekends and legal holidays", but the reference to "weekends" was deleted from the final bill. The result is an exception to the general rule set out in GS 1A-1, Rule 6, with weekend days counted toward satisfaction of the two-day requirement. Consequently, service on Friday would allow a case to be heard on Monday, since Monday is the third day following service.

Caveat and Summary

As we have seen, the proper application of these two amendments is unclear in some situations and likely to remain so until further guidance is provided by the General Assembly and/or the appellate courts. This memo has attempted to set out a rationale in support of one possible resolution of these issues, but whether the appellate courts will answer the questions addressed in the manner as the author necessarily remains uncertain. For purposes of clarity and ease of reference, the author's recommendations are summarized below, but magistrates are as always reminded that the suggestions herein are just that—suggestions—and should not be regarded as dispositive of the questions addressed.

Obviously, the language of the two amendments is not identical, and thus the legal issues presented are somewhat different. Nevertheless, the author's suggestions about how to dispose of cases in which inadequate notice is present are the same, and are as follows:

If both parties appear, the magistrate should continue the case unless the defendant makes a knowing waiver.

If only the plaintiff appears, the magistrate should continue the case.

If only the defendant appears, the magistrate should continue the case unless the defendant makes a knowing waiver. If the defendant waives the right to a continuance, the case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

If neither party appears, the author makes no recommendation other than to suggest that the magistrates in each county discuss the question and adopt a consistent policy for responding to these cases.

If you have questions or concerns or would like to discuss the contents of this memo further, please don't hesitate to call or email me:

Dona Lewandowski (919)966-7288 lewandowski@sog.unc.edu

Small Claims: What Lawyers Need to Know

Small claims procedure is governed in large part by GS Ch. 7A, Art. 19.

The Rules of Civil Procedure apply only when Article 19 does not contain a more specific rule applicable to small claims court. Here are a few of the most significant differences in small claims procedure:

Service by publication is allowed only in (certain) cases involving motor vehicle liens. G.S. 7A-217, -211.1.

Motions to dismiss based on *Rule* 12(b)(6) are not permitted. See GS 7A-216 (referring to such motions by the old common-law term "demurrer").

The defendant is not required to file an answer, and failure to do so constitutes a general denial. G.S. 7A-218. There are *no default judgments* in small claims, and (with the exception of summary ejectment actions meeting the requirements set out in GS 42-30 for obtaining a judgment on the pleadings) the plaintiff must prove the case by the greater weight of the evidence even if the defendant files no answer and fails to appear at trial.

The compulsory *counterclaim* rule does not apply in small claims court. GS 7A-219.

The result in a case in which the plaintiff fails to produce sufficient evidence to establish a right to relief is a judgment *of dismissal*.

Time periods for service of process, calendaring a case for hearing, and giving notice of appeal *are abbreviated* in small claims court. The procedure overall is less formal, and the rules of evidence are only generally observed. See GS 7A-222.

Appeal of a small claims judgment is to district court for trial de novo.

Small Claims Forms

(These and other forms can be found at the <u>www.nccourts.org</u> webpage)

AOC-CVM-100	Magistrate Summons
AOC-CVM-200	Complaint for Money Owed
AOC-CVM-201	Complaint for Summary Ejectment
AOC-CVM-202	Complaint to Recover Possession of Personal Property
AOC-CVM-203	Complaint to Enforce Possessory Lien on Motor Vehicle
AOC-CVM-400	Judgment in Action to Recover Money or Personal Property
AOC-CVM-401	Judgment in Action for Summary Ejectment
AOC-CVM-402	Judgment in Action on Possessory Lien on Motor Vehicle
AOC-CV-415	Motion To Claim Exempt Property
AOC-G-108	Order
AOC-G-250	Servicemembers Civil Relief Act Affidavit

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA	File No.
County	In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division - Small Claims
Plaintiff(s)	MAGISTRATE SUMMONS
VERSUS Defendant(s)	G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4; 7A-217, -232 Date Original Summons Issued
	Date(s) Subsequent Summons(es) Issued
то	то
Name And Address Of Defendant 1	Name And Address Of Defendant 2
You are notified to appear before the magistrate at the specifi the opportunity at the trial to defend yourself against the clain You may file a written answer, making defense to the claim, ir the time set for trial. Whether or not you file an answer, the pl	n stated in the attached complaint. In the office of the Clerk of Superior Court at any time before aintiff must prove the claim before the magistrate.
If you fail to appear and defend against the proof offered, the Date Of Trial Time Of Trial	Location Of Court
Name And Address Of Plaintiff Or Plaintiff's Attorney	Date Issued
	Signature
	Deputy CSC Assistant CSC Clerk Of Superior Court
0	vver)

		RETURN O	F SERVICE			
I certify that this su	mmons and a copy of the com	plaint were received	d and served as follo	ws:		
		DEFEN	DANT 1			
Date Served	Time Served	AM PM	Name Of Defendant			
By delivering to the defendant named above a copy of the summons and complaint.						
By leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the defendant named above with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.						
As the defendation below.	nt is a corporation, service wa	s effected by delive	ring a copy of the su	mmons and complaint to the person named		
Name And Address Of Person With Whom Copy Left (if corporation, give title of person copy left with)						
Other manner of service (specify)						
Defendant WA	S NOT served for the following	reason:				
		DEFEN	DANT 2			
Date Served	Time Served	AM PM	Name Of Defendant			
By delivering to	the defendant named above a	a copy of the summ	ons and complaint.			
	ppy of the summons and comp ble age and discretion then res		house or usual place	e of abode of the defendant named above with a		
As the defendant is a corporation, service was effected by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the person named below.						
	erson With Whom Copy Left (if corporat	ion, give title of person co	ppy left with)			
	of service (specify)					
Defendant WAS NOT served for the following reason:						
FOR USE IN	Service was made by ma by posting a copy of the			mmons and complaint to the defendant(s) and		
SUMMARY EJECTMENT		me(s) Of The Defendant		, promoto.		
CASES ONLY: Address Of Premises Where Posted						
Santias Fac			Signature Of Danuty She	with Making Datum		
Service Fee \$			Signature Of Deputy She	-		
Date Received Name Of Deputy Sheriff Making Return (type or print)						
Date Of Return County Of Deputy Sheriff Making Return						
			1			

File No.	STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA		i	
	County		In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division-Small Claims	urt Of Justice n-Small Claims
COMPLAINT	1. The defendant is a resident of the county named above	amed above.		
FOR MONEY OWED		or the following reason:		
G.S. 7A-216, 7A-232 Name And Address Of Plaintiff		Principal Amount Owed	Dwed	
		Interest Owed (if any)	\$	
		Total Amount Owed	d d	
	(check one below)			
County Telephone No.	On An Account (attach a copy of the account)	Date From Which Interest Due		Interest Rate
VERSUS Name And Address Of Defendant 1 Individual Corporation	- For Goods Sold And Delivered Between	Beginning Date	Ending Date	Interest Rate
]	For Money Lent	Date From Which Interest Due		Interest Rate
	On a Promissory Note (attach copy)	Date Of Note Date	Date From Which Interest Due II	Interest Rate
	□ For a Worthless Check (attach a copy of the check)	(X)		
County Telephone No.	For conversion (describe property)			
Name And Address Of Defendant 2 Individual Corporation				
	Other: (specify)			
County Telephone No.				
Name And Address Of Plaintiffs Attorney				
	I demand to recover the total amount listed above, plus interest and reimbursement for court costs.	ove, plus interest and rei	mbursement for court	costs.
	Date Of Plaintiff Or Attorney (Type Or Print)		Signature Of Plaintiff Or Attorney	
AOC-CVM-200, Rev. 9/13 © 2013 Administrative Office of the Courts	. (Over)			

TIFF OR DEFENDANT	6. The DEFENDANT may file a written answer, making defense to the claim, in the office of the Clerk of Superior Court. This answer	later than the time set for trial. The filing of the answer DOES NOT relieve the defendant of the need to appear before the magistrate to assert the defendant's defense.	7. Whether or not an answer is filed, the PLAINTIFF must appear before the magistrate.	8. The PLAINTIFF or the DEFENDANT may appeal the magistrate's decision in this case. To appeal, notice must be given in open court when the judgment is rendered, or notice may be given in writing to the Clerk of Superior Court within ten (10) days after the judgment is rendered. If notice is given in writing, the appealing party must also	serve written notice of appeal on all other parties. The appealing party must PAY to the Clerk of Superior Court the costs of court for appeal within twenty (20) days after the judgment is rendered.	9. This form is supplied in order to expedite the handling of small claims. It is designed to cover the most common claims.	10. The Clerk or magistrate cannot advise you about your case or assist you in completing this form. If you	have any questions, you should consult an attorney.
INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT	1. The PLAINTIFF must file a small claim action in the county where at least one of the defendants resides.	 The PLAINTIFF cannot sue in small claims court for more than \$10,000.00. This amount may be lower, depending on local judicial order. If the amount is lower, it may be any amount between \$5,000.00 and \$10,000.00, as determined by the chief district court judge of the judicial district. 	The PLAINTIFF must show the complete name and address of the defendant to ensure service on the defendant. If there are two defendants	and they reside at different addresses, the plaintiff must include both addresses. The plaintiff must determine if the defendant is a corporation and sue in the complete corporate name. If the business is not a corporation, the plaintiff must determine the owner's name and sue the owner.	 The PLAINTIFF may serve the defendant(s) by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the party to be served or by paying the costs to 	have the sheriff serve the summons and complaint. If certified or registered mail is used, the plaintiff must prepare and file a sworn statement with the Clerk of Superior Court proving service by certified	mail and must attach to that statement the postal receipt showing that the letter was accepted.	 The PLAINTIFF must pay advance court costs at the time of filing this Complaint. In the event that judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff, court costs may be charged against the defendant.

File No.	STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA	
COMPLAINT	County	In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division-Small Claims
IN SUMMARY EJECTMENT	1. The defendant is a resident of the county named above	ed above.
	2. The defendant entered into possession of premises described below as a lessee of plaintiff.	nises described below as a lessee of plaintiff.
G.S. 7A-216, 7A-232; Ch. 42, Art. 3 and 7 Name And Address Of Plaintiff	Description Of Premises (Include Location)	Conventional Public Housing
	Rate Of Rent Month Date Rent Due \$ per Week	Date Lease Ended Type Of Lease Date Lease Image: Construction of the constr
	3. The defendant failed to pay the rent due on the above date an and waited the 10-day grace period before filing the complaint.	The defendant failed to pay the rent due on the above date and the plaintiff made demand for the rent and waited the 10-day grace period before filing the complaint.
County Telephone No.	□ The lease period ended on the above date a period.	The lease period ended on the above date and the defendant is holding over after the end of the lease period.
VERSUS	☐ The defendant breached the condition of the] The defendant breached the condition of the lease described below for which re-entry is specified.
Name And Address Of Defendant 1 🛛 Individual 🔲 Corporation	☐ Criminal activity or other activity has occurred in violation of G.S. 42-63 as specified below.	d in violation of G.S. 42-63 as specified below.
County Telephone No.	4. The plaintiff has demanded possession of the premise it, and the plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession.	4. The plaintiff has demanded possession of the premises from the defendant, who has refused to surrender it, and the plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession.
Name And Address Of Defendant 2 Individual Corporation	5. The defendant owes the plaintiff the following:	
]	Description Of Any Property Damage	
	Amount Of Damage (If Known) Amount Of Rent Past Due \$	t Due Total Amount Due \$
County Telephone No.	6. I demand to be put in possession of the premises and to recover the total am rental until entry of judgment plus interest and reimbursement for court costs.	6. I demand to be put in possession of the premises and to recover the total amount listed above and daily rental until entry of judgment plus interest and reimbursement for court costs.
Name And Address Of Plaintiff's Attorney Or Agent	Date Of Plaintiff/Attorney/Agent (Type Or Print)	Print) Signature Of Plaintiff/Attorney/Agent
	CERTIFICATION WHEN COMPL	CERTIFICATION WHEN COMPLAINT SIGNED BY AGENT OF PLAINTIFF
	I certify that I am an agent of the plaintiff and hav	I certify that I am an agent of the plaintiff and have actual knowledge of the facts alleged in this Complaint.
	Date // Name Of Agent (Type Or Print)	Signature Of Agent
AOC-CVM-201, Rev. 9/13 © 2013 Administrative Office of the Courts	(Over)	

NTIFF OR DEFENDANT	by a copy for the plaintiff and be filed no later than the time set for trial. The filing of the answer DOES NOT relieve the defendant of the need to appear appear before the magistrate to assert the defendant's defense. 9. Requests for continuances of cases before the magistrate may be granted	for good cause shown and for no more than five (5) days per continuance unless the parties agree otherwise. 10. The magistrate will render judgment on the date of hearing unless the parties agree otherwise, or the case is complex as defined in G.S. 7A-222, in which case the decision is required within five (5) days.	11. The PLAINTIFF or the DEFENDANT may appeal the magistrate's decision in this case. To appeal, notice must be given in open court when the judgment is entered, or notice may be given in writing to the Clerk of Superior Court within ten (10) days after the judgment is entered. If notice is given in in writing, the appealing party must also serve written notice of appeal on all other parties. The appealing party must PAY to the Clerk of Superior Court the costs of court for appeal within ten (10) days after the judgment is entered.	In the appealing party applies to appeal as an indigent, and that request is denied, that party has an additional five (5) days to pay the court costs for the appeal. 12. If the defendant appeals and wishes to remain on the premises the defendant must also post a stay of execution bond within ten (10) days after the judgment is entered. In the event of an appeal by the tenant to district court, the landlord may file a motion to dismiss that appeal under G.S. 7A-228(d). The court may decide the motion without a hearing if the tenant fails to file a response within ten (10) days of receipt of the motion.	13. Upon request of the tenant within seven (7) days of the landlord being placed in lawful possession, the landlord shall release any personal property of the tenant. After seven (7) days, the landlord may sell, throw away or dispose of said property. If sold, the landlord must disburse any surplus proceeds to the tenant upon request within seven (7) days of the sale. If the total value of the property is less than \$500.00, it is deemed abandoned five (5) days after execution.	 This form is supplied in order to expedite the handling of small claims. It is designed to cover the most common claims. The Clerk or magistrate cannot advise you about your case or assist you in completing this form. If you have 	any questions, you should consult an attorney.
INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT	 The PLAINTIFF must file a small claim action in the county where at least one of the defendants resides. The PLAINTIFF cannot sue in small claims court for more than \$10,000.00 excluding interest and costs unless further restricted by court order. 	ddress of the defendant fendants and they both addresses. The on and sue in the ocration, the plaintiff	must determine the owner's name and sue the owner. 4. The PLAINTIFF may serve the defendant(s) by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the party to be served or by paying the costs to have the sheriff serve the summons and complaint. If certified or registered mail is used, the plaintiff must prepare and file a sworn statement with the Clerk of Superior Court proving service by certified mail and must attach to that statement the nostal receipt showing that the letter was accented	ove t block date grace the natic eached		Complaint. In the event that judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, court costs may be charged against the defendant. The PLAINTIFF must appear before the magistrate to prove his/her claim. The DEFENDANT may file a written answer, making defense to the claim, in	the office of the Clerk of Superior Court. This answer should be accompanied

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File No.	STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA	
	County	In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division-Small Claims
OF DERSONAL PROPERTY	WHEN PLAINTIFF	WHEN PLAINTIFF IS A SECURED PARTY
PLAINTIFF A SECURED PARTY PLAINTIFF NOT A SECURED PARTY G.S. 7A-232; 25-9-609 Name And Address Of Plaintiff	The defendant is a resident of the county named above. I have a security interest in the personal property described in the attached security agreement. The total current value of this property is as shown below. The defendant has defaulted in the payment of the debt which the property secures or has otherwise breached the terms of the security agreement giving me the right to claim immediate possession of the property described below. I demand recovery of this property and reimbursement for court costs.	<i>ve.</i> I have a security interest in the personal property tal current value of this property is as shown below. bt which the property secures or has otherwise ne the right to claim immediate possession of the property and reimbursement for court costs.
	Description Of Personal Property In Which You Have a Secured Interest (Attach Copy Of Security Agreement)	
Social Security No./Taxpayer ID No.		÷
County Telephone No.	Date	Signature Of Plaintiff Or Attorney
VERSUS	WHEN PLAINTIFF IS	WHEN PLAINTIFF IS NOT A SECURED PARTY
Name And Address Of Defendant 1 Individual Corporation County Telephone No.	The defendant is a resident of the county named above. The defendant has in his/her possession the personal property described below which belongs to me. I am entitled to immediate possession of the property, but the defendant has refused on demand to deliver it to me. The defendant has unlawfully kept possession of this property since the date listed below and has therefore deprived me of its use. The damage due me for the loss of use and physical damage to the property is set out below. I demand recove of this property and damages in the total amount set out below, plus interest and reimbursement for court costs.	The defendant is a resident of the county named above. The defendant has in his/her possession the personal property described below which belongs to me. I am entitled to immediate possession of the property, but the defendant has refused on demand to deliver it to me. The defendant has unlawfully kept possession of this property since the date listed below and has therefore deprived me of its use. The damage due me for the loss of use and physical damage to the property is set out below. I demand recovery of this property and damages in the total amount set out below, plus interest and reimbursement for court costs.
Name And Address Of Defendant 2 Individual Corporation	Description Of Personal Property You Own Which Is In Possession Of Defendant	int Total Value Of Property To Be Recovered
		↔
County Telephone No.	Date Defendant Wrongfully Took Or Kept Property	Damage Due For Loss Of Use 🔰 \$
Name And Address Of Plaintiff's Attorney		Physical Damage To Property
		Total Amount Of Damages
	Date Name Of Plaintiff Or Attorney (Type Or Print)	Signature Of Plaintiff Or Attorney
AOC-CVM-202, Rev. 9/13 © 2013 Administrative Office of the Courts	Original-File Copy-Each Defendant Copy-Attorney/Plaintiff (Over)	

	INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT	TIFF	OR DEFENDANT
. .	The PLAINTIFF must file a small claim action in the county where at least one of the defendants resides.	⊡ 9	The DEFENDANT may file a written answer, making defense to the claim, in the office of the Clerk of Superior Court. This answer should be accompanied by a copy for the plaintiff and be filed no later than the time
N	 The PLAINTIFF cannot sue in small claims court to recover property worth more than \$10,000.00. This amount may be lower, depending on local judicial order. If the amount is lower, it may be any amount between \$5,000.00 and \$10,000.00, as determined by the chief district court judge 	0 = 0	set for trial. The filing of the answer DOES NOT relieve the defendant of the need to appear before the magistrate to assert the defendant's defense.
		, ∼ 2 ⊂	Whether or not an answer is filed, the PLAINTIFF must appear before the magistrate.
ς. Υ	The PLAINTIFF must show the complete name and address of the defendant to ensure service on the defendant. If there are two defendants and they reside at different addresses, the plaintiff must include both addresses. The plaintiff must determine if the defendant is	ю В	The PLAINTIFF or the DEFENDANT may appeal the magistrate's decision in this case. To appeal, notice must be given in open court when the indoment is entered or notice may be diven in writing to the Clerk of
	a corporation and sue in the complete corporate name. If the business is not a corporation, the plaintiff must determine the owner's name and sue the owner.		Superior Court within ten (10) days after the judgment is entered. If notice is given in writing, the appealing party must also serve written notice of appeal on all other parties. The appealing party must PAY to the Clerk of
4.	 The PLAINTIFF may serve the defendant(s) by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the party to be served or by paying the costs to have the sheriff serve the summons and complaint. If certified or 	<u></u>	superior court the costs of court for appeal within twenty (<0) days after the judgment is entered. A defendant who appeals also must post a bond to stay execution of the judgment within ten (10) days after the judgement is entered.
	ed	⊢.≌ б	This form is supplied in order to expedite the handling of small claims. It is designed to cover the most common claims.
		10. T	The Clerk or magistrate cannot advise you about your case or assist vou in completing this form. If you have
IJ.	. The PLAINTIFF must pay advance court costs at the time of filing this Complaint. In the event that judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, court costs may be charged against the defendant.		any questions, you should consult an attorney.
AOC-CV © 2013 /	AOC-CVM-202, Rev. 9/13 © 2013 Administrative Office of the Courts		

File No.		STATE OF N	OF NORTH CAROLINA		
			County	Dist	In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division-Small Claims
COMPLAINT TO ENFORCE	TO ENFORCE	1. The lien c	The lien claimed arose in the county named above.	bove.	
POSSESSO	POSSESSORY LIEN ON	2a. 🗌 I repair, s	I repair, service, tow or store motor vehicles in the ordinary course of business.	the ordinary cours	e of business.
MOTOR		b. 🗌 l am an ol motor veh	I am an operator of a place of business for garaging or parking motor vehicles for the public and the motor vehicle listed below has remained unclaimed for at least 10 days.	raging or parking m aimed for at least 10	otor vehicles for the public and the) days.
G.S. 7A-211.1; Name And Address Of Plaintiff	G.S. 7A-211.1; 20-77(d), 44A-2(d), 44A-4(b), (e) Of Plaintiff	c. 🗌 I am a lan 30 days. ⁻	☐ I am a landowner on whose property the motor vehicle listed below has been abandoned for at least 30 days. The property was not left by a tenant. [G.S. 42-25.9(g); 44A-2(e2)]	r vehicle listed belc [G.S. 42-25.9(g); 4	w has been abandoned for at least 44A-2(e2)]
		 I came int the vehicle at the rate 	I came into possession of the motor vehicle described on the date shown below, am in possession of the vehicle, and claim a possessory lien on this vehicle for the amounts indicated below plus storage at the rate indicated from this date until the lien is satisfied.	escribed on the date is vehicle for the am n is satisfied.	I came into possession of the motor vehicle described on the date shown below, am in possession of the vehicle, and claim a possessory lien on this vehicle for the amounts indicated below plus storage at the rate indicated from this date until the lien is satisfied.
		Make/Year Of Vehicle			
County	Telephone No.	ID Number		Repairs	\$
VER Name And Address Of Defendant 1	VERSUS	Date Of Possession		Towing	θ
		Date Storage Began		Storage Cost to Date	te \$
		Date Notice Of Unclaimed Vehicle Given	Vehicle Given	Vehicle Rental	€
County	Telephone No.	(Plus Storage @ \$	Per Day Until Sold)	Total Lien Claimed To Date	d S
Name And Address Of Defendant 2		4. The defer	The defendants are the registered owner of the vehicle and the known secured party(ies).	e vehicle and the k	nown secured party(ies).
		5. I gave not	gave notice of an unclaimed vehicle to the Division of Motor Vehicles on the date listed above.	ivision of Motor Veh	licles on the date listed above.
		6. I have giv proposed	I have given notice to the North Carolina Divisior proposed for the above described motor vehicle.	ion of Motor Vehick le.	l have given notice to the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles that a lien is asserted, and sale is proposed for the above described motor vehicle.
County Te Name And Address Of Plaintiff's Attorney	Telephone No. ney	I demand Carolina I that prope	I demand that this Court declare the lien valid and enforceable by sale and order that the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles transfer title to the person who purchases at the sale upon proof that proper notice of sale has been given.	and enforceable by le to the person wh	sale and order that the North o purchases at the sale upon proof
		Date	Name Of Plaintiff Or Attorney (Type Or Print)	Signa	Signature Of Plaintiff Or Attorney
AOC-CVM-203 Rev. 9/13			(Over)	_	

AOC-CVM-203, Rev. 9/13 © 2013 Administrative Office of the Courts

The PLAINTIFF must pay advance court costs at the time of filing this Complaint. In the event that judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, court costs may be charged against the defendant.	 The DEFENDANT may file a written answer, making defense to the claim, in the office of the Clerk of Superior Court. This answer should be accompanied by a copy for the plaintiff and be filed no later than the time set for trial. The films of the answer DOFS NOT reliave the 	defendant of the need to appear before the magistrate to assert the defendant's defense.	9. The PLAINTIFF or the DEFENDANT may appeal the magistrate's decision in this case. To appeal, notice must be given in open court when the judgment is rendered, or notice may be given in writing to the Clerk of Superior Court within ten (10) days after the judgment is rendered. If notice is given in writing, the appealing party must also serve written notice of appeal on all other parties. The appealing party must PAY to the Clerk of Superior Court the judgment is rendered.	D. This form is supplied in order to expedite the handling of small claims. It is designed to cover the most common claims. Questions about the adequacy of this form or whether it is the appropriate form to be used should be addressed to an attorney.
. Before filing this Complaint, you must have filed certain forms with the Division of Motor Vehicles. Contact your local Division of Motor Vehicles office.	. The PLAINTIFF must file a small claim action in the county where the claim arose (i.e. where the motor vehicle was repaired, towed or stored).	The PLAINTIFF cannot sue in small claims court for more than \$10,000.00. This amount may be lower, depending on local judicial order. If the amount is lower, it may be any amount between \$5,000.00 and \$10,000.00, as determined by the chief district court judge of the judicial district.	The registered owner of the vehicle and any secured parties listed with the Division of Motor Vehicles must be made defendants in the case. The PLAINTIFF must show the complete name and address of the defendant to ensure service on the defendant. If there are two defendants and they reside at different addresses, the plaintiff must include both addresses. The plaintiff must determine if the defendant is a corporation and sue in the complete corporate name. If the business is not a corporation, the plaintiff must determine the owner's name and sue him/her.	The PLAINTIFF may serve the defendant(s) by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the party to be served or by paying the costs to have the sheriff serve the summons and complaint. If certified or registered mail is used, the plaintiff must file a sworn statement with the Clerk of Superior Court proving service by certified mail and must attach to that statement the postal receipt showing that the letter was accepted. If the name or address of the vehicle owner cannot be determined, service by publication is authorized. In that case plaintiff may want to consult an attorney.

INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT

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File No.	STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA	
Film No.	County	In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division-Small Claims
Judgment Docket Book And Page No.	This action was tried before the undersigned on the cause stated in the complaint. The record show defendant was given proper notice of the nature of the action and the date, time and location of trial.	was tried before the undersigned on the cause stated in the complaint. The record shows that the was given proper notice of the nature of the action and the date, time and location of trial.
IIDCMENT	FINC	FINDINGS
IN ACTION TO RECOVER MONEY OR	: proved the case by t ailed to prove the co	f the evidence. /eight of the evidence.
PERSONAL PROPERTY G.S. 7A-210(2), 7A-224	the defendant(s) U was unto present at trial. the case involves a breach of contract and the date of breach is: the contract provides for pre-judgment interest on damages for breach at the rate of	at trial. reach is:
Name And Address Of Plaintiff	post-judgment interest at the rate of%. the contract does not provide a specific pre-judgment interest rate. the contract does not provide a specific post-judgment interest rate.	
		ORDER
	It is ORDERED that:	/ described in the complaint.
County Telephone No.	The plaintiff recover possession of the personal property listed below:	/ listed below:
VERSUS	☐ □ the plaintiff recover nothing of the defendant(s) and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.	t this action be dismissed with prejudice.
Name And Address Of Defendant 1	 (for breach of contract cases) the plaintiff recover of the defendant(s) the followin principal from the date of breach to the date of judgment (1) at the rate provid (2) at the legal rate. In addition, the principal shall bear interest from the date (1) at the rate provided in the contract, as found above; or (2) at the legal rate. 	<i>(for breach of contract cases</i>) the plaintiff recover of the defendant(s) the following principal sum plus interest on the principal from the date of breach to the date of judgment (1) at the rate provided in the contract, as found above; or (2) at the legal rate. In addition, the principal shall bear interest from the date of judgment until the judgment is satisfied (1) at the rate provided in the rowing the judgment is satisfied (1) at the rate provided in the contract, and make the satisfied (1) at the rate provided in the contract.
	(for tort cases) the plaintiff recover of the defendant(s) the foll the date the action was instituted until judgment is satisfied.	(for tort cases) the plaintiff recover of the defendant(s) the following principal sum, plus interest at the legal rate from the date the action was instituted until judgment is satisfied.
County Telephone No.	☐ ☐ Other: <i>(specify)</i> ☐ Costs of this action are taxed to the ☐ plaintiff.	defendant.
Name And Address Of Defendant 2	Principal Sum Of Judgment \$	Name Of Judgment Debtor(s) From Whom Amount Recovered
	Pre-judgment Interest Not Included \$	□ Judgment Announced And Signed In Open Court
	Attorney's Fees Or Other Damages \$ (when appropriate)	Date Signature Of Magistrate
County Telephone No.		Name Of Party Announcing Appeal In Open Court
Name And Address Of Plaintiff's Attorney	CERTIF	CERTIFICATION
	NOTE: To be used when magistrate does not announce and sign this Judgment in open court at the conclusion of the trial. I certify that this Judgment has been served on each party named by depositing a copy in a post-paid properly addressed envelope in a post office or official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Postal Service.	is Judgment in open court at the conclusion of the trial. y depositing a copy in a post-paid properly addressed envelope in a y of the United States Postal Service.
	Date Ognature Oriviagorate	
AOC-CVM-400, Rev. 2/12 © 2012 Administrative Office of the Courts		

STATE OF NORTH CARO	LINA			File No.		
		Judgment Abstract No.				
0	ounty	Date Judgment Filed				
				In The General Court Of Justice		
Name Of Judgment Creditor (Plaintiff)				MOTION TO CLAIM EXEMPT PROPERTY		
VERSUS			(S1	TATUTORY EXEMPTIONS)		
Name Of Judgment Debtor (Defendant)		(Us		dgment Filed On Or After Jan. 1, 2006) G.S. 1C-1603(d		
NOTE TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR: The Cler	k of Superior Court cannot f	ill out this forn	n for you	ı. If you need assistance, you should talk with an		
judgment creditor. (b) To preserve that right, you schedule of assets that are claimed as exempt, i creditor at the address provided in the notice. (c, (d) You may have exemptions under State and fi the notice, such as Social Security benefits, une	are required to respond to no later than 20 days after y) You have the option to reque deral law that are in addition mployment benefits, worker for challenging an attachme	the notice by rou receive the uest a hearing on to those list s' compensati ent or levy on	filing a m e notice, g to claim ted on the ion benet	certain property free from collection efforts by the notion or petition to claim exempt property, including a and you must also mail or take a copy to the judgment in exemptions rather than filing a schedule of assets. The form for the debtor's statement that is included with affits, and earnings for your personal services rendered operty. (f) You may wish to consider hiring an attorney.		
I, the undersigned, move to set aside the p	roperty claimed below as	s exempt.				
1. I am a citizen and resident of		•				
2. 🗌 a. I am married to						
b. I am not married.						
3. My current address is						
4. The following persons are dependent	t on me for support:					
Name(s) Of Person(s) Depende	ent On Me	Age		Relationship		
property, that I use as a residence. I a understand that my total interest claim and am 65 years of age or older, I am	lso wish to claim my intened in the residence and entitled to claim a total er y owned by me as a tena	rest in the fo burial plots i exemption in	ollowing may not the res	personal property, or in a cooperative that owns burial plots for myself or my dependents. I t exceed \$35,000.00, except that if I am unmarried sidence and burial plots not to exceed \$60,000.00, or as a joint tenant with rights of survivorship, and		
Street Address Of Residence						
County Where Property Located	Township			No. By Which Tax Assessor Identifies Property		
Legal Description (Attach a copy of your deed or other in	strument of conveyance or des	cribe property in	n as much	l n detail as possible. Attach additional sheets if necessary.)		
I am unmarried and 65 years of age or tenant with rights of survivorship and th				ed by me as a tenant by entireties or as a joint sed.		
Name(s) Of Owner(s) Of Record Of Residence				Estimated Value Of Residence (What You		
				Think You Could Sell It For)		
AOC-CV-415 Rev 10/14	(C	Over)				

Amount Of Lien(s) And name(s) And Address(es) Of Lienholder(s): (How Much Money Is Owed On The Property And To Whom)	Current Amount Owed
	\$
	\$
Location Of Burial Plots Claimed	Value Of Burial Plots Claimed \$
6. I wish to claim the following personal property, consisting of household furnishings, household goods, w	• • • • • • • •

books, animals, crops or musical instruments, as exempt from the claims of my creditors *(in other words, keep them from being taken from me)*. These items of personal property are held primarily for my personal, family, or household use.

I understand that I am entitled to personal property worth the sum of \$5,000.00. I understand I am also entitled to an additional \$1,000.00 for each person dependent upon me for support, but not to exceed \$4,000.00 for dependents. I further understand that I am entitled to this amount after deducting from the value of the property the amount of any valid lien or security interest. Property purchased within ninety (90) days of this proceeding may not be exempt. (Some examples of household goods would be TVs, appliances, furniture, clothing, radios, record players.)

Item Of Property	Fair Market Value (What You Could Sell It For)	Amount Of Lien Or Security Interest (Amount Owed On Property)	Name(s) Of Lienholder(s) (To Whom Money Is Owed)	Value Of Debtor's (Defendant's) Interest (Fair Market Value Less Amount Owed)
	\$	\$		\$
	\$	\$		\$
	\$	\$		\$

7. I wish to claim my interest in the following motor vehicle as exempt from the claims of my creditors. I understand that I am entitled to my interest in one motor vehicle worth the sum of \$3,500.00 after deduction of any valid liens or security interests. I understand that a motor vehicle purchased within ninety (90) days of this proceeding may not be exempt.

Make And Model	Year	Name Of Title Owner Of Record		
Fair Market Value (What You Could Sell It For)		Name(s) Of Lienholder(s) Of Record (Person(s) To Whom Money Is Owed)		
\$				
Amount Of Liens (Amount Owed)		Value Of Debtor's (Defendant's) Interest (Fair Market Value Less Amount Owed)		
\$		\$		

8. (*This item is to claim any other property you own that you wish to exempt.*) I wish to claim the following property as exempt because I claimed residential real or personal property as exempt that is worth less than \$35,000.00, or I made no claim for a residential exemption under section (5) above. I understand that I am entitled to an exemption of up to \$5,000.00 on any property only if I made no claim under section (5) or a claim that was less than \$35,000.00 under Section (5). I understand that I am entitled to claim any unused amount that I was permitted to take under section (5) up to a maximum of \$5,000.00 in any property. (*Examples: If you claim \$34,000 under section (5), \$1,000 allowed here; if you claim \$30,000 under section (5), \$5,000 allowed here; if you claim \$35,000 under section (5), no claim allowed here.*) I further understand that the amount of my claim under this section is after the deduction from the value of this property of the amount of any valid lien or security interests and that tangible personal property purchased within ninety (90) days of this proceeding may not be exempt.

Item Of Personal Property Claimed	Fair Market Value	Amount Of Lien(s)	Name	e(s) Of Lienholder(s)	Value Of Debtor's (Defendant's) Interest			
	\$	\$			\$			
	\$	\$			\$			
	\$	\$			\$			
	\$	\$			\$			
Real Property Claimed (I understand that if I wish to claim more than one parcel, I must attach additional pages setting forth the following information for each parcel claimed as exempt.)								
Street Address				Estimated Value Of Property (What Y	ou Could Sell It For)			
				\$,			
County Where Property Located	Towns	hip		No. By Which Tax Assessor Identifies	Property			

Description (Attach a copy of your deed or other instrument of conveyance or describe the property in as much detail as possible.)

VERSUS		File No.		
Name Of Judgment Creditor (Plaintiff)		Judgment Abstract N	lo.	Date Judgment Filed
Name And Address Of Lienholder				Current Amount Owed
Name And Address Of Lienholder				\$
Name And Address Of Lienholder				Current Amount Owed
(Attach additional sheets for more lienholders.)			
9. I wish to claim the following items of	health care aid (wheelchairs	s, hearing aids, etc.,) necessary for 🗌 mys	elf 🗌 my dependents.
Item			Purpose	
10. I wish to claim the following implemented dependent. I understand such properties of the stand such				
Item	Estimated Va (What You Could S		What Busines	s Or Trade Used In
	\$			
	\$			
	\$			
11. I wish to claim the following life insu		peneficiaries are r	⊥ my spouse and/or my chil	dren as exempt.
Name Of Insurer	Policy Num	ber	Benef	ïciary(ies)
\$	ndent for support, including the death of a person upon aims for funeral, legal, med	compensation fro whom I was depo- ical, dental, hosp (Add additional she	om a private disability pol endent for support. I unde ital or health care charge ets if more than one amount	icy or an annuity, erstand that this s related to the accident or of compensation.)
Location/Source Of Compensation				
13. I wish to claim my individual retireme	ent accounts, including Rot	h accounts, and i	ndividual retirement annu	ities (IRAs) that are listed
Name Of Custodian Of IRA Account		Type Of Account	Accoun	t Number
Name Of Custodian Of IRA Account		Type Of Account	Accourt	t Number
			1.000.00	
Name Of Custodian Of IRA Account		Type Of Account	Accoun	t Number
Name Of Custodian Of IRA Account		Type Of Account	Accoun	t Number
14. I wish to claim the following funds I I Code, not to exceed \$25,000.00. I u expenses. I understand that I may n extent that any contributions were m contributions.	nderstand that the plan mu ot exempt any funds I place	st be for my child ed in this account	l and must actually be use t within the preceding 12 i	ed for the child's college months, except to the
College Saving Plan	Account Number	Value	Name(s) Of Chi	ld(ren) Beneficiaries
		\$		
		\$		
			1	
	(0	ver)		

State/Gov	ernmental	Unit	Name Of Retirement F	Plan	Identifying Number
					or funds that I have received
my support or for the supp Type Of Support	port of a per				Location Of Funds
			\$		
			\$		
			\$		
7. The following is a complet	te listing of	my property which I do No			
Item	is loting of		ocation		Estimated Value
				\$	
				\$	
				\$	
I certify that the above sta	tements are	e true.		•	
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintifi	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, tress shown on the notice	properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me.	opy to the in a pc	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintiff post-paid, properly-addres address:	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, tress shown on the notice	intiff) by: delivering a c properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me.	opy to the in a poor of the po	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito ost office, addressed to the iting a copy of this motion in ntiff's) attorney at the followin
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintifi post-paid, properly-addres address:	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado ssed envelo	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, dress shown on the notice ope in a post office, addre	intiff) by: delivering a c properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me. ssed to the judgment credito	opy to the in a poor of the po	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito ost office, addressed to the iting a copy of this motion in ntiff's) attorney at the followin
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintifi post-paid, properly-addres address:	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado ssed envelo	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, dress shown on the notice ope in a post office, addre	intiff) by: delivering a c properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me. ssed to the judgment credito	opy to the in a poor of the po	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito ost office, addressed to the iting a copy of this motion in ntiff's) attorney at the followin
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintifi post-paid, properly-addres address:	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado ssed envelo	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, dress shown on the notice ope in a post office, addre	intiff) by: delivering a c properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me. ssed to the judgment credito	opy to the in a poor of the po	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito ost office, addressed to the iting a copy of this motion in ntiff's) attorney at the followin
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintifi post-paid, properly-addres address:	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado ssed envelo	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, dress shown on the notice ope in a post office, addre	intiff) by: delivering a c properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me. ssed to the judgment credito	opy to the in a poor of the po	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito ost office, addressed to the iting a copy of this motion in ntiff's) attorney at the followin
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintifi post-paid, properly-addres address:	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado ssed envelo	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, dress shown on the notice ope in a post office, addre	intiff) by: delivering a c properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me. ssed to the judgment credito	opy to the in a poor of the po	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito ost office, addressed to the iting a copy of this motion in ntiff's) attorney at the followin
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintifi post-paid, properly-addres address:	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado ssed envelo	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, dress shown on the notice ope in a post office, addre	intiff) by: delivering a c properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me. ssed to the judgment credito	opy to the in a poor of the po	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito ost office, addressed to the iting a copy of this motion in ntiff's) attorney at the followin
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintifi post-paid, properly-addres address:	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado ssed envelo	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, dress shown on the notice ope in a post office, addre	intiff) by: delivering a c properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me. ssed to the judgment credito	opy to the in a poor of the po	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito ost office, addressed to the iting a copy of this motion in ntiff's) attorney at the followin
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintifi post-paid, properly-addres address:	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado ssed envelo	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, dress shown on the notice ope in a post office, addre	intiff) by: delivering a c properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me. ssed to the judgment credito	opy to the in a poor of the po	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito ost office, addressed to the iting a copy of this motion in ntiff's) attorney at the followin
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintifi post-paid, properly-addres address:	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado ssed envelo	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, dress shown on the notice ope in a post office, addre	intiff) by: delivering a c properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me. ssed to the judgment credito	opy to the in a poor of the po	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito ost office, addressed to the iting a copy of this motion in ntiff's) attorney at the followin
A copy of this Motion was personally delivering attorney. depositing judgment creditor (plaintifi post-paid, properly-addres address:	served on g a copy to a copy of th f) at the ado ssed envelo	the judgment creditor (pla nis Motion in a post-paid, dress shown on the notice ope in a post office, addre	intiff) by: delivering a c properly-addressed envelope of rights served on me. ssed to the judgment credito	opy to the in a poor of the po	he judgment creditor (plaintiff , the judgment credito ost office, addressed to the iting a copy of this motion in ntiff's) attorney at the followin
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STATE OF NORTH O	CAROLINA		File No.
	County		Film No.
		In T	he General Court Of Justice Superior Court Division
Name Of Plaintiff/Petitioner			
VER Name Of Defendant/Respondent	SUS	-	ORDER
		Projudice	
This action is dismissed		Prejudice	Without Prejudice
	not to prosecute this action and	has moved for o	Jismissal.
	or the defendant appeared on		
The plaintiff failed to dismiss this action.	appear on the scheduled trial d	ate; the defenda	ant did appear on that date and has moved to
Other:			
	S. 1A-1, Rule 4(e)]		
The defendant has neve summons was issued.	r been served in this action, and	d more than nine	ety (90) days have elapsed since the last
The trial of this action is	continued to the following date	and time on mo	tion of the
Defendant			
☐ Judge or Magistrate			
Other: (specify)			
Date Of New Trial	Time Of New Trial	Location Of New Tria	1
		Location Of New The	u
	d staying this proceeding. This		aced on inactive status because a petition for einstated if the claim is not resolved in the
Date	Signature		Judge Magistrate Assistant CSC Clerk Of Superior Court
AOC C 109 Day 11/02	<u>l</u>		

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA	File No.
County	In The General Court Of Justice
ame And Address Of Plaintiff	SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT
VERSUS	
ame And Address Of Defendant	50 U.S.C. app. 501 to 597
NOTE: This form is not for use in Chapter 45 Foreclosure actions.	50 0.3.0. αμ. 301 10 337
	FIDAVIT
determine the defendant's military status. The (NOTE: The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act Website is a certificates are not installed on your computer, you may ex- the website. DoD security certificates will be automatically not expect security alerts to appear with this website after includes the following advice: "Most web browsers don't co- is for the user to install all of the DoD's public certificates in	med above is in military service.* bers Civil Relief Act Website (https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/scra/) to results from my use of that website are attached. a website maintained by the Department of Defense (DoD). If DoD security aperience security alerts from your internet browser when you attempt to access added to the computers of all Judicial Branch users, such that these users should July of 2015. As of June 18, 2015, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act Website ome with the DoD certificates already installed. The best and most secure solution
Coast Guard; service as a member of the National Guard under for a period of more than 30 consecutive days for purposes of	Date
ate	Signature Of Affiant
gnature Of Person Authorized To Administer Oaths	Name Of Affiant (type or print)
Deputy CSC Assistant CSC Clerk Of Superior Court	
SEAL Date My Commission Expires	
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act affidavit (whe	minal case in which the defendant has not made an appearance until a other on this form or not) has been filed, and if it appears that the defendant oudgment until such time that you have appointed an attorney to represent
	(Over)
AOC-G-250, New 6/15 © 2015 Administrative Office of the Courts	

Information About Servicemembers Civil Relief Act Affidavits

1. Plaintiff to file affidavit

In any civil action or proceeding, including any child custody proceeding, the court, before entering judgment for the plaintiff, shall require the plaintiff to file with the court an affidavit—

- (A) stating whether or not the defendant is in military service and showing necessary facts to support the affidavit; or
- (B) if the plaintiff is unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in military service, stating that the plaintiff is unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in military service.

50 U.S.C. app. 521(b)(1).

2. Appointment of attorney to represent defendant in military service

If in a civil action or proceeding it appears that the defendant is in military service, the court may not enter a judgment until after the court appoints an attorney to represent the defendant. If an attorney appointed to represent a service member cannot locate the service member, actions by the attorney in the case shall not waive any defense of the service member or otherwise bind the service member. 50 U.S.C. app. 521(b)(2). State funds are not available to pay attorneys appointed pursuant to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. The plaintiff may be required to pay the costs of attorneys appointed pursuant to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.

3. Defendant's military status not ascertained by affidavit

If based upon the affidavits filed in such an action, the court is unable to determine whether the defendant is in military service, the court, before entering judgment, may require the plaintiff to file a bond in an amount approved by the court. If the defendant is later found to be in military service, the bond shall be available to indemnify the defendant against any loss or damage the defendant may suffer by reason of any judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant, should the judgment be set aside in whole or in part. The bond shall remain in effect until expiration of the time for appeal and setting aside of a judgment under applicable Federal or State law or regulation or under any applicable ordinance of a political subdivision of a State. The court may issue such orders or enter such judgments as the court determines necessary to protect the rights of the defendant under this Act. 50 U.S.C. app. 521(b)(3).

4. Satisfaction of requirement for affidavit

The requirement for an affidavit above may be satisfied by a statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, in writing, subscribed and certified or declared to be true under penalty of perjury. 50 U.S.C. app. 521(b)(4). The presiding judicial official will determine whether the submitted affidavit is sufficient.


5. Penalty for making or using false affidavit

A person who makes or uses an affidavit permitted under 50 U.S.C. app. 521(b) (or a statement, declaration, verification, or certificate as authorized under 50 U.S.C. app. 521(b)(4)) knowing it to be false, shall be fined as provided in title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. 50 U.S.C. app. 521(c).

TAB:

Recovering Personal Property

ACTIONS TO RECOVER PERSONAL PROPERTY



These are two entirely different lawsuits. Only the remedy is the same.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS: LEARNING THE LINGO

Friendly Furniture sells bedroom furniture, and Connie Consumer would like to purchase some. Connie doesn't have the money to pay the entire purchase price, though. So FF offers to sell her the furniture on an installment plan—in other words, to "finance" her purchase. Of course, there's a possibility that Connie will take the furniture but not finish paying for it. If that happened, FF could certainly sue Connie for breach of contract. But there's a good chance that Connie might turn out to be "judgment-proof," and even if she isn't, it would involve a lot of effort and expense on FF's part to collect. An alternative, which helps FF feel more secure, and thus more interested in selling to low-income customers, is for FF and Connie to enter into another contract saying that if

Connie misses a payment, FF can repossess the furniture. FF doesn't even have to come to court, unless its effort to retrieve the furniture might cause a breach of the peace.

Imagine that Connie defaults, having paid \$400 toward the total purchase price of \$1000 for the furniture. (She's also made interest payments, but we can ignore those for the moment.) FF repossesses the furniture and sells it, for \$250. FF next files an action for money owed against Connie, seeking \$350.


As you know, a business deal is often referred to as a transaction, and this special type of two-contracts-in-one is called a

The rules about what FF does after repossessing the property are complex. If FF sells the property, it is required to conduct the sale in a

manner.

Any amount still owing after the sale is called a

and FF's lawsuit seeking that amount is an *action on the deficiency*.



Recovering Personal Prop. - Page 4

File No.	STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA	
	County	In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division-Small Claims
IU RECUVER PUSSESSIUN OF PERSONAL PROPERTY	WHEN PLAINTIFF I	WHEN PLAINTIFF IS A SECURED PARTY
PLAINTIFF A SECURED PARTY PLAINTIFF NOT A SECURED PARTY G.S. 7A-232; 25-9-609 Name And Address Of Plaintiff	The defendant is a resident of the county named above. I have a security interest in the personal property described in the attached security agreement. The total current value of this property is as shown below. The defendant has defaulted in the payment of the debt which the property secures or has otherwise breached the terms of the security agreement giving me the right to claim immediate possession of the property described below. I demand recovery of this property and reimbursement for court costs.	/e. I have a security interest in the personal property tal current value of this property is as shown below. bt which the property secures or has otherwise ne the right to claim immediate possession of the property and reimbursement for court costs.
	Description Of Personal Property In Which You Have a Secured Interest (Attach Copy Of Security Agreement)	
Social Security No./Taxpayer ID No.		θ
County Telephone No.	Date	Signature Of Plaintiff Or Attorney
VERSUS	WHEN PLAINTIFF IS	WHEN PLAINTIFF IS NOT A SECURED PARTY
Ind Address Of Defendant 1	The defendant is a resident of the county named above. The defendant has in his/her possession the personal property described below which belongs to me. I am entitled to immediate possession of the property, but the defendant has refused on demand to deliver it to me. The defendant has unlawfully kept possession of this property since the date listed below and has therefore deprived me of its use. The damage due me for the loss of use and physical damage to the property is set out below. I demand recovery	/e. The defendant has in his/her possession the ne. I am entitled to immediate possession of the o deliver it to me. The defendant has unlawfully kept / and has therefore deprived me of its use. The age to the property is set out below. I demand recove
County Telephone No.	of this property and damages in the total amount set c costs.	but below, plus interest and reimbursement for court
]	Description Of Personal Property You Own Which Is In Possession Of Defendant	nt Total Value Of Property To Be Recovered \$
County Telephone No.	Date Defendant Wrongfully Took Or Kept Property	Damage Due For Loss Of Use
Name And Address Of Plaintiff's Attorney		Physical Damage To Property \$
	Date Of Plaintiff Or Attorney (Type Or Print)	
AOC-CVM-202, Rev. 9/13 © 2013 Administrative Office of the Courts	Original-File Copy-Each Defendant Copy-Attorney/Plaintiff (Over)	

	INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT	1 E	OR DEFENDANT
€	 The PLAINTIFF must file a small claim action in the county where at least one of the defendants resides. 	⊢ ≞ œ o	The DEFENDANT may file a written answer, making defense to the claim, in the office of the Clerk of Superior Court. This answer should be accompanied by a copy for the plaintiff and be filed no later than the time
(N	 The PLAINTIFF cannot sue in small claims court to recover property worth more than \$10,000.00. This amount may be lower, depending on local judicial order. If the amount is lower, it may be any amount between \$5.000.00 and \$10.000.00. as determined by the chief district court iudge 	στο	set for trial. The filing of the answer DOES NOT relieve the defendant of the need to appear before the magistrate to assert the defendant's defense.
	of the judicial district.	, ∠ 2 ⊂	Whether or not an answer is filed, the PLAINTIFF must appear before the magistrate.
	3. The PLAINTIFF must show the complete name and address of the defendant to ensure service on the defendant. If there are two defendants and they reside at different addresses, the plaintiff must include both addresses. The plaintiff must determine if the defendant is according to the complete contrast page.	ю Э Ц О Ц О Ц О Ц О Ц О	The PLAINTIFF or the DEFENDANT may appeal the magistrate's decision in this case. To appeal, notice must be given in open court when the judgment is entered, or notice may be given in writing to the Clerk of
	is not a corporation, the plaintiff must determine the owner's name and sue the owner.). <u>∞</u> α 0,	is given in writing, the appealing party must also serve written notice of appeal on all other parties. The appealing party must PAY to the Clerk of Sumerior Court the costs of court for anneal within twenty (20) days after
V	 The PLAINTIFF may serve the defendant(s) by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the party to be served or by paying the costs to have the sherift serve the summons and complaint. If certified or 	≌. ⊈ ⊕	the judgment is entered. A defendant who appeals also must post a bond to stay execution of the judgment within ten (10) days after the judgement is entered.
	registered mail is used, the plaintiff must <u>prepare and file</u> a sworn statement with the Clerk of Superior Court proving service by certified mail and must attach to that statement the nostal receint showing that	ы. Б	This form is supplied in order to expedite the handling of small claims. It is designed to cover the most common claims.
		10. T	The Clerk or magistrate cannot advise you about your
47	The PLAINTIFF must pay advance court costs at the time of filing this Complaint. In the event that judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, court costs may be charged against the defendant.	שכ	case or assist you in completing this form. If you have any questions, you should consult an attorney.
AOC-C © 2013	AOC-CVM-202, Rev. 9/13 © 2013 Administrative Office of the Courts		

FIG No.	STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA	
Film No.	County	In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division-Small Claims
Judgment Docket Book And Page No.	This action was tried before the undersigned on the cause stated in the complaint. The record show defendant was given proper notice of the nature of the action and the date, time and location of trial.	was tried before the undersigned on the cause stated in the complaint. The record shows that the was given proper notice of the nature of the action and the date, time and location of trial.
IIIDOMENT.	FINC	FINDINGS
IN ACTION TO RECOVER MONEY OR PERSONAL PROPERTY	The Court finds that: the plaintiff has proved the case by the greater weight of the evidence. the plaintiff has failed to prove the case by the greater weight of the evidence. the defendant(s)	f the evidence. /eight of the evidence. at trial.
G.S. 7A-210(2), 7A-224 Name And Address Of Plaintiff		damages for breach at the rate of% and/or at interest rate.
		ORDER
County Telephone No.	It is OKDERED that: the plaintiff recover possession of the personal property described in the complaint. the plaintiff recover possession of the personal property listed below:	/ described in the complaint. / listed below:
VERSUS	the plaintiff recover nothing of the defendant(s) and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.	t this action be dismissed with prejudice.
Name And Address Of Defendant 1	 (for breach of contract cases) the plaintiff recover of the defendant(s) the followin principal from the date of breach to the date of judgment (1) at the rate provid (2) at the legal rate. In addition, the principal shall bear interest from the date (1) at the rate provided in the contract, as found above; or (2) at the legal rate. (for tort cases) the plaintiff recover of the defendant(s) the following principal su the date the date the date the action was instituted until judgment is satisfied. 	(for breach of contract cases) the plaintiff recover of the defendant(s) the following principal sum plus interest on the principal from the date of breach to the date of judgment (1) at the rate provided in the contract, as found above; or (2) at the legal rate. In addition, the principal shall bear interest from the date of judgment until the judgment is satisfied (1) at the rate provided in the contract, as found above; or (2) at the legal rate. In addition, the contract, as found above; or (2) at the legal rate provided in the contract, as found above; or (2) at the legal rate.
County Telephone No.	 Uther: (specify) Costs of this action are taxed to the 	defendant.
Name And Address Of Defendant 2	Principal Sum Of Judgment \$	Name Of Judgment Debtor(s) From Whom Amount Recovered
	Pre-judgment Interest Not Included \$ In Principal Attorney's Fees Or Other Damages \$	Judgment Announced And Signed In Open Court Date Signature Of Magistrate
County Telephone No.	(when appropriate) (when appropr	Name Of Party Announcing Appeal In Open Court
Name And Address Of Plaintiff's Attorney	CERTIF	CERTIFICATION
	NOTE: To be used when magistrate does not announce and sign this Judgment in open court at the conclusion of the trial. I certify that this Judgment has been served on each party named by depositing a copy in a post-paid properly addressed envelope in a post office or official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Postal Service. Date	<i>iis Judgment in open court at the conclusion of the trial.</i> <i>y</i> depositing a copy in a post-paid properly addressed envelope in a y of the United States Postal Service.
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- 1. "Should I file a lawsuit or take out a warrant for stealing my dog?" 2. "We're getting a divorce, and I'm just trying to get my property back. Can I file a small claims lawsuit, so I don't have to get a lawyer?" 3. "Can I sue for money, or just to get my dog back? What if he doesn't still have my dog?" 4. "He borrowed my lawnmower and didn't give it back, and now it's torn up, and I don't want it back. Do I have to take it back?" FAQ'S: WE WANT TO REPO THE COLLATERAL
- 1. "He's missed several payments. Is it legal for us to go tow his car out of his driveway?"

2. "What do you mean by 'breach of the peace'?

3. "I only owe \$50 on it—I've paid off all the rest. Can they still repo my car?"

4. "I got a judgment ordering the defendant to turn over the diamond ring, but when the sheriff went out to get it, the guy said he didn't have it anymore. How am I going to get my money if I can't find the ring?"

Actions to Recover Personal Property

I. By a non-secured party

A. Conversion (Forced Sale). Essential elements:

- 1. Plaintiff is owner (or person entitled to possession)
- 2. Defendant wrongfully took or retained Wrongful retention requires demand for return, even if due date
 - specified.
- 3. FMV (Plaintiff's opinion testimony sufficient)

B. Action to Recover

- 1. Essential elements:
 - a) Plaintiff is owner (or person entitled to possession)
 - b) Property was wrongfully taken or retained
 - c) Defendant has possession of property
 If not, plaintiff may amend complaint to seek money damages for conversion.
 - d) Damages necessary to return plaintiff to original position: return of property, compensation for injury to property, and costs associated with loss of use.
- 2. Claim and delivery: Ancillary remedy sought by plaintiff from CSC to take immediate possession of property pending trial; rare in small claims.

II. By a secured party

A. SP is either a lender (L) or a seller of property on credit (S).

B. Essential Elements

- 1. Valid security agreement
- 2. Applicable to property sought to be recovered
- 3. Debtor defaulted in manner triggering right to repossess

C. Essential Element #1: Valid Security Agreement

- 1. Authenticated by debtor
- 2. Description of property sufficient to allow identification
- 3. Writing sufficient to indicate intention to create security interest
- 4. If *consumer credit*, must be dated. *Consumer credit* definition:

- a) S in ordinary course of business regularly extends credit,
- b) buyer is natural person,
- c) goods or services are purchased for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes,
- d) debt is payable in installments or finance charge imposed,
- e) and amount does not exceed \$75,0000.

D. Essential Element #2: SA applies to particular property sought to be recovered.

- 1. RISA (GS Ch. 25A) limits S in consumer credit sales (NOT lenders) to
 - a) Collateral
 - b) Previous purchases not yet paid off
 - c) Personal property to which goods are installed (\$300+)
 - d) MV to which repairs are made (\$100 +)
 - e) Property sold for use in agricultural business
- 2. SI taken in property other than that above is void.
- 3. FIFO rule applies to allocation of payments to collateral purchased from same seller over time. S has burden of proof on proper allocation.
- 4. RISA applies only to sellers; for loans, federal regulation provides SI in household goods other than *purchase money security interest* is unfair trade practice. *Purchase money security interest* is interest taken in property purchased with money obtained from loan.

E. SP's Rights on Buyer's Default

- 1. May repossess without court order if no breach of peace.
- Effect of breach of peace is to render repossession wrongful.
 Consequences of wrongful repossession are that SP may be liable for conversion, civil trespass, or even criminal charges.
- 3. Factors relevant to whether repossession caused breach of peace:
 - a) Location
 - b) D's express or constructive consent
 - c) Reactions of third parties
 - d) Type of premises entered
 - e) Use of deception by creditor
- 4. SP can elect to sue for \$ or repossession; not required to repossess.

III. What happens after repossession

- A. Generally, SP has option of sale or keeping goods in full satisfaction of debt.
 - 1. Debtor must agree to decision not to sell, either by signing agreement or by failing to object to notice of intent to keep within 20 days
 - 2. Consumer goods/60% of debt paid: SP <u>must</u> sell property within 90 days.

B. Sale of repossessed property

1. Statute requires notice to debtor of sale, and notice must be given in commercially reasonable manner, in terms of timing, content, and manner in which it is sent.

Consumer goods: GS 25-9-614 spells out required contents of notice.

- 2. Debtor has right to redeem property at any point prior to sale.
 - a) Amount owed, expenses, and attorney fees (if SA provides) required for redemption.
 - b) Effect of acceleration clause: D must pay full amount of debt to redeem property.
- 3. Sale must be conducted in commercially reasonable manner "in every aspect."
 - a) Whether sale meets CRM standard depends on facts; guiding star is reasonable efforts to obtain best price.
 - b) Whether sale is CR may include consideration of time, place, price obtained for goods, amount of publicity, other broad range of factors.
 - c) May require S to make reasonable efforts to prepare property for sale.
 - d) S may elect public sale (auction, with notice to general public) or private sale (all others). S is allowed to purchase property only at public sale unless fair price is capable of objective determination.

C. Post-sale

- 1. Proceeds allocated in order to a) expenses, b) debt to S, c) debt to other SPs, & d) surplus to D.
- 2. Consumer goods: S must provide written accounting to D.

D. Action for deficiency

- 1. If proceeds are insufficient for expenses & debt to S, S may bring action for \$ owed ("action for deficiency").
- 2. Essential elements:
 - a) S gave D proper written notice of disposition of property

- b) Sale was conducted in CRM
- c) Amount of remaining debt
- 3. Consequence of failure to conduct CR sale: Rebuttable presumption that value of property was at least equivalent to amount of debt.

E. D's Remedies for Creditor's Violation of Rules

- 1. 60% Rule: action for conversion
- 2. Any actual damages debtor is able to prove
- 3. Consumer goods: liquidated damages of not less than total finance charge plus 10% principal
- 4. Treble damages if B proves unfair or deceptive practice
- 5. \$500 penalty for
 - a) Creditor who refuses to provide statement of amount owed or list of collateral securing debt in response to written request, or
 - b) Creditor who fails to account for proceeds of sale and who has a pattern of noncompliance.

IV. Rights of Third Parties

A. SP may be able to repossess property from 3rd parties if SP has a *perfected* security interest.

B. Perfection may occur in four ways:

- 1. By filing financing statement with Secretary of State.
- 2. A purchase money security interest is automatically perfected.
- 3. In the case of motor vehicles, by filing a lien with DMV.
- 4. Creditor retains possession of property (e.g., pawnbroker)

C. Priority rules for perfected security interests:

- 1. Purchase money security interest prevails over all others.
- 2. First to perfect wins otherwise.
- 3. Perfected interest wins over unperfected interest.
- D. Special rule for consumer goods: A "good faith purchaser" of consumer goods who purchases from a buyer takes free of a security interest in the goods if
 - 1. The GFP did not know there was a security interest in the goods;
 - 2. The GFP paid for the goods;
 - 3. The goods were for the GFP's personal use;
 - 4. The GFP bought the goods before a financing statement was filed.

TAB: Domestic Violence

LEGAL ISSUES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

SOME BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDERS¹

G.S. Ch. 50B creates a special kind of civil action in which the relief sought is protection from injury by the defendant, in the form of a coercive order by a judge prohibiting the defendant from taking certain actions. If the defendant knowingly violates the order, he may be found in contempt of court for violation of a court order. As an alternative to being found in contempt, the defendant may be found guilty of the crime of violating a DVPO.

A special kind of DVPO is available to a plaintiff who fears that she may be injured during the interval between filing the complaint and the time the hearing is held. What statistical fact suggests that this concern of plaintiffs is often well-founded?

A person seeking a DVPO has the option of asking for an **ex parte DVPO** as well. An ex parte DVPO is a protective order already in place before the defendant learns that the victim has filed for a DVPO. An ex parte DVPO is issued following a hearing conducted in the absence of the defendant. What concern does this raise in your mind?

Magistrates never issue DVPOs, but in some counties magistrates are authorized to determine whether an <u>ex parte DVPO</u> should issue. Authorized magistrates may conduct hearings on requests for ex parte DVPOs only if (1) district court is not in session, and (2) no district court judge will be available to conduct the hearing for at least four hours.

Has your chief district court judge authorized magistrates to issue ex parte DVPO's?

- ____ Never
- ____ Only during conferences or other relatively rare occasions
- ____ Theoretically, but we are strongly urged to use criminal charges when possible
- ___ Yes

¹ This outline refers to the victim of domestic violence as "the plaintiff" or "she", and the perpetrator of domestic violence as "the defendant" or "he", but any of these terms may be inaccurate in a specific case. The terms are used consistently in order to avoid confusion, and were chosen because they are accurate in the majority of cases. In fact, though, a significant minority of victims of domestic violence are male. And because a person may seek a DVPO either by filing a civil action or by filing a motion in an already-existent civil action, that person may be a plaintiff or a defendant.

An ex parte DVPO issued by a magistrate is valid until midnight of the next day district court is in session. A district court judge will conduct another ex parte hearing when court is back in session.

The "permanent" hearing on plaintiff's request for a DVPO is referred to as the "10 day hearing," After defendant is served with the complaint, a full hearing is conducted on whether plaintiff is entitled to a DVPO and, if so, what provisions the order should contain. The order entered by the district court judge after hearing the evidence is valid for one year, and may be extended at the end of that time for up to two years.

A DVPO is available only to parties involved in a **type of personal relationship** specified in the statute. These relationships are:

- --current or former spouses
- --persons of the opposite sex who live together or have lived together
- --parents and children,² and grandparents and grandchildren. NOTE: no DVPO may issue <u>under this section</u> against a child under the age of 16.

--persons having a child in common

--current or former household members

--persons of the opposite sex who are or have been in a dating relationship.³

² Including those acting *in loco parentis* to a minor child.

³ A dating relationship is defined as a relationship in which the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuous basis over the course of the relationship.

A DVPO is available only against a person who **has done one of the following things** to the plaintiff, or to a child who lives with the plaintiff:

--He tried to cause physical injury;

- --He intentionally caused physical injury;
- --He behaved in a way that caused the plaintiff, a member of her family, or a member of her household, to be afraid of imminent serious bodily injury;
- -- He behaved in a way that caused the plaintiff, a member of her family, or a member of her household, to be afraid that defendant will continue to terrorize that person to such a degree that the person experiences significant mental suffering. This behavior must be intentional on the part of the defendant, and it must have no legitimate purpose.⁴ The statute refers to this behavior as **harassment**.

--He committed any act defined as rape or sexual offense in GS 14-27.2 to 14-27.7.

If a magistrate finds that an act of domestic violence did in fact occur (i.e., the defendant committed one of the acts listed above against a person in a personal relationship protected by the statute), the magistrate MUST grant an ex parte DVPO, ordering that the defendant refrain from acts of domestic violence. And the magistrate must do one other thing as well: the magistrate must question the plaintiff about defendant's ownership or access to firearms. (Does the defendant have access? Does the defendant own or have access to ammunition? A permit to purchase firearms? A permit to carry a concealed firearm?)

The magistrate must ask about the information above in every case, but in some cases the magistrate is required to go further and specifically order the defendant to turn over to the sheriff all guns, ammunition, and permits within his custody or control. This order is mandatory if any of the following factors are present:

⁴ The statute specifically states that this behavior may include, among other things, written communication, telephone calls (including voice mail), email, faxes, and pager messages.

- 1) The defendant has at some time in the past used or threatened to use a deadly weapon.
- 2) The defendant has a pattern of prior conduct involving the use or threatened use of violence with a firearm against people.
- 3) The defendant has made threats to seriously injure or kill the plaintiff or minor child.
- 4) The defendant has threatened suicide.
- 5) The defendant has inflicted serious injuries on the plaintiff or minor child.

The magistrate has authority to grant a wide range of additional relief to the plaintiff, depending on the particular circumstances of the case. These remedies include

- 1) granting the plaintiff possession of the parties' shared residence, and ordering the defendant to leave the home;
- 2) determining which party has the right to possession of personal property during the time the order is effective, including possession of family pets; and
- 3) ordering the defendant to stay away from the plaintiff, as well as specific places such as the plaintiff's workplace and homes of family members.

The magistrate is often asked to make a determination of temporary custody of minor children residing with one or both parties. The magistrate is explicitly prohibited by GS 50B-2(c)(1) from doing this, unless the magistrate finds that ...

... the child is exposed to a substantial risk of physical or emotional injury or sexual abuse.

If a magistrate makes this finding, s/he may then go on to order that the defendant stay away from the minor child, return the child to the plaintiff, or not remove the child from the plaintiff. In support of this order, the magistrate must make a formal finding that the order is necessary for the child's safety.

ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT DVPO'S

Every magistrate should know the answers to the following questions, and those answers sometimes vary from one county to the next—and one magistrate to the next, depending on your personality, the shift you're working, and other circumstances. Magistrates should be guided by two fundamental principles in responding to these questions:

Providing information to citizens about the court system's response to domestic violence is an important part of your job;

and

You have a responsibility to be certain that the information you provide is accurate.

- 1. How do I get a DVPO?
- 2. Why should I consider a DVPO?
- 3. How much does it cost?
- 4. What do I have to prove to get one?
- 5. What if my spouse violates the order?
- 6. How long will it last?
- 7. Can I get one for my kids and family too?
- 8. Do I need a lawyer to get one?
- 9. Is there anyone that can help me fill out the forms?
- 10. When will my spouse find out about it?

List other questions you've heard or can think of:

11	 	
12	 	
13	 	

In many counties, the clerk's office or local agency offering assistance to domestic violence has prepared brochures or other handouts providing victims with answers to these questions. In every case, the magistrate should be certain that the citizen is informed that **there are no court costs** associated with seeking a DVPO, and that an attorney is not necessary to access these services.

Selections from Chapter 50B. Domestic Violence.

§ 50B- 1. Domestic violence; definition.

(a) Domestic violence means the commission of one or more of the following acts upon an aggrieved party or upon a minor child residing with or in the custody of the aggrieved party by a person with whom the aggrieved party has or has had a personal relationship, but does not include acts of self- defense:

- (1) Attempting to cause bodily injury, or intentionally causing bodily injury; or
- (2) Placing the aggrieved party or a member of the aggrieved party's family or household in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or continued harassment, as defined in G.S. 14- 277.3A, that rises to such a level as to inflict substantial emotional distress; or
- (3) Committing any act defined in G.S. 14- 27.2 through G.S. 14- 27.7.

(b) For purposes of this section, the term "personal relationship" means a relationship wherein the parties involved:

- (1) Are current or former spouses;
- (2) Are persons of opposite sex who live together or have lived together;
- (3) Are related as parents and children, including others acting in loco parentis to a minor child, or as grandparents and grandchildren. For purposes of this subdivision, an aggrieved party may not obtain an order of protection against a child or grandchild under the age of 16;
- (4) Have a child in common;
- (5) Are current or former household members;
- (6) Are persons of the opposite sex who are in a dating relationship or have been in a dating relationship. For purposes of this subdivision, a dating relationship is one wherein the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuous basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary fraternization between persons in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

(c) As used in this Chapter, the term "protective order" includes any order entered pursuant to this Chapter upon hearing by the court or consent of the parties.

§ 50B-2. Institution of civil action; motion for emergency relief; temporary orders; temporary custody.

(a) Any person residing in this State may seek relief under this Chapter by filing a civil action or by filing a motion in any existing action filed under Chapter 50 of the General Statutes alleging acts of domestic violence against himself or herself or a minor child who resides with or is in the custody of such person. Any aggrieved party entitled to relief under this Chapter may file a civil action and proceed pro se, without the assistance of legal counsel. The district court division of the General Court of Justice shall have original jurisdiction over actions instituted under this Chapter. Any action for a domestic violence protective order requires that a summons be issued and served. The summons issued pursuant to this Chapter shall require the defendant to answer within 10 days of the date of service. Attachments to the summons shall include the complaint, notice of hearing, any temporary or ex parte order that has been issued, and other papers through the appropriate law enforcement agency where the defendant is to be served. No court costs shall be assessed for the filing, issuance, registration,

or service of a protective order or petition for a protective order or witness subpoena in compliance with the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg- 5.

(b) Emergency Relief. – A party may move the court for emergency relief if he or she believes there is a danger of serious and immediate injury to himself or herself or a minor child. A hearing on a motion for emergency relief, where no ex parte order is entered, shall be held after five days' notice of the hearing to the other party or after five days from the date of service of process on the other party, whichever occurs first, provided, however, that no hearing shall be required if the service of process is not completed on the other party. If the party is proceeding pro se and does not request an ex parte hearing, the clerk shall set a date for hearing and issue a notice of hearing within the time periods provided in this subsection, and shall effect service of the summons, complaint, notice, and other papers through the appropriate law enforcement agency where the defendant is to be served.

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(c1) Ex Parte Orders by Authorized Magistrate. – The chief district court judge may authorize a magistrate or magistrates to hear any motions for emergency relief ex parte. Prior to the hearing, if the magistrate determines that at the time the party is seeking emergency relief ex parte the district court is not in session and a district court judge is not and will not be available to hear the motion for a period of four or more hours, the motion may be heard by the magistrate. If it clearly appears to the magistrate from specific facts shown that there is a danger of acts of domestic violence against the aggrieved party or a minor child, the magistrate may enter orders as it deems necessary to protect the aggrieved party or minor children from those acts, except that a temporary order for custody ex parte and prior to service of process and notice shall not be entered unless the magistrate finds that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of physical or emotional injury or sexual abuse. If the magistrate finds that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of physical or emotional injury or sexual abuse, upon request of the aggrieved party, the magistrate shall consider and may order the other party to stay away from a minor child, or to return a minor child to, or not remove a minor child from, the physical care of a parent or person in loco parentis, if the magistrate finds that the order is in the best interest of the minor child and is necessary for the safety of the minor child. If the magistrate determines that it is in the best interest of the minor child for the other party to have contact with the minor child or children, the magistrate shall issue an order designed to protect the safety and well-being of the minor child and the aggrieved party. The order shall specify the terms of contact between the other party and the minor child and may include a specific schedule of time and location of exchange of the minor child, supervision by a third party or supervised visitation center, and any other conditions that will ensure both the well- being of the minor child and the aggrieved party. An ex parte order entered under this subsection shall expire and the magistrate shall schedule an exparte hearing before a district court judge by the end of the next day on which the district court is in session in the county in which the action was filed. Ex parte orders entered by the district court judge pursuant to this subsection shall be entered and scheduled in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.

(c2) The authority granted to authorized magistrates to award temporary child custody pursuant to subsection (c1) of this section and pursuant to G.S. 50B- 3(a)(4) is granted subject to custody rules to be established by the supervising chief district judge of each judicial district.

(d) Pro Se Forms. – The clerk of superior court of each county shall provide to pro se complainants all forms that are necessary or appropriate to enable them to proceed pro se pursuant to this section. The clerk shall, whenever feasible, provide a private area for

complainants to fill out forms and make inquiries. The clerk shall provide a supply of pro se forms to authorized magistrates who shall make the forms available to complainants seeking relief under subsection (c1) of this section.

§ 50B- 3. Relief.

(a) If the court, including magistrates as authorized under G.S. 50B- 2(c1), finds that an act of domestic violence has occurred, the court shall grant a protective order restraining the defendant from further acts of domestic violence. A protective order may include any of the following types of relief:

- (1) Direct a party to refrain from such acts.
- (2) Grant to a party possession of the residence or household of the parties and exclude the other party from the residence or household.
- (3) Require a party to provide a spouse and his or her children suitable alternate housing.
- (4) Award temporary custody of minor children and establish temporary visitation rights pursuant to G.S. 50B- 2 if the order is granted ex parte, and pursuant to subsection (a1) of this section if the order is granted after notice or service of process.
- (5) Order the eviction of a party from the residence or household and assistance to the victim in returning to it.
- (6) Order either party to make payments for the support of a minor child as required by law.
- (7) Order either party to make payments for the support of a spouse as required by law.
- (8) Provide for possession of personal property of the parties, including the care, custody, and control of any animal owned, possessed, kept, or held as a pet by either party or minor child residing in the household.
- (9) Order a party to refrain from doing any or all of the following:
 - a. Threatening, abusing, or following the other party.
 - b. Harassing the other party, including by telephone, visiting the home or workplace, or other means.
 - b1. Cruelly treating or abusing an animal owned, possessed, kept, or held as a pet by either party or minor child residing in the household.
 - c. Otherwise interfering with the other party.
- (10) Award attorney's fees to either party.
- (11) Prohibit a party from purchasing a firearm for a time fixed in the order.
- (12) Order any party the court finds is responsible for acts of domestic violence to attend and complete an abuser treatment program if the program is approved by the Domestic Violence Commission.
- (13) Include any additional prohibitions or requirements the court deems necessary to protect any party or any minor child.

(c) A copy of any order entered and filed under this Article shall be issued to each party. In addition, a copy of the order shall be issued promptly to and retained by the police department of the city of the victim's residence. If the victim does not reside in a city or resides in a city with no police department, copies shall be issued promptly to and retained by the

sheriff, and the county police department, if any, of the county in which the victim resides. If the defendant is ordered to stay away from the child's school, a copy of the order shall be delivered promptly by the sheriff to the principal or, in the principal's absence, the assistant principal or the principal's designee of each school named in the order.

(c1) When a protective order issued under this Chapter is filed with the Clerk of Superior Court, the clerk shall provide to the applicant an informational sheet developed by the Administrative Office of the Courts that includes:

- (1) Domestic violence agencies and services.
- (2) Sexual assault agencies and services.
- (3) Victims' compensation services.
- (4) Legal aid services.
- (5) Address confidentiality services.
- (6) An explanation of the plaintiff's right to apply for a permit under G.S. 14-415.15.

(d) The sheriff of the county where a domestic violence order is entered shall provide for prompt entry of the order into the National Crime Information Center registry and shall provide for access of such orders to magistrates on a 24- hour- a- day basis. Modifications, terminations, renewals, and dismissals of the order shall also be promptly entered.

§ 50B- 3.1. Surrender and disposal of firearms; violations; exemptions.

(a) Required Surrender of Firearms. – Upon issuance of an emergency or ex parte order pursuant to this Chapter, the court shall order the defendant to surrender to the sheriff all firearms, machine guns, ammunition, permits to purchase firearms, and permits to carry concealed firearms that are in the care, custody, possession, ownership, or control of the defendant if the court finds any of the following factors:

- (1) The use or threatened use of a deadly weapon by the defendant or a pattern of prior conduct involving the use or threatened use of violence with a firearm against persons.
- (2) Threats to seriously injure or kill the aggrieved party or minor child by the defendant.
- (3) Threats to commit suicide by the defendant.
- (4) Serious injuries inflicted upon the aggrieved party or minor child by the defendant.

(b) Ex Parte or Emergency Hearing. – The court shall inquire of the plaintiff, at the ex parte or emergency hearing, the presence of, ownership of, or otherwise access to firearms by the defendant, as well as ammunition, permits to purchase firearms, and permits to carry concealed firearms, and include, whenever possible, identifying information regarding the description, number, and location of firearms, ammunition, and permits in the order.

§ 50B- 4. Enforcement of orders.

. . . .

(a) A party may file a motion for contempt for violation of any order entered pursuant to this Chapter. This party may file and proceed with that motion pro se, using forms provided by the clerk of superior court or a magistrate authorized under G.S. 50B- 2(c1). Upon the filing pro se of a motion for contempt under this subsection, the clerk, or the authorized magistrate, if the facts show clearly that there is danger of acts of domestic violence against the aggrieved party or a minor child and the motion is made at a time when the clerk is not available, shall

schedule and issue notice of a show cause hearing with the district court division of the General Court of Justice at the earliest possible date pursuant to G.S. 5A-23. The Clerk, or the magistrate in the case of notice issued by the magistrate pursuant to this subsection, shall effect service of the motion, notice, and other papers through the appropriate law enforcement agency where the defendant is to be served.

(c) A valid protective order entered pursuant to this Chapter shall be enforced by all North Carolina law enforcement agencies without further order of the court.

A valid protective order entered by the courts of another state or the courts of an (d)Indian tribe shall be accorded full faith and credit by the courts of North Carolina whether or not the order has been registered and shall be enforced by the courts and the law enforcement agencies of North Carolina as if it were an order issued by a North Carolina court. In determining the validity of an out- of- state order for purposes of enforcement, a law enforcement officer may rely upon a copy of the protective order issued by another state or the courts of an Indian tribe that is provided to the officer and on the statement of a person protected by the order that the order remains in effect. Even though registration is not required, a copy of a protective order may be registered in North Carolina by filing with the clerk of superior court in any county a copy of the order and an affidavit by a person protected by the order that to the best of that person's knowledge the order is presently in effect as written. Notice of the registration shall not be given to the defendant. Upon registration of the order, the clerk shall promptly forward a copy to the sheriff of that county. Unless the issuing state has already entered the order, the sheriff shall provide for prompt entry of the order into the National Crime Information Center registry pursuant to G.S. 50B- 3(d).

(e) Upon application or motion by a party to the court, the court shall determine whether an out- of- state order remains in full force and effect.

(f) The term "valid protective order," as used in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, shall include an emergency or ex parte order entered under this Chapter.

§ 50B- 4.1. Violation of valid protective order.

(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, a person who knowingly violates a valid protective order entered pursuant to this Chapter or who knowingly violates a valid protective order entered by the courts of another state or the courts of an Indian tribe shall be guilty of a Class A1 misdemeanor.

(b) A law enforcement officer shall arrest and take a person into custody, with or without a warrant or other process, if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person knowingly has violated a valid protective order excluding the person from the residence or household occupied by a victim of domestic violence or directing the person to refrain from doing any or all of the acts specified in G.S. 50B- 3(a)(9).

(c) When a law enforcement officer makes an arrest under this section without a warrant, and the party arrested contests that the out- of- state order or the order issued by an Indian court remains in full force and effect, the party arrested shall be promptly provided with a copy of the information applicable to the party which appears on the National Crime Information Center registry by the sheriff of the county in which the arrest occurs.

(d) Unless covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment, a person who commits a felony at a time when the person knows the behavior is prohibited by a valid protective order as provided in subsection (a) of this section shall be guilty of a felony one class higher than the principal felony described in the charging document. This subsection

shall not apply to a person who is charged with or convicted of a Class A or B1 felony or to a person charged under subsection (f) or subsection (g) of this section.

(e) An indictment or information that charges a person with committing felonious conduct as described in subsection (d) of this section shall also allege that the person knowingly violated a valid protective order as described in subsection (a) of this section in the course of the conduct constituting the underlying felony. In order for a person to be punished as described in subsection (d) of this section, a finding shall be made that the person knowingly violated the protective order in the course of conduct constituting the underlying felony.

(f) Unless covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment, any person who knowingly violates a valid protective order as provided in subsection (a) of this section, after having been previously convicted of two offenses under this Chapter, shall be guilty of a Class H felony.

(g) Unless covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment, any person who, while in possession of a deadly weapon on or about his or her person or within close proximity to his or her person, knowingly violates a valid protective order as provided in subsection (a) of this section by failing to stay away from a place, or a person, as so directed under the terms of the order, shall be guilty of a Class H felony.

(g1) Unless covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment, any person who is subject to a valid protective order, as provided in subsection (a) of this section, who enters property operated as a safe house or haven for victims of domestic violence, where a person protected under the order is residing, shall be guilty of a Class H felony. A person violates this subsection regardless of whether the person protected under the order is present on the property.

(h) For the purposes of this section, the term "valid protective order" shall include an emergency or ex parte order entered under this Chapter. (1997-471, s. 3; 1997-456, s. 27; 1999-23, s. 4; 2001-518, s. 5; 2007-190, s. 1; 2008-93, s. 1; 2009-342, s. 5; 2009-389, s. 2; 2010-5, s. 1.)

§ 50B- 4.2. False statement regarding protective order a misdemeanor.

A person who knowingly makes a false statement to a law enforcement agency or officer that a protective order entered pursuant to this Chapter or by the courts of another state or Indian tribe remains in effect shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor. (1999-23, s. 5.)

§ 50B- 5. Emergency assistance.

(a) A person who alleges that he or she or a minor child has been the victim of domestic violence may request the assistance of a local law enforcement agency. The local law enforcement agency shall respond to the request for assistance as soon as practicable. The local law enforcement officer responding to the request for assistance may take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to protect the complainant from harm and may advise the complainant of sources of shelter, medical care, counseling and other services. Upon request by the complainant and where feasible, the law enforcement officer may transport the complainant to appropriate facilities such as hospitals, magistrates' offices, or public or private facilities for shelter and accompany the complainant to his or her residence, within the jurisdiction in which the request for assistance was made, so that the complainant may remove food, clothing, medication and such other personal property as is reasonably necessary to remain to remain

elsewhere pending further proceedings.

(b) In providing the assistance authorized by subsection (a), no officer may be held criminally or civilly liable on account of reasonable measures taken under authority of subsection (a). (1979, c. 561, s. 1; 1985, c. 113, s. 5; 1999-23, s. 6.)

Case No. Court County	General Court of Justice District Court Division	NORTH CAROLINA	c	EX P/ DOMESTIC DRDER OF F	VIOLEN	ΓΙΟΝ	
County						G.S. 50B-2	2, -3, -3.1
	PETITIONER/PLA		PEII	TIONER/PLAII		NTIFIERS	
First	Middle	Last	Date Of Birth Of Petit	ioner			
And/or on b	ehalf of minor family member	(s): (List Name And DOB)	Other Protected	Persons/DOB			
		VER	SUS				
	RESPONDENT/DEF			ONDENT/DEFE		ENTIFIERS	
			Sex	Race	DOB	HT	WT
First	Middle	Last					
unmarrie	p to Petitioner: Spouse d, of opposite sex, currently c	former spouse formerly living together	Eyes	Hair	Social S	Security Nu	mber
	d, have a child in common ite sex, currently or formerly ir	dating relationship		icense No.	State	Evoiration	Data
	r former household member		Drivers	icense no.	State	Expiration	Date
parent	🗌 grandparent 🔄 child 🗌	grandchild					
Responden	t's/Defendant's Address		Distinguishing Fe	eatures			
CAUTION:							
THE COU	RT HEREBY FINDS THAT	r.					
	was heard by the undersigne	··		he court has juri	sdiction over	r the subject r	natter.
Additional fi	indings of this order are set fo	rth on Page 2.					
THE COU	RT HEREBY ORDERS TH	IAT:					
The aboviolence	ve named Respondent/Defen (G.S. 50B-1).	dant shall not commit any fu	irther acts of dome	stic violence or n	nake any thr	eats of dome	stic
defendar	ve named Respondent/Defen nt-initiated contact, except thr g or telefacsimile machine. [0	ough an attorney, direct or i					l, pager,
Additiona	al terms of this order are as se	et forth on Pages 3 and 4.					
The terms of	of this order shall be effective	until		,			
WARNING	SS TO THE RESPONDEN	T/DEFENDANT:					
Territory, a	shall be enforced, even wit and may be enforced by Trik order may result in federal	oal Lands (18 U.S.C. Section	on 2265). Crossing				0
	will be enforced anywhere		·				
	ourt can change this order.		e vou permissio	on to violate th	is order.		
	onal warnings on Page 4.						
	J · · · · · · · · ·	(0)	(27)				

(Over)

		ADI	DITIONAL FI	NDINGS			
1.	As indicated by the check block under R relationship.	esponden	t/Defendant's r	ame on Page	1, the parties ar	e or have been in a	a personal
$\square 2$	That on (date of most recent conduct)		. t	ne defendant			
		ntionally ca		injury to	the plaintiff	the child(ren)	living with
	 b. placed in fear of imminent serious a member of the plaintiff's hou 		ury	the plaintiff	a membe	er of the plaintiff's f	family
	 c. placed in fear of continued harass the plaintiff a member 	sment that			flict substantial e		
	d. committed an act defined in G.S.	14] 27.5A (se] 27.2 (1st deg. ı exual battery)	аре) 27.3	3 (2nd deg. rape) al activity by subs	27.4 (1st deg. stitute parent) again	,
3.	The defendant is in possession of, owns firearms, ammunition, gun permits and give id						ı. (Describe all
<u> </u>	 The defendant a. used threatened to use the custody of the plaintiff b. has a pattern of prior conduct inv c. made threats to seriously injure of d. made threats to commit suicide e. inflicted serious injuries upon the in that (state facts): 	olving the or kill the	use [plaintiff]] threatened u] minor child(re	use of violence en) residing with	r child(ren) residing with a firearm aga or in the custody he custody of the p	ainst persons of the plaintiff
□ 5.	The parties are the parents of the followic custody of the plaintiff. defense in the second s	ndant. Th	e plaintiff has	submitted an "A	Affidavit As To T	(ren) are presently he Status Of The I	
	Name	Sex	Date Of Birth		Name	Sex	Date Of Birth
					ituito		2410 01 21111
□ 6.	The minor child(ren) is exposed to a sub	stantial ris	k of physical o	r emotional inju	ury or sexual ab	use in that:	
7.	It is in the best interest of and necessary child(ren) in that the defendant return child(ren) from plaintiff in that:					nt stay away from dant not remove th	
8.	(Check block only if plaintiff is entitled to physic contact with the minor child(ren) in that:	ical care of	<i>child(ren).)</i> It is	in the best inte	erest of the mind	or child(ren) that de	efendant have
9.	The 🗌 defendant 🗌 plaintiff is pres	ently in po	ossession of th	e parties' resid	ence at		

Name Of L	Defendant File No.
🗌 10.	The defendant plaintiff is presently in possession of the parties' vehicle. (describe vehicle)
🗆 11.	Other: (specify)
[] 12.	(for magistrate only) This matter was heard at a time when the district court was not in session and a district court judge was not available and would not be available for a period of four or more hours.
	CONCLUSIONS
	on these facts, the Court makes the following conclusions of law:
	The defendant has committed acts of domestic violence against the plaintiff.
	The defendant has committed acts of domestic violence against the minor child(ren) residing with or in the custody of the plaintiff. It clearly appears that there is a danger of acts of domestic violence against the plaintiff. It clearly appears that there is a danger of acts of domestic violence against the plaintiff.
	[G.S. 50B-2(c)]
	The minor child(ren) is exposed to a substantial risk of physical injury. emotional injury. sexual abuse. [G.S. 50B-2(c)]
	The Court has jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction And Enforcement Act.
[] 6.	It is in the best interest of and necessary for the safety of the minor child(ren) that the defendant stay away from the minor child(ren). (and) return the minor child(ren) to the physical care of the plaintiff. (and) not remove the minor
	child(ren) from the physical care of the plaintiff.
	The defendant's conduct requires that he/she surrender all firearms, ammunition and gun permits. [G.S. 50B-3.1] The plaintiff has failed to prove grounds for ex parte relief.
0.	ORDER
It is O	RDERED that:
	the defendant shall not assault, threaten, abuse, follow, harass (by telephone, visiting the home or workplace or other means), or interfere with the plaintiff. A law enforcement officer shall arrest the defendant if the officer has probable cause to believe the
	defendant has violated this provision. [01] the defendant shall not assault, threaten, abuse, follow, harass (by telephone, visiting the home or workplace or other means), or
	interfere with the minor child(ren) residing with or in the custody of the plaintiff. A law enforcement officer shall arrest the defendant if the officer has probable cause to believe the defendant has violated this provision. [01]
3.	the defendant shall not threaten a member of the plaintiff's family or household. [02]
☐ 3a.	the defendant shall not cruelly treat or abuse an animal owned, possessed, kept, or held as a pet by either party or minor child residing in the household.
4.	the plaintiff is granted possession of, and the defendant is excluded from, the parties' residence described above and all personal preparty located in the residence except for the defendant's personal dething taileting and table of trade [02]
5.	property located in the residence except for the defendant's personal clothing, toiletries and tools of trade. [03] any law enforcement agency with jurisdiction shall evict the defendant from the residence and shall assist the plaintiff in returning to the residence. [08]
6.	the plaintiff [08] defendant [08] is entitled to get personal clothing, toiletries, and tools of trade from the parties' residence. A law enforcement officer shall assist the plaintiff defendant in returning to the residence to get these
6a.	items. the plaintiff is granted the care, custody, and control of any animal owned, possessed, kept, or held as a pet by either party or
7.	minor child residing in the household. the defendant shall stay away from the plaintiff's residence or any place where the plaintiff receives temporary shelter. A law
	enforcement officer shall arrest the defendant if the officer has probable cause to believe the defendant has violated this provision. [04]
8.	the defendant shall stay away from the following places:
	a. the place where the plaintiff works. [04] . b. any school(s) the child(ren) attend. [04]
	 c. the place where the child(ren) receives day care. [04] d. the plaintiff's school. [04] e. Other: (name other places) [04]
	The sheriff must deliver a copy of this order to the principal or the principal's designee at the following school(s): (name schools)
9.	the plaintiff is granted possession and use of the vehicle described in Block No. 10 of the Findings on Page 3. [08]
	The plaintiff is awarded temporary custody of the minor child(ren) (Check any of a, b, or c that apply.)
	a. and the defendant is ordered to stay away from the minor child(ren).
	 b. and the defendant is ordered to immediately return the minor child(ren) to the care of the plaintiff. c. and the defendant is ordered not to remove the minor child(ren) from the care of the plaintiff.
AOC-C	V-304, Page 3 of 5, Rev. 5/13 (Over)
	Administrative Office of the Courts

Domestic Violence - Page 17

11. (If No. 10 is checked and you are allowing visitation to defendant) The defendant is allowed the following conta child(ren):	act with the minor
 12. the defendant is prohibited from possessing or receiving [07] purchasing a firearm for the this Order [07] and the defendant's concealed handgun permit is suspended for the effective per the defendant is a law enforcement officer/member of the armed services and may may a firearm for official use. 13. the defendant surrender to the Sheriff serving this order the firearms, ammunition, and gun permits des Findings on Page 2 of this Order and any other firearms and ammunition in the defendant's care, custor or control. NOTE TO DEFENDANT: You must surrender these items to the sheriff within 24 hours at by the sheriff. Failure to surrender the weapons and permits as ordered or possessing, purchasing, or received or permits to purchase or carry concealed firearms after being ordered not to possess firearms, ammunition See "Notice To Parties: To The Defendant" on Page 4 of this Order for information regarding the penalty for on how to request return of surrendered weapons. 14. the request for Ex Parte Order is denied. 15. Other: (specify) [08] 	riod of this Order. [08] y not possess or use scribed in Number 3 of the ody, possession, ownership s Order is served on you. If the time and place specified viving a firearm, ammunition n or permits is a crime.
Date Signature	District Court Judge
NOTE TO PLAINTIFF: If the judge signs this Order and gives it to you, take it to the Clerk's office immediately. If the mag gives it to you, follow the magistrate's directions. NOTE TO CLERK: Give or mail a copy of this Order to the plaintiff and to the appropriate local law enforcement agency. S Notice Of Hearing, Complaint and Summons for service on defendant. Send extra copies to the sheriff if required to deliver of school.	Send copies to sheriff with
NOTICE TO PARTIES	
 TO THE DEFENDANT: If this Order prohibits you from possessing, receiving or purchasing a firearm and you violate or a provision, you may be charged with a Class H felony pursuant to North Carolina G.S. 14-269.8 and for up to 30 months. If you have been ordered to surrender firearms, ammunition, and gun permits and you fail to surre by this Order, or if you failed to disclose to the Court all information requested about possession false information about any of these items you may be charged with a Class H felony and may be months. If you surrendered your firearms, ammunition, and permits, you may file a motion for the return of court in the county in which this Order was entered when the protective order is no longer in effect, exc expires criminal charges, in either state or federal court, are pending against you alleged to have been cow who is protected by this order, you may not file for return of the firearms until final disposition of the crimin "Motion For Return Of Weapons Surrendered Under Domestic Violence Protective Order" AOC-CV-319, court's office. The motion must be filed not later than 90 days after the expiration of the Order that return the firearms or if you have pending criminal charges alleged to have been committed against the by the domestic violence protection order, the motion must be filed not later than 90 days after the expiration of the Order that return or the firearms. At the time you file the motion, the clerk will schedule a hearing before the district cour whether to return the weapons to you. The sheriff cannot return your weapons unless the Court orders the file of the file	d may be imprisoned ender them as required of these items or provide imprisoned for up to 30 of weapons with the clerk cept if at the time this Order ommitted against the person nal charges. The form, is available from the clerk of equires you to surrender person who is protected nal disposition of the int for a judge to determine the sheriff to do so. You must
pay the sheriff's storage fee before the sheriff returns your weapons. If you fail to file a motion for return of days after the expiration of this Order, or the final disposition of criminal charges pending at the time this to pay the storage fees within 30 days after the Court enters an order to return your weapons, the s from the Court to dispose of your weapons. TO THE PLAINTIFF:	Order expired, or if you fail
 You should keep a copy of this order on you at all times and should make copies to give to your friends ar another county or state, you may wish to give a copy to the law enforcement agency where you move, bu do so. 	

- 2. The court or judge is the only one that can make changes to this order. If you wish to change any of the terms of this order, you must come back into court to have the judge modify the order.
- 3. If the defendant violates any provision of this order, you may call a law enforcement officer or go to a magistrate to charge the defendant with the crime of violating a protective order. You also may go to the Clerk of Court's office in the county where the protective order was issued and ask to fill out form AOC-CV-307, Motion For Order To Show Cause Domestic Violence Protective Order, to have an order issued for the defendant to appear before a district court judge to be held in contempt for violating the order.

Name Of Defendant					File No.	
			CERTIFIC			
I certify this order is a	true copy.					
Date	Signature O	f Clerk			Deputy CSC	Assistant CSC
			RETURN C	OF SERVICE		
complaint and	civil summ	ons. If comple	aint and summons	are served with orde	e served on defendant sep er, return on summons cove	
I certify that this Ex Parte			er of Protection wa		ed as follows:	
Date Served	Tii	me Served	AM PM	Name Of Defendant		
By delivering to the	e defenda	nt named ab	ove a copy of the	e order.		
By leaving a copy person of suitable Name And Address Of Person W	age and c	discretion the			e of the defendant name	ed above with a
Name And Address Of Person W	πη ννηση Οσμ	des Len				
Other manner of s	ervice on	the defenda	nt (specify)			
			(opoony)			
Defendant WAS N	OT serve	d for the follo	owing reason.			
Date Received				Signature Of Deputy She	eriff Making Return	
Date Of Return				Name Of Deputy Sheriff	Making Return (Type Or Print)	
				County Of Sheriff		

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

County

Name Of Plaintiff (Person Filing Complaint)

Name And Address Of Defendant (Person Accused Of Abuse)

No.			
-----	--	--	--

File

In The General Court Of Justice **District Court Division**

COMPLAINT AND MOTION FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE **PROTECTIVE ORDER** G.S. 50B-1, -2, -3, -4

VERSUS

2	I live in		Co	ounty, North Carolina.		
Ζ.	The defendant and I	are persons of the c		e not married but live together	or have lived toge	ether.
			er household membe			
				in or have been in a dating re	alationship	
3.			ding between the de	fendant and me pending in thi		te. (List count
] 4.	or household in fear of	imminent serious bodily	injury or in fear of co	ne bodily injury; or has placed ontinued harassment that rises gainst me in that: <i>(Give specific</i>	s to such a level a	s to inflict
5	has placed my child(re	en) in fear of imminent sei	rious bodily injury or	bodily injury to the child(ren) liv in fear of continued harassme ffense against the child(ren) ir	ent that rises to su	ch a level as
_ 0.	to inflict substantial em describe in detail what ha				n that. (Give specifi	c dates and
_ 0.					n mat. (Give specin	c dates and
	describe in detail what ha	appened.)			n mat. (Give specin	c dates and
] 6.	describe in detail what ha I believe there is dange (Check this block if you a of eighteen.	appened.) er of serious and immedia isk for temporary child custoo	ate injury to me or m dy.) The defendant a	y child(ren). nd I are the parents of the follo	owing child(ren) u	nder the age
] 6.	describe in detail what hat I believe there is dange (<i>Check this block if you a</i> of eighteen. A COPY OF "AFFIDA	appened.) er of serious and immedia sk for temporary child custor VIT AS TO STATUS OF	ate injury to me or m dy.) The defendant a MINOR CHILD" (Ad	y child(ren). nd I are the parents of the follo DC-CV-609) MUST BE ATTA	owing child(ren) u CHED FOR EAC	nder the age H CHILD .
] 6.	describe in detail what ha I believe there is dange (Check this block if you a of eighteen.	appened.) er of serious and immedia sk for temporary child custor VIT AS TO STATUS OF	ate injury to me or m <i>dy.)</i> The defendant a MINOR CHILD'' (A (y child(ren). nd I are the parents of the follo	owing child(ren) u	nder the age H CHILD .
] 6.	describe in detail what hat I believe there is dange (<i>Check this block if you a</i> of eighteen. A COPY OF "AFFIDA	appened.) er of serious and immedia sk for temporary child custor VIT AS TO STATUS OF	ate injury to me or m dy.) The defendant a MINOR CHILD" (Ad	y child(ren). nd I are the parents of the follo DC-CV-609) MUST BE ATTA	owing child(ren) u CHED FOR EAC	nder the age
] 6.	describe in detail what hat I believe there is dange (<i>Check this block if you a</i> of eighteen. A COPY OF "AFFIDA	appened.) er of serious and immedia sk for temporary child custor VIT AS TO STATUS OF	ate injury to me or m dy.) The defendant a MINOR CHILD" (Ad	y child(ren). nd I are the parents of the follo DC-CV-609) MUST BE ATTA	owing child(ren) u CHED FOR EAC	nder the age H CHILD.
] 6.	describe in detail what hat I believe there is dange (<i>Check this block if you a</i> of eighteen. A COPY OF "AFFIDA	appened.) er of serious and immedia sk for temporary child custor VIT AS TO STATUS OF	ate injury to me or m dy.) The defendant a MINOR CHILD" (Ad	y child(ren). nd I are the parents of the follo DC-CV-609) MUST BE ATTA	owing child(ren) u CHED FOR EAC	nder the age H CHILD.
] 6.	describe in detail what hat I believe there is dange (<i>Check this block if you a</i> of eighteen. A COPY OF "AFFIDA	appened.) er of serious and immedia sk for temporary child custor VIT AS TO STATUS OF	ate injury to me or m dy.) The defendant a MINOR CHILD" (Ad	y child(ren). nd I are the parents of the follo DC-CV-609) MUST BE ATTA	owing child(ren) u CHED FOR EAC	nder the age H CHILD.
] 6.	describe in detail what hat I believe there is dange (<i>Check this block if you a</i> of eighteen. A COPY OF "AFFIDA	appened.) er of serious and immedia sk for temporary child custor VIT AS TO STATUS OF	ate injury to me or m dy.) The defendant a MINOR CHILD" (Ad	y child(ren). nd I are the parents of the follo DC-CV-609) MUST BE ATTA	owing child(ren) u CHED FOR EAC	nder the age H CHILD.

 9. The defendant has firearms and ammunition as described below, has a permit to purchase a firearm, and has a permit to carry a concealed weapon. (Describe all firearms, ammunition, gun permits and give identifying number(s) if known, and indicate where defendant keeps firearms and gun permits.) 10. The defendant has used or threatened to use a deadly weapon against me or minor child(ren) in my custody or has a pattern o prior conduct involving the use or threatened use of violence with a firearm against any persons in that (Give specific dates and describe in detail what happened.) 11. The defendant has made threats to commit suicide in that (Give specific dates and describe in detail what happened.) 	
prior conduct involving the use or threatened use of violence with a firearm against any persons in that (Give specific dates and describe in detail what happened.)	f
11. The defendant has made threats to commit suicide in that (Give specific dates and describe in detail what happened.)	
Because Of The Acts Of Domestic Violence By The Defendant, I Am Requesting That The Court Give Me The Following Reliefs (Check only boxes that apply.)	 :
1. I want emergency relief.	
2. Since there is a danger of acts of domestic violence against me or my child(ren), I want an Ex Parte Order before notice of a hearing is given to the defendant.	
3. I want the Court to order the defendant not to assault, threaten, abuse, follow, harass or interfere with me and my child(ren).	
3a. I want the defendant ordered not to cruelly treat or abuse an animal owned, possessed, kept, or held as a pet by either party of minor child residing in the household.	я
4. I want possession of our residence at the address listed below, and I want the defendant to move from and not return to the residence.	
Address Of Residence	
 5. I want the Court to order the eviction of the defendant from the residence listed above and I want assistance in returning to the residence. 	 ?
 I want possession of the personal property such as clothing and household goods in the residence listed above except for the defendant's personal clothing, toiletries and tools of trade. 	
 6a. I want the care, custody, and control of any animal owned, possessed, kept, or held as a pet by either party or minor child residing in the household granted to me. 	

(a) my res						
(a) my res		/				
(e) the pla	Tendant to be ordered not to come on sidence. ace where I work. ace where the child(ren) receives day (name other places)	(b) any place where I am receiving temporary shelter.(d) any school(s) the child(ren) attend.				
The child(ren) currently attend: (name school)					
8. I want the de	fendant to be ordered to have no cont	act with me.				
9. I want posses	ssion and use of the following vehicle:					
Describe Vehicle						
	rary custody of our minor child(ren) lis manent custody.	sted in this Complaint. I understand that I must file a separate child custod				
☐ 11. I want the de	endant to be ordered to make payme	nts for the support of our minor child(ren), as required by law, but I a separate child support action for regular, permanent child support.				
12. I want the Co	2. I want the Court to prohibit the defendant from possessing or purchasing a firearm.					
	urt to order the defendant to surrende arry a concealed weapon.	er to the sheriff his/her firearms, ammunition, and gun permits to purchase				
14. I want the de	4. I want the defendant to be ordered to attend an abuser treatment program.					
15. I want the de	endant to be ordered to provide me a	and the child(ren) suitable alternative housing.				
] 16. I want the de	fendant to be ordered to make payme st file a separate action for regular pe	nts for my support as required by law, but I understand it is only temporary				
17. Other: (specify						
		Signature Of Plaintiff (Person Filing Complaint)				
te		VERIFICATION				
le						
l, the undersigned, be matters and things all	ing first duly sworn, say that I am the					
l, the undersigned, be matters and things all those I believe them t	ing first duly sworn, say that I am the eged in the Complaint and Motion are	True except as to those things alleged upon information and belief and as RE ME				
matters and things all those I believe them t	ing first duly sworn, say that I am the eged in the Complaint and Motion are o be true and accurate.	true except as to those things alleged upon information and belief and as Date				
I, the undersigned, be matters and things all those I believe them t SWORN/AFFIRMEI te Deputy CSC	ing first duly sworn, say that I am the eged in the Complaint and Motion are o be true and accurate. O AND SUBSCRIBED TO BEFOR Signature Clerk of Superior Court	True except as to those things alleged upon information and belief and as				
I, the undersigned, be matters and things all those I believe them t SWORN/AFFIRMEI	ing first duly sworn, say that I am the eged in the Complaint and Motion are o be true and accurate. O AND SUBSCRIBED TO BEFOR Signature	Percent as to those things alleged upon information and belief and as RE ME Date Signature Of Plaintiff (Person Filing Complaint)				

INSTRUCTIONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FORMS

FORMS YOU NEED TO FILL OUT:

- I. Complaint And Motion For Domestic Violence Protective Order (AOC-CV-303)
 - 1. You will need three (3) copies of this form.
 - 2. Fill in:
 - (a) Name of county;
 - (b) Plaintiff's name you are the plaintiff;
 - (c) Defendant's name and address a defendant is a spouse, former spouse, person of the opposite sex with whom you live or have lived as if married, your child or grandchild who is at least 16 years old, the mother or father of your child, a current or former household member, or a person of the opposite sex that you are dating or have dated;
 - (d) Check the blocks and fill in the blanks that apply to you. If you are afraid of additional acts of domestic violence and you want the judge/magistrate to act immediately, check block #2 at the bottom of page 2, asking for an Ex Parte Order. A request for an Ex Parte Order will be heard soon and without giving notice to the defendant. If a magistrate hears your request for ex parte relief, the magistrate's order is only good for a short period of time and a second temporary Ex Parte Order must be issued by the judge. If the judge issues the temporary Ex Parte Order, another hearing will be held after the defendant is given notice. If no Ex Parte Order is entered, a hearing will still be held after the defendant is given notice;
 - (e) Date and sign the complaint on the back (above the verification section). The verification must be signed before a clerk or notary;
 - (f) In some counties you may be able to take it to the magistrate's office on weekends and evenings.
 - 3. If you or the defendant is under the age of eighteen (18) and not married, you must ask the clerk for the form to appoint a guardian ad litem (AOC-CV-318).
- II. Notice Of Hearing On Domestic Violence Protective Order (AOC-CV-305)
 - 1. You will need three (3) copies of this form.
 - 2. Fill in:
 - (a) Name of county;
 - (b) Plaintiff's name;
 - (c) Defendant's name and address.
 - 3. DO NOT fill out the remainder of this form.
- III. Ex Parte Domestic Violence Order Of Protection (AOC-CV-304)
 - 1. You will need only one (1) copy of this form.
 - 2. Fill in:
 - (a) Name of county;
 - (b) Plaintiff's name;
 - (c) Defendant's name and address.
 - 3. DO NOT fill out the remainder of this form.
- IV. Civil Summons Domestic Violence (AOC-CV-317)
 - 1. You will need three (3) copies of this form.
 - 2. Fill in:
 - (a) Name of county;
 - (b) Plaintiff's name and address. You may give an address where you want your mail to go, not necessarily where you are staying;
 - (c) Defendant's name and address (under the block designated "Defendant");
 - (d) Defendant's name and address again in the block designated "Name and Address of Defendant."
 - 3. **DO NOT** fill out the remainder of this form.

AOC-CV-303 Instructions, Rev. 10/14 © 2014 Administrative Office of the Courts (Over)

- V. Identifying information About Defendant Domestic Violence Action (AOC-CV-312)
 - 1. You will need only one (1) copy of this form.
 - 2. Fill in all the information that you know. Be as complete and accurate as you can.
 - 3. Leave blank any portion for which you do not have the information.
 - 4. You may either:
 - (a) turn in the completed form to the clerk or magistrate with the other papers, or
 - (b) keep the form, get the needed information, and turn in the completed form to the judge or magistrate at the hearing.
- VI. Affidavit As To Status Of Minor Child (AOC-CV-609)
 - 1. You do not need this form unless you are asking for temporary custody of the children.
 - 2. You will need one (1) copy of this form for each minor child.
 - 3. You must attach the completed form to the Complaint and give it to the clerk or magistrate with the other papers:
 - (a) turn in the completed form to the clerk or magistrate with the other papers, or
 - (b) keep the form, get the needed information, and turn in the completed form to the judge or magistrate at the hearing.

TAKE ALL FORMS TO THE CLERK/MAGISTRATE FOR FURTHER DIRECTIONS.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA		File No.	
County			eneral Court Of Justice ct Court Division
Name Of Plaintiff			
Address	-		
City, State, Zip		OMESTIC VI	
VERSUS		LIAS AND PLURIE	G.S. 50B-2(a)
Name Of Defendant	Date Original Summons	Issued	G.S. 50B-2(a)
	Date(s) Subsequent Su	nmons(es) Issued	
To The Defendant Named Below:			
Name And Address Of Defendant			
A Civil Action Has Been Commenced Against You!			
You are notified to appear and answer the complaint of t	he plaintiff as foll	ows:	
 Serve a copy of your written answer to the complaint upor have been served. You may serve your answer by delive known address; and 			
2. File the original of the written answer with the Clerk of Sup	perior Court of the	county named abc	ve.
If you fail to answer the complaint, the plaintiff will apply to the	e Court for the reli	ef demanded in the	e complaint.
	Date Issued	Time	
	Oliver a fewer		AM PM
	Signature		
	Deputy CSC	Assistant CSC	Clerk Of Superior Court
	Date Of Endorsement	Time	
This Summons was originally issued on the date indicated above and returned not served. At the request	Signature		
of the plaintiff, the time within which this Summons must be served is extended sixty (60) days.	Deputy CSC	Assistant CSC	Clerk Of Superior Court

	RETURN	OF SERVICE	
I certify that this Summons ar served as follows:	nd a copy of the complaint	☐ and a copy of the ex parte order	were received and
	DEF	ENDANT	
Date Served	Time Served AM PM	Name Of Defendant	
By delivering to the defen	ndant named above a copy of t	he summons and complaint.	
above with a person of s	suitable age and discretion ther	dwelling house or usual place of abod residing therein.	e of the defendant named
Name And Address Of Person With Whom) Copies Left		
Other manner of service	(specify)		
Defendant WAS NOT ser	rved for the following reason:		
Service Fee Paid \$		Signature Of Deputy Sheriff Making Return	
Date Received		Name Of Sheriff (Type Or Print)	
Date Of Return		County Of Sheriff	

ENFORCEMENT OF DVPO'S

Research has demonstrated repeatedly that DVPOs can be a powerful tool in reducing domestic violence when they are consistently enforced. In NC, violation of a DVPO is both a crime, punishable under criminal law statutes, and a violation of a court order, punishable by the contempt power of the court. In the majority of cases, violation of a DVPO is treated as a criminal offense, which may come before a magistrate either before or after an arrest is made. The elements of the offense are:

- 1) Knowingly
- 2) Violates
- 3) A valid protective order entered pursuant to
 - a) N.C. Gen. Stat. Ch. 50B, or
 - b) A court of another state, or
 - c) A court of an Indian tribe.

KEY POINTS ABOUT ENFORCEMENT

- 1. Immediate arrest is mandatory if an officer has probable cause to believe that the defendant knowingly has violated a valid protective order
 - a) excluding the defendant from the residence or household occupied by a victim of domestic violence or
 - b) directing the defendant to refrain from threatening, abusing, or following the plaintiff, harassing the plaintiff, including by telephone, visiting the home or workplace, or other means, or otherwise interfering with plaintiff.
- 2. Arrest without a warrant is discretionary for any other violation of G.S. 50B-4.1.

- 3. An officer, who has probable cause, may arrest even though the defendant has left the premises by the time the officer arrives. The officer need not actually see the violation himself or herself if the officer has probable cause to believe that the defendant violated the provisions of a domestic violence protective order. However, the officer may not enter defendant's home without consent to arrest unless officer gets arrest warrant and may not enter the home of another person to arrest defendant without consent unless the officer gets an arrest warrant for the defendant and a search warrant for the premises.
- 4. In determining the validity of an out-of-state order, a law enforcement officer may rely upon a copy of the protective order issued by another state that is provided to the officer and on the statement of the person protected by the order that to the best of that person's knowledge the order is presently in effect as written. [G.S. 50B-4(d)] The officer can also rely on any other information in determining that the defendant has violated a valid protective order.

MAGISTRATE'S DUTY WHEN DEFENDANT IS ARRESTED FOR A VIOLATION OF G.S. 50B-4.1.

If defendant is arrested by an officer **without** a warrant:

determine whether there is probable cause to believe person violated order.

- If magistrate does not find probable cause, defendant is released.
- If magistrate finds probable cause, issues a magistrate's order.

If defendant is arrested **with or without a warrant**, conduct initial appearance (i.e., notify defendant of rights and charges against him or her).

Do not set conditions of pretrial release for defendant. G.S. 15A-534.1 provides that only a judge may determine conditions of pretrial release.


Fill in the following portions of the Release Order (AOC-CV-200):

- Name and address of the defendant
- Offense—"Violation of a civil domestic violence protective order, G.S. 50B-4.1"
- Order of Commitment– Check block that says "produce him/her at the first session of district or superior court held in this county after the entry of this Order or, if no session is held before (*enter date and time 48 hours after arrest*) ______, produce

him/her before a magistrate of this county at that time to determine conditions of pretrial release."

If defendant has been arrested on other crimes in addition to G.S. 50B-4.1, determine whether the additional charges are subject to the special 48-hour pretrial release rules:

- If they are, do not set bond for any of the offenses.
- If they are not, the magistrate may set bond for those offenses not covered by the special pre-trial release provisions or may choose to not set bond for any of the offenses since he or she can not set bond for the G.S. 50B-4.1 offense.



MAGISTRATE'S DUTIES IF NO JUDGE ACTS AND A DEFENDANT IS BROUGHT BEFORE MAGISTRATE AFTER BEING HELD FOR 48 HOURS:

If judge hasn't set bond with 48 hours, defendant must be brought back before magistrate on duty. Cannot wait until next morning or day.¹

Magistrate determines conditions of pretrial release.

Sometimes, the magistrate on duty at time for pretrial release is not the same one who held initial appearance or who issued the arrest warrant. Therefore, magistrate who determines pretrial release may not have knowledge of the facts of case unless other the magistrate left notes.

NOTE: GS 15A-534.1 (which provides that defendant may be retained in custody for reasonable period of time while determining conditions of pretrial release if the immediate release will pose a danger of injury to the alleged victim or to any other person or is likely to result in intimidation of the alleged victim and if execution of an appearance bond will not reasonably insure that such injury or intimidation will not occur) usually will not be an available option because the defendant has already been held 48 hours. However, the statute can be used in usual situations where it is clear that immediate release will pose a danger of injury to the victim. Example: when determining conditions of pretrial release the defendant says to the magistrate "when I get home my wife is going to regret ever calling the police."

WHAT CONSTITUTES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FOR PURPOSES OF SPECIAL 48-HOUR PRETRIAL RELEASE PROVISIONS (G.S. 15A-534.1)

• Defendant is charged with assault on a spouse or former spouse or on a person with whom the defendant lives or has lived as if married (opposite sex).

¹ *State v. Thompson*, 349 N.C. 483, 508 S.E.2d 277 (1998) (upheld constitutionality of statute but said unconstitutional as applied to defendant who was not taken before a judge at 9:30 in the morning when court opened but was held until 2:30 that afternoon).

- Defendant is charged with communicating a threat (G.S. 14-277.1) to a spouse or former spouse or on a person with whom the defendant lives or has lived as if married.
- Defendant is charged with domestic criminal trespass. Domestic criminal trespass is entering after having been forbidden to enter the premises occupied by defendant's present or former spouse or person with whom the defendant has lived as if married at a time when the complainant and defendant are living apart. Evidence of living apart includes a court order directing the defendant to stay away from the premises occupied by the complainant. [GS 14 -134.3]
- Defendant is charged with the crime of willful violation of a valid domestic violence protective order under GS 50B-4.1. This offense applies if the relationship between the defendant and victim is a "personal relationship." but the magistrate does not even need to inquire because that must be the relationship for the protective order to have been issued in the first place.
- Defendant is charged with any felony under Art. 7A of Chapter 14—rape or sexual offense—on a spouse or former spouse or on a person with whom the defendant lives or has lived as if married.
- Defendant is charged with any felony under Art. 8 of Chapter 14—assaults, which were already covered, castration, maiming, throwing of corrosive acid—on a spouse or former spouse or on a person with whom the defendant lives or has lived as if married.
- Defendant is charged with any felony under Art. 10 of Chapter 14—kidnapping, abduction of children, felonious restraint—on a spouse or former spouse or on a person with whom the defendant lives or has lived as if married.
- Defendant is charged with any felony under Art. 15 of Chapter 14—arson and other burnings—on a spouse or former spouse or on a person with whom the defendant lives or has lived as if married.

ISSUES THAT ARISE IN ENFORCING VIOLATIONS

- *Q:* What if officer with probable cause will not arrest without a warrant for the crime of violating a domestic violence protective order by returning to the residence or by harassing, following or otherwise interfering with the plaintiff?
- A: Magistrate should issue criminal process for crime of violating protective order and for any other crime that the conduct constituted.

Q: Is an order issued by a district court judge in one judicial district valid in another district?

A: Yes. A domestic violence order issued by a North Carolina judge or magistrate is effective and enforceable anywhere in North Carolina. If the plaintiff wishes to enforce a violation through a motion and show cause for contempt, that motion and hearing must be filed and set in the county where the protective order was issued. However, the defendant may be charged with the crime of violating a protective order either in the county where the violation occurred or in the county where the order was issued since an element of the crime took place in each county.

Example: Susie is assaulted by her husband, Sam. She files a domestic violence action in Forsyth County where they live and the judge enters an order against Sam, which orders him not to assault, harass, follow, etc. Susie. Susie is afraid of Sam and decides to leave. She goes to her friend's home in Davie County. Sam finds out she is there and goes to Davie County where he hits her again. An officer arrests Sam and takes him before a magistrate in Davie County who charges him with assault and violating a protective order. Both charges will be set in Davie County (the charge of violating the protective order could be tried in either Davie or Forsyth because an element of the offense occurred in both counties, but would normally be tried in the county where the violation occurred.) If Susie had sought to enforce the order by filing a motion to show cause, she would have to file that motion with the Forsyth County clerk's office.

- *Q:* Is a domestic violence order effective if the parties have reconciled or the plaintiff has invited the defendant to return to the premises?
- A: Yes. A domestic violence protective order is a court order, which means that it remains effective until the date set in the order or until a judge sets it aside, even though the parties may reconcile. [*State v. Dejarlais*, 969 P.2d 90 (Wash. 1998), *aff'g* 944 P.2d 1110 (1997) (plaintiff's consent is not a defense to a charge of violating a protection order).]

- *Q:* Is a domestic violence protective order issued in another state enforceable in North Carolina?
- A: Yes. G.S. 50B-4(d) provides that valid protective orders entered by the courts of another state or the courts of an Indian tribe shall be accorded full faith and credit by the courts of North Carolina as if they were orders issued by North Carolina courts. It does not matter whether the order is registered in North Carolina. It is enforced like any NC issued protective order-by charging a person who violates the out-of-state issued order in North Carolina with the crime of violating the protective order or by the victim filing a motion for the clerk to issue a show cause order for contempt.

The victim may register the order in NC by filing a copy with the clerk along with an affidavit that to the best of the victim's knowledge the order is presently in effect as written. No notice of the registration is given to the defendant. If the victim does not register the order, it is still enforceable in NC.

CONDITIONS ON PRETRIAL RELEASE/VIOLATIONS

G.S. 15A-534.1 authorizes magistrates to impose the following conditions on pretrial release for crimes of domestic violence:

- That defendant stay away from the home, school, business or place of employment of the alleged victim.
- That the defendant refrain from assaulting, beating, molesting, or wounding the alleged victim.
- That the defendant refrain from removing, damaging, or injuring specifically identified property.

G.S. 15A-534(a)(4) authorizes a magistrate to place restrictions on travel, associations, conduct or place of abode of any defendant, not just for domestic violence crimes, as conditions of pretrial release.

In 2004 the General Assembly amended G.S. 15A-401(b)(2)f. to provide that if a defendant violates a pretrial release order entered under subsection A. above (domestic violence crimes), a law enforcement officer may arrest the defendant without a warrant.

If an officer has arrested a defendant for violating a condition of pretrial release for a domestic violence crime, the magistrate should try to get direction from the chief district court judge how to handle the matter. If there is no direction from the judge, the magistrate should reconsider the bond and set new conditions of pretrial release.

If a defendant violates a condition of pretrial release for a domestic violence crime, but is not arrested by an officer, the magistrate can issue an order for arrest to bring the defendant in to modify the pretrial release order only if the first appearance before the district court judge has not been held. If a first appearance has been held, the magistrate should consult the chief district court judge about what practice the magistrate should follow.

WHAT CONSTITUTES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FOR CRIME VICTIM'S RIGHTS LAW

Crime Victim's Rights Act [G.S. 15A-830 to –841] provides that victims of certain crimes must be given notice about the services available, time of trial and release from custody of defendant and that victims are eligible for crime victim's compensation funds.

For the most part, victims are persons against whom violent felonies were committed, but the law also applies to the following misdemeanors when the victim and defendant have a personal relationship as defined by the G.S. 50B-1.

Assault inflicting serious injury. [G.S. 14-33(c)(1)] Assault with a deadly weapon [G.S. 14-33(c)(1)] Assault on a female [G.S. 14-33(c)(2)] Simple assault [G.S. 14-33(a)] Assault by pointing a gun [G.S. 14-34] Domestic criminal trespass [G.S. 14-134.3] Stalking [G.S. 14-277.3]

The category of domestic violence victims covered by the Crime Victim's Rights Act is broader than the category of those covered by the special pretrial release rules. A magistrate issuing an arrest warrant in one of these covered misdemeanors must note on the process that it is a Crime Victim's Rights Act crime and record the victim's name, address, and telephone number electronically or on a form separate from the warrant and send to the clerk. The automated system has pop up questions if one of these offenses is charged and will electronically send required information. Magistrates not using automated system must mark on the process that the case is Crime Victim's Rights case and must note information about victim on form separate from the criminal process.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA	File No.
County	In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division
Name Of Plaintiff	
	MOTION FOR ORDER
VERSUS	TO SHOW CAUSE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
	PROTECTIVE ORDER
	G.S. 50B-4; 5A-15, -23
The Court issued a Domestic Violence Protective Order in The defendant has willfully violated that Order by (<i>Tell what</i>	
I am informed and believe that the defendant has the mea	ins to comply with the Order.
I want the Court to issue an Order which requires the defe should not be held in contempt for the defendant's failure	endant to appear and to show cause, if any, why the defendant to comply with the Court's Order.
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO BEFORE ME	Date
Date Signature	Signature Of Person Making Motion
itle Of Person Authorized To Administer Oaths	Name Of Person Making Motion (Type Or Print)
ate Commission Expires	
Date Commission Expires	
SEAL	

INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO FILL OUT THIS FORM

- 1. Use this form only if a judge has already signed a Domestic Violence Protective Order or an Ex Parte Order. Do not use this form to start a domestic violence proceeding.
- 2. Use this form when the defendant has done something which was forbidden by the Order, or has failed to do something which was required by the Order.
- 3. THE PEOPLE IN THE CLERK'S OFFICE CANNOT HELP YOU FILL OUT THIS FORM OR TELL YOU WHAT TO SAY. The law forbids them from doing that.
- 4. Use the space on the front of this form to tell which item or items in the Order have not been complied with. Then, tell how the defendant failed to comply with those items. Tell what happened in your own words. Tell what the defendant did and said. Tell when and where the defendant did it or said it. Or, tell what the defendant has not done. Finally, tell what shows that the defendant acted willfully. Willfully means that the defendant knew that something was forbidden and did it on purpose. Willfully also means that the defendant knew that something was required, and was able to do it, and still did not do it.
- 5. Date and sign the form. Then take it to a notary public or the clerk. Tell the notary or the clerk that you want to notarize a show cause order in a domestic violence proceeding. The notary or clerk will have you take an oath or affirmation. Then you will date and sign the form a second time, and the notary or clerk will "notarize" it.
- 6. Now this form is ready to be "filed" with the clerk. There will be no cost in the clerk's office, but there may be a charge for having the sheriff give papers to the defendant.
- 7. After this form is filed, the clerk will fill out an "Order to Appear And Show Cause For Failure To Comply With Domestic Violence Protective Order," form AOC-CV-308, commonly called a "Show Cause Order." The Show Cause Order will tell the defendant to appear before a judge at the date, time and place shown on the form. A hearing will be held at that time. The defendant must show cause, if any, why the defendant should not be found in contempt. You will receive a copy of the Show Cause Order and must also attend the hearing. If the judge finds the defendant in criminal contempt, the defendant can be sentenced to serve up to thirty (30) days in jail and fined up to \$500 or both. If the judge finds the defendant in civil contempt, the defendant can be kept in jail until what has been ordered has been done.

STATE OF NORTH	CAROLINA		File No.	
County		In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division		
Name Of Plaintiff VERSUS Name And Address Of Defendant		ORDER TO APPEAR AND SHOW CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH		
			MESTIC VIOLENCE OTECTIVE ORDER	
To The Defendant Named	Above:		G.S. 50B-4; 5A-15, -23	
I find that there is probable Order issued in this case of	-		plating the Domestic Violence Protective as alleged in the attached Motion.	
held in contempt of court for committed to jail for as long	r violating the lawful orders of thi	s Court. If the Court fir	w to show cause why you should not be nds you in civil contempt, you may be u in criminal contempt, you may be fined	
Date To Appear	Time To Appear	Date Of Order		
Place To Appear	PM	Signature		
		Assistant CSC	Clerk Of Superior Court	
		District Court Judge	Designated Magistrate	
Leartify that this Order was		DF SERVICE		
Date Served	received and served as follows:	Name Of Defendant		
By personally serving the s	ne defendant named above.			
Defendant was not serv	red for the following reason:			
Date Received	Date Of Return	Name Of Sheriff		
County		Deputy Sheriff Making Paturn		
County		Deputy Sheriff Making Return		
AOC-CV-308, Rev. 4/10 © 2010 Administrative Office of the	Courts			

DOMESTIC	VIOLENCE	CRIMES ¹
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Crime Charged	Relationship Between Defendant and Victim	Only Judge May Set Bond for First 48 Hours After Arrest	Crime Victims' Rights Act (VRA) Applies
Simple assault [G.S 14-33(a)]	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. Child in common. 	Yes	Yes [Magistrate must indicate
	 Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	VRA Case on the criminal process]
Assault on a female [G.S. 14-33(c)(2)]	Current or former spouses.Persons who live or have lived together as if married.	Yes	
	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	Yes [Magistrate must indicate VRA Case on the criminal process]
Assault with a deadly weapon [G.S. 14-33(c)(1)]	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	Yes
	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	[Magistrate must indicate VRA Case on the criminal process]

¹ This chart lists the most common offenses to which the special 48-hour pretrial release rule applies, but it does not list every felony to which it applies. The rule covers any felony in Articles 7A (Rape and Sexual Offenses), 8 (Assaults), 10 (Kidnapping and Abduction), or 15 (Arson and Other Burnings) of the General Statutes if the relationship between the defendant and the victim is current or former spouse or persons who are living together or have lived together as if married.

Crime Charged	Relationship Between Defendant and Victim	Only Judge May Set Bond for First 48 Hours After Arrest	Crime Victims' Rights Act (VRA) Applies	
Assault	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	Yes	
inflicting serious injury [G.S.14- 33(c)(1)]	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	[Magistrate must indicate VRA Case on the criminal process]	
Assault by	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	Yes	
Assault by pointing a gun [G.S. 14-34]	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	[Magistrate must indicate VRA Case on the criminal process]	
Assault with a	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	Yes; because VRA	
deadly weapon with intent to kill [G.S. 14-32(c)]	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	felony no matter what relationship.	
Assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury [G.S. 14-32(b)]	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	Yes; because VRA felony no matter what relationship.	
	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No		

Crime Charged	Relationship Between Defendant and Victim	Only Judge May Set Bond for First 48 Hours After Arrest	Crime Victims' Rights Act (VRA) Applies
Assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury [GS 14-32(a)]	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	Yes; because VRA felony no matter what relationship.
	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members 	No	
Assault inflicting	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	Yes; because
serious bodily injury [G.S. 14- 32.4(a)]	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	VRA felo no matter No	VRA felony no matter what relationship.
Assault by strangulation [G.S. 14- 32.4(b)]	tion •Persons who live or have lived together as if Yes	Yes	
	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	No
Habitual misdemeanor assault [G.S. 14-33.2]	• Current or former spouses. •Persons who live or have lived together as if Messential Yes married.	Yes; because VRA felony no matter	
14-33.2]	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	what relationship.
Communicating a threat	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	
[G.S. 14-277.1]	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	No

Crime Charged	Relationship Between Defendant and Victim	Only Judge May Set Bond for First 48 Hours After Arrest	Crime Victims' Rights Act (VRA) Applies
Domestic criminal trespass [G.S. 14-134.3]	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. (having one of these relationships is an element of this offense) 	Yes	Yes [Magistrate must indicate VRA Case on the criminal process]
Violating a protective order [G.S. 50B-4.1]	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	Yes	Yes [Magistrate must indicate VRA Case on the criminal process]
Stalking [G.S. 14-	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	Yes [Magistrate
277.3A]	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	must indicate VRA Case on the criminal process]
Rape or sexual	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	
offense [G.S. 14-27.2 to -27.8]	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	Yes; because VRA felony no matter what relationship.

Crime Charged	Relationship Between Defendant and Victim	Only Judge May Set Bond for First 48 Hours After Arrest	Crime Victims' Rights Act (VRA) Applies
Kidnapping	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	
[GS. 14-39]	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	Yes because VRA felony no matter what relationship.
Harassing telephone calls	Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married.	No	No
[G.S. 14-196]	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 		
Arson	 Current or former spouses. Persons who live or have lived together as if married. 	Yes	Yes because VRA
	 Child in common. Persons of the opposite sex in a dating relationship. Parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. Current or former household members. 	No	felony no matter what relationship.

Understanding Domestic Violence

Chapter 50B. Domestic Violence.

§ 50B-1. Domestic violence; definition.

(a) Domestic violence means the commission of one or more of the following acts upon an aggrieved party or upon a minor child residing with or in the custody of the aggrieved party by a person with whom the aggrieved party has or has had a personal relationship, but does not include acts of self-defense:

- (1) Attempting to cause bodily injury, or intentionally causing bodily injury; or
- (2) Placing the aggrieved party or a member of the aggrieved party's family or household in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or continued harassment, as defined in G.S. 14-277.3A, that rises to such a level as to inflict substantial emotional distress; or
- (3) Committing any act defined in G.S. 14-27.2 through G.S. 14-27.7.

(b) For purposes of this section, the term "personal relationship" means a relationship wherein the parties involved:

- (1) Are current or former spouses;
- (2) Are persons of opposite sex who live together or have lived together;
- (3) Are related as parents and children, including others acting in loco parentis to a minor child, or as grandparents and grandchildren. For purposes of this subdivision, an aggrieved party may not obtain an order of protection against a child or grandchild under the age of 16;
- (4) Have a child in common;
- (5) Are current or former household members;
- (6) Are persons of the opposite sex who are in a dating relationship or have been in a dating relationship. For purposes of this subdivision, a dating relationship is one wherein the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuous basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary fraternization between persons in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

(c) As used in this Chapter, the term "protective order" includes any order entered pursuant to this Chapter upon hearing by the court or consent of the parties. (1979, c. 561, s. 1; 1985, c. 113, s. 1; 1987, c. 828; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 893, ss. 1, 3; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 591, s. 1; 1997-471, s. 1; 2001-518, s. 3; 2003-107, s. 1; 2009-58, s. 5.)

PHYSICAL VIOLENCE SEXUAL

POWER

AND

CONTROL

USING COERCION AND THREATS

Making and/or carrying out threats to do something to hurt her • threatening to leave her, to commit suicide, to report her to welfare • making her drop charges • making her do illegal things.

USING ECONOMIC ABUSE

Preventing her from getting or keeping a job • making her ask for money • giving her an allowance • taking her money • not letting her know about or have access to family income.

USING INTIMIDATION

Making her afraid by using looks, actions, gestures • smashing things • destroying her property • abusing pets • displaying weapons.

USING Emotional Abuse

Putting her down • making her feel bad about herself • calling her names • making her think she's crazy • playing mind games • humiliating her • making her feel guilty.

USING MALE PRIVILEGE

Treating her like a servant • making all the big decisions • acting like the "master of the castle" • being the one to define men's and women's roles

USING Children

Making her feel guilty about the children • using the children to relay messages • using visitation to harass her • threatening to take the children away.

PHYSICAL

USING ISOLATION

Controlling what she does, who she sees and talks to, what she reads, where she goes • limiting her outside involvement • using jealousy to justify actions.

MINIMIZING, DENYING AND BLAMING

VIOLENCE SEXUAL

Making light of the abuse and not taking her concerns about it seriously • saying the abuse didn't happen • shifting responsibility for abusive behavior • saying she caused it.

DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROJECT

202 East Superior Street Duluth, Minnesota 55802 218-722-2781 www.duluth-model.org

Power and Control Wheel Enactments

Power and Control

Abusers believe they have a right to control their partners by:

- Telling them what to do and expecting obedience
- Using force to maintain power and control over partners
- Feeling their partners have no right to challenge their desire for power and control
- Feeling justified making the victim comply
- Blaming the abuse on the partner and not accepting responsibility for wrongful acts.

The characteristics shown in the wheel are examples of how this power and control are demonstrated and enacted against the victim.

Isolation

- Limiting outside involvement
- Making another avoid people/friends/family by deliberately embarrassing or humiliating them in front of others
- Expecting another to report every move and activity
- Restricting use of the car
- Moving residences

Emotional Abuse

- Putting another down/name-calling
- Ignoring or discounting activities and accomplishments
- Withholding approval or affection
- Making another feel as if they are crazy in public or through private humiliation
- Unreasonable jealousy and suspicion
- Playing mind games

Economic Abuse

- Preventing another from getting or keeping a job
- Withholding funds
- Spending family income without consent and/or making the partner struggle to pay bills
- Not letting someone know of or have access to family/personal income
- Forcing someone to ask for basic necessities

Intimidation

- Driving recklessly to make another feel threatened or endangered
- Destroying property or cherished possessions
- Making another afraid by using looks/actions/gestures
- Throwing objects as an expression of anger to make another feel threatened
- Displaying weapons

<u>Using Children or Pets</u>

- Threatening to take the children away
- Making the partner feel guilty about the children
- Abusing children or pets to punish the partner
- Using the children to relay messages

Power and Control Wheel Enactments

Using Privilege

- Treating another like a servant
- Making all the big decisions
- Being the one to define male and female roles
- Acting like the master or queen of the castle

Sexual Abuse

- Sex on demand or sexual withholding
- Physical assaults during sexual intercourse
- Spousal rapes or non-consensual sex
- Sexually degrading language
- Denying reproductive freedom

Threats

- Threats of violence against significant third parties
- Threats to commit physical or sexual harm
- Threats to commit property destruction
- Threats to commit suicide or murder

Physical Abuse

- Biting/scratching
- Slapping/punching
- Kicking/stomping
- Throwing objects at another
- Locking another in a closet or utilizing other confinement
- Sleep interference and/or deliberately exhausting the partner with unreasonable demands and lack of rest
- Deprivation of heat or food
- Shoving another down steps or into objects
- Assaults with weapons such as knives/guns/other objects

Case Study

I have been married to my husband for ten years. I became pregnant with my first child shortly after we were married. We now have three children, ages nine, seven and six. Even from the beginning, my husband has made all of the decisions for our family. He told me that my job was to be a good wife—to take care of the children and to cook and clean for him.

The first time he hit me was when I was pregnant with my first child. We had come home from my mother's house and he was angry about something. I think I had forgotten to buy a kind of food item that he wanted, and then he slapped me. I thought it was just an isolated event. I never thought he would do it again.

Since then, he has hit, kicked, choked, slapped and burned me. He does not hurt me physically that often, though, maybe only once a month. Mainly, when I do something he doesn't like, such as visiting my mother or talking on the phone to a friend, he calls me a prostitute and other bad names, and tells me that he will take the children and go to his mother's home if I am not a good wife. He refuses to let me take a job, even though all of our children are in school, and I would be qualified for many different kinds of jobs. He does not let me have any money, except for a little for grocery shopping.

He is very jealous and possessive. A few months ago, he became very angry because I was late getting home from the store. He accused me of seeing another man and punched a hole in the door between the kitchen and the living room. My sons were there and saw this, and he yelled at them to go to their rooms. I recently overheard him talking to my seven-year-old son. He was asking if my son ever saw me talking to "other men." He told my son that I was crazy and that my son should watch me and tell him if I did anything strange.

Another time, we went to a party given by a friend of his from work. I met the wife of one of the people my husband works with. We spent a long time talking. After some time, my husband came up to me, grabbed my arm so tightly it hurt and left bruises, and whispered in my ear, "We're leaving." Just by the look he gave me, I knew he was angry that I spent so much time talking with the woman, and that he would likely beat me when we got home. When we got home, he smashed a framed picture I have of myself with a group of my friends at the university, before I was married, by throwing it at the wall near where I was standing. He told me that I "knew" what would happen if I continued to disobey him.

A few months ago, my husband came home late with friends and made me get up to cook them food. He started joking with his friends about how much I weighed, and that I was like all other women who let themselves go once they got married. He called me many bad names. After his friends left, he woke me up again and forced me to have sex with him, even though I didn't want to and was feeling sick.

Recently, I tried to talk to my husband about the abuse. He got very angry. He said he doesn't hurt me any more than is to be expected of a husband and that in fact he thinks that he is too nice to me. He said that if he did happen to be a bit harsh with me sometimes, it was my fault anyway for not being a good wife and letting myself become so unattractive.

I love my husband, but I do not think I can continue to live with him. He has threatened to kill me, the children, and himself if I leave him, and I don't have anywhere to go. I don't have a job or any money, and would not be able to find another place to stay even if I did leave.

This scenario is fictional. Some aspects of the scenario are based on descriptions of domestic violence contained in reports by Minnesota Advocates. For Human Rights, available at <u>http://www.mnadvocates.org</u>; the Domestic Violence Centre, available at <u>http://www.dvc.org.nz</u>; and the Family Violence Prevention Fund, available at <u>http://www.fvpf.org</u>.

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Do's and Don'ts of Handling Domestic Violence Victims

DO

- Explain the services available in a simple and direct manner.
- Prioritize the victim's needs.
- Express concern for their safety and that of their children. Empower the victim with information that increases their choices.
- Be aware of your own attitude, experiences and reactions to abuse. It is appropriate to disagree with the victim's behavior and/or attitude while remaining objective, empathetic and understanding.
- Help the victim understand the danger and repetitiveness of the violence.
- Encourage the victim to take small steps, which will promote independence and build self-confidence.
- Take into consideration cultural values and beliefs.
- Challenge any efforts on the victim's part to justify the abuse through religion.
- Convey fears for the victim's safety and respect their reasons for staying. Separation from the abuser can be the most dangerous time for the victim.
- Define your role as a court official; be realistic about what you can and cannot do with regards to the relationship.
- Recognize that the victim's reactions and responses may change frequently and be unpredictable. Reactions will range from resistance to cooperation.
- Express your concerns if the situation is lethal and take appropriate action.
- Be patient and honest with the victim.
- Emphasize the abuser's responsibility for his/her own choices.
- Expect the "honeymoon" period to emerge following an abusive episode.
- Challenge the victim's explanation of the incident and openly ask if their partner is hurting them. The approach must be sensitive and not threatening in nature.
- Be honest with the victim, especially about confidentiality issues.

DON'T

- Assume that battered women know about their options and the services available.
- Overload the victim with services and decisions.
- Ever ask the victim why they stay. This is a shaming remark, which insinuates the victim is at fault. Leaving does not always solve the problem.
- Impose your own values and make quick judgments. Your reaction to the victim's responses will be communicated strongly.
- Expect the victim to exaggerate or invent the violence.
- Try to rescue the victim.
- Lump all victims into one category.
- Reject the woman's religion or ignore references to religious beliefs.
- Convey disappointment if the victim chooses to stay. This can elicit feelings of failure and worthlessness.
- Get caught up in the role of marriage counselor, mediator and/or referee.
- Become cynical with the victim's failure to take the action or respond the way you believe they should. Your frustration can result in victim blaming and impact your ability to intervene effectively.
- Ignore or minimize the potential dangerousness of the situation.
- Expect instant decision-making by the victim or contribute to unrealistic expectations.
- Let the victim blame themselves or other factors for the abuse.
- Delay in responding to a reported incident of violence. Timing is a key factor in gathering evidentiary information.
- Accept unexplained injuries accompanied by implausible reasons.
- Make a promise you can't keep.

Danger Assessment*

- 1. Has the physical violence increased in severity or frequency over the past year?
- 2. Does he own a gun?
- 3. Have you left him after living together during the past year?
- 3a. (If you have *never* lived with him, check here___)
- 4. Is he unemployed?
- 5. Has he ever used a weapon against you or threatened you with a lethal weapon?
- 5a. (If yes, was the weapon a gun?____)
- 6. Does he threaten to kill you?
- 7. Has he avoided being arrested for domestic violence?
- 8. Do you have a child that is not his?
- 9. Has he ever forced you to have sex when you did not wish to do so?
- 10. Does he ever try to choke you?
- 11. Does he use illegal drugs? By drugs, I mean "uppers" or amphetamines, speed, angel dust, cocaine, "crack", street drugs or mixtures?
- 12. Is he an alcoholic or problem drinker?
- 13. Does he control most or all of your daily activities? (For instance: does he tell you who you can be friends with, when you can see your family, how much money you can use, or when you can take the car? (If he tries, but you do not let him, check here: ____)
- 14. Is he violently and constantly jealous of you? (For instance, does he say "If I can't have you, no one can.")
- 15. Have you ever been beaten by him while you were pregnant? (If you have never been pregnant by him, check here: ____)
- 16. Has he ever threatened or tried to commit suicide?
- 17. Does he threaten to harm your children?
- 18. Do you believe he is capable of killing you?
- 19. Does he follow or spy on you, leave threatening notes or messages on an answering machine, destroy your property, or call you when you don't want him to?
- 20. Have you ever threatened or tried to commit suicide?
- One study has shown that women who score 8 or higher on the Danger Assessment are at very grave risk of being killed by their intimate partners; women who score 4 or higher are at great risk. . . .By simply asking the questions in the assessment, magistrates may raise a victim's awareness of the dangerousness of the situation.
- *"Danger Assessment," Jacquelyn C. Campbell, PhD, RN, FAAN. This lethality checklist is taken from The Magistrate Protocol for Domestic Violence Cases.

Why Victims of Domestic Violence Stay and Go

Situational Factors:

- Economic dependence
- Fear of greater physical danger to themselves and their children if they attempt to leave
- Fear of emotional damage to children
- Fear of losing custody of children
- Lack of alternative housing
- Lack of job skills
- Social isolation resulting in lack of support from family or friends and lack of information regarding alternatives
- Fear of involvement in court processes
- Cultural and religious constraints
- Fear of retaliation

Emotional Factors:

- Fear of loneliness
- Insecurity over potential independence and lack of emotional support
- Guilt about failure of marriage
- Fear that partner is unable to survive along
- Belief that partner will change
- Ambivalence and fear over making formidable life changes

Signs to Look for in a Battering Personality

- 1. <u>Possessiveness.</u> At the beginning of a relationship, an abuser may say that jealousy (actually possessiveness) is a sign of love. Possessiveness has nothing to do with love. It is a sign of lack of trust. The abuser may question his partner about who she talks to, accuse her of flirting, or keep her from spending time with family, friends, or children. As the possessiveness progresses, he may call her frequently during the day or drop by unexpectedly. He may refuse to let her work for fear she'll meet someone else, or even engage in behaviors such as checking her car mileage or asking friends to watch her.
- 2. <u>Controlling Behavior</u>. At first the batterer will say this behavior is due to his concern for her safety, her need to use her time well, or her need to make good decisions. He will be angry if the woman is "late" coming back from the store or an appointment; he will question her closely about where she went and who she talked with. As this behavior progresses, he may not let the woman make personal decisions about the house, her clothing, or even going to church. He may keep all the money or even make her ask permission to leave the house or room.
- 3. **Quick Involvement.** Many battered women dated or knew their abuser for less than six months before they were married, engaged, or living together. He comes in like a whirlwind, claiming, "you're the only person I could ever talk to", or "I've never been loved like this by anyone." He will pressure the woman to commit to the relationship in such a way that later the woman may feel very guilty or that she's "letting him down" if she wants to slow down involvement or break off the relationship.
- 4. <u>Unrealistic Expectations.</u> Abusive people will expect their partner to meet all their needs. He expects a perfect wife, mother, lover, and friend. He will say things such as "if you love me, I'm all you need, and you're all I need." His partner is expected to take care of everything for him emotionally and in the home.
- 5. <u>Isolation.</u> The abusive person tries to cut his partner off from all resources. If she has male friends, she's a "whore." If she has women friends, she's a lesbian. If she's close to family, she's "tied to the apron strings." He accuses people who are the woman's supports of causing trouble. He may want to live in the country, without a telephone, or refuse to let her drive the car, or he may try to keep her from working or going to school.
- 6. <u>Blames others for problems.</u> If he is chronically unemployed, someone is always doing him wrong or out to get him. He may make mistakes and then blame the woman for upsetting him and keeping him from concentrating on the task at hand. He may tell the woman she is at fault for virtually anything that goes wrong in his life.
- 7. <u>Blames others for feelings.</u> The abuser may tell his partner "you make me mad," "you're hurting me by not doing what I want you to do," or "I can't help being angry." He is the one who makes the decision about what he thinks or feels, but he will use these feelings to manipulate his partner. Harder to catch are claims, "you make me happy," or "you control how I feel."
- 8. <u>Hypersensitivity.</u> An abuser is easily insulted, claiming his feelings are hurt, when in actuality he is angry or taking the slightest setback as a personal attack. He will rant and rave about the injustice of things that have happened, things that are just a part of living (for example being asked to work late, getting a traffic ticket, being asked to help with chores, or being told some behavior is annoying).
- 9. <u>Cruelty to animals or children.</u> Abusers may punish animals brutally or be insensitive to their pain or suffering. An abuser may expect children to be capable of things beyond their abilities (e.g. punishes a 2 year old for wetting a diaper). He may tease children until they cry. Some studies indicate that about 60% of men who physically abuse their partners also abuse their children.
- 10. <u>Sexual abuser.</u> An abuser may physically assault private parts of a woman's body. He may show little concern about whether the woman wants to have sex and use violence to coerce her into having sex with him. He may begin having sex with his partner while she is sleeping. He may

force her to do sexual acts that she finds uncomfortable, unpleasant, or degrading. He may demand sex after beating her.

- 11. <u>Verbal abuse</u>. In addition to saying things that are intentionally meant to be cruel and hurtful, verbal abuse is also apparent in the abuser's degrading of his partner, cursing her, and belittling her accomplishments. The abuser tells her she is stupid and unable to function without him. This may involve waking her up to verbally abuse her or not letting her go to sleep.
- 12. **<u>Rigid sex roles.</u>** The abuser expects his partner to serve him. He may even say the woman must stay at home and obey in all things even acts that are criminal in nature. The abuser sees women as inferior to men, responsible for menial tasks, and unable to be a whole person without a relationship.
- 13. **Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde personality.** Many women are confused by the abuser's sudden changes in mood. She may think he has some sort of mental problem because one minute he's agreeable, the next he's exploding. Explosiveness and moodiness are typical of men who beat their partners. These behaviors are related to other characteristics, such as hypersensitivity.
- 14. <u>Past battering.</u> The abuser may say he has hit women in the past, but blame them for the abuse (e.g., they made me do it"). The women may hear from relatives or ex-partners that he is abusive. A batterer will abuse any woman he is with if the relationship lasts long enough for the violence to begin; situational circumstances do not make one's personality abusive.
- 15. <u>Threats of violence</u>. This includes any threat of physical force meant to control the partner. "I'll slap your mouth off," "I'll kill you," "I'll break your neck." Most people do not threaten their partners. Abusers will try to excuse their threats by saying that everybody talks that way.
- 16. **Breaking or striking objects.** Breaking loved possessions is used as a punishment, but mostly to terrorize the woman into submission. The abuser may beat on the table with his fist, or throw objects around or near his partner. There is great danger when someone thinks he has the right to punish or frighten his partner.
- 17. <u>Any force during an argument.</u> This may involve the abuser's holding the woman down, physically restraining her from leaving the room, or any pushing or shoving. He may hold his partner against the wall, telling her, "You're going to listen to me."

Domestic Violence and Children Children Exposed to Batterers

Traits of Batterers

- Controlling
- Entitled/Self-Centered
- Believe they are the victims
- Manipulative
- Good public image
- Skillfully dishonest (e.g. say they "don't remember")
- Disrespectful, Superior

Implications of Entitlement Thinking

- Leads abusers to think they are the victim
- Will stop partner from attending to children so she can attend to him
- Wants children to meet his needs
- Increases a child's vulnerability when conditioned to meet adult's needs

Implications of Good Public Image

- Keeps people from believing partner and children
- Abuser looks like sensitive team player
- Confuses the children
 - o believe no one else thinks anything is wrong with battering
 - Leads children to blaming the mom, because she is only one saying something is wrong

Implications of Manipulation

- Calm demeanor in court
- File multiple harassing or retaliatory motions
- Make false allegations against partner, (e.g. -flight risk, substance abuser, neglects children)
- Use court process to avoid child support or get it reduced
- Use parallel actions in different jurisdictions to gain advantage

Batterers

- Good early in a relationship
- Externalize responsibility
- Punish, retaliate
- Batter serially
- Danger increases post separation

Batterer's Risk to Abuse Children

Physical Abuse

- 50% of batterers abuse their children
- 7 times more likely to abuse their children than a non-battering parent

Sexual Abuse

- Six times more likely to sexually abuse their children than a non-battering parent
- Correlated with presence of violence towards partner but not severity

Post Separation Risk

- Abuse mothers during exchanges
- Use child as weapon for information on mother
- Physical, sexual, or mental abuse of child
- Child exposed to abuser's violence of new partner
- Learn attitudes and behaviors that lead to violence
- Batterer is not focused on needs of child

TAB: Ethics

Magistrates, like other judicial officials, may be removed from office if they are found to have engaged in willful misconduct or in conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute." The primary source for determining what specific behavior constitutes such conduct is the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct. The Code consists of a Preamble and seven Canons (general statements of overall principles), set out below. The complete Code contains a substantial number of more specific provisions for each Canon; that document appears at the end of this section of the notebook.

North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct

Preamble

An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society, and to this end and in furtherance thereof, this Code of Judicial Conduct is hereby established. *A violation of this Code of Judicial Conduct may be deemed conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute*, or willful misconduct in office, or otherwise as grounds for disciplinary proceedings....

Canon 1

A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.

Canon 2

A judge should avoid impropriety in all his activities.

Canon 3

A judge should perform the duties of his office impartially and diligently.

Canon 4

A judge may participate in cultural or historical activities or engage in activities concerning the legal, economic, educational, or governmental system, or the administration of justice.

Canon 5

A judge should regulate his extra-judicial activities to ensure that they do not prevent him from carrying out his judicial duties.

Canon 6

A judge should regularly file reports of compensation received for quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities.

Canon 7

A judge may engage in political activity consistent with his status as a public official.

Could you boil this down to The R^{oo(} Ten Big Rules?


- 1. When it comes to behaving honorably, a magistrate is a magistrate 24 hours day.
- 2. A magistrate's judicial duties must be given priority over all other activities.
- 3. An ethical magistrate is patient, dignified, and courteous to all those with whom s/he comes into contact with in the course of performing his or her responsibilities.

4. A magistrate must avoid ex parte communication with parties interested in a proceeding except when such communication is authorized by law.

- 5. A magistrate should avoid participating as a judicial official in a proceeding in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
- 6. A magistrate should not allow his or her family, social, or personal relationships to influence his or her judicial conduct or judgment.
- 7. A magistrate may engage in civic and charitable activities and other public service, including teaching, writing, and public speaking, so long as (a) the magistrate does not raise funds for the organization; and (b) his or her activities do not raise doubt about the magistrate's ability to be impartial in performing the duties of the judicial office.
- 8. Neither a magistrate nor any member of the magistrate's family should accept a gift or other benefit given in connection with the magistrate's office.
- 9. A magistrate should never engage in direct fund-raising.

¹ Dona's paraphrase, offered for the purpose of structuring in-class discussion. The Ten Big Rules are certainly not to be relied upon instead of, or as a definitive restatement of, the Code of Judicial Conduct, which may be found in its entirety at the end of this Tab.

10. A magistrate should not endorse, or contribute to the campaign of, any particular candidate for office.



It might be said that a magistrate is most likely to run afoul of the Code of Judicial Conduct in three areas: (1) bias, (2) incompetence and/or lack of professionalism, and (3) abuse of power. Reading the Code from this perspective generates the following list of particularly important considerations for an inexperienced magistrate in approaching the duties of this new office:

To avoid the appearance of **bias**:

- a. Be extremely careful about ex parte communications.
- b. Avoid mixing work with family, social, or other relationships
- c. Do not participate in any matter involving (in any way) a person within the third degree of relationship to you or your spouse.
- d. Don't hesitate to disqualify yourself in any matter in which your impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
- e. Keep your interactions with law enforcement officers professional, being mindful of your differential roles.
- f. Eschew membership in organizations that practice unlawful discrimination
- g. Be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.

h. Be very careful about public comment on matters likely to come before you.

To avoid the appearance of **incompetence/lack of professionalism**:

- a. Be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it.
- b. Maintain order and decorum in proceedings before you.
- c. Address parties by their appropriate title and last name and require them to address you in the same way.

To avoid the appearance of **abuse of power**:

- a. Do not lend the prestige of your office to advance the private interest of others.
- b. Treat everyone who appears before you with patience, dignity, and courtesy.
- c. Do not engage in fundraising activity.
- d. Do not endorse anyone for public office (although you may attend political gatherings, be active in a political party, and make contributions to the party).
- e. Do not accept a gift from a party, and avoid accepting gifts from parties who appear frequently before you or who are otherwise in a position likely to benefit or suffer from your decisions as a judicial official.

Discussion Questions for Ethics

A magistrate is married to a police officer. Can the magistrate handle cases in which the officer appears before him or her?

You arrive early to small claims court, as does a merchant bringing several collection suits. One of the defendants comes into the courtroom and sees the two of you chatting. Does your behavior raise ethical concerns?

Your church asks you to serve as the head of its finance committee. Your duties would include raising money for next year's budget. Can you serve?

The incumbent sheriff is running for re-election and asks you to endorse him. Can you?

A local bail bonding company gives each magistrate a gift certificate to the local mall at Christmas? Can you accept it?

Additional Notes: _____

Ethics-Page 6

Practical Tips for New Judges Making the Transition to the Bench

By Judge Douglas S. Lavine

Hon. Douglas S. Lavine was appointed to the trial bench by Connecticut Governor Lowell P. Weicker Jr. in 1993 and to the Connecticut Appellate Court in 2006 by Governor M. Jodi Rell. The views expressed in this article are strictly his own. He can be reached at Douglas.Lavine@connapp.jud.ct.gov.

Congratulations! You have been appointed to the bench. I can assure you that you will find your new job to be enormously gratifying and challenging. You will have a rare opportunity to use your legal and personal skills, honed by the practice of law, to serve the community. I can honestly say that I have enjoyed going to work on all but a few days of the nearly sixteen years I have been on the bench. Almost all of my judge friends feel the same way.

With your new position comes a significant passage. You are beginning something exciting, but you are also ending an important phase of your life. You will be moving out of your previous comfort zone, one in which you may have had a high degree of control over your daily life and significant confidence in your abilities. In your new milieu, it is likely that almost everyone you deal with—other judges, lawyers, court staff—will initially understand the way the system operates better than you. It will take time to adapt to your new surroundings in what one writer has called the "neutral zone"—a time of reorientation to new circumstances and surroundings.¹ Be patient with yourself. In a relatively short period of time, you will emerge, like the proverbial butterfly from the cocoon, relaxed and confident, ready to fly.

Everyone will call you "Your Honor," doors will be held open, and lawyers will laugh at your jokes—even when they are not funny. *Especially* when they are not funny. You will carry an elevated status in your community, particularly in the legal world you inhabit. People will view you differently, and you will view yourself differently. You will be held to higher, more exacting standards. Everyone will stand when you enter the courtroom. I have a colleague who recalled the first time she headed out onto the bench. Everyone stood. She reflexively turned around, asking herself, "Whom are they standing for?" From now on, they will be standing for *you*. This is heady stuff and can result in a severe attack of early onset robitis, a dreaded disease sometimes afflicting new judges which I will discuss later.

It takes some time to adjust. Presumably, mentors, colleagues, and others you trust will offer advice. Like everyone who came before you, you will need to find your own way. No matter the advice you receive from other judges, every decision you make will be your own. It will become part of your judicial DNA. I wish you the best in ruling on the myriad issues you will confront over the years, issues often critical in the lives of the people who come before you and in the communities in which you live.

I do not claim to have any sage advice when it comes to the art of judging. But in more than fifteen years on the bench thirteen as a trial judge, and almost three on the Connecticut Appellate Court—I have learned a few things about how to deal with recurring issues, some on the bench and many off, that you are sure to encounter. I claim to speak for no one but myself and underscore that the points raised here are based on my own experiences and observations, and sometimes, mistakes. As a judicial colleague, I hope these nuts-and-bolts suggestions will help you successfully cope with some of the mundane issues that you will face in your new role.

Dealing with Friends

Some people will take your new status in stride. But others, including people you have known your whole life, may act differently. Some acquaintances might be a bit standoffish or appear to be slightly intimidated. Others will tease you about having all the answers. Dealing with lawyer friends and colleagues—people you used to practice with or against—will present special challenges, especially when faced with issues of recusal or disqualification. It is important to be familiar with professional requirements relating to these issues. I recommend speaking to experienced judges with a good sense of local practices and mores before making recusal or disqualification decisions. Of course, judges have a duty *not* to remove themselves from a case merely because a motion has been made. But experience teaches that even if litigants lose their cases, they can accept their disappointment if they think they have had a fair hearing. Appearances matter. Obviously every case is different, but be very careful about remaining in a case if your fairness or objectivity can be reasonably questioned. You must be the guardian of your own reputation for fairness and impartiality.

The Line Between Public and Private Behavior

In a nutshell, it is best, under most circumstances, to act as if this line no longer exists. What I mean is this: whatever you say and do, anywhere and to anyone, can be grist for the mill if it reflects upon your fitness to dispense justice. I suggest the following approach: except, perhaps, when dealing with immediate family and friends, imagine that what you say or do will appear in your local newspaper. Much as you may try, you really cannot be a judge just during the hours you are at court, or in your chambers. You are a judge *all the time*. Let me give a few hypotheticals. (1) Every year, prior to your appointment, you have hosted a big party at which alcohol is served. In the past, if someone was stopped on the way home for a DUI, it might have been a cause for concern. Now, it could mushroom into a major career blemish. (2) In the past, you sat and smiled uncomfortably when someone told an inappropriate joke. Now, doing or saying nothing might be understood by oth-

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ers to be an endorsement of the offensive attitudes expressed by the teller of the joke. (3) In the past, when someone was tailgating at high speeds you might have been tempted to slow down, or yell at them, or gesticulate. Now, taking any of these actions could lead to an allegation that you exhibited "road rage" and lack appropriate judicial temperament. (4) In the past, you might talk freely in an elevator no matter who was in it. Now, any words you utter could have an impact on a case or a juror or could be repeated in another courtroom.

The simple truth is this: the line between private and public behavior has become blurred beyond recognition now that you are a judge. As a judge, you are a public figure. Your private conduct, therefore, is of interest to the public—and the press. Therefore, you must conduct yourself with the utmost care in private matters as well as public.

Requests for Legal Advice

Here is the usual scenario. You are at a party when the friend of a friend approaches you, introduces himself, and states he knows you are a judge. He makes small talk. He says that he knows you are not allowed to give legal advice. Actually, he tells you, he is not seeking legal advice, but he has just one question, and maybe you can assist. It seems that his brother-inlaw has been kicked out of the house by his spouse and he wants to go in to get his clothes and other personal belongings. Any problem? Or "a friend's son" got caught in the school bathroom smoking marijuana and was manhandled by the school's personnel. Can't they sue the school? Or his elderly mother got this speeding ticket and You get the idea. As a lawyer, you have undoubtedly dealt with such questions throughout the years. But as a judge, it becomes more important still that you absolutely, positively say or do nothing that could be construed—or misconstrued—as giving legal advice. First of all, judges are prohibited from giving such advice. Secondly, it is not uncommon for laypeople to misunderstand or misinterpret legal concepts—or to hear what they want to hear. So even if you decide to be polite and give some seemingly innocuous counsel with a disclaimer, the disclaimer is likely to be ignored. The last thing you want to learn is that Joe Smith's friend went into criminal court and told the judge that he went into the house to retrieve his belongings because "Judge Jones told me I could." My advice? Tell the simple truth. Explain that you would like to be of assistance but that you are strictly prohibited, for professional reasons, from giving legal advice. And never, ever succumb to the temptation to do so.

Mentioning that You Are a Judge

Years ago, I worked as an assistant U.S. attorney. Often, I would be sitting next to someone on an airplane and the conversation would be relaxed and friendly until I mentioned that I was a prosecutor. Then everything stopped. I always assumed that people thought that I would initiate a tax investigation if they said the wrong thing. In your new role, people will react differently to you when they learn you are a judge. Some people will want to treat you more favorably because of your position. My advice is to resist, except in social situations where the subject arises naturally, the temptation to tell people that you are a judge unless you are asked. What that means is this. (1) If you are on a waiting list at a local restaurant, do not mention that you are a judge in the hope of getting seated before your time, and don't permit your spouse, significant other, or partner to do so either. (2) If you are pulled over for speeding, do not disclose that you are a judge in the hope of gaining favored treatment. And do not put your judicial credentials next to your driver's license so the officer will inevitably discover that you are a judge. (3) If your spouse has a dispute with the local mechanic because he charged more than he said he would, do not make that angry phone call claiming that, as a judge, you know what he is doing is unlawful, a violation of consumer protection laws, that you decided a case just like this, etc. (4) If your child is arrested for possession of marijuana, do not try to use your status to obtain preferential treatment for him or her. And so on. The bottom line is that the inappropriate use of your position to obtain special treatment is an abuse of power.

Charities

Some people will try to use your presence at an event or your name on a letterhead to raise funds. No matter how worthy the charity or cause, this should be resisted. Check relevant ethical rules, guidelines, and decisions to determine to what extent you can be involved in charitable events, including those with which you have had a long-time involvement.

Political Activities

Different considerations may apply, of course, in states in which judges are elected. But for appointed judges in places like Connecticut, the rule is simple. Political activity is strictly verboten. Avoid rallies, fund-raisers, making contributions, bumper stickers, and signs or posters on your lawn. If your spouse is involved in politics, steer clear of situations in which it appears that you yourself are engaging in political conduct.

Email

It is probable that at home you have received unsolicited email that is offensive to you. Be careful not to allow any such unsolicited material to be forwarded to your work computer. When writing email messages at work, avoid language that would embarrass you if printed in the local newspaper. Tell friends and colleagues *not* to send you jokes, articles, and pictures at work. When online at work, avoid sites or searches that could call up offensive material. Use your home computer to communicate with friends to avoid contamination of your work computer.

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Work Interactions

All of your contacts with everyone in the work setting should be polite, professional, and courteous. You are a role model and should set the appropriate tone. This includes lawyers, secretaries, marshals, probation officers, the cleaning crew, family relations officers, stenographers, court reporters, members of the public, foreign visitors, school children on a class trip—virtually everyone. Court systems are huge echo chambers. Everything you say and do is grist for the mill. Rumors and anecdotes fly from court to court. If you are rude or inconsiderate, that will be known to everyone quickly. Jokes or comments that might have been appropriate in your past life, when talking to longtime associates or employees, are better left unsaid in your new role.

Discussing Cases or Opinions in Public

The scenario is a familiar one. You are out to lunch with judge friends and the discussion turns to a trial you are presiding over. You offer a few tart opinions on the performance of a lawyer or the merits of the case. Oops! You didn't notice, but in the next booth is the very lawyer you have been discussing, or the plaintiff, or a juror. The prospect of a mistrial in your first trial now dangles before you. Be very, very discreet when discussing legal matters, particularly a case, with a colleague. Talking about cases or decisions in a public setting—a restaurant, a hallway, an elevator—frequently invites disaster. Similarly, do not leave files, drafts of opinions, or anything else relating to a case lying around—in a car, at a restaurant, or anywhere.

Ruling Before You Are Ready

Your job is now to analyze arguments and make decisions. In a variety of settings, the problems requiring a decision will come at you very quickly. Nonetheless, my advice is to never rule unless you are comfortable with what you are doing. It is often said that lawyers prefer a timely decision, any decision, even if it is at odds with their positions, to being forced to wait. And there will be times when numerous factors—a heavy docket, a crowded court, the presence of people who have come from a long distance to attend a proceeding—will militate toward just ruling and moving on. I am *not* counseling timidity or indecision. But if that little internal voice that sometime speaks to you tells you that you are not ready to rule, listen to it. Take a recess. Hear more argument and think it over. Seek out advice from a senior colleague. Order additional briefs. Or just sleep on it. Very few decisions are so urgent that they cannot wait a few more hours or days.

Expressions of Personal Opinions on the Bench

During my first judicial assignment, a crusty veteran gave me two bits of advice. First, he said, always stop in the bathroom before going out onto the bench. Second, KYBMS—Keep Your Big Mouth Shut. I leave to you whether you choose to follow his first bit of advice. But over the years I have come to appreciate his blunt advice about keeping personal comments and observations to an absolute minimum. Pleasantries are okay. Occasional conversation can be alright. But always remember that we are *not* being paid to express our personal or political views on the matters of the day or share our thoughts on the pennant race, the state of the economy, or anything else. Nor are we a sort of master of ceremonies in a robe, presiding over an entertainment event. Except for court personnel, lawyers and the like, the people in the courtroom almost always do not want to be there. They are a captive audience. It is, frankly, somewhat egocentric to think otherwise and an abuse of your authority to force people to listen to opinions they would just as soon not hear.

Humor on the Bench or in Written Opinions

Off the bench, a lively and irreverent sense of humor can be charming. I used to think I was funny until my now-twentytwo-year-old daughter somewhere back in the eighth grade or so stopped laughing at my jokes and just sighed. But on the bench, or in written opinions, joke-telling runs the risk of detracting from the solemnity of the proceedings, being boorish, and veering off into abusiveness. A joke—particularly at someone's expense—may earn you snickers from some observers, but what seems funny to you will be deeply offensive to someone else. Criminal defendants, litigants in a divorce, plaintiffs in a malpractice case, and others forced into court, see nothing at all humorous about their situation. Never forget that for most people, a court case represents a traumatic event and frequently involves matters of the utmost importance in their lives. Even when you are acting with the best of intentions or trying to lessen the tension in the courtroom, attempts at humor are almost always likely to be misunderstood. My advice? Avoid the laugh lines; think it, but don't say it. The same applies to written opinions. Jokes, or opinions in verse, may seem clever when written, but they are not likely to seem funny to the people on the receiving end whose cases you are deciding.

Treating Everyone with Courtesy and Respect

You should strive to treat everyone—underline *everyone*—with patience, courtesy, and respect. This includes the corporation president and the convicted felon, the elderly alcoholic and the star athlete, the pro se litigant and the top flight lawyer. You speak for the community, so at times, you will be required to make harsh decisions—particularly when sentencing defendants convicted of serious crimes. But even as you voice the community's concerns, there is never a reason to treat any-

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one with disrespect or deprive a person of inherent human dignity or make him or her the butt of jokes or derogatory remarks. Your job is to set the appropriate tone of dignity and fairness in the courtroom and to apply the rules fairly to everyone.

Dealing with the Media

How do you deal with the media? With extreme care. This is particularly the case if you receive a call asking you to comment on a pending matter. In most, if not all, jurisdictions, judges are prohibited from commenting on a pending case. In many jurisdictions, the judicial branch will have designated a person to handle calls and manage press relations. If you are uncomfortable returning reporters' calls, you can delegate that job to someone else. However, as a former reporter who covered legal matters, I can attest to the fact that often reporters are working under tight deadlines. Therefore, even if you cannot or do not wish to comment, the courteous thing to do is to return the call personally or to direct someone else to do it so that the reporter is informed that you cannot, or will not, comment.

Robitis

We turn now to the dreaded disease, robitis. Robitis is defined as a condition that befalls a judge when he or she dons a robe which causes the judge to assume a self-important, arrogant attitude. In your years in practice, you have undoubtedly practiced before judges with this dreaded affliction. Robitis can be fatal to a judge's career. Friends and colleagues will probably be reticent to tell you if you have come down with it. Figure out a way to have someone—perhaps a mentor or more experienced colleague who you respect—close the door and tell you if you are showing symptoms of the disease. Comments from lawyers and jurors, if you have access to them, can be helpful. If you see a recurring theme emerging in these comments, resist the human urge to resent them and ignore them. Also try to step outside of yourself—mentally—on occasion, look dispassionately down at your own behavior, and ask yourself if you like what you see. Your work is important; take it seriously. Try not to take yourself too seriously. A touch of humility goes a long way. So does a willingness to acknowledge that you have made a mistake or misunderstood an argument or would like to be educated on a point of law.

Ethical Concerns

You must be the guardian of your own integrity and reputation. Friends and family may ask you to do things not understanding that a different set of rules applies to you. My wife still makes fun of me when we are walking our dogs because I refuse to walk over a small patch of waterfront property near our home that has a "No Trespassing" sign posted. Explain to your family in emphatic terms that you are now living under a set of rules that is different from other people's and that you need to be scrupulous in ways that others may find excessive. Periodically review the Code of Judicial Conduct. When in doubt about the propriety of conduct, check with a senior colleague or a designated person in your judicial branch. Keep your ethical antennae up. Never do anything if you have qualms about its propriety.

A Final Comment

Again, congratulations to you. I guarantee that you will love being a judge. It is an honor and a privilege to be appointed or elected a judge. It is also a great responsibility. I wish you the best. I hope these suggestions are helpful to you as begin this exciting passage.

Endnote

1. WILLIAM BRIDGES, TRANSITIONS: MAKING SENSE OF LIFE'S CHANGES (1980).

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JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES

Michael Crowell UNC School of Government August 2012 (Updated)

One of the significant developments in communication in recent years is the astounding growth of social networking websites. Huge numbers of people have joined Facebook or LinkedIn or Twitter or other on-line social networks as a means to notify others of news in their lives, to learn what their friends and relatives and acquaintances are doing, and to generally stay in touch with other people with whom they have something in common. Businesses, organizations and government agencies use social networks to communicate information about their products and services and get limited feedback. For individuals, and for some kinds of organizations, the appeal of such sites is the opportunity for ongoing back-and-forth communication among large groups of people. Typically a social network allows someone to post a profile and photographs, videos, music, etc., and invite others to become "friends" or "fans." Some information may be shared with the whole world; other parts may be restricted to a select, small group.

As with the general population, the number of judges using social media sites continues to increase. A 2012 <u>report</u> says that 46.1 percent of judges surveyed use a social media profile site. Among those judges, Facebook is most popular, being the choice of 86.3 percent of the users.

For some time now state bar regulatory agencies have been addressing the effect of electronic communication on traditional ethical rules for lawyers — the extent to which law firm websites constitute advertising, whether e-mail inquiries establish an attorney/client relationship, and so on. Likewise, judges hearing cases have faced new legal issues involving electronic discovery and searches of computers. Judges are becoming familiar, too, with problems of jurors communicating with the outside world and conducting their own research via their smart phones and other devices.

Until recently, though, there has been relatively little reference material for judges concerning their own social networking and the Code of Judicial Conduct. The purpose of this paper is to share some information addressing questions of judges' personal use of social networks. I welcome any additional material anyone knows about.

Judges' use of social networks

A good overview of social networking issues for judges appears in an April 30, 2010, on-line article from Slate entitled "<u>Tweet Justice</u>." The article reports that some judges search Facebook and other sites to check on what lawyers and parties are up to, and it tells of one judge who requires all juveniles appearing before her to friend her on Facebook or MySpace so she can monitor their activities. As the article says, the new social media can generate ethical issues for judges. One question is the appearance created by a judge and lawyer "friending" each other on a social network. Another potential pitfall is the increased opportunity for ex parte communication. The article cites a North Carolina judicial discipline case arising from a Facebook friendship.

North Carolina disciplinary case

The North Carolina disciplinary case mentioned in the Slate article is an <u>April 2009 reprimand</u> issued by the Judicial Standards Commission. The judge and lawyer had decided at the beginning of a child custody/support proceeding to friend each other on Facebook and then exchanged comments about the case on the social network. That contact led to the reprimand for ex parte communication. The judge was also reprimanded for his independent research on the parties, without informing either side, through his visits to the wife's business website, a photography business where she posted both photographs and poems.

Articles about judges and social networks

For another example of how a judge's use of Facebook can lead to trouble, there is the resignation of Georgia judge Ernest Wood as reported in both the <u>ABA Journal</u>.

Another example, also reported in a <u>local newspaper</u>, involves a lawyer who served as a substitute judge in North Las Vegas. He was removed from the office once the district attorney discovered that the judge's MySpace page said one of his personal interests was "Breaking my foot off in a prosecutor's ass."

There are also two articles on social networking in American Judicature Society publications, but they are not on-line. One is "Judges and Social Networks" in the Judicial Conduct Reporter, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 1. The other is "The Too Friendly Judge? Social Networks and the Bench," by Cynthia Gray in *Judicature* magazine, Vol. 93, p. 236 (May-June 2010).

Ethics opinions

The question of whether judges may join social networks and whether they may be social networking friends with lawyers, law enforcement officers and others now has been addressed

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by eight state ethics committees. All the opinions say that judges may join social networks, but they disagree on the propriety of friending lawyers. Florida, Oklahoma and Massachusetts say no; New York, Kentucky, South Carolina, Ohio and California say yes, though usually with qualifications. All the opinions warn judges about the potential pitfalls of social networks for embarrassment and damage to the dignity and integrity of the office. The short reviews of the ethics opinions below explain the issues that may arise under the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Florida

The Florida Supreme Court's <u>Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee's opinion 2009-20</u>, issued on November 17, 2009, received a great deal of publicity because it was one of the earliest opinions and because it concluded that judges may not add lawyers as friends on a social network. The opinions from several other jurisdictions have taken a different view, as discussed below.

The Florida committee opined that a judge could join a social network and post comments and other materials so long as the material did not otherwise violate the Code of Judicial Conduct, but that the judge could not add as friends lawyers who appear before the judge, nor allow lawyers to add the judge as a friend. The committee further said that a judge's election campaign committee could post material on a social network and could allow lawyers and others to list themselves as "fans," provided the judge or campaign committee did not control who could list themselves in that manner.

The committee's concern was that the judge's acceptance of a lawyer as a friend on the judge's page on the social network would violate the canon which prohibits a judge from conveying the impression, or allowing others to convey the impression, that a person is in a special position to influence the judge. The comparable provision in North Carolina's Code of Judicial Conduct is in Canon 2B. The Florida's committee noted that being listed as a friend as the term is used on social network would not necessarily mean that the lawyer actually was in a special position, but the listing would convey that impression.

The original Florida opinion generated additional inquiries resulting in three follow-up opinions. The first is <u>Opinion Number 2010-04</u> which advises that judicial assistants may add as Facebook friends lawyers who may appear before the judge for whom the assistant works, so long as the assistant's Facebook activity is conducted independently of the judge and does not mention the judge or court.

The next Florida opinion, <u>Number 2010-05</u>, advised that candidates for judicial office are not subject to the original opinion and that they, thus, may add as Facebook friends lawyers who are likely to appear before them if elected. The opinion is based on the wording of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct which specifies the portions that apply to candidates.

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Finally, the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee revisited and reiterated its support for its original opinion on March 26, 2010, with <u>Opinion Number 2010-06</u>. The new opinion was prompted by several inquiries, two of which proposed disclaimers on judges' Facebook pages and one of which asked about an organization's Facebook page. The committee advised, first, that a judge who is a member of a voluntary bar association which uses a Facebook page may use that page to communicate with other members, including lawyers, about the organization and about non-legal matters, and does not have to "de-friend" lawyer members who might appear before the judge. The opinion emphasized that the organization, not the judge, controlled the Facebook page and decided which friend requests would be accepted and rejected.

One judge asked whether the concerns expressed in the original opinion could be addressed by including a disclaimer on the judge's Facebook page stating that (a) the judge would accept as a friend anyone the judge recognized or who shared a number of common friends; (b) the term "friend" does not mean a close relationship; and (c) no one listed as a friend is in a position to influence the judge. Another judge inquired about a similar approach, proposing to state on the judge's Facebook page that the judge would accept as a friend all lawyers who requested to be added.

The Florida committee rejected both proposals and stuck to its original opinion. The committee majority said that the disclaimer failed to cure the impression that a lawyer listed as a Facebook friend had special influence. The majority observed that lawyers who chose not to use Facebook would not be listed as friends and that there was no assurance that someone viewing the page would see or read the disclaimer. A minority of the committee wrote a dissent, calling for withdrawal of the original opinion, arguing that judges are not prohibited from having lawyers as friends in the historic sense of the word and that adding a lawyer as a Facebook-defined friend creates no stronger impression of special influence than does ordinary socializing. The minority would advise that a judge may accept lawyers as Facebook friends and that any motion to require the judge to recuse because of that relationship would need to include additional specific allegations supporting the impression of special influence.

South Carolina

In October 2009 the South Carolina Advisory Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct issued <u>Opinion 17-2009</u>. With little discussion the committee said that a magistrate may join Facebook and be friends with law enforcement officers and court employees so long as the site is not used for discussion of judicial business.

New York

More extended discussions, tending toward the same result as South Carolina but with more helpful analysis and discussion, have come from New York, Kentucky, Ohio and California. The gist of <u>Opinion 08-176</u> of the New York Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics, issued on January 29, 2009, is that there is nothing fundamentally different about a judge socializing through a social network and socializing in person, and nothing fundamentally different about communicating electronically rather than face to face. The key question for the committee was not whether a judge could join a social network but how the judge behaves on the network. The judge, said the committee, needs to be aware of the public nature of comments posted on such a site; the potential of creating the appearance that a lawyer who friends the judge will have special influence; and the likelihood that people might use the judge's social network page to seek legal advice. The committee observed that in some ways allowing a person to become a friend on a social network is no different than adding the person's contact information to a Rolodex, but still cautioned that when combined with other circumstances the friending can lead to the appearance of a close social relationship requiring disclosure or recusal.

Kentucky

One of the most extensive opinions is <u>Formal Judicial Ethics Opinion JE-119</u> issued on January 10, 2010, by the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary. The Kentucky committee does not believe that being designated a friend on a social network by itself conveys an impression of a special relationship. The committee repeats the cautions of the New York opinion, though, and notes that "social networking sites are fraught with peril for judges" Personal information, photographs and comments that might be appropriate for someone else may not satisfy the higher standards for judges. The committee also warns of the problem of ex parte communications and cites the North Carolina reprimand.

California

<u>Opinion 66</u> from the Judicial Ethics Committee of the California Judges Association, issued on November 23, 2010, is well written and useful. The California committee concludes, with qualifications, that a judge may join a social network, even one which includes lawyers who may appear before the judge, but the judge must disclose the social network connection and must defriend the lawyer when the lawyer has a case before the judge.

As to whether a judge may friend a lawyer, the committee answers that it depends on the nature of the social network and whether the lawyer has a case before the judge. If the social network is one limited to the judge's relatives and a few close colleagues and it is used for exchanging personal information, for example, the likelihood will be greater that the lawyer appears to have special influence. There is much less risk, by comparison, when the social

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network involves individuals and organizations interested in a particular subject or project, say a sports team or a charitable project, and the exchanges are limited to that topic. Regardless of the nature of the social network, however, the California opinion says the judge should always disclose that the judge has a social network tie to a lawyer and must recuse from any case in which a friend from the first kind of network, the more personal one, is participating. Even for the second kind of social network, the less personal one, the judge should de-friend the lawyer when the lawyer appears in a case before the judge.

One issue the California opinion addresses but others do not is the judge's obligation when others post comments on the judge's personal social network page. The committee says that the ethical obligation to avoid the appearance of bias requires the judge to monitor the judge's page frequently for such comments and to delete the comments, hide them from public view or otherwise repudiate anything others say that is offensive or demeaning. Leaving comments on the page can create the impression that the judge has adopted the comments.

The California opinion also admonishes judges to not create links to political organizations or others that would amount to impermissible political activity. And the judge must be careful not to lend the prestige of the office to another by posting any material that would be construed as advancing that other person's interest.

Finally, the opinion admonishes judges to be familiar with a social network's privacy settings and how to modify them. And the judge should be aware that other participants in the social network may not guard privacy as diligently and may thereby expose the judge's comments, photographs, etc., to others without the judge's permission.

Ohio

The Ohio opinion is Opinion 2010-7, issued December 3, 2010, by the Ohio Supreme Court's Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. It is the last opinion in the list of <u>2010</u> <u>opinions</u>.

The Ohio opinion observes that there is no prohibition on a judge being a friend of a lawyer who appears before the judge, thus friending on-line cannot be an ethics violation by itself. The opinion notes the special risks associated with social networks for judges and advises that: (a) the judge must be careful to maintain the dignity of the office in every comment, photograph, etc., posted on the site; (b) a judge should not interact on social networks with individuals or organizations whose advocacy or interest in matters before the court would raise questions about the judge's independence; (c) the judge should not make any comments on a site about any matter pending before the judge; (d) the judge should not use the social network for ex parte communications; and (e) the judge should not undertake independent investigation of a case by visiting a party's or witness' page. Finally, the Ohio opinion advises judges to consider

whether interaction with a lawyer on a social network creates any bias or prejudice concerning the lawyer or a party.

Oklahoma

The Oklahoma Judicial Ethics Advisory Board issued its <u>Judicial Ethics Opinion 2011-3</u> on July 6, 2011. Oklahoma supports the Florida point of view, that while a judge may participate in social networking sites the judge should not be social network friends with lawyers, law enforcement officers, social workers or others who may appear in the judge's court. In the panel's view such a relationship can convey the impression that the person is in a special position to influence the judge. It is immaterial whether the person actually is in such a position, it is the possible impression that matters, and in the opinion of the Oklahoma committee, "We believe that public trust in the impartiality and fairness of the judicial system is so important that [it] is imperative to err on the side of caution where the situation is 'fraught with peril.'"

Massachusetts

The last opinion issued is <u>CJE Opinion No. 2011-6</u> from the Committee on Judicial Ethics of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Massachusetts relies on the Florida analysis in concluding that a judge may join a social network site but may not friend any lawyer who appears before the judge. "Stated another way, in terms of a bright-line test, judges may only 'friend' attorneys as to whom they would recuse themselves when those attorneys appeared before them." Friending creates the impression, Massachusetts concludes, that the lawyer is a special position to influence the judge.

The Massachusetts opinion repeats briefly the warnings from other opinions about the posting of embarrassing photographs, the avoidance of ex parte communications, and the like, and also adds a new caution. It tells judges not to identify themselves as judges on the social network site, nor allow others to do so. Such identification would run afoul of the code provisions against using the prestige of the office to advance private interests, in addition to the problem of creating an impression that others are in a special position to influence the judge.

Summary

Although the number of opinions about judges and social networks is still small, there does seem to be a consensus building on several issues. There appears to be general agreement among the ethics committee that:

- (1) Judges may join on-line social networks.
- (2) Social networks create opportunities and temptations for ex parte communication that judges must be careful to avoid.

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- (3) Judges are still judges when posting materials on their social networking pages and need to realize that the kinds of comments and photographs posted by others may not be appropriate for them.
- (4) Judges need to avoid on-line ties to organizations that discriminate, just as they are prohibited from joining such organizations.
- (5) Judges also need to avoid on-line ties to organizations that may be advocates before the court.
- (6) Judges need to avoid posting comments on social network sites or taking other actions on such sites that lend the prestige of the judge's office to the advancement of a private interest.

The ethics committees divide most sharply on the issue of a judge accepting a lawyer as a friend on a social network. The majority of the states opining on the issue to date conclude that friending does not by itself establish such a relationship as to imply that the lawyer has special influence and does not by itself require the judge to recuse from cases with that lawyer, although they recognize that a social network friendship may create such problems when combined with other circumstances. In the view of those states, being a friend of a judge on a social network is no different than being a friend in person and does not by itself lead to automatic recusal. On the other hand, the ethics committees of three states have concluded that a social network friendship is sufficiently likely to create the impression of special influence that it should be barred. Although such an impression of favoritism may be mistaken, the approach of those ethics committee is to err on the side of caution when it comes to appearances of fairness.

Judges also should be aware of the security issues that come with social networking. A judge's page on Facebook or MySpace or other social network can provide lots of information to someone who is dissatisfied with the judge's decisions and wants to do harm.

8/10/12

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North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct

Adopted April 2003

The North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct is hereby amended to read as follows:

Preamble

An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society, and to this end and in furtherance thereof, this Code of Judicial Conduct is hereby established. A violation of this Code of Judicial Conduct may be deemed conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, or willful misconduct in office, or otherwise as grounds for disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Article 30 of Chapter 7A of the General Statutes of North Carolina. No other code or proposed code of judicial conduct shall be relied upon in the interpretation and application of this Code of Judicial Conduct.

Canon 1

A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.

A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself observe, appropriate standards of conduct to ensure that the integrity and independence of the judiciary shall be preserved.

Canon 2

A judge should avoid impropriety in all his activities.

A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

B. A judge should not allow his family, social or other relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private interest of others; nor should he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him. A judge may, based on personal knowledge, serve as a personal reference or provide a letter of recommendation. He should not testify voluntarily as a character witness.

C. A judge should not hold membership in any organization that practices unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion or national origin.

Canon 3

A judge should perform the duties of his office impartially and diligently.

The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all his other activities. His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply.

A. Adjudicative responsibilities.

(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. He should be unswayed by partian interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.

(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before him.

(3) A judge should be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials and others subject to his direction and control.

(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither knowingly initiate nor knowingly consider *ex parte* or other communications concerning a pending proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him.

(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.

(6) A judge should abstain from public comment about the merits of a pending proceeding in any state or federal court dealing with a case or controversy arising in North Carolina or addressing North Carolina law and should encourage similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to his direction and control. This subsection does not prohibit a judge from making public statements in the course of official duties; from explaining for public information the proceedings of the Court; from addressing or discussing previously issued judicial decisions when serving as faculty or otherwise participating in educational courses or programs; or from addressing educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, political, or civic organizations.

(7) A judge should exercise discretion with regard to permitting broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during civil or criminal sessions of court or recesses between sessions, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 15 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts.

B. Administrative responsibilities.

(1) A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and court officials.

(2) A judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to him.

(3) A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware.

(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should exercise his power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoiding nepotism and favoritism. He should not approve compensation of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.

C. Disqualification.

(1) On motion of any party, a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality may reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:

(a) He has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;

(b) He served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;

(c) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(d) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

(2) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.

(3) For the purposes of this section:

(a) The degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system;

(b) "Fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee and guardian;

(c) "Financial interest" means ownership of a substantial legal or equitable interest (*i.e.*, an interest that would be significantly affected in value by the outcome of the subject legal proceeding), or a relationship as director or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;

(ii) an office in an educational, cultural, historical, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities held by the organization.

D. Remittal of disqualification.

Nothing in this Canon shall preclude a judge from disqualifying himself from participating in any proceeding upon his own initiative. Also, a judge potentially disqualified by the terms of Canon 3C may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of his potential disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, on behalf of their clients and independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the judge's basis for potential disqualification is immaterial or insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualified, and may participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding. For purposes of this section, *pro se* parties shall be considered lawyers.

Canon 4

A judge may participate in cultural or historical activities or engage in activities concerning the legal, economic, educational, or governmental system, or the administration of justice.

A judge, subject to the proper performance of his judicial duties, may engage in the following quasi-judicial activities, if in doing so he does not cast substantial doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before him:

A. He may speak, write, lecture, teach, participate in cultural or historical activities, or otherwise engage in activities concerning the economic, educational, legal, or governmental system, or the administration of justice.

B. He may appear at a public hearing before an executive or legislative body or official with respect to activities permitted under Canon 4A or other provision of this Code, and he may otherwise consult with an executive or legislative body or official.

C. He may serve as a member, officer or director of an organization or governmental agency concerning the activities described in Canon 4A, and may participate in its management and investment decisions. He may not actively assist such an organization in raising funds but may be

listed as a contributor on a fund-raising invitation. He may make recommendations to public and private fund-granting agencies regarding activities or projects undertaken by such an organization.

Canon 5

A judge should regulate his extra-judicial activities to ensure that they do not prevent him from carrying out his judicial duties.

A. Avocational activities. A judge may write, lecture, teach, and speak on legal or non-legal subjects, and engage in the arts, sports, and other social and recreational activities, if such avocational activities do not substantially interfere with the performance of his judicial duties.

B. Civic and charitable activities. A judge may participate in civic and charitable activities that do not reflect adversely upon his impartiality or interfere with the performance of his judicial duties. A judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization subject to the following limitations.

(1) A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before him.

(2) A judge may be listed as an officer, director or trustee of any cultural, educational, historical, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization. He may not actively assist such an organization in raising funds but may be listed as a contributor on a fund-raising invitation.

(3) A judge may serve on the board of directors or board of trustees of such an organization even though the board has the responsibility for approving investment decisions.

C. Financial activities.

(1) A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that reflect adversely on his impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial position or involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which he serves.

(2) Subject to the requirements of subsection (1), a judge may hold and manage his own personal investments or those of his spouse, children, or parents, including real estate investments, and may engage in other remunerative activity not otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Code but should not serve as an officer, director or manager of any business.

(3) A judge should manage his investments and other financial interests to minimize the number of cases in which he is disqualified.

(4) Neither a judge nor a member of his family residing in his household should accept a gift from anyone except as follows:

(a) A judge may accept a gift incident to a public testimonial to him; books supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official or academic use; or an invitation to the judge and his spouse to attend a bar-related function, a cultural or historical activity, or an event related to the economic, educational, legal, or governmental system, or the administration of justice;

(b) A judge or a member of his family residing in his household may accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift, favor or loan from a friend or relative; a wedding, engagement or other special

occasion gift; a loan from a lending institution in its regular course of business on the same terms generally available to persons who are not judges; or a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms applied to other applicants; (c) Other than as permitted under subsection C.(4)(b) of this Canon, a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may accept any other gift only if the donor is not a party presently before him and, if its value exceeds \$500, the judge reports it in the same manner as he reports compensation in Canon 6C.

(5) For the purposes of this section "member of his family residing in his household" means any relative of a judge by blood or marriage, or a person treated by a judge as a member of his family, who resides in his household.

(6) A judge is not required by this Code to disclose his income, debts or investments, except as provided in this Canon and Canons 3 and 6.

(7) Information acquired by a judge in his judicial capacity should not be used or disclosed by him in financial dealings or for any other purpose not related to his judicial duties.

D. Fiduciary activities. A judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust or person of a member of his family, and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. "Member of his family" includes a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or any other relative of the judge by blood or marriage. As a family fiduciary a judge is subject to the following restrictions:

(1) He should not serve if it is likely that as a fiduciary he will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before him, or if the estate, trust or ward becomes involved in adversarial proceedings in the court on which he serves or one under its appellate jurisdiction.

(2) While acting as a fiduciary a judge is subject to the same restrictions on financial activities that apply to him in his personal capacity.

E. Arbitration. A judge should not act as an arbitrator or mediator. However, an emergency justice or judge of the Appellate Division designated as such pursuant to Article 6 of

Chapter 7A of the General Statutes of North Carolina, and an Emergency Judge of the District Court or Superior Court commissioned as such pursuant to Article 8 of Chapter 7A of the General Statutes of North Carolina may serve as an arbitrator or mediator when such service does not conflict with or interfere with the justice's or judge's judicial service in emergency status. A judge of the Appellate Division may participate in any dispute resolution program conducted at the Court of Appeals and authorized by the Supreme Court.

F. Practice of law. A judge should not practice law.

G. Extra-judicial appointments. A judge should not accept appointment to a committee, commission, or other body concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than those relating to cultural or historical matters, the economic, educational, legal or governmental system, or the administration of justice. A judge may represent his country, state or locality on ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical, educational or cultural activities.

Canon 6

A judge should regularly file reports of compensation received for quasi-judicial and extrajudicial activities.

A judge may receive compensation, honoraria and reimbursement of expenses for the quasijudicial and extra-judicial activities permitted by this Code, subject to the following restrictions:

A. Compensation and honoraria. Compensation and honoraria should not exceed a reasonable amount.

B. Expense reimbursement. Expense reimbursement should be limited to the actual cost of travel, food and lodging reasonably incurred by the judge and, where appropriate to the occasion, by his spouse. Any payment in excess of such an amount is compensation.

C. Public reports. A judge shall report the name and nature of any source or activity from which he received more than \$2,000 in income during the calendar year for which the report is filed. Any required report shall be made annually and filed as a public document as follows: The members of the Supreme Court shall file such reports with the Clerk of the Supreme Court; the members of the Court of Appeals shall file such reports with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals; and each Superior Court Judge, regular, special, and emergency, and each District Court Judge, shall file such report with the Clerk of the Court of the Court of the Supreme Court Judge, shall file such report shall be filed, absent good cause shown, not later than May 15th of the following year.

Canon 7

A judge may engage in political activity consistent with his status as a public official.

The provisions of Canon 7 are designed to strike a balance between two important but competing considerations: (1) the need for an impartial and independent judiciary and (2) in light of the continued requirement that judicial candidates run in public elections as mandated by the Constitution and laws of North Carolina, the right of judicial candidates to engage in constitutionally protected political activity. To promote clarity and to avoid potentially unfair

application of the provisions of this Code, subsection B of Canon 7 establishes a safe harbor of permissible political conduct.

A. Terminology. For the purposes of this Canon only, the following definitions apply.

(1) A "candidate" is a person actively and publicly seeking election to judicial office. A person becomes a candidate for judicial office as soon as he makes a public declaration of candidacy, declares or files as a candidate with the appropriate election authority, authorizes solicitation or acceptance of contributions or public support, or sends a letter of intent to the chair of the Judicial Standards Commission. The term "candidate" has the same meaning when applied to a judge seeking election to a non-judicial office.

(2) To "solicit" means to directly, knowingly and intentionally make a request, appeal or announcement, public or private, oral or written, whether in person or through the press, radio, television, telephone, Internet, billboard, or distribution and circulation of printed materials, that expressly requests other persons to contribute, give, loan or pledge any money, goods, labor, services or real property interest to a specific individual's efforts to be elected to public office.

(3) To "endorse" means to knowingly and expressly request, appeal or announce publicly, orally or in writing, whether in person or through the press, radio, television, telephone, Internet, billboard or distribution and circulation of printed materials, that other persons should support a specific individual in his efforts to be elected to public office.

B. Permissible political conduct. A judge or a candidate may:

(1) attend, preside over, and speak at any political party gathering, meeting or other convocation, including a fund-raising function for himself, another individual or group of individuals seeking election to office and the judge or candidate may be listed or noted within any publicity relating to such an event, so long as he does not expressly endorse a candidate (other than himself) for a specific office or expressly solicit funds from the audience during the event;

(2) if he is a candidate, endorse any individual seeking election to any office or conduct a joint campaign with and endorse other individuals seeking election to judicial office, including the solicitation of funds for a joint judicial campaign;

(3) identify himself as a member of a political party and make financial contributions to a political party or organization; provided, however, that he may not personally make financial contributions or loans to any individual seeking election to office (other than himself) except as part of a joint judicial campaign as permitted in subsection B(2);

(4) personally solicit campaign funds and request public support from anyone for his own campaign or, alternatively, and in addition thereto, authorize or establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the solicitation and expenditure of campaign funds;

(5) become a candidate either in a primary or in a general election for a judicial office provided that he should resign his judicial office prior to becoming a candidate either in a party primary or in a general election for a non-judicial office;

(6) engage in any other constitutionally protected political activity.

C. Prohibited political conduct. A judge or a candidate should not:

(1) solicit funds on behalf of a political party, organization, or an individual (other than himself) seeking election to office, by specifically asking for such contributions in person, by telephone, by electronic media, or by signing a letter, except as permitted under subsection B of this Canon or otherwise within this Code;

(2) endorse a candidate for public office except as permitted under subsection B of this Canon or otherwise within this Code;

(3) intentionally and knowingly misrepresent his identity or qualifications.

D. Political conduct of family members. The spouse or other family member of a judge or a candidate is permitted to engage in political activity.

Limitation of Proceedings

Disciplinary proceedings to redress alleged violations of Canon 7 of this Code must be commenced within three months of the act or omission allegedly giving rise to the violation. Disciplinary proceedings to redress alleged violations of all other provisions of this Code must be commenced within three years of the act or omission allegedly giving rise to the violation; provided, however, that disciplinary proceedings may be instituted at any time against a judge convicted of a felony during his tenure in judicial office.

Scope and Effective Date of Compliance

The provisions of Canon 7 of this Code shall apply to judges and candidates for judicial office. The other provisions of this Code shall become effective as to a judge upon the administration of the judge's oath to the office of judge; provided, however, that it shall be permissible for a newly installed judge to facilitate or assist in the transfer of his prior duties as legal counsel but he may not be compensated therefor.

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Supreme Court State of North Carolina Raleigh

CHANGERS OF

50X (84) 2)P CODE 27502 TEL. (919) 733-3711

Memorandum

To: All Employees of the Administrative Office of the Courts

From: Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, Jr.

Re: Guidelines for Providing Legal Information to the Public

Date: September 1, 2004

In August 2003, I appointed an ad hoc committee of the State Judicial Council to review guidelines for court staff who provide legal information to the public. The Committee consisted of Judge Beth Keever, Clerk of Superior Court Tim Spear, Magistrate Jean Massengill, and Public Defender Angus Thompson. This Committee reviewed information from the Institute of Government, articles by a court consultant, and court rules from other states. After dedicated efforts, which are sincerely appreciated, the Committee recommended the following guidelines, which the Supreme Court adopted in late June of this year.

These guidelines are being sent to all employees of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and you are asked to use them as a guide in working with the public. The Judicial Branch is blessed with dedicated and public service minded employees, and these guidelines were developed to assist you as you go about your daily work.

I again thank the members of the ad hoc committee who worked diligently to offer the Court these well-researched guidelines.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

Order

Adopting Guidelines for Court Staff Providing Legal Information to the Public

Pursuant to the recommendations of a subcommittee of the North Carolina Judicial

Council, the following guidelines are issued for the benefit of all court staff who provide legal

information to the public.

- I. Purpose: The purpose of these guidelines is to assist court staff in communicating with individual court users without practicing law. The guidelines are intended to enable court staff to provide the best service possible to individuals within the limits of the individual staff member's responsibility. The guidelines are not intended to restrict powers of court staff otherwise provided by statute or rule. The guidelines are not intended to list all assistance that can be provided. The guidelines recognize that the best service the court staff may provide in many proceedings is advising an individual to seek the assistance of an attorney.
- II. Impartiality: Court staff shall remain impartial and may not provide or withhold assistance for the purpose of giving one party an advantage over another.

III. Authorized Information and Assistance: Court staff may do all of the following:

A. Provide <u>public</u> information contained in any of the following:

- 1. Dockets or Calendars
- 2. Case files
- 3. Indexes
- B. Provide a copy of, or recite, any of the following:
 - 1. State and local court rules
 - 2. Court procedures
 - 3. Applicable fees and costs
- C. Inform an individual where to find statutes and rules without advising whether a particular statute or rule is applicable.
- D. Identify and provide applicable forms and written instructions without providing recommendations as to any specific course of action.

Adopted by the Court in Conference this the 24th day of June 2004. These guidelines shall be delivered to each employee of the Administrative Office of the Courts at the earliest practical and economical mailing by the Administrative Office of the Courts.

Brady, For the Court

Witness my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, this the 1st day of September 2004.

ameron

Christie Speir Cameron Clerk of the Supreme Court

Published on NAACP LDF (http://www.naacpldf.org)

Home > Our Work > News Updates > ABA-LDF Joint Statement on Eliminating Bias in the Criminal Justice System

ABA-LDF Joint Statement on Eliminating Bias in the Criminal Justice System

7/16/15 **Related Case or Issue:** Policing Reform Campaign [1]





The American Bar Association and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. have long and proud traditions of fighting for civil rights, human rights and equal justice. Although, over the years, we have celebrated much progress in these arenas, we are now confronted by a troubling and destabilizing loss of public confidence in the American criminal justice system. The growing skepticism about the integrity of the criminal justice system is driven by real and perceived evidence of racial bias among some representatives of that system. This crisis of confidence must be addressed, and the time to act is now.

While we believe that the overwhelming percentage of law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges are not racist, explicit bias remains a real factor in our country –and criminal justice system – and implicit or unconscious bias affects even those who may believe themselves to be fair. Indeed, as Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy once observed (in the 2001 case of *Board of Trustees v. Garrett*), prejudice may arise from not just overt "malice or hostile animus alone," but also "insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard against people who appear to be different in respects from ourselves."

One would have to have been outside of the United States and cut off from media to be unaware of the recent spate of killings of unarmed African American men and women at the hands of white law enforcement officers. Several of these killings, like those of Walter Scott in South Carolina, 12-year-old Tamir Rice in Ohio, and Eric Garner in New York, have been captured by citizen video and viewed nationwide. More recently, the in-custody death of Freddie Gray sparked days of unrest in Baltimore City, which ended only when the officers (who were of multiple races) were charged by the local prosecutor.

Given the history of implicit and explicit racial bias and discrimination in this country, there has long been a strained relationship between the African-American community and law enforcement. But with video cameras and extensive news coverage bringing images and stories of violent encounters between (mostly white) law enforcement officers and (almost exclusively African-American and Latino) unarmed individuals into American homes, it is not surprising that the absence of criminal charges in many of these cases has caused so many people to doubt the ability of the criminal justice system to treat individuals fairly, impartially, and without regard to their race.

That impression is reinforced by the statistics on race in our criminal justice system. With approximately 5% of the world's population, the United States has approximately 25% of the world's jail and prison population. Some two-thirds of those incarcerated are persons of color. While crime rates may vary by neighborhood and class, it is difficult to believe that racial disparities in arrest, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration rates are unaffected by attitudes and biases regarding race.

And, to the extent that doubts remain, the U.S. Department of Justice's recent investigation of law enforcement practices in Ferguson, Missouri, should put them to rest. In Ferguson, the Justice Department found that the dramatically different rates at which African-American and White individuals in Ferguson were stopped, searched, cited, arrested, and subjected to the use of force could not be explained by chance or differences in the rates at which African-American and White individuals violated the law. These disparities can be explained at least in part by taking into account racial bias.

Given these realities, it is not only time for a careful look at what caused the current crisis, but also time to initiate an affirmative effort to eradicate implied or perceived racial bias – in all of its forms – from the criminal justice system.

As lawyers, we have a very special role to play. As the Preamble to the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct states,

As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. . . . In addition, a lawyer should further the public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority.

What must we do? The answer lies in making both macro and micro changes in our criminal justice system.

At the macro level, Congress and state legislatures must look at the vast array of laws that criminalize behaviors that pose little, if any, danger to society. We have over-criminalized conduct throughout the United States and have come inappropriately to rely on the criminal justice system to address problems of mental health and poverty. We have adopted unnecessary zero-tolerance policies in schools that inappropriately require police officers to take the place of teachers and principals and become behavioral judges. We need fewer criminal laws, and fewer circumstances in which police, prosecutors, and judges are called upon to deal with social, as opposed to criminal, issues.

Over-criminalization is such a significant problem that virtually every careful observer of criminal justice in America, conservative or liberal, recognizes it. This consensus presents a unique opportunity to unflinchingly confront the need to improve our justice system.

De-criminalization is, however, not a short-term solution to the current crisis of confidence. Every day, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges are making discretionary decisions in a country where, literally, any person could be arrested for something if government officials focused sufficient time and energy on him or her.

We must therefore take immediate action at the micro level to begin the process of rebuilding trust and confidence in the criminal justice system and fulfilling the promise of equal justice.

Prosecutors play an important and vital role within the criminal justice system and should be leaders in this effort. We have begun what we anticipate will be a series of conversations focused on identifying ways in which prosecutors can play a more powerful role in addressing the problem of racial bias in our justice system. Our organizations arranged an off-the-record discussion that included prosecutors and other participants in the criminal justice system committed to equal justice. We emerged from our discussion with a commitment to advancing the reforms listed below. We regard these reforms as necessary investments that are essential to strengthening public confidence in the rule of law and the legitimacy of our justice system.

1. We need better data on the variety of interactions between law enforcement and citizens. Earlier this year FBI Director James Comey – himself a former federal prosecutor – acknowledged that gathering better and more reliable data about encounters between the police and citizens is "the first step to understanding what is really going on in our communities and our country." Data related to violent encounters is particularly important. As Director Comey remarked, "It's ridiculous that I can't know how many people were shot by police." Police departments should be encouraged to make and keep reports on the racial identities of individuals stopped and frisked, arrested, ticketed, or warned for automobile and other infractions. Police departments should report incidents in which serious or deadly force is used by officers and include the race of the officer(s) and that of the civilian(s). This will certainly require investment of funds, but that investment is key to a better future. We cannot understand what we cannot measure, and we cannot change what we cannot understand.

2. Prosecutors should collect and publicly disclose more data about their work that can enable the public to obtain a better understanding of the extent to which racial disparities arise from the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. While this data collection will also require investment of funds, it is essential to achieving the goal of eliminating racial bias in the criminal justice system.

3. Prosecutors and police should seek expert assistance from organizations with expertise in conducting objective analyses to identify and localize unexplained racial disparities. These and similar organizations can provide evidence-based analyses and propose protocols to address any identified racial disparities.

4. Prosecutors' offices, defense counsel, and judges should seek expert assistance to implement training on implicit bias for their employees. An understanding of the science of implicit bias will pave the way for law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges to address it in their individual work. There should also be post-training evaluations to determine the effectiveness of the training.

5. Prosecutors' offices must move quickly, aggressively, unequivocally – and yet deliberately – to address misconduct that reflects explicit racial bias. We must make clear that such conduct is fundamentally incompatible with our shared values and that it has an outsized impact on the public's perception of the fairness of the system.

6. Prosecutors' offices and law enforcement agencies should make efforts to hire and retain lawyers and officers who live in and reflect the communities they serve. Prosecutors and police should be encouraged to engage with the community by participating in community forums, civic group meetings, and neighborhood events. Prosecutors' offices should build relationships with African-American and minority communities to improve their understanding about how and why these communities may view events differently from prosecutors.

7. There should be a dialogue among all the stakeholders in each jurisdiction about race and how it affects criminal justice decision making. In 2004, the ABA Justice Kennedy Commission recommended the formation of Racial Justice Task Forces – which would consist of representatives of the judiciary, law enforcement and prosecutors, defenders and defense counsel, probation and parole officers, and community organizations – to examine the racial impact that policing priorities and prosecutorial and judicial decisions might produce and whether alternative approaches that do not produce racial disparities might be implemented without compromising public safety. There is little cost associated with the assembly of such Task Forces, and they can develop solutions that could be applicable to a variety of jurisdictions provided that the various stakeholders were willing to do the hard work of talking honestly and candidly about race.

8. As surprising as it might seem, many people do not understand what prosecutors do. Hence, prosecutors' offices, with the help of local and state bar associations, should seek out opportunities to explain their function and the kinds of decisions they are routinely called upon to make. Local and state bar associations and other community organizations should help to educate the public that the decision *not* to prosecute is often as important as the decision *to* prosecute; that prosecutors today should not to be judged solely by conviction rates, but, instead, by the fairness and judgment reflected in their decisions and by their success in making communities safer for all their members; and that some of the most innovative alternatives to traditional prosecution and punishment – like diversion and re-entry programs, drug and veteran courts, and drug treatment – have been instigated, developed, and supported by prosecutors.

9. To ensure accountability, the public should have access to evidence explaining why grand juries issued "no true bills" and why prosecutors declined to prosecute police officers involved in fatal shootings of unarmed civilians. The release of grand jury evidence, as in Ferguson, is one way to promote the needed accountability.

10. Accountability can also be promoted by greater use of body and vehicle cameras to create an actual record of police-citizen encounters. With the proliferation of powerful firearms in our communities, law enforcement departments reasonably seek equipment that enable them to protect themselves and their communities when called upon to confront armed and dangerous individuals seeking to engage in criminal or terrorist acts. However, while it is appropriate to arm our police and train them in the use of ever more powerful weapons, it is equally important to train our law enforcement officers in techniques designed to de-escalate tense situations, make accurate judgments about when use of force is essential, and properly determine the appropriate amount of force required in each situation.

11. We must recognize that not every lawyer has the judgment and personal qualities to be a successful prosecutor, do justice, and be willing to acknowledge the possibility of implicit bias. Prosecutors who routinely engage in conduct or make decisions that call into question the fairness or integrity of their offices should be removed from office if they cannot be trained to meet the high standards expected of public officers. At the same time, the terms "prosecutorial misconduct" and "police misconduct" should be used with greater care. Even the best prosecutors will make mistakes, much like the best defense lawyers and judges do. There is good reason to limit the characterization of "misconduct" to intentional acts that violate legal or ethical rules.

12. Prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel must pay more attention to the collateral consequences of convictions. In many jurisdictions, after an individual is convicted of an offense and completes his or her sentence (by serving time, paying a fine, or completing probation or parole), the individual nevertheless faces a life sentence of disqualification and

deprivation of educational, employment, housing, and other opportunities. This runs counter to the interests we all share in rehabilitation of the offender and positive re-integration into and engagement with the communities in which they live. In many cases, prosecutions can be structured to limit some of the most pernicious of these consequences, provided that the lawyers and the courts take the time and care to examine alternative disposition options. Prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel should join together to urge legislatures and administrative agencies to reconsider the laws and regulations that impose these collateral consequences and determine whether they can be modified to provide more opportunities for former offenders without compromising public safety.

The American criminal justice system is unquestionably at a moment of crisis. But there are many steps we, as members of the bar, can and should take quickly to begin to turn the ship of justice around and ensure that the system delivers the blind justice that it promises. If we commit ourselves to confronting and eliminating the racial biases that now exist, we can restore the much-needed public confidence in our criminal justice system. As Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall once exhorted in accepting the Liberty Medal Award in 1992, "America can do better." Indeed, "America has no choice but to do better."

Both the American Bar Association and the Legal Defense Fund will continue to convene meetings with prosecutors and other law enforcement groups to support the reforms we have identified. We also will work to support and advance a robust dialogue among prosecutors and leaders in the profession about how best to eliminate racial bias from our justice system.

William C. Hubbard, Provident American Par Associa

President, American Bar Association

Sherrilyn Ifill [2]

President and Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.

The following individuals participated in the discussion that led to this joint statement:

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[8] http://www.naacpldf.org/print/press-release/joint-statement-eliminating-bias-criminal-justice-system

TAB: Contempt

ESSENTIALS OF CONTEMPT FOR MAGISTRATES

Michael Crowell UNC School of Government October 2013

Different kinds of contempt

There are two kinds of contempt: criminal contempt and civil contempt.

Criminal contempt is used to <u>punish</u> for acts that disrupt a court proceeding or show disrespect, and also can be used for violation of court orders. Criminal contempt can be <u>direct</u> or <u>indirect</u>. Direct criminal contempt occurs in the court's presence; indirect does not. Criminal contempt can be punished by imprisonment and/or a fine.

Civil contempt is used to get someone to <u>comply</u> with a court order. There is no distinction between direct and indirect civil contempt; in any event, virtually all civil contempt takes place outside the court's presence. The only means of enforcing civil contempt is to imprison the person until the person complies with the court order.

Magistrate's authority

A magistrate's authority to use contempt is stated in G.S. 7A-292(2). A magistrate may punish <u>only</u> for direct criminal contempt. That is, a magistrate may punish only for criminal contempt that takes place in the magistrate's presence. Any other kind of contempt must be referred to a district court judge.

Meaning of criminal contempt

Criminal contempt is defined in G.S. 5A-11. <u>Only</u> the acts listed in the statute may be punished by criminal contempt.

The contemptuous acts listed in G.S. 5A-11 most likely to be committed directly before a magistrate are:

- "Willful behavior committed <u>during the sitting of a court</u> and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings."
- "Willful behavior committed <u>during the sitting of a court in its immediate view and</u> <u>presence</u> and directly tending to impair the respect due its authority."

It is also possible, though less likely, that this form of criminal contempt will be committed directly before a magistrate:

• "Willful refusal to be sworn or affirmed as a witness, or, when so sworn or affirmed, willful refusal to answer any legal and proper question when the refusal is not legally justified."

One can also think of unusual situations in which the following forms of criminal contempt could occur directly before a magistrate, but most often they would not be direct contempt because the magistrate would not have actually observed the violation:

- "Willful disobedience of, resistance to, or interference with a court's lawful process, order, directive, or instruction or its execution."
- "Willful or grossly negligent failure to comply with schedules and practices of the court resulting in substantial interference with the business of the court."

Meaning of direct contempt

G.S. 5A-13 says that an act is direct criminal contempt only when the act:

"(1) Is committed within the sight and hearing or a presiding judicial official; and

(2) Is committed in, or in immediate proximity to, the room where proceedings are being held before the court; and

(3) Is likely to interrupt or interfere with matters then before the court."

Summary or plenary proceeding

Contempt may be dealt with in a summary proceeding or a plenary proceeding. A summary proceeding means that the magistrate deals with the contempt right then and there as it occurs. That choice is always available for direct contempt. If for whatever reason the magistrate does not wish to deal with the contempt immediately, the magistrate may issue a show cause order for the defendant to appear before a district judge at a later time for a plenary proceeding. A summary proceeding is an on-the-spot quick determination of contempt; a plenary proceeding is more like a regularly-scheduled trial.

The summary proceeding

At a summary proceeding for direct criminal contempt the magistrate must tell the person that the magistrate is considering holding the person in contempt; describe what the person did that was contemptuous; and give the person a chance to respond why it is not contempt. Even if the conduct which is the basis for contempt is obvious to everyone, and it is clear that the defendant has no good excuse, the magistrate still must explain the basis for the contempt and still must give the defendant an opportunity to respond. The magistrate should also inform the person that contempt can be punished by imprisonment for up to 30 days and a fine of up to \$500.

The summary proceeding must be held "substantially contemporaneously" with the contempt. As a practical matter that means just as soon as the contempt occurs or within a few minutes thereafter. There can be situations in which it is permissible to delay the summary proceeding for a day or so, but a magistrate should not attempt to do that. If the contempt proceeding is not going to be held right away the magistrate should issue a show cause order for the defendant to appear before a district judge at a later time.

G.S. 15A-511(a)(3) says that if a defendant at an initial appearance is so unruly or is unconscious or so intoxicated as to be unable to understand what is going on the magistrate can order the person held for a short time before conducting the initial appearance. If the defendant's unruliness includes contemptuous behavior, the magistrate may wait on the summary proceeding until the defendant is brought back for the initial appearance. If the defendant acts contemptuously but is too intoxicated for the initial appearance or for an orderly summary proceeding, the defendant probably is not capable of acting willfully (see below) and contempt is not appropriate.

G.S. 5A-16(a) authorizes a magistrate to order a person being charged with direct criminal contempt to be held and restrained "to the extent necessary to assure his presence for summary proceedings" That statute should be used only when necessary to keep the person from fleeing.

A magistrate conducting a summary proceeding should use form AOC-CR-390. The form should describe in detail the behavior that was contemptuous, including direct quotation of words that were spoken.

Show-cause order for a plenary proceeding

Although direct criminal contempt always may be punished summarily, it does not have to be done summarily. The magistrate may choose to issue a show cause order and direct the person to appear before a district court judge in a plenary proceeding. The plenary proceeding should be used when the person is so belligerent or disruptive that it is not possible to conduct a summary proceeding; when the office is too busy to stop for a summary proceeding; or when the magistrate has become too personally involved to decide the contempt.

The form a magistrate should use for a show-cause order for contempt is AOC-CR-219, but the form is not designed for the most common kind of direct criminal contempt. The simplest way to use the form usually will be to check box IV for "Failure To Obey Other Order Of the Court" but strike through that heading and substitute "Interruption of Court Proceeding" or "Disrespect to Court" and then describe the behavior which is contemptuous.

Willfulness and warning

G.S. 5A-12(b) provides that a person may be punished for criminal contempt only if the person's actions are "willfully contemptuous" or the person was given "a clear warning by the court that the conduct is improper." Willfulness has been defined by appellate court opinions to mean "more than deliberation or conscious choice; it also imports a bad faith disregard for authority

and the law." Some acts such as spitting at a magistrate or yelling profanity or kicking a table are willfully contemptuous by their nature and so inherently disruptive and disrespectful that no warning is needed. However, when the defendant is doing something less disrespectful and disruptive, such as talking so much that no one else can speak or refusing to sit down and await one's turn to be heard, the magistrate must warn the person that the behavior is unacceptable before using contempt.

To avoid later questions about whether the contempt was "willfully contemptuous," it is better for the magistrate to always give a warning before holding a person in contempt. The willfully contemptuous defendant is not likely to stop just because of the warning.

Right to counsel

If a lawyer is present with a person charged with direct contempt, of course the lawyer may represent the defendant in the summary contempt proceeding. It is not necessary to delay the summary hearing to allow the defendant to get a lawyer, however. And it is not necessary to appoint a lawyer to represent an indigent defendant in a summary contempt proceeding. If the contempt is not addressed summarily by the magistrate and instead proceeds to a plenary hearing before a judge, the indigent defendant is entitled to have counsel appointed.

Recusal

Contemptuous conduct often can be very personal. A defendant may use degrading terms to speak to the magistrate and may be openly hostile in close quarters. In those circumstances the magistrate may feel personally insulted and want to get back at the defendant. If anything about the contemptuous behavior causes a magistrate to feel that way, the magistrate should not conduct a summary proceeding for contempt but instead should issue a show-cause order and allow the contempt charge to be heard by a judge at a later time.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt

The standard for criminal contempt is the same as for conviction of a crime: A person may not be held in criminal contempt unless the contempt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because direct contempt occurs in the presence of the magistrate, the magistrate's own view of the defendant's conduct will establish the proof.

Punishment

G.S. 5A-12 sets out the punishment for criminal contempt. The possible punishments include censure, imprisonment for up to 30 days, a fine of not more than \$500, or any combination of those three options. A magistrate will not use censure, leaving imprisonment and a fine as the choices. Before sentencing a defendant to jail for contempt, or imposing a fine, the magistrate should consider how the penalty will compare with the punishment a defendant likely would

4

receive for conviction of a crime. If a fine is being imposed, the magistrate needs to consider the person's ability to pay.

Although it will not be appropriate in most instances when a magistrate holds a person in contempt, the sentence for criminal contempt may be suspended with conditions, just as for other criminal offenses.

If a magistrate sentences a defendant to jail for criminal contempt, the magistrate may go back and reduce or terminate the sentence at any time. For example, if a magistrate sentenced a person to jail for two days for contempt, the magistrate could terminate the sentence after one day. Likewise, if a magistrate imposes a fine the magistrate may later reduce or eliminate the fine.

Appeal

Appeal for criminal contempt is from the magistrate to superior court. The appeal is for a hearing *de novo*.

G.S. 5A-17 provides that an appeal from criminal contempt is the same as an appeal in a criminal action. The statute on criminal appeals generally, G.S. 15A-1451, provides that the payment of a fine and costs is stayed upon the defendant's giving notice of appeal, but confinement is stayed only when the defendant is released pursuant to the bail statutes. Thus, if the defendant gives notice of appeal from a sanction of criminal contempt the payment of any fine is stayed automatically but the defendant starts serving the jail time until released on bail. Starting December 1, 2013, G.S. 5A-17 will require that the bail hearing be held by a district judge when a magistrate orders someone to jail for criminal contempt and that the hearing has to be within 24 hours. If a district judge has not held the bail hearing within 24 hours, any other judicial official may do so.

Chapter 5A. Contempt. Article 1. Criminal Contempt.

§§ 5A-1 through 5A-10. Reserved for future codification purposes.

§ 5A-11. Criminal contempt.

- (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), each of the following is criminal contempt:
 - (1) Willful behavior committed during the sitting of a court and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings.
 - (2) Willful behavior committed during the sitting of a court in its immediate view and presence and directly tending to impair the respect due its authority.
 - (3) Willful disobedience of, resistance to, or interference with a court's lawful process, order, directive, or instruction or its execution.
 - (4) Willful refusal to be sworn or affirmed as a witness, or, when so sworn or affirmed, willful refusal to answer any legal and proper question when the refusal is not legally justified.
 - (5) Willful publication of a report of the proceedings in a court that is grossly inaccurate and presents a clear and present danger of imminent and serious threat to the administration of justice, made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. No person, however, may be punished for publishing a truthful report of proceedings in a court.
 - (6) Willful or grossly negligent failure by an officer of the court to perform his duties in an official transaction.
 - (7) Willful or grossly negligent failure to comply with schedules and practices of the court resulting in substantial interference with the business of the court.
 - (8) Willful refusal to testify or produce other information upon the order of a judge acting pursuant to Article 61 of Chapter 15A, Granting of Immunity to Witnesses.
 - (9) Willful communication with a juror in an improper attempt to influence his deliberations.
 - (9a) Willful refusal by a defendant to comply with a condition of probation.
 - (10) Any other act or omission specified elsewhere in the General Statutes of North Carolina as grounds for criminal contempt.

The grounds for criminal contempt specified here are exclusive, regardless of any other grounds for criminal contempt which existed at common law.

(b) No person may be held in contempt under this section on the basis of the content of any broadcast, publication, or other communication unless it presents a clear and present danger of an imminent and serious threat to the administration of criminal justice.

(c) This section is subject to the provisions of G.S. 7A-276.1, Court orders prohibiting publication or broadcast of reports of open court proceedings or reports of public records banned. (1977, c. 711, s. 3; 1994, Ex. Sess., c. 19, s. 1.)

§ 5A-12. Punishment; circumstances for fine or imprisonment; reduction of punishment; other measures.

(a) A person who commits criminal contempt, whether direct or indirect, is subject to censure, imprisonment up to 30 days, fine not to exceed five hundred dollars (\$500.00), or any combination of the three, except that:

- (1) A person who commits a contempt described in G.S. 5A-11(8) is subject to censure, imprisonment not to exceed 6 months, fine not to exceed five hundred dollars (\$500.00), or any combination of the three;
- (2) A person who has not been arrested who fails to comply with a nontestimonial identification order, issued pursuant to Article 14 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes is subject to censure, imprisonment not to exceed 90 days, fine not to exceed five hundred dollars (\$500.00), or any combination of the three; and
- (3) A person who commits criminal contempt by failing to comply with an order to pay child support is subject to censure, imprisonment up to 30 days, fine not to exceed five hundred dollars (\$500.00), or any combination of the three. However, a sentence of imprisonment up to 120 days may be imposed for a single act of criminal contempt resulting from the failure to pay child support, provided the sentence is suspended upon conditions reasonably related to the contemnor's payment of child support.

(b) Except for contempt under G.S. 5A-11(5) or 5A-11(9), fine or imprisonment may not be imposed for criminal contempt, whether direct or indirect, unless:

- (1) The act or omission was willfully contemptuous; or
- (2) The act or omission was preceded by a clear warning by the court that the conduct is improper.

(c) The judicial official who finds a person in contempt may at any time withdraw a censure, terminate or reduce a sentence of imprisonment, or remit or reduce a fine imposed as punishment for contempt if warranted by the conduct of the contemnor and the ends of justice.

(d) A person held in criminal contempt under this Article shall not, for the same conduct, be found in civil contempt under Article 2 of this Chapter, Civil Contempt.

(e) A person held in criminal contempt under G.S. 5A-11(9) may nevertheless, for the same conduct, be found guilty of a violation of G.S. 14-225.1, but he must be given credit for any imprisonment resulting from the contempt. (1977, c. 711, s. 3; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 843, s. 1; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1040, ss. 2, 4; 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 1039, s. 4; 1991, c. 686, s. 3; 1999-361, s. 3; 2009-335, s. 1.)

§ 5A-13. Direct and indirect criminal contempt; proceedings required.

- (a) Criminal contempt is direct criminal contempt when the act:
 - (1) Is committed within the sight or hearing of a presiding judicial official; and
 - (2) Is committed in, or in immediate proximity to, the room where proceedings are being held before the court; and
 - (3) Is likely to interrupt or interfere with matters then before the court.

The presiding judicial official may punish summarily for direct criminal contempt according to the requirements of G.S. 5A-14 or may defer adjudication and sentencing as provided in G.S. 5A-15. If proceedings for direct criminal contempt are deferred, the judicial official must, immediately following the conduct, inform the person of his intention to institute contempt proceedings.

(b) Any criminal contempt other than direct criminal contempt is indirect criminal contempt and is punishable only after proceedings in accordance with the procedure required by G.S. 5A-15. (1977, c. 711, s. 3.)

§ 5A-14. Summary proceedings for contempt.

(a) The presiding judicial official may summarily impose measures in response to direct criminal contempt when necessary to restore order or maintain the dignity and authority of the court and when the measures are imposed substantially contemporaneously with the contempt.

(b) Before imposing measures under this section, the judicial official must give the person charged with contempt summary notice of the charges and a summary opportunity to respond and must find facts supporting the summary imposition of measures in response to contempt. The facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. (1977, c. 711, s. 3.)

§ 5A-15. Plenary proceedings for contempt.

(a) When a judicial official chooses not to proceed summarily against a person charged with direct criminal contempt or when he may not proceed summarily, he may proceed by an order directing the person to appear before a judge at a reasonable time specified in the order and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. A copy of the order must be furnished to the person charged. If the criminal contempt is based upon acts before a judge which so involve him that his objectivity may reasonably be questioned, the order must be returned before a different judge.

(b) Proceedings under this section are before a district court judge unless a court superior to the district court issued the order, in which case the proceedings are before that court. Venue lies throughout the district court district as defined in G.S. 7A-133 or superior court district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1, as the case may be, where the order was issued.

(c) The person ordered to show cause may move to dismiss the order.

(d) The judge is the trier of facts at the show cause hearing.

(e) The person charged with contempt may not be compelled to be a witness against himself in the hearing.

(f) At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge must enter a finding of guilty or not guilty. If the person is found to be in contempt, the judge must make findings of fact and enter judgment. The facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.

(g) The judge presiding over the hearing may appoint a prosecutor or, in the event of an apparent conflict of interest, some other member of the bar to represent the court in hearings for criminal contempt. (1977, c. 711, s. 3; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 44.)

§ 5A-16. Custody of person charged with criminal contempt.

(a) A judicial official may orally order that a person he is charging with direct criminal contempt be taken into custody and restrained to the extent necessary to assure his presence for summary proceedings or notice of plenary proceedings.

(b) If a judicial official who initiates plenary proceedings for contempt under G.S. 5A-15 finds, based on sworn statement or affidavit, probable cause to believe the person ordered to appear will not appear in response to the order, he may issue an order for arrest of the person, pursuant to G.S. 15A-305. A person arrested under this subsection is entitled to release under the provisions of Article 26, Bail, of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes. (1977, c. 711, s. 3.)

§ 5A-17. Appeals.

A person found in criminal contempt may appeal in the manner provided for appeals in criminal actions, except appeal from a finding of contempt by a judicial official inferior to a superior court judge is by hearing de novo before a superior court judge. (1977, c. 711, s. 3.)

§ 5A-18. Reserved for future codification purposes.

§ 5A-19. Reserved for future codification purposes.

§ 5A-20. Reserved for future codification purposes.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA			File No.			
		County	Г		The General Court	Of Justice] Superior Court Division
	IN TH	E MATTER OF				
Name And Addres	s Of Contemnor					
				5		
Race	Sex	Date of Birth	Age	-	FINDINGS AN	DORDER
						G.S. 5A-11, -12, -13, -14
Date		Time	AM 🗌 PM	Place		
On the date	, time and place	of hearing as stated abo	ve, the unders	igned judicial offic	ial conducted:	
	appearance	🗌 a pr	obable cause	hearing	a trial	
	pearance		estates procee	•	other	
·	al motion hearing		becial proceedi	•		
		asonable doubt that durin		ing the above cor	temnor willfully beha	ved in a
contemptuo	us manner, in th	at the above named conf				
				t was improper. I	n addition, the conter	nnor was given summary
notice of the	charges and su	ummary opportunity to res	spond.			
(NOTE: The	contemnor should	d be aiven an opportunity to	explain his/her b	ehavior. however th	ne contemnor is not enti	itled to counsel, if court promptly
punishes act		so given an opportunity to	oxplain morner s			and to councel, a court prompty
•	. ,	terrupted the proceeding	s of the court a	nd impaired the r	espect due its author	ity
				-	-	-
Therefore, it	is adjudged that	it the above named conte	emnor is in con	tempt of court. It i	s ordered that the co	ontemnor
NOTE TO C	OURT: If susper	nding a sentence for contem	pt. impose iudan	nent on form AOC-0	CR-604.	
	red for contemp	-				
	a fine of \$		x \$500.00).	shall pay the c	acts of court	
		·				
be impri	soned for a term	of hours	🗌 days 🛛 in th	e custody of the	Sheriff Misde	emeanant Confinement Progran
The con	temnor shall be	given credit for	davs' pretrial	confinement.	Work release is re	ecommended.
		<u> </u>				
Date	Nam	e Of Judicial Official (Type Or P	rint)	Sign	ature Of Judicial Official	
		ORDER OF	COMMITME	NT/APPEAL E	NTRIES	
It is ORD	ERED that the O	Clerk deliver two certified	copies of this	Findings and Ord	er to the sheriff or otl	her qualified officer and that
						unty named above to serve the
		I the contemnor shall have				
	•	ice of appeal from this Fir	•			
	-		•	•		
The conte	emnor gives not	ice of appeal from this Fir	ndings and Orc	der in the Superio	r Court to the appella	te division. Appeal entries and
any cond	itions of post co	nviction release are set for	orth on form AC	JC-CR-350.		
NOTE TO CO	OURT: If finding	of contempt was made by a	judicial official in	ferior to a Superior	Court Judge, the appea	al is to Superior Court. G.S. 5A-17.
On appeal fror	n criminal contem	pt imposing confinement, the	ere must be a ba	ail hearing "within a	reasonable time period'	after confinement is imposed. The
contemnor ma	y not be confined	more than 24 hours without	a bail hearing. S	See G.S. 5A-17(b) fo	or officials who may con	duct the hearing.
Date	Name Of	Judicial Official (Type Or Print)		Sian	ature Of Judicial Official	
Jaie				Cigii		
			CERTIE			
I certify that t	his Findings and	d Order is a true and com			is on file in this case	
Date				Signature		·
				Signature		SEAL
Date Certified Cor	oies Delivered To Sh	eriff				
ale Cerimea Cop	nes Denvereu 10 SN	61111		Deputy CSC	Assistant CSC	Clerk Of Superior Court
						;
			Original-File	Copy-Sheriff		
AOC-CR-390,	Rev. 12/13		5			
	istrative Office of	the Courts				

TAB: Contracts

THE CRUX OF CONTRACTS: HOW TO ANALYZE A CONTRACTS CASE

GENERALIZED STATEMENT OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN CONTRACT CASES:


Plaintiff in breach of contract case must prove each of the following essential elements by the greater weight of the evidence:

- ____ There was a contract (aka agreement, bargain, bargained-for exchange)
- ____ The defendant and I were the parties to the contract.
- ____ The terms of the contract were A, B, C, and D.
- ____ Defendant breached term A as follows:
- ____ The breach by defendant resulted in the my being damaged in this particular way.
- ____ The monetary amount of my damages is X, and here's how I calculated X.

1. Is there a contract?

- 2. Who are the parties to the contract?
 - 3. What kind of contract is it?
 - 4. What are its terms?
 - 5. Did defendant breach the contract?
- 6. What damages is plaintiff entitled to?

IS THERE A CONTRACT?



NOTES:

WHO ARE THE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT?

Begin by asking the question "who agreed to this contract?" Who signed it, or who shook hands, or who was present at the conversation when the deal was struck?

Complicating matters:

1. Business entities _____

2.	Agency
3.	Joint and several liability
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
4.	Guarantors
5.	Spouses and kids
	·

WHAT KIND OF CONTRACT WAS IT?

There are special rules for special kinds of contracts:

Breach of warranty (pp. 61-65) Installment sales contracts (pp. 81-84) Loans (pp. 90-91, 96-97) Worthless check (pp. 87-89) Actions on security agreement (pp. 125-144) Residential lease agreements (see numerous special provisions in Ch.VI, Landlord-Tenant Law) Miscellaneous consumer protection provisions The most common impact of these special rules is the revision or even removal of contract provisions inconsistent with them. For example, a landlord who contracts for a late fee that exceeds the statutory maximum loses the right to collect the fee at all.

NOTES:

WHAT WERE THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT?

Best Evidence Rule: When an action by a party is based on a right created by a written contract, and the content of that contract is in dispute, the party must either produce the contract or adequately explain why he is unable to do so.

Parol Evidence Rule: "The parol evidence rule . . . prohibits the admission of parol evidence to vary, add to, or contradict a written instrument. . . . In substantive terms, the rule is stated as follows: 'Any or all parts of a transaction prior to or contemporaneous with a writing intended to record them finally are superseded and made legally ineffective by the writing.'" <u>Van Harris Realty, Inc. v. Coffey</u>, 41 NC App 112.

Verified Statement of Account: G.S. 8-45 provides that in an action on an account for goods sold, rents, services rendered, or labor performed, or any oral contract for money loaned, a verified itemized statement of the account is admissible into evidence and is deemed correct unless disputed by the defendant.

"Itemized": describes each item with price and item number, if there is one.

"Verified": Accompanied by an affidavit from a person who (1) would be competent to testify at trial; (2) has personal knowledge of the particular account, or of the books and

records of the business in general; and (3) swears that the account is correct and presently is owed by defendant to plaintiff.

Business records exception to hearsay rule: "Writings or records of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge are admissible if kept in the regular course of business and if it was the regular course of business to make that record, unless the source of information or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness."

WHAT DAMAGES IS PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO?

Common damage items:

- 1. Direct damages (difference between value of promised performance and what it will cost now)
- 2. Incidental damages (costs of preparing to perform, those incurred in response to breach, those involved in minimizing injury)
- 3. Consequential damages (foreseeable damages resulting from breach)
- 4. Pre-judgment interest from date of breach (see Appendix)
- 5. Attorney fees (requires contract + authorizing statute; see Appendix)

Less common: Rescission (cancelling contract and returning all parties to original condition.

Special cases:

- 1. Failure to return property: FMV of property
- 2. Breach of warranty: difference between FMV of goods as warranted and FMV of goods received
- 3. Checks NSF: Amount of check + bank charge + processing fee + amount of check x 3 (\$100-\$500)

Be aware of law regulating duty to mitigate & liquidated damages provisions.

NOTES:

CHECKLIST FOR CONTRACT CASES IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT

does this case involve an agreement between π and $\Delta?$

WHO ARE THE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT?

If parties are not identical to people who entered into contract, why not?

Agency Guarantors Joint and Several Liability Husbands, Wives, and Kids

WHAT ARE THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT?

If the agreement is in writing, ask for a copy. Read it carefully. Are the terms clear?

If the agreement is not in writing, listen to the testimony about the terms.

- □ Do the parties agree about the terms of their agreement?
- \Box If they don't agree, what specifically do they disagree about? What does π contend? What does Δ contend? In the case of a disagreement, the magistrate must determine the terms, remembering that the party seeking to enforce the contract has the B/P on its terms.
- □ Are there terms they left out? Assuming the intent to contract is clear, the magistrate "fills in the blanks" based on evidence about what is usual and reasonable, to implement the probable intention of the parties.

What rules of evidence should the magistrate be mindful of in determining the terms?

- □ If a contract is written, the *best evidence* of what the parties agreed to is the written contract.
- □ If a contract is written, evidence about what the parties said before signing the contract is not relevant unless meaning is unclear (parol *evidence rule*).
- \Box In an action on an account, a *verified itemized statement of the account* is sufficient to prove that Δ owes that amount of money in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Are there additional or different terms written into the agreement by the law?

- \Box In contracts for the sale of goods, is π 's claim for breach of warranty?
- □ In actions based on a lease, does the landlord have additional responsibilities under the RRAA?
- □ In actions involving consumer credit sales, does the Retail Installment Sales Act affect any of the contract terms?

Before moving to the next question, stop and decide what the terms of the agreement are.

Is the agreement one that the law will enforce?

- Does it involve a bargained-for exchange?
- □ Is this particular defendant (rather than someone else) bound by the contract?
 - --Does the contract involve a corporation?
 - --Does the contract involve an agency relationship?
- \Box Is there any question about Δ 's ability to consent?
 - --Was Δ a minor at the time of the contract?
 - -- Is there doubt about Δ 's competence to contract?
- □ Is there a legal rule that renders this agreement unenforceable?
 - --Is this one of the kinds of contracts the law requires to be written?
 - --Did π wait too long to file the lawsuit?
 - --Are the terms of the agreement so one-sided and unfair as to be unconscionable?

DID Δ breach the contract?

WHAT DAMAGES IS π ENTITLED TO?

Common damage items:

- Direct damages (difference between value of promised performance and what it will cost now)
- □ Incidental damages (costs of preparing to perform, those incurred in response to breach, those involved in minimizing injury)
- Consequential damages (foreseeable damages resulting from breach)
- □ Interest from date of breach

Special cases:

- □ Cancelling the contract: damages for putting everything back the way it was
- □ Liquidated damages clauses
- □ Failure to return property: FMV of property
- Breach of warranty: difference between FMV of goods as warranted and FMV of goods received
- □ Checks NSF: Amount of check + bank charge + processing fee + amount of check x 3 (\$100-\$500)
- □ Attorney fees

Be on the lookout for:

- □ Duty to mitigate damages
- □ Joint & several liability

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE INTEREST RATES ON LOANS IN NORTH CAROLINA

Type of Lender	Amount Lent	Security	Interest Rate	Other Allowable Charges
Bank, credit union, savings and loans, and individual (G.S. 24- 1.1, -10.1)	\$25,000 or less	Any property (but not home loan secured by first deed of trust)	Greater of 16% or noncompetitive rate for U.S. Treasury bills with six-month maturity plus 6%. Rate will be set monthly by Comm'r of Banks.	Late payment charge up to 4% of outstanding balance. Prepayment fee of 2% if prepaid within 3 years of 1st payment for contract loan. Fee of ¹ /4% of 1% of balance for modification of loan.
Bank, credit union, savings and loans, and individual (G.S. 24- 11)	Extension of credit on open-end credit or revolving credit charges.	Any property if charge 1 ¹ / ₄ % or less. No property if over 1 ¹ / ₄ %	1½% per month (18% per year) on unpaid balance	Annual charge of no more than \$24. Late pyt fee of \$5 for unpaid balance less than \$100 and \$10 for balance of \$100 or more
Finance company (G.S. 53-176, -177, - 180, -189, G.S. 25A- 30)*	\$15,000 or less	Any personal property	Prejudgment: Loan of \$10,000 or less30% per year on unpaid principal to \$4,000, 24% on unpaid principal between \$4,000 & \$8,000, and 18% per year on the remainder. Loan of more than \$10,000, 18% per year. Postjudgment: 8%	Processing fee not to exceed \$25 for loans up to \$2,500 and 1% for loans over \$2,500, but max. of \$40. \$15 late fee. Deferral charge of $1 \frac{1}{2}$ % of amount deferred. Fee for purchase of insurance policy in lieu of recording.


PENALTIES:

Banks, credit union, individuals: Knowingly charging greater rate of interest than allowable forfeits entire interest on loan and borrower may recover twice the amount of interest actually paid. (G.S. 24-2)

Finance companies: Misdemeanor with punishment of \$500 to \$2,500 fine and/or imprisonment for 4 months to 2 years. Also contract is void unless violation result of accidental or bona fide error of computation. Lender has no right to collect or retain any principal or interest with respect to the loan. Borrower would have an action against the lender to recover any principal or interest paid. (G.S. 153-166)

Note additional requirements for loans to certain military service members. (G.S. 53-180.1)


TAB: Landlord-Tenant Law



What is summary ejectment?

If Larry "owns" real property (i.e., land, not personal property), what is it that he owns, exactly?

Landlord-tenant law is challenging sometimes because it's not intuitive. Presentday law is a mixture drawn from three sources, each with its own historical development, primary goals, and interests to be protected.



Different rules apply (sometimes) to commercial leases and residential leases.

NOTES

Differences Between Commercial and Residential Leases

Issue	Residential Lease	Commercial Lease
Self-help eviction		
я р п		
Late fee		
Administrative fee		
Security deposit		
	а. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —	
Duty to provide fit and		
habitable premises	ч. <u>к</u>	
		4 × ×
Duty to repair	20 2	
Tenant's property left	2 2	e e
on premises after eviction		8
		21. 21.
Retaliatory eviction		
е	9	

Exercise: Pretend you're a landlord.

You rented the garage apartment at your home to Tammy Tenant using a lease you downloaded off the internet. Tammy is supposed to pay \$750/month, due on the first of each month. She didn't pay on January 1, and she's told you that she lost her job and isn't going to have the money for February either. You feel sorry for her, but your mortgage payment depends on her rent payment, so if she can't pay, she's going to have to leave. When you told her this, she said she has nowhere to go, so you've decided to take her to court to get her out and to get your rent.

The first step is to fill out the complaint form. The clerk gave you the right form, but says she can't answer any questions about how to fill it out. Do the best you can.

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	2 · · · · · ·	
	2	

The unique remedy of summary ejectment is available only for four specific breaches

- Failure to pay rent
- Holding over
- Breach of a lease condition for which re-entry is specified.
- Criminal activity

No matter what the complaint says, it works best to begin in every case by determining whether the lease contains a forfeiture clause (i.e., a lease condition for which re-entry is specified).

Exercise: Find the forfeiture clause.

Next, find the trigger.

Finally, find provisions addressing required procedure for termination of lease.

The landlord must demonstrate that the tenant's breach triggered the forfeiture clause, and that the landlord (strictly) followed the procedure for termination set out in the lease.

<u>What if there is no forfeiture clause?</u> If the breach is failure to pay rent, the landlord may be able to rely on that ground to regain possession. This ground is only available if there is no forfeiture clause in the lease. Because the purpose of the law is to avoid a situation in which a tenant is able to occupy rental property for a prolonged period without paying rent, the landlord must meet an additional requirement: the landlord must make a demand that the tenant pay rent and must give the tenant at least ten days from the date of demand before filing an action for summary ejectment. The landlord has the burden of showing compliance with this requirement as part of a prima facie case.

Holding over ("The lease has ended, but the tenant's still there!")

There are three ways a lease can end:

- (1) the parties agree at the beginning on the end-date ("This lease for one year begins on Sept. 1, 2011, and ends on August 31, 2012.")
- (2) the parties agree at the beginning on a procedure for ending the lease ("The landlord will provide the tenant 45 days advance written notice prior to the termination date.")
- (3) the parties did not agree about when or how the lease would end, resulting in termination based on statute:
 - a. lease for 7 days: 2 days notice

- b. lease for one month: 7 days notice
- c. lease for one year: 30 days notice
- d. lease for mobile home space: 60 days notice

NOTE: This notice operates to terminate lease as of end of rental period. For example, in a month-to-month lease, with rent payable on the first day of the month, the landlord may give notice as early as Sept. 1, or as late as Sept. 23, in order to terminate the lease as of Sept. 30.

Criminal activity

If the lease itself states that criminal activity is a trigger for a forfeiture clause, the ground for summary ejectment is actually "breach of a lease condition" (see pp. 182-184 for discussion).

G.S. 42-59 to -73 sets out the statutory procedure for eviction based on criminal activity when the lease does not make that available. The statute is long and complex, and a magistrate should not hear a summary ejectment action based on the statute before studying pp. 178-184 of <u>Small Claims Law.</u>

The most important aspect of making correct decisions in summary ejectment actions is identifying the grounds and then applying the rules associated with that ground.

ACTIVITY: LISTENING FOR ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN A SUMMARY EJECTMENT ACTION

FAILURE TO PAY RENT

Plaintiff/LL must prove:

____ existence of a landlord-tenant relationship;

- _____ terms of the lease related to obligation to pay rent;
- ____lease does NOT contain forfeiture clause;
- ____ LL demanded that tenant pay rent on certain date;
- ____ LL waited at least 10 days after demand to file this action;
- ____ tenant has not yet paid the full amount due.

Most common defenses: failure to make proper demand and wait ten days, tender

HOLDING OVER

Plaintiff/LL must prove:

____ existence of a landlord-tenant relationship;

- ____ terms of lease related to duration;
- _____ if lease is not for a fixed term, that proper notice was given of intent to terminate.

Most common defenses: waiver, improper notice.

BREACH OF A LEASE CONDITION

Plaintiff/LL must prove:

- ____ existence of a landlord-tenant relationship;
- ____ lease contains a forfeiture clause;
- _____ tenant breached lease condition for which forfeiture is specified;
- ___ LL followed procedure set out in lease for declaring forfeiture and terminating the lease.

Most common defenses: failure to follow proper procedure, waiver

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

Plaintiff/LL must prove *one* of the following things:

- Criminal activity occurred within the rental unit;
- > The rental unit was used to further criminal activity;
- Tenant, member of household, or guest engaged in criminal activity on the premises or in immediate vicinity;
- > The tenant gave permission for a barred person to return to property;
- > Where person barred from unit re-entered unit, tenant failed to notify LEO or LL.
- Defense: T did not know or have reason to know of #1, #2, or #3. T took all reasonable steps to prevent criminal activity. Eviction would create serious injustice.*



"My tenant moved out and left a bunch of stuff—looks like garbage mostly. Can I go in and clean it out?" Answer: _____

"My tenant maybe moved out—I haven't seen them around for a while. Can I just go in and look around to be sure they didn't leave the stove on or nothing like that?" Answer: _____

"My landlord turned off the power. Can he do that?" Answer: _____ "I rent some property to this guy. The lease says he's not allowed to sub-lease, but he's moved out, and the people in it now say they leased it from him. Can I just tell them they're trespassing?" Answer:

"I let this woman move a mobile home onto some land I have—I let her rent the space. She's long gone, but I still have this crappy trailer sitting on my property. How can I get rid of it? Answer: ______

"My landlord is refusing to fix anything—the air conditioning's broken, and the washing machine doesn't work. Can I just stop paying rent until he fixes things? If I go ahead and pay to have them fixed, does he have to reimburse me? Could I take it out of my rent money?"

Answer: _____

"I let a family member move in with me for a while, but we're not getting along and I'd like him to move on. He's refusing to move out—how I can I make him leave?" Answer: _____

"My tenant is driving me and all my neighbors crazy. He plays loud music all night long, and has these parties with people staggering around drunk and peeing in the bushes. Can I evict him?" Answer:

"I have a rent-to-own contract with this guy, and he's stopped paying rent. Should I go criminal, or is that a civil kind of thing?" Answer: _____

The Residential Rental Agreements Act (and Other Tenants' Rights Statutes)

The Residential Rental Agreements Act is set out in G.S. Chapter 42, Sections 38 to 44. This law, which was passed in 1977, re-wrote the common law to provide that landlords must maintain residential rental premises to be fit to live in, and to make clear that a tenant's right to such housing cannot be waived. Prior law had followed the rule of *caveat emptor* ("let the buyer beware").

What Does the Law Provide?

The law imposes 8 distinct obligations on a landlord:

- 1. He must comply with building and housing codes.
- 2. He must keep premises in a fit and habitable condition.
- 3. He must keep common areas in safe condition
- 4. He must maintain and promptly repair electrical, plumbing, heating, and other supplied facilities and appliances.
- 5. He must install a smoke detector and keep it in good repair.
- 6. He must install a carbon monoxide detector and keep it in good repair.
- 7. He must notify the tenant if water the landlord charges to provide exceeds a certain contaminant level.
- 8. He must repair within a reasonable time any "imminently dangerous condition" listed in the statute:
 - a. Unsafe wiring.
 - b. Unsafe flooring or steps.
 - c. Unsafe ceilings or roofs.
 - d. Unsafe chimneys or flues.
 - e. Lack of potable water.
 - f. Lack of operable locks on all doors leading to the outside.
 - g. Broken windows or lack of operable locks on all windows on the ground level.
 - Lack of operable heating facilities capable of heating living areas to 65 degrees
 Fahrenheit when it is 20 degrees Fahrenheit outside from November 1 through March 31.
 - i. Lack of an operable toilet.
 - j. Lack of an operable bathtub or shower.
 - k. Rat infestation as a result of defects in the structure that make the premises not impervious to rodents.
 - I. Excessive standing water, sewage, or flooding problems caused by plumbing leaks or inadequate drainage that contribute to mosquito infestation or mold.

There is something a little confusing about this: some of these overlap. Rental premises might, for example, have a broken furnace that violates obligation #4 above, but the fact that it's below-freezing in the house also means the premises are not habitable. The reason it matters is that different rules apply as far as the notice that's required. Let's look at that more closely.

Notice Requirements

Only one of the obligations has a notice requirement written specifically into the statute: a landlord's obligations with regard to electrical, plumbing, and other "facilities and appliances" arise only if he has written notice that repair or maintenance is necessary. After receiving notice, the landlord is entitled to a "reasonable time" to make repairs. The exception to this requirement is when there is an emergency. If the shower handle breaks off and water is pouring out of the tub onto the floor, the law will not require the tenant to notify the landlord in writing and then wait a few days before imposing an obligation on the landlord to make a repair.

A common-sense rule applies to the other obligations: the tenant must give whatever notice is necessary to reasonably permit the landlord to fulfill his obligations. If there's a leak in the roof, for example, the tenant must notify the landlord before it's reasonable to expect the landlord to repair it. In that case, however, oral notice is acceptable. It may be that in some cases, no notice at all is required, when the evidence demonstrates that the landlord actually knew of the problem (for example, there were holes in the floor before the tenant moved in).

Waiver

The RRAA is a consumer-protection statute. Like other consumer protection legislation, the rights of the parties are not created by contract—or agreement—in these cases. Instead, the obligations of the landlord are imposed by law—even if the contract says nothing about them, **or even if the lease says the tenant waives those rights.** The statute is clear that a tenant doesn't waive his rights by signing a lease providing for waiver; nor does a tenant waive his rights to fit and habitable housing by agreeing to rent a place with obvious defects, even if the landlord specifically tells him about them. If a tenant rents a house without air conditioning, that's fine. But if a tenant rents a house with air conditioning, even if the lease says otherwise.

Sometimes a landlord will say, "I know the house wasn't up to code, but that's why the rent was so low. I agreed to let him live in the house for low rent, and he agreed that he would do some work on the house for me." The RRAA anticipated this, and sets out the following rule: An agreement between the landlord and tenant that the tenant will work on the house and be paid by the landlord is fine, so long as the agreement is entered into AFTER the lease agreement is complete, and the arrangement for payment by the landlord for the tenant's work is separate from the rent payment.

Sometimes a landlord will say, "The reason the house isn't up to code is that the tenant himself keeps damaging it." This allegation, if true, is a valid defense to the landlord's violation of the Act. The tenant also has obligations under the Act, including refraining from deliberately or negligently damaging any part of the premises.

Procedure:

The Act states that a tenant may enforce his rights under the Act by civil action, including "recoupment, counterclaim, defense, setoff, and any other proceeding, including an action for possession." Thus, a magistrate may be confronted with applying the Act in any of the following circumstances:

- 1. The landlord brings an action for possession and/or money damages, and the tenant defends by contending that the landlord violated the Act.
- 2. The landlord brings an action for possession and/or money damages, and the tenant brings a counterclaim for rent abatement based on the landlord's violation of the Act.
- 3. The landlord brings an action for money damages, and the tenant responds by arguing that the landlord's damages should be reduced ("set-off") because of his violation of the Act.
- 4. The tenant files an action for rent abatement.

Damages

The tenant is entitled to the difference between the FRV (fair rental value) of the property as warranted and the FRV of the property as it actually is, plus any incidental damages (for example, the tenant had to buy a space heater when the furnace stopped working). NOTE: A tenant may only recover up to the amount of rent he actually paid. If he lived in the property and paid no rent, for example, he is not entitled to also recover money damages.

How are damages proven? No expert testimony is required. Witnesses may offer their opinon about the FRV of property, and the magistrate may also rely on his own experience in determining reasonable damages.

Are punitive damages allowed? No, punitive damages are not authorized in actions for breach of contract. Treble damages under G.S. 75-1.1 (prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce) are available, however, if the tenant is able to demonstrate the essential elements of that claim.

Retaliatory Eviction

G.S. 42-37.1 to 42-37.3: North Carolina has a strong public policy protecting tenants who exercise their rights to safe housing. When a landlord files an action for summary ejectment, a tenant may *defend* against ejectment by proving by the *greater weight of the evidence* that the landlord's action is *substantially in response* to one of several listed events that has occurred within the last 12 months.

What are those events?

- 1. Asking landlord to make repairs;
- 2. Complaining to government agency about violation of law;
- 3. Formal complaint lodged against landlord by government agency;
- 4. Attempting to exercise legal rights under law or as provided in lease;
- 5. Organizing or participating in tenants' rights organization.

Remedy

If a tenant successfully demonstrates retaliatory eviction, the magistrate must deny the landlord's request for possession (although the landlord is entitled to back rent in any case). Furthermore, a tenant may have an independent action for an unfair or deceptive act or practice (with treble damages) under G.S. 75-1.1.

Note that this law is based on public policy. It won't surprise you, then, to learn that the statute specifically provides that any attempted waiver by the tenant of his rights under this law is void. What's the obvious concern here? That a tenant will seek the protection of this law without really deserving it—in bad faith. If my lease has a forfeiture clause related to keep pets, and I get caught with my dog when the landlord drops by, I might quickly begin to organize a tenant's rights organization.

That way, I think, if the landlord tries to evict me, I'll be able to claim it was because of my organizational efforts, and not the real reason—that I have a dog.

Rebuttal by the Landlord

When a tenant defends in an action for summary ejectment by asserting that the landlord is actually retaliating against him or her for an action protected under the statute, the landlord may rebut that argument by showing one of the following things:

- 1. Tenant failed to pay rent or otherwise broke the lease in a manner that allows eviction, and the violation of the lease is the reason for the eviction.
- 2. Tenant is holding over after termination of lease for definite period with no option to renew.
- 3. The violations the tenant complained about were caused by willful or negligent act of tenant.
- 4. Displacement of tenant is required in order to comply with housing code.
- 5. Landlord had given tenant a good-faith notice of termination before protected conduct occurred
- 6. Landlord plans in good faith to do one of the following after terminating tenancy:
 - 1) Live there himself;
 - 2) Demolish the premises, or make major alterations;
 - 3) Terminate use of premises as a dwelling for at least 6 months.

Self-Help Eviction

Back in the old days, a landlord who wished to evict a tenant simply changed the locks, or put their property out on the sidewalk. In 1981 the North Carolina General Assembly put G.S. 42-25.6 on the statute books:

"It is the public policy of the State of North Carolina, in order to maintain the public peace, that a residential tenant shall be evicted, dispossessed, or otherwise constructively or actually removed from his dwelling unit only in accordance with the procedure prescribed in [the remaining provisions of the statute]."

--Note: This rule applies only to *residential tenancies*. Self-help eviction is perfectly permissible in commercial lease situations.

--Note also the reference to "constructively . . . removed." The law applies not only to actual removal of a tenant from rental premises, but also to actions taken by a landlord to make continued occupancy unpleasant: turning off utilities would be the most common example.

The General Assembly took aim at another common practice in 1981:

"It is the public policy of the State of North Carolina that distress and distraint are prohibited, and that landlords of residential rental property shall have rights concerning the personal property of their residential tenants only in accordance with [other provisions of the statute]."

This law put an end to the practice of some landlords of either seizing property owned by the tenant to compensate for unpaid rent or refusing to release a tenant's property until that tenant paid past-due rent. As you well know (since you get hundreds of questions a year about it), landlords are now required to comply with specific legal requirements in dealing with property left behind by tenants.

As is typical of laws based on public policy, the statute provides that any attempted waiver of the legal prohibition against self-help eviction is void.

Tenant's Remedies

What remedies does a tenant have when a landlord violates the prohibition against self-help eviction? The law provides that a tenant in this circumstance is

"entitled to recover possession or to terminate his lease and the . . . landlord. . . . shall be liable to the tenant for damages caused by the tenant's removal or attempted removal."

Further, if a landlord takes possession of a tenant's personal property, or interferes with a tenant's access to his personal property, the statute provides that a tenant is entitled to recover possession of the property, or compensation for its value (as in an action for conversion). In addition, a landlord is liable for actual damages caused by his wrongful interference.

In addition to the actions authorized by this statute, our courts have held that a tenant may bring an action for unfair or deceptive acts or practices when a landlord violates these provisions.

Other Tenants' Rights Statutes

Security deposit (pp. 189-190): In residential leases, maximum security deposit established by statute (month-to-month maximum is 1 ½ months rent). Specifies permitted uses of security deposit, requires

accounting by landlord with 30 (extension to 60 possible) days. Failure to do so, if willful, results in loss of deposit altogether in addition to responsibility for tenant's attorney fees.

Late fees (pp. 169-170): In residential leases, maximum established by statute (GS 42-46). Fee must be contained in written contract, payable only if rent is more than 5 days late. Violation of statute results in loss of fee.

Administrative fees (<u>Small Claims Law</u> is out-of-date on this point): GS 42-46 provides for specific fees for various stages of litigation, which will be an issue before a magistrate infrequently. Any fees associated with litigation not in compliance with statute are void as against public policy.

North Carolina Residential Lease Agreement

THIS LEASE AGREEMENT (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement") made and entered into this 1st day of Jan, 2011, by and between Steve Earl Properties Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Landlord") and Townie Van Zandt (hereinafter referred to as "Tenant").

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, Landlord is the fee owner of certain real property being, lying and situated in Apple County, North Carolina, such real property having a street address of 4107 Mockingbird Lane, Granny Smith, NC (hereinafter referred to as the "Premises").

WHEREAS, Landlord desires to lease the Premises to Tenant upon the terms and conditions as contained herein; and

WHEREAS, Tenant desires to lease the Premises from Landlord on the terms and conditions as contained herein;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the covenants and obligations contained herein and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto hereby agree as follows:

- 1. TERM. Landlord leases to Tenant and Tenant leases from Landlord the above described Premises together with any and all appurtenances thereto, for a term of 1 year, such term beginning on Jan. 1, 2011 and ending at 11:59 PM on December, 31, 2011.
- 2. RENT. The total rent for the term hereof is the sum of \$8,640 DOLLARS payable on the 1st day of each month of the term, in equal installments of \$720 DOLLARS, first and last installments to be paid upon the due execution of this Agreement, the second installment to be paid on Feb. 1, 2011. All such payments shall be made to Landlord at Landlord's address as set forth in the preamble to this Agreement on or before the due date and without demand.
- 3. DAMAGE DEPOSIT. Upon the due execution of this Agreement, Tenant shall deposit with Landlord the sum of \$1000 DOLLARS receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by Landlord, as security for any damage caused to the Premises during the term hereof. Such deposit shall be returned to Tenant, without interest, and less any set off for damages to the Premises upon the termination of this Agreement.
- 4. USE OF PREMISES. The Premises shall be used and occupied by Tenant and Tenant's immediate family, exclusively, as a private single family dwelling, and no part of the Premises shall be used at any time during the term of this Agreement by Tenant for the purpose of carrying on any business, profession, or trade of any kind, or for any purpose other than as a private single family dwelling. Tenant shall not allow any other person, other than Tenant's immediate family or transient relatives and friends who are guests of Tenant, to

use or occupy the Premises without first obtaining Landlord's written consent to such use. Tenant shall comply with any and all laws, ordinances, rules and orders of any and all governmental or quasi-governmental authorities affecting the cleanliness, use, occupancy and preservation of the Premises.

- 5. CONDITION OF PREMISES. Tenant stipulates, represents and warrants that Tenant has examined the Premises, and that they are at the time of this Lease in good order, repair, and in a safe, clean and tenantable condition.
- 6. ASSIGNMENT AND SUB-LETTING. Tenant shall not assign this Agreement, or sub-let or grant any license to use the Premises or any part thereof without the prior written consent of Landlord. A consent by Landlord to one such assignment, sub-letting or license shall not be deemed to be a consent to any subsequent assignment, sub-letting or license. An assignment, sub-letting or license without the prior written consent of Landlord or an assignment or sub-letting by operation of law shall be absolutely null and void and shall, at Landlord's option, terminate this Agreement.
- 7. ALTERATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS. Tenant shall make no alterations to the buildings or improvements on the Premises or construct any building or make any other improvements on the Premises without the prior written consent of Landlord. Any and all alterations, changes, and/or improvements built, constructed or placed on the Premises by Tenant shall, unless otherwise provided by written agreement between Landlord and Tenant, be and become the property of Landlord and remain on the Premises at the expiration or earlier termination of this Agreement.
- 8. NON-DELIVERY OF POSSESSION. In the event Landlord cannot deliver possession of the Premises to Tenant upon the commencement of the Lease term, through no fault of Landlord or its agents, then Landlord or its agents shall have no liability, but the rental herein provided shall abate until possession is given. Landlord or its agents shall have thirty (30) days in which to give possession, and if possession is tendered within such time, Tenant agrees to accept the demised Premises and pay the rental herein provided from that date. In the event possession cannot be delivered within such time, through no fault of Landlord or its agents, then this Agreement and all rights hereunder shall terminate.
- 9. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS. Tenant shall not keep on the Premises any item of a dangerous, flammable or explosive character that might unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion on the Premises or that might be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company.
- 10. UTILITIES. Tenant shall be responsible for arranging for and paying for all utility services required on the Premises.
- 11. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR; RULES. Tenant will, at its sole expense, keep and maintain the Premises and appurtenances in good and sanitary condition and repair during the term of this Agreement and any renewal thereof. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Tenant shall:

- (a) Not obstruct the driveways, sidewalks, courts, entry ways, stairs and/or halls, which shall be used for the purposes of ingress and egress only;
- (b) Keep all windows, glass, window coverings, doors, locks and hardware in good, clean order and repair;
- (c) Not obstruct or cover the windows or doors;
- (d) Not leave windows or doors in an open position during any inclement weather;
- (e) Not hang any laundry, clothing, sheets, etc. from any window, rail, porch or balcony nor air or dry any of same within any yard area or space;
- (f) Not cause or permit any locks or hooks to be placed upon any door or window without the prior written consent of Landlord;
- (g) Keep all air conditioning filters clean and free from dirt;
- (h) Keep all lavatories, sinks, toilets, and all other water and plumbing apparatus in good order and repair and shall use same only for the purposes for which they were constructed. Tenant shall not allow any sweepings, rubbish, sand, rags, ashes or other substances to be thrown or deposited therein. Any damage to any such apparatus and the cost of clearing stopped plumbing resulting from misuse shall be borne by Tenant;
- And Tenant's family and guests shall at all times maintain order in the Premises and at all places on the Premises, and shall not make or permit any loud or improper noises, or otherwise disturb other residents;
- (j) Keep all radios, television sets, stereos, phonographs, etc., turned down to a level of sound that does not annoy or interfere with other residents;
- (k) Deposit all trash, garbage, rubbish or refuse in the locations provided therefor and shall not allow any trash, garbage, rubbish or refuse to be deposited or permitted to stand on the exterior of any building or within the common elements;
- (I) Abide by and be bound by any and all rules and regulations affecting the Premises or the common area appurtenant thereto which may be adopted or promulgated by the Condominium or Homeowners' Association having control over them.
- 12. DAMAGE TO PREMISES. In the event the Premises are destroyed or rendered wholly uninhabitable by fire, storm, earthquake, or other casualty not caused by the negligence of Tenant, this Agreement shall terminate from such time except for the purpose of enforcing rights that may have then accrued hereunder. The rental provided for herein shall then be, accounted for by and between Landlord and Tenant up to the time of such injury or destruction of the Premises, Tenant paying rentals up to such date and Landlord refunding rentals collected beyond such date. Should a portion of the Premises thereby be rendered uninhabitable, the Landlord shall have the option of either repairing such injured or damaged portion or terminating this Lease. In the event that Landlord exercises its right to repair such uninhabitable portion, the rental shall abate in the proportion that the injured parts bears to the whole Premises, and such part so injured shall be restored by Landlord as speedily as practicable, after which the full rent shall recommence and the Agreement continue according to its terms.
- 13. INSPECTION OF PREMISES. Landlord and Landlord's agents shall have the right at all reasonable times during the term of this Agreement and any renewal thereof to enter the

Premises for the purpose of inspecting the Premises and all buildings and improvements thereon. And for the purposes of making any repairs, additions or alterations as may be deemed appropriate by Landlord for the preservation of the Premises or the building. Landlord and its agents shall further have the right to exhibit the Premises and to display the usual "for sale", "for rent" or "vacancy" signs on the Premises at any time within forty-five (45) days before the expiration of this Lease. The right of entry shall likewise exist for the purpose of removing placards, signs, fixtures, alterations or additions, that do not conform to this Agreement or to any restrictions, rules or regulations affecting the Premises.

- 14. SUBORDINATION OF LEASE. This Agreement and Tenant's interest hereunder are and shall be subordinate, junior and inferior to any and all mortgages, liens or encumbrances now or hereafter placed on the Premises by Landlord, all advances made under any such mortgages, liens or encumbrances (including, but not limited to, future advances), the interest payable on such mortgages, liens or encumbrances and any and all renewals, extensions or modifications of such mortgages, liens or encumbrances.
- 15. TENANT'S HOLD OVER. If Tenant remains in possession of the Premises with the consent of Landlord after the natural expiration of this Agreement, a new tenancy from month-to-month shall be created between Landlord and Tenant which shall be subject to all of the terms and conditions hereof except that rent shall then be due and owing at whatever amount is established at the sole discretion of the landlord upon written notice to the tenant and except that such tenancy shall be ferminable upon thirty (30) days written notice served by either party
- 16. SURRENDER OF PREMISES. Upon the expiration of the term hereof, Tenant shall surrender the Premises in as good a state and condition as they were at the commencement of this Agreement, reasonable use and wear and tear thereof and damages by the elements excepted.
- 17. ANIMALS. Tenant shall be entitled to keep no more than two (2) domestic dogs, cats or birds; however, at such time as Tenant shall actually keep any such animal on the Premises, Tenant shall pay to Landlord a pet deposit of \$150 DOLLARS which shall be non-refundable and shall be used upon the termination or expiration of this Agreement for the purposes of cleaning the carpets of the building.
- 18. QUIET ENJOYMENT. Tenant, upon payment of all of the sums referred to herein as being payable by Tenant and Tenant's performance of all Tenant's agreements contained herein and Tenant's observance of all rules and regulations, shall and may peacefully and quietly have, hold and enjoy said Premises for the term hereof.
- 19. INDEMNIFICATION. Landlord shall not be liable for any damage or injury of or to the Tenant, Tenant's family, guests, invitees, agents or employees or to any person entering the Premises or the building of which the Premises are a part or to goods or equipment, or in the structure or equipment of the structure of which the Premises are a part, and Tenant

hereby agrees to indemnify, defend and hold Landlord harmless from any and all claims or assertions of every kind and nature.

- 22. LATE CHARGE. In the event that any payment required to be paid by Tenant hereunder is not made within five (5) calendar days of when due, Tenant shall pay to Landlord, in addition to such payment or other charges due hereunder, a "late fee" in the amount of \$108 DOLLARS.
- 24. ABANDONMENT. If at any time during the term of this Agreement Tenant abandons the Premises or any part thereof, Landlord may, at Landlord's option, obtain possession of the Premises in the manner provided by law, and without becoming liable to Tenant for damages or for any payment of any kind whatever. Landlord may, at Landlord's discretion, as agent for Tenant, relet the Premises, or any part thereof, for the whole or any part thereof, for the whole or any part of the then unexpired term, and may receive and collect all rent payable by virtue of such reletting, and, at Landlord's option, hold Tenant liable for any difference between the rent that would have been payable under this Agreement during the balance of the unexpired term, if this Agreement had continued in force, and the net rent for such period realized by Landlord by means of such reletting. If Landlord's right of reentry is exercised following abandonment of the Premises by Tenant, then Landlord shall consider any personal property belonging to Tenant and left on the Premises to also have been abandoned, in which case Landlord may dispose of all such personal property in any manner Landlord shall demonstrate and Landlord is hence, for all liability for doing so.
- 25. ATTORNEYS' FEES. Should it become negessary for Laboling the collection of rentals or gaining possession of the Premises, Tenant agrees to pay all expenses so incurred, including a reasonable attorneys' fee.
- 26. **RECORDING OF AGREEMENT**. Tenant shall not record this Agreement on the Public Records of any public office. In the event that Tenant shall record this Agreement, this Agreement shall, at Landlord's option, terminate immediately and Landlord shall be entitled to all rights and remedies that it has at law or in equity.
- 25. GOVERNING LAW. This Agreement shall be governed, construed and interpreted by, through and under the Laws of the State of North Carolina.
- 26. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this Agreement or the application thereof shall, for any reason and to any extent, be invalid or unenforceable, neither the remainder of this Agreement nor the application of the provision to other persons, entities or circumstances shall be affected thereby, but instead shall be enforced to the maximum extent permitted by law.
- 27. BINDING EFFECT. The covenants, obligations and conditions herein contained shall be binding on and inure to the benefit of the heirs, legal representatives, and assigns of the parties hereto.

- 28. DESCRIPTIVE HEADINGS. The descriptive headings used herein are for convenience of reference only and they are not intended to have any effect whatsoever in determining the rights or obligations of the Landlord or Tenant.
- 29. CONSTRUCTION. The pronouns used herein shall include, where appropriate, either gender or both, singular and plural.
- 30. NON-WAIVER. No indulgence, waiver, election or non-election by Landlord under this Agreement shall affect Tenant's duties and liabilities hereunder.

MODIFICATION. The parties hereby agree that this document contains the entire agreement between the parties and this Agreement shall not be modified, changed, altered or amended in any way except through a written amendment signed by all of the parties hereto.

Here be LANDLORD: Sign CASE Prof Print: Marche Margaraphs A MADOC sign: Townes Van Zand TENANT : Print: TOWNES VAN ZANDT Date: 1/1/ 2011

File No.	STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA	
COMPLAINT	County	In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division-Small Claims
IN SUMMARY EJECTMENT	1. The defendant is a resident of the county named above	oove.
	2. The defendant entered into possession of premises described below as a lessee of plaintiff	s described below as a lessee of plaintiff.
G.S. 7A-216, 7A-232; Ch. 42, Art. 3 and 7 Name And Address Of Plaintiff	Description Of Premises (Include Location)	Conventional Public Housing
	Rate Of Rent Month Date Rent Due \$ per Week	Date Lease Ended Type Of Lease Date Lease Type Of Lease
	3. The defendant failed to pay the rent due on the above date and and waited the 10-day grace period before filing the complaint.	3. The defendant failed to pay the rent due on the above date and the plaintiff made demand for the rent and waited the 10-day grace period before filing the complaint.
County Telephone No.	The lease period ended on the above date and t period.	☐ The lease period ended on the above date and the defendant is holding over after the end of the lease period.
VERSUS	The defendant breached the condition of the lease described below for which re-entry is specified.	se described below for which re-entry is specified.
Name And Address Of Defendant 1 Individual Corporation	\Box Criminal activity or other activity has occurred in violation of G.S. 42-63 as specified below.	violation of G.S. 42-63 as specified below.
County Telephone No.	4. The plaintiff has demanded possession of the premise it, and the plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession.	4. The plaintiff has demanded possession of the premises from the defendant, who has refused to surrender it, and the plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession.
Name And Address Of Defendant 2 Individual Corporation	5. The defendant owes the plaintiff the following:	
	Description Of Any Property Damage	
	Amount Of Damage (If Known) Amount Of Rent Past Due \$ \$	Total Amount Due
County Telephone No.	6. I demand to be put in possession of the premises and to recover the total amount listed above and daily rental until entry of judgment plus interest and reimbursement for court costs.	and to recover the total amount listed above and daily bursement for court costs.
Name And Address Of Plaintiff's Attorney Or Agent	Date Of Plaintiff/Attorney/Agent (Type Or Print)	Signature Of Plaintiff/Attorney/Agent
	CERTIFICATION WHEN COMPLAIN	CERTIFICATION WHEN COMPLAINT SIGNED BY AGENT OF PLAINTIFF
	I certify that I am an agent of the plaintiff and have actual knowledge of the facts alleged in this Complaint.	tual knowledge of the facts alleged in this Complaint.
	Date Name Of Agent (Type Or Print)	Signature Of Agent
AOC-CVM-201, Rev. 9/13 © 2013 Administrative Office of the Courts	(Over)	

Landlord-Tenant Law - Page 29

by a copy for the plaintiff and be filed no later than the time set for trial. The filing of the answer DOES NOT relieve the defendant of the need to appear	appear before the magistrate to assert the defendant's defense.9. Requests for continuances of cases before the magistrate may be granted for good cause shown and for no more than five (5) days per continuance unless the parties agree otherwise.	-	11. The PLAINTIFF or the DEFENDANT may appeal the magistrate's decision in this case. To appeal, notice must be given in open court when the judgment is entered, or notice may be given in writing to the Clerk of Superior Court within ten (10) days after the judgment is entered. If notice is given in in writing, the appealing party must also serve written notice of appeal on all	other parties. The appealing party must PAY to the Clerk of Superior Court the costs of court for appeal within ten (10) days after the judgment is entered. If the appealing party applies to appeal as an indigent, and that request is		12. If the defendant appeals and wishes to remain on the premises the defendant must also post a stay of execution bond within ten (10) days after the judgment is entered. In the event of an appeal by the tenant to	district court, the landlord may file a motion to dismiss that appeal under G.S. 7A-228(d). The court may decide the motion without a hearing if the tenant fails to file a response within ten (10) days of receipt of the motion.	 Upon request of the tenant within seven (7) days of the landlord being placed in lawful possession, the landlord shall release any personal property of the tenant. After seven (7) days. the landlord may sell. throw 	away or dispose of said property. If sold, the landlord must disburse any surplus proceeds to the tenant upon request within seven (7) days of the sale. If the total value of the property is less than \$500.00, it is deemed	abandoned five (5) days after execution. 14. This form is supplied in order to expedite the handling of small claims. It is designed to cover the most common claims.	15. The Clerk or magistrate cannot advise you about your case or assist you in completing this form. If you have any questions, you should consult an attorney.
 The PLAINTIFF must file a small claim action in the county where at least one of the defendants resides. 	 The PLAINTIFF cannot sue in small claims court for more than \$10,000.00 excluding interest and costs unless further restricted by court order. The PLAINTIFF must show the complete name and address of the defendant to ensure service on the defendant. If there are two defendants and they 	reside at different addresses, the plaintiff must include both addresses. The plaintiff must determine if the defendant is a corporation and sue in the complete corporate name. If the business is not a corporation, the plaintiff must determine the owner's name and sue the owner.	4. The PLAINTIFF may serve the defendant(s) by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the party to be served or by paying the costs to have the sheriff serve the summons and complaint. If certified or registered modified to conserve the summons and file a conserved or registered		b. In mining out number 3 in the complaint, it the landlord is seeking to remove the tenant for failure to pay rent when there is no written lease, the first block should be checked. (Defendent failed to nay the rent due on the above date	and the plaintiff made demand for the rent and waited the ten (10) day grace period before filling the complaint.) If the landlord is seeking to remove the tenant for failure to pay rent when there is a written lesse with an automatic	forfeiture clause, the third block should be checked. (The defendant breached the condition of the lease described below for which re-entry is specified.) And "failure to pay rent" should be placed in the space for description of the	breach. If the landlord is seeking to evict tenant for violating some other condition in the lease, the third block should also be checked. If the landlord is claiming that the term of the lease has ended and the tenant refuses to	to leave, the second block should be checked. If the landlord is claiming that criminal activity occurred, the fourth block should be checked and the conduct must be described in space provided.	The PLAINTIFF must pay advance court costs at the time of filing this Complaint. In the event that judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, court costs may be charged against the defendant.	 The PLAINTIFF must appear before the magistrate to prove his/her claim. The DEFENDANT may file a written answer, making defense to the claim, in the office of the Clerk of Superior Court. This answer should be accompanied

INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT

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File No.	Abstract No.	STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Film No.		
Judgment Docket Book And Page No.		This action was tried before the undersigned on the cause stated in the complaint. The record shows that the defendant was given proper notice of the nature of the action and the date, time and location of trial.
		FINDINGS
JUDGMENT IN ACTION FOR SUMMARY EJECTMENT	ENT N FOR ECTMENT	The Court finds that: 1. □ a. the plaintiff has proved the case by the greater weight of the evidence. □ b. the plaintiff has failed to prove the case by the greater weight of the evidence. □ c. the plaintiff requested and was entitled to a judgment for possession based on the pleading.
Mama And Addrass Of Dlaintiff	G.S. 7A-210(2), 7A-224; 42-30	
varie And Address Of Plantin		 3. a. there is no dispute as to the amount of rent in arrears, and the amount is \$ b. there is an actual dispute as to the amount of rent in arrears. The defendant(s) claims the amount of rent in arrears is \$ and this amount is the undisputed amount of rent in arrears. 4. other:
		ORDER
County Te	Telephone No.	1. The defendant(s) be removed from and the plaintiff be put in possession of the premises described in the defendant(s) be removed from and the plaintiff be put in possession of the premises described in the described in the defendant second s
VERSUS	S	Companie.
Name And Address Of Defendant 1		□ 3. this action be dismissed with prejudice because the defendant tendered the rent due and the court costs
		of this action. 4. the plaintiff recover rent of the defendant(s) in the amount and at the rate listed below, plus other damages in the amount indicated. The plaintiff is also entitled to interest on the total principal sum from this date until the judgment is paid.
County Tei	Telephone No.	
Name And Address Of Defendant 2		\Box 6. costs of this action are taxed to the \Box plaintiff. \Box defendant.
		Rate Of Rent In Mo. Amt. Of Rent In Arrears (Owed To Date) Udgment Announced And Signed In Open Court
		Amount Of Other Damages
County Te	Telephone No.	TOTAL AMOUNT \$ Name Of Party Announcing Appeal In Open Court 0.00 0.00
Name And Address Of Plaintiff's Attorney		CERTIFICATION
		(NOTE: To be used when magistrate does not announce and sign this Judgment in open court at the conclusion of the trial.) I certify that this Judgment has been served on each party named by depositing a copy in a post-paid properly addressed envelope in a post office or official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Postal Service. Date
AOC-CVM-401, Rev. 2/06 © 2006 Administrative Office of the Courts	Courts	

Landlord-Tenant Law - Page 31

OUTLINE ON RIGHTS REGARDING TENANT'S PROPERTY

RESIDENTIAL LEASES: PROPERTY OTHER THAN MOBILE HOME AND CONTENTS.

A landlord has no authority to do anything with a tenant's property until the landlord has brought a summary ejectment action, won a judgment for possession, and had the sheriff execute a writ of possession to enforce the judgment. In 2013 the General Assembly changed the law to require the sheriff to execute a writ of possession within five days of receiving it.

• The need for the landlord to deal with property remaining will arise only if the landlord selects the padlocking method of execution.

After the sheriff padlocks the premises under a writ of possession, the landlord must hold property for seven days and then may dispose of any items of personal property remaining on the premises.

- During the seven-day period the landlord may remove the property and store it or may leave the property on the premises.
- If the tenant requests the property during that seven-day period, the landlord must release the property to the tenant during regular business hours at an agreed upon time.

If the landlord decides to sell the property, the landlord must give written notice to the tenant by first-class mail to the tenant's last known address at least seven days before the date of the sale.

- The notice must indicate when and where the sale will occur and how surplus can be claimed by tenant and what happens to it if not claimed.
- The tenant is entitled to return of the property, upon request, any time before the day of the sale.
- The statute does not set out any procedure for how the landlord must sell the property or what kind, if any, advertising is required. (It is unclear whether

the court would impose some reasonableness standard on the manner of sale.)

- The landlord may apply the proceeds of sale to unpaid rent, other damages, storage fees, and sale costs.
- Any surplus must be disbursed to the tenant, upon request, within seven days of the sale.
- If not requested by the tenant within seven days of the sale, the landlord must give the surplus proceeds to the county government of the county in which the real property is located.

If the total value all of the personal property left on the premises *is less than \$500* (increased from \$100 by the General Assembly in 2012), the property is considered abandoned five days after execution of a writ of possession. At that time the landlord may throw away or dispose of the property.

• If the tenant requests the property before the expiration of the five-day period, the landlord must release possession to the tenant during regular business hours or at a time agreed upon.

If a tenant abandons personal property with a total *value of \$750 or less* (increased from \$500 by the General Assembly in 2012), or fails to remove such property at the time of execution of a writ of possession, the landlord may immediately remove the property and deliver it to a nonprofit organization that regularly provides free or at a nominal cost clothing and household furnishings to people in need.

- The nonprofit organization must agree to identify and separately store the tenant's property for thirty days.
- It must release the property to the tenant at no charge if the tenant requests release during the thirty-day period.
- Landlord must give notice to tenant of name and address of organization to which the tenant's property was delivered by
 - posting notice at the rented premises
 - posting notice at the place where the rent is received, and
 - mailing copy of notice by first-class mail to the tenant's last known address.

RESIDENTIAL LEASES-MOBILE HOME AND CONTENTS.

If the tenant rents a mobile home space so that the tenant brings a mobile home on the landlord's lot, separate rules apply.

If the mobile home has a fair market value *of \$500 or less,* the landlord may dispose of the mobile home and its contents as specified in section I above.

• The landlord determines the value of the mobile home.

Because a mobile home is a motor vehicle, the landlord must notify DMV if the landlord wishes to sell the mobile home.

The landlord must get permission of the local tax collectors before moving the mobile home.

If the mobile home has a fair market value of *more than \$500,* the landlord must dispose of the mobile home and contents as provided in G.S. 42-2(e2).

- The mobile home must be titled in the name of the tenant. If owned by someone else, the landlord cannot acquire a landlord's lien in the mobile home.
- The landlord must get a judgment for possession and must have a writ of possession issued to enforce the judgment.
- After the writ has been executed, the landlord may immediately remove the property from the land and store it.
- The landlord must release the mobile home and contents to the tenant during regular business hours or at a time mutually agreed upon for 21 days after the writ has been executed.
- Twenty-one days after writ has been executed, whether the property remains on the premises or whether the landlord has removed and stored it, landlord has a lien on the property for the amount of rent due at the time the tenant vacated the premises; for the time up to 60 days from vacating the premises to the date of sale; for physical damages to the property beyond normal wear and tear; and for reasonable expenses costs and expenses of the sale.
 - The landlord must dispose of the property by selling it at a public auction pursuant to G.S. 44A-4.
 - The statute requires the landlord to post the notice of sale at the courthouse and to advertise in a newspaper in certain instances.
 - The landlord must give notice of the sale to the tenant.
 - Because the mobile home is a motor vehicle, the landlord may not sell the mobile home without notifying DMV and getting permission to sell the vehicle.

• The purchaser may not move the mobile home without first getting permission from the local tax collector.

COMMERCIAL LEASES.

The old landlord's possessory lien statute, G.S. 44A-2(e), continues to apply to commercial leases.

Landlord may sell property.

- Under G.S. 44A-2(e) if property has been left on premises for at least 21 days after tenant vacated premises and landlord has a lawful claim for damages against tenant, may sell property.
- Lien is for amount of rent due at time tenant vacated and for the time, up to 60 days, from the vacating of the premises to the date of sale; for any sums necessary to repair damages to the premises caused by the tenant, except for normal wear and tear; and for the reasonable costs and expenses of selling the personal property.
- Notice must be given and property must be sold at public sale under provisions of G.S. 44A-4.
- If at any time before the expiration of the 21-day period tenant requests his property, landlord must turn it over to tenant.
- Lien does not have priority over any prior perfected security interests.

Landlord may store property.

- Under G.S. 44A-4(e) landlord may remove tenant's property and store it if left on the premises at least 21 days after the tenant vacates the premises or at least 10 days after the landlord has received a judgment for possession.
- Property placed in storage belongs to the tenant, who is entitled to recover it from storage.
- If property stored with person who in ordinary course of business stores property, that person will have a storage lien under G.S. 44A-2(a) and may require the tenant to pay the storage costs before releasing the property to him. (If property stored in self-storage facility, owner is entitled to a lien under G.S. 44A-41.)

Landlord may donate property to charity.

• Under G.S. 44A-2(e) if the total value of all property remaining is less than \$100, then any time more than 5 days after tenant has vacated or sheriff has padlocked the

premises, landlord may remove the property and donate it to any charitable organization.

Fees in Summary Ejectment Actions

For Leases Entered Into On or After Oct. 1, 2009

Late Fees

In residential leases, parties may agree to late fee for payments five or more days late. When rent is paid monthly, the maximum fee is \$15 or 5%, whichever is greater. In case of weekly rent, maximum is \$4 or 5%, whichever is greater.

Complaint Filing Fee

Authorized for written leases not to exceed \$15 or 5%, whichever is greater, only if:

- ---tenant was in default
- ---LL filed complaint for SE
- ---tenant cured the default
- ---LL dismissed the claim.

Fee may be charged as part of amount required to cure default.

Court-Appearance Fee

Authorized for written leases, equal to 10% of monthly rent if ---tenant was in default ---LL won a SE action ---neither party appealed.

Second Trial Fee

Authorized for written leases in event of new trial following appeal from small claims judgment. Not to exceed 12% of monthly rent. Available if ---tenant was in default ---LL prevailed


Additional Rules


LL can charge only one of the last three fees, and that fee may not be deducted from subsequent rent payment or asserted as ground for default in subsequent SE action. Prohibits LL from attempting to charge a larger fee and provides lease provision in violation of law is void.

SUBSIDIZED HOUSING CASES:

GETTING THE RIGHT ANSWER







PRACTICAL DIFFERENCES

Always written. Always a forfeiture clause.

Breach of lease condition (almost) always basis for eviction.

Everything you need to know is in the lease.

THE RULES DEPEND ON THE TYPE OF SUBSIDY

FOUR MOST FREQUENT TYPES OF SUBSIDY:

* Public Housing

- * Tenant-Based (aka Housing Choice/Voucher)
- * Project-Based
- * Miscellaneous Rural Development

PUBLIC HOUSING

Lease termination at any point only for good cause (defined in regulations).

Procedural requirements include

 notice of lease termination with contents specified, including specific factual grounds, and
 notice term depends on ground for eviction (14 days for nonpayment of rent).

TENANT-BASED

Good cause definition differs from public housing definition.

No state action involved in eviction by private landlord. Procedure requires written notice specifying grounds (which may be satisfied by complaint if sufficiently detailed) AND notice to PHA. Regulations do not specify notice period.

PROJECT-BASED

Lease may not be terminated (at any point) unless one of statutory grounds exist.

Most frequent ground is "material non-compliance."

"Other good cause" requires prior notice that violation is basis for termination and terminates only at end of lease term.

Law specifies content of notice of termination, including right to meet with landlord, and imposes additional requirements in terms of timing of and service of notice.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES

Similar to (but slightly different from) other three types.

Review Questions on Summary Ejectment

- T signed a lease for one year. Lease says nothing about notice required to terminate. When the year ended, T continued to occupy the property. LL files for summary ejectment. T defends on ground that LL failed to give notice of termination. Who wins? What legal principle explains your answer?
- 2. T had a lease for one year, with rent payable at the first of each month. At the end of the year he remained on the property and continued to pay rent. Six months later, LL filed a summary ejectment action on the ground that T held over after the one-year lease. (He's decided he could get more money if he rented to a new T.) Who wins? What legal principle explains your answer?
- 3. LL and T have an oral lease agreement to rent an apartment on a month-to-month basis for \$250/month. T agreed to pay \$250 and move in on July 1. He paid for July and August, but on Sept. 1 he failed to pay. On Sept. 2 LL demanded the rent. On Sept. 5 LL filed a summary ejectment lawsuit. Trial was held on Sept 30. LL proved that the Sept rent was due Sept. 1, that he demanded it on Sept. 2, and that it remained unpaid at the time of trial. T offers a check for \$250 in court, but LL insists on a judgment. Who wins? What legal principle explains your answer?
- 4. LL and T have an oral lease providing for month-to-month tenancy, with rent due the first day of the month. T failed to pay rent on Jan. 1. On Jan. 10, LL gives T notice that he wants to end the lease at the end of the month, telling T she'll have to be out of the rental property by that day. When T remained on the property on Feb. 1 LL filed this action. At trial, T offers a cash payment for the Jan. and Feb. rent and court costs. LL insists on a judgment. Who wins? What legal principle explains your answer?
- 5. LL and T have a written one-year lease requiring payment of \$400/month due on the first. The lease contains a forfeiture clause for failure to pay rent. T failed to pay rent on May 1, and LL filed an action seeking possession on May 3, seeking possession and back rent. At trial on May 25 T asks you to dismiss the case because LL did not offer any evidence that he demanded the rent and waited ten days before filing the action. Who wins? What legal principle explains your answer?

- 6. Same facts, except that T is not present at trial and LL asks for judgment on the pleadings. Do you grant his request? What legal principle explains your answer?
- 7. LL has filed a summary ejectment action based on holding over at the end of a lease for six months. The lease ended on May 31, and you hear the case on June 15. The monthly rent was \$250. At trial LL offers evidence that she has entered into a lease with a new tenant, who was to move in on June 1, at an increased rental rate of \$300/month. LL also seeks damages for injury to property: she found nicks in the living room wall and the clothesline in the backyard on the ground. She says it will cost \$75 to paint the living room and \$25 to put up a new clothesline. LL is seeking \$300 (rent for June) plus \$100 damage to property. T says he moved out on the 10th, and so should have to pay only \$83.33 (10 days, based on his rent of \$250). He also says the clothesline was at least 10 years old and fell down because the metal rusted through. What damages do you award? State your reasons.
- 8. LL filed a summary ejectment action on May 31 after T failed to pay rent for May. Trial is held on June 15. LL proves that rent was \$350 a month, T failed to pay, and that LL demanded the rent on May 10. Assuming you rule in LL's favor, what is the amount of your judgment? If T came to court and offered tender as a defense, what amount would be required for an effective tender?
- 9. T rents a mobile home space from LL. She failed to pay rent on May 1. On May 2 LL demanded the rent, and filed this action on May 15. At trial on June 10, LL proves the terms of the lease, that rent has not been paid, and that he made demand on the 2nd. T defends based on the special law requiring 60 days notice in cases involving rental of mobile home spaces. Who wins? Why?
- 10. LL brings an action for summary ejectment based on failure to pay rent. At trial LL proves that the lease provided for a monthly rental of \$550, that she made demand, and waited 10 days before filing this action. She seeks possession, \$825 for 1 ½ months rent, a late fee of \$60 (for 2 months at \$30/month), and an administrative fee of \$150 for her inconvenience in having to come to court. Assume that the written lease has a late fee and administrative fee provision consistent with the amounts she seeks. What damages do you award?
- 11. LL has filed a summary ejectment action against T for breach of a lease condition (no pets clause, stating that having a pet on the

premises results in an automatic forfeiture of the lease). The one-year lease provides for monthly rent of \$450. LL testifies that he has seen a cat in T's apartment. He also states that T did not pay rent for this month (having been served with the complaint and summons on the first of the month), and so asks for two weeks back rent. T defends, saying (1) he has no proof she had a cat, (2) she certainly doesn't have a cat now, and (3) she's prepared to tender rent for the entire month in addition to court costs. How do you rule?

Servicemembers' Civil Relief Act Applies to Family Cases Too

This entry was contributed by Cheryl Howell on February 13, 2015 at 5:00 am and is filed under Adoptions, Child Welfare Law, Civil Law, Civil Practice, Civil Procedure - General, Family Law, Small Claims Law.

In January we were reminded by the North Carolina Supreme Court in <u>In Re J.B.</u> that:

1) We have military personnel living throughout our state, not just in districts with military facilities, and

2) The federal <u>Servicemember's Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 501, et. seq.</u>, (SCRA) applies to **all noncriminal judicial and administrative proceedings** involving service personnel, including domestic and juvenile cases.

The Act contains *no exception* for any civil proceeding. So it covers custody, divorce, support, equitable distribution, 50B and 50C cases, abuse, neglect and dependency proceedings and termination of parental rights.

So what does the SCRA Require?

First: An Affidavit from Plaintiff

If a defendant has not made an appearance, no judgment can be entered until plaintiff files an affidavit stating whether defendant is in the military. 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 521. The term 'judgment' is defined as "any judgment, decree, order, or ruling, final **or temporary**." 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 511(9). The Act states: "[T]he court, before entering judgment for the plaintiff, shall require the plaintiff to file with the court an affidavit –

(A) Stating whether or not the defendant is in military service and showing necessary facts to support the affidavit; or

(B) If the plaintiff is unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in military service, stating that the plaintiff is unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in military service."

The Act places responsibility for making sure the Affidavit is filed on the court. For an example of a court form created to help comply with this requirement, see the form adopted in <u>Wake County</u>.

If plaintiff's affidavit does not establish that defendant is in the military, the court can proceed with the case. However, the court may require a bond to compensate a defendant later allowed to set aside a judgment because he or she actually was in military service. In addition, the court can enter any other order "the court determines necessary to protect the rights of the defendant under this Act." 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 521(b)(3).

Second: Appointment of Attorney for Servicemember

If plaintiff's affidavit or other information before the court shows that a defendant who has not made an appearance is in the military, "the court may not enter judgment until after the court appoints an attorney to represent the defendant." 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 521(b)(2). As previously stated, the term 'judgment' is defined by the SCRA to include all orders, including temporary orders. This means the court cannot enter any order – temporary or permanent – before appointing an attorney when defendant has not made an appearance. The SCRA does not define the role of the attorney, but it does require that the attorney attempt to contact the service member and consider requesting a stay of the proceedings. 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 521(d)

Third: Stay of Proceedings

After counsel has been appointed for a servicemember who has not made an appearance, the court must stay the case for *at least* 90 days either "upon motion by the appointed counsel, or on the court's own motion, if the court determines that:

- 1. There may be a defense to the action and a defense cannot be presented without the presence of the defendant; or
- 2. After due diligence, counsel has been unable to contact the defendant or otherwise determine if a meritorious defense exists."

http://civil.sog.unc.edu/servicemembers-civil-relief-act-applies-to-family-cases-too/

The Act does not define 'stay of proceedings.' The term certainly means the trial court cannot enter final judgment, but does it prohibit the court from entering temporary orders, such as temporary custody or emergency domestic violence protective orders? North Carolina courts have not addressed the issue but at least one state supreme court has held the stay does not mean a court loses jurisdiction to act so it does not prohibit a court from entering temporary orders in custody cases, noting that a child's life does not go into "suspended animation" while a service member is on duty. *Lenser v. McGowan*, 191 S.W.3rd 506 (Arkansas, 2010). *See also* <u>N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-75.12</u>(stay pursuant to that statute does not terminate jurisdiction of trial court until 5 years after it is granted).

Fourth: When the Servicemember Has Notice of the Proceeding

A servicemember who has notice of the proceedings may request a stay pursuant to Section 522 of the Act. The SCRA specifies that a request for a section 522 stay does not constitute an appearance "for jurisdictional purposes," 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 522(c), but does not say that the request does not constitute an appearance for other purposes. This indicates that a servicemember who requests this stay is *not* entitled to a court-appointed attorney, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 521(b)(2) discussed above, because the request is an appearance.

Section 522 provides that, at any stage of the proceeding before final judgment the court may upon its own motion, and shall upon motion of the service member, stay the proceeding for *not less than* 90 days if:

- 1. A letter or other communication establishes that a servicemember's military duty requirements materially affect the servicemember's ability to appear and gives a date when the servicemember will be available to appear; and
- 2. A letter or other communication from the servicemember's commanding officer shows that the servicemember's military duty prevents appearance and that leave is not authorized for the servicemember at the time of the letter.

The court is not required to grant the stay unless the court concludes, based on this information provided, that the servicemember's current military duty requirements materially affect the servicemember's ability to appear.

If the initial Section 522 stay is granted, a servicemember can request an additional stay "based on continuing material effect of military duty on the servicemember's ability to appear." 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 522(d)(1). In support of the request for additional time, the court must receive letters or communications containing the same information required for the first stay request. If the court refuses the additional time, the court must appoint an attorney for the servicemember before proceeding with the case. 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 522(d)(2).

How is the Court-Appointed Attorney Paid?

SCRA does not answer this question. This appears to be a wonderful opportunity for pro bono service.

There's definitely more to be said about the SCRA, but this covers the basics.

This entry was tagged with the following terms: Servicemembers Civil Relief Act

Cheryl Howell Cheryl Howell is a Professor of Public Law and Government at the School of Government specializing in family law.

TAB: Involuntary Commitment

UNC SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

Criteria for Involuntary Commitment in North Carolina

Mental Illness (Adults)

an illness that so lessens the capacity of the individual to use self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under treatment, care, supervision, guidance, or control.

Mental Illness (Minors)

a mental condition, other than mental retardation alone, that so impairs the youth's capacity to exercise age-adequate self-control or judgment in the conduct of his activities and social relationships that he is in need of treatment.

Substance abuse

the pathological use or abuse of alcohol or other drugs in a way or to a degree that produces an impairment in personal, social, or occupational functioning. Substance abuse may include a pattern of tolerance and withdrawal.

Dangerous to self

Within the relevant past, the individual has:

- 1. acted in such a way as to show that
 - a. he would be unable, without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not otherwise available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety; and
 - b. there is a reasonable probability of his suffering serious physical debilitation within the near future unless adequate treatment is given. Behavior that is grossly irrational, actions that the individual is unable to control, behavior that is grossly inappropriate to the situation, or other evidence of severely impaired insight and judgment creates an inference that the individual is unable to care for himself; or
- 2. attempted suicide or threatened suicide and there is a reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate treatment is given; or
- 3. mutilated himself or attempted to mutilate himself and there is a reasonable probability of serious self-mutilation unless adequate treatment is given.

Previous episodes of dangerousness to self, when applicable, may be considered when determining the reasonable probability of serious physical debilitation, suicide, or serious self-mutilation.


Dangerous to others

Within the relevant past the individual has:

- 1. inflicted, attempted to inflict, or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another and there is a reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated, or
- 2. acted in a way that created a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another and there is a reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated, or
- 3. engaged in extreme destruction of property and there is a reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated.

Previous episodes of dangerousness to others, when applicable, may be considered when determining the reasonable probability of future dangerous conduct. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that an individual has committed a homicide in the relevant past is evidence of dangerousness to others.

Magistrate's Involuntary Commitment Decision Tree



IVC - Page 3

COMMON QUESTIONS TO ASK TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FOR THE PETITION FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT

- Has the person harmed or threatened to harm himself or others within the past 24 hours? Week? Month? 3 months?
 (a) What did he/she do to you?
 - (b) What did he/she do to others?
- 2. Is the person hallucinating (seeing or hearing things that other people don't see or hear)?(a) What is he/she seeing or hearing?
- 3. Can the person identify the day, where he is, his name, and his age?
- 4. Does the person have unreasonable thoughts that people are talking about him or are going to kill or hurt him?
- 5. Is the person making elaborate, exaggerated claims about himself? Such as:
 - (a) Being on a special mission;
 - (b) Being another important and powerful person;
 - (c) Being a part of a powerful organization.
- 6. Does the person have trouble sleeping at night? How long since the person had a normal night's rest?
- 7. Has the person consumed more than 1 pint of alcohol per day for the past 3-10 days?
- 8. Is the person taking any medication?
 - (a) What is it?
 - (b) Has the person taken any illegal drugs within the past 24 hours? Week? Month? 3 months?
 - (1) What kind of drug?
 - (2) How much?
- 9. Has there been any change in the person's appetite? More? Less? Not eating?
- 10. Is the person working and doing his/her normal activities?
- 11. Is the person not able to take care of himself of his mental condition? (Eat, sleep, dress, bathe, use the toilet, stay out of traffic?)

I. BEHAVIORS

- A. <u>hostile vs. passive</u> -- acting out in destructive ways vs. withdrawn, quiet, apathetic
- B. erratic, excitable -- sensitive to slight irritation, unpredictable, agitated
- C. <u>combative</u>, <u>violent</u> -- destructive, physically and/or verbally abusive
- D. <u>incontinence</u> -- poor control of urine and feces
- E. <u>inappropriate social judgment</u> -- behaviors usually considered in poor taste and usually rejected or found offensive by other people

II. MOVEMENTS

- A. <u>overactivity, restlessness, agitation</u> -- parts of body in constant motion, repetitive, activity beyond reasonable level
- B. involuntary movements -- parts of body jerk, shake or activated without apparent reason
- C. <u>underactivity</u> -- immobile, stuporous, sluggish
- D. <u>general muscle tension</u> -- parts of body held taut (e.g., clenched teeth), possibly small tremors, rigid posture or walking stance

III. SPEECH

- A. overtalkative vs. mute -- constant talking vs. unresponsive, "pressure of speech"
- B. <u>unusual speech</u> -- strange words, "word salad," disconnected speech
- C. assaultive/suicidal content -- words that suggest harmful intent

IV. EMOTIONS

- A. <u>flat or inappropriate emotions</u> -- little change in expression or expression that doesn't fit occasion (e.g., happy but angry, crying when happy)
- B. mood swings -- dramatic changes from dejection to elation
- C. general overapprehension --anxiety in most areas of life
- D. depression, apathy, hopelessness -- withdrawal and minimal interest in activities of daily life
- E. euphoric -- grandiose and unrealistic feelings, often of feeling indestructible

V. THOUGHTS

- A. disturbed awareness -- unaware of self or others or time or place
- B. disturbed memory -- impairment of short term and/or long term memory
- C. disturbed reasoning/judgment -- impaired logic or decisions not tied to common thinking
- D. confused thoughts -- inconsistent and/or combination of unrelated thoughts

- E. poor concentration and/or attention
- F. low intellectual functioning
- G. slow mental speed

VI. ABNORMAL MENTAL TRENDS

- A. <u>false perceptions (hallucinations)</u> -- experiences in visual, hearing, smelling, tasting or skin sensations without real basis
- B. false beliefs (delusions) -- usually persecutory or grandiose thoughts without real basis
- C. paranoid ideas -- involves suspiciousness or belief that one is persecuted or unfairly treated
- D. <u>body delusion</u> -- delusion involving body functions (e.g., "my brain is rotting," a 60 year-old insisting she is pregnant)
- E. <u>feelings of unreality or depersonalization</u> -- sense of own reality is temporarily lost, so body parts distorted or sensing self from a distance
- F. repetitious behaviors/thoughts/speech
- G. extreme fears -- especially when seriously impairing activities of daily life

VII. PREVIOUS EVIDENCE

- A. psychiatric assessments or treatment
- B. prior petitions or associated legal difficulties

VIII. COURSE OR DISTURBANCE

- A. chronic
- B. gradual onset
- C. C. acute episode

Involuntary Commitment—Case Studies July 2015

1. You are a magistrate who receives a petition from an emergency room physician. The physician has checked box number 1 on the petition, which states that the respondent, Martin, is "mentally ill and dangerous to self of others or mentally ill and in need of treatment in order to prevent further disability and deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness." The facts upon which the physician's opinion is based, according to the petition, are: "Patient behaving in a bizarre manner. Confused. Poor judgment. Unclear if suicidal."

What do you do? Describe what you do and explain why.

2. Molly lives with her husband and daughter. Her husband reports that Molly has forgotten to turn off the stove two times in the last week, resulting in the burning of some pots and pans and a Formica countertop. Molly is extremely forgetful, frequently talks to the wall, and appears to be out of touch with her real surroundings. She has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder (manic-depressive disorder).

Is Molly dangerous to herself or others? Why or why not?

3. John goes downtown, hangs out on the main street sidewalk, blocks people from walking by, preaches loud words, and refuses to leave after being directed by the city police. John's brother says that John is religiously preoccupied, has ideas of persecution, and delusions of grandeur. John cannot understand why City Hall will not give him a license. John's brother is afraid that if John persists in trying to convert someone on the street who is resisting John's idea, then this person might become physically aggressive toward John. John's brother does not get any indication that John is aggressively motivated in the sense of being physically violent. John's brother has prepared a petition/affidavit for commitment for the magistrate. John's brother has written down in the petition the facts stated above and added that he believes John is in a mentally ill state of mind, is dangerous to himself or others, and needs medical treatment.

Is John dangerous to himself or others? Why or why not?

4. Same facts as in number 3, except the petitioner adds that John "assaulted two people yesterday." Is John dangerous to himself or others? Why or why not?

5. Jane has been unemployed for almost one year, having left her job because she felt she was being harassed by married men at work. She has not attempted to seek other employment and has been living in her car for the past two weeks, despite the cold weather (December). Jane believes that people are harassing her. Jane's daughter, Mary, was able to get her mother assessed by a physician who diagnosed Jane as suffering from psychotic depression, and possibly paranoid schizophrenia. The doctor also noted to Mary that Jane was not eating well. Since this initial evaluation two weeks ago, Jane has refused treatment and begun living in her car. Mary reports that her mother seems to have imaginary friends visiting her car, has a flat affect, and believes that others are "harming her." Mary believes that her mother is incapable of providing for herself in her present state and is not getting sufficient nourishment. Mary says that Jane does not appear to have eaten much in the last two weeks and is losing weight. Jane apparently runs the car engine periodically to keep warm. Mary fears that Jane might die of carbon monoxide poisoning if Jane continues to live in her car the rest of the winter.


Is Jane dangerous to herself? Why or why not?

6. Mary has a hammer in the house, breaks everything she can find, and told her husband that if he went to sleep she would bash his brains out. She has threatened to kill her daughter, granddaughter and sister. The daughter says, "Upon coming home, I found the TV busted, the telephone had been cut away from the wall, and glass was all over the living room. When I asked what happened, mother became excited and said that she had broken the TV, cut the phone, and broke some of the glass. On the phone the night before, mother had threatened to kill father and aunt."

Is Mary dangerous to herself? Why or why not?

7. David was found sitting on the edge of a busy airport runway. He had been observed in the woods with a rope around his neck and cutting his arm with a knife. He kept an iron pipe and hatchet under his bed and threatened his mother three days age by forcing her to sit in one chair and not move for two hours while he was screaming, shouting, and cursing. He threatened to "bust" his mother's head if she called anybody. He complained of demons and of feeling that his bones were being pulled out.

Is David dangerous? Why or why not?



procedure by-passes magistrate.



What Happens After a Magistrate Issues a Custody and Transportation Order Source: Administration of Justice Bulletin, September 2007

Upon request, the magistrate or clerk of court has issued an order for custody and transportation of a person alleged to be in need of examination and treatment. This order is not an order of commitment but only authorizes the person to be evaluated and treated until a court hearing. The individual making the request has filed a petition with the court for this purpose and is, therefore, called the "petitioner." The individual to be taken into custody for examination will have an opportunity to respond to the petition and is, therefore, called the "respondent." If you are taken into custody, the word "respondent," below, refers to you.

- 1. A law enforcement officer or other person designated in the custody order must take the respondent into custody within 24 hours. If the respondent cannot be found within 24 hours, a new custody order will be required to take the respondent into custody. Custody is not for the purpose of arrest, but for the respondent's own safety and the safety of others, and to determine if the respondent needs treatment.
- 2. Without unnecessary delay after assuming custody, the law enforcement officer or other individual designated to provide transportation must take the respondent to a physician or eligible psychologist for examination.
- 3. The respondent must be examined as soon as possible, and in any event within 24 hours, after being presented for examination. The examining physician or psychologist will recommend either outpatient commitment, inpatient commitment, substance abuse commitment, or termination of these proceedings.
 - *Inpatient commitment*: If the examiner finds the respondent meets the criteria for inpatient commitment, the examiner will recommend inpatient commitment. The law enforcement officer or other designated person must take the respondent to a 24-hour facility.
 - *Outpatient commitment*: If the examiner finds the respondent meets the criteria for outpatient commitment, the examiner will recommend outpatient commitment and identify the proposed outpatient treatment physician or center in the examination report. The person designated in the order to provide transportation must return the respondent to the respondent's regular residence or, with the respondent's consent, to the home of a consenting individual located in the originating county. The respondent must be released from custody.
 - *Substance abuse commitment*: If the examiner finds the respondent meets the criteria for substance abuse commitment, the examiner must recommend commitment and whether the respondent should be released or held at a 24-hour facility pending a district court hearing. Depending upon the physician's recommendation, the law enforcement officer or other designated individual will either release the respondent or take him or her to a 24-hour facility.
 - *Termination*: If the examiner finds the respondent meets neither of the criteria for commitment, the respondent must be released from custody and the proceedings terminated. If the custody order was based on the finding that the respondent was probably mentally ill, then the person designated in the order to provide transportation must return the respondent to the respondent's regular residence or, with the respondent's consent, to the home of a consenting individual located in the originating county.
- 4. If the law enforcement officer transports the respondent to a 24 hour facility, another evaluation must be performed within 24 hours of arrival. This evaluator has the same options as indicated in step 3 above. If the respondent is not released, the respondent will be given a hearing before a district court judge within 10 days of the date the respondent was taken into custody.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

County

File No.

In The General Court Of Justice District Court Division

IN THE MATTER OF: Name And Address Of Respondent

AFFIDAVIT AND PETITION FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT

	G.	S. 122C-261, 122C-281
Date Of Birth	Drivers License No. Of Respondent	State

I, the undersigned affiant, being first duly sworn, and having sufficient knowledge to believe that the respondent is a proper subject for involuntary commitment, allege that the respondent is a resident of, or can be found in the above named county, and is:

(Check all that apply)

- 1. mentally ill and dangerous to self or others or mentally ill and in need of treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness.
 - in addition to being mentally ill, respondent is also mentally retarded.

□ 2. a substance abuser and dangerous to self or others.

The facts upon which this opinion is based are as follows: (State facts, not conclusions, to support ALL blocks checked.)

Name And Address Of Nearest Relative Or Guardian		Name And Address Of Person Other Than Petitioner Who May Testify		
lome Telephone No.		Business Telephone No.	Home Telephone No.	Business Telephone No.
	person au	t to issue an order to a law enfor ithorized by law to conduct the ex mitted.		
SWORN/AFFIRM	I AND SUI	BSCRIBED TO BEFORE ME	Signature Of Petitioner	
Pate S	ignature		Name And Address Of Petitioner (Typ	e Or Print)
Deputy CSC Ass	sistant CSC	Clerk Of Superior Court Magistrate		
Notary (use only with or psychologist petition	Silvan	te Notary Commission Expires	-	
SEAL	Co	unty Where Notarized	Relationship To Respondent	
	I		Home Telephone No.	Business Telephone No.
		Original Eila Cony Hagnital Cony O		
AOC-SP-300, Rev. 7/1	1		pecial Counsel Copy-Attorney General ver)	
© 2011 Administrative		Courts		

PETITIONER'S WAIVER OF NOTICE OF HEARING

I voluntarily waive my right to notice of all hearings and rehearings in which the Court may commit the respondent or extend the respondent's commitment period, or discharge the respondent from the treatment facility.

Signature Of Witness	Date
	Signature Of Petitioner

NOTE: "Upon the request of the legally responsible person or the minor admitted or committed, and after that minor has both been released and reached adulthood, the court records of that minor made in proceedings pursuant to Article 5 of [Chapter 122C] may be expunded from the files of the court." G.S. 122C-54(e)

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA			File No.		
County				ral Court Of Ju t Court Divisio	
IN THE MATTER OF: Name And Address Of Respondent	FINDINGS AND CUSTODY ORDER INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT (PETITIONER APPEARS BEFORE MAGISTRATE OR CLERK)				
Social Security No. Of Respondent	ial Security No. Of Respondent Date Of Birth			22C-252, -261, -2 State	63, -281, -283
	I. FIND	DINGS			
The Court finds from the petition in the above r true and that the respondent is probably: (<i>Check all that apply</i>) 1. mentally ill and dangerous to self or oth deterioration that would predictably resu In addition to being mentally ill, the r 261(b) and (d) for special instruction 2. a substance abuser and dangerous to se	ers or mentally ill and in ult in dangerousness. espondent probably is a s.) self or others.	n need of treatment i	n order to prevent fur	ther disability or	
TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER: The Court ORDERS you to take the above nar the respondent for examination by a person au SHALL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE CLERK C	ned respondent into cu ithorized by law to cond	istody WITHIN 24 HC duct the examination			
 IF the examiner finds that the respondent home or to a consenting person's home respondent home or to a consenting person is that the respondent home or to a consenting person is that the respondent for a 24-hour facility designation and respondent for custody, examination and recommend whether the respondent between the respondent to a 24-hour facility designation and the respondent is that the respondent between the respondent to a 24-hour facility designation and the recommend whether the respondent between the respondent for custody, examination and present the respondent for custody, examination and the respondent for custody, examined whether the respondent between the respondent for custody, examined between the respondent for custody for the present the respondent for custody fo	e in the originating cour int IS mentally ill and a irson's home in the orig int IS mentally ill and a atted by the State for the id treatment pending a ent IS a substance abuse taken to a 24-hour fac acility designated by the	ty and release him/r proper subject for ou- inating county and re proper subject for inp e custody and treatme district court hearing ser and subject to inv illity or released, and e State for the custod	ner. tipatient commitment, elease him/her. batient commitment, to ent of involuntary clie oluntary commitment then you shall either dy and treatment of in	, then you shall t then you shall tra ents and present t, the examiner r release him/her	take the ansport the the must or
This Order is valid throughout the State. If the of issuance.	respondent is taken in	to custody, this Orde	r is valid for seven (7	') days from the	date and time
	III RETURN OF A. CUSTODY CE				
Respondent WAS NOT taken into cust I certify that this Order was received ar Date Respondent Taken Into Custody	, ,		istody as follows:		
				AM	PM
Name Of Law Enforcement Officer (Type Or Print)		Signature Of Law Enforce	ment Officer		
Name Of Law Enforcement Agency NOTE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER: appropriate box above and return to the Clerk return of service on the reverse. When taking has not committed a crime, but is being transp	of Superior Court imme respondent into custo	ediately. If responde dy you must inform h	nt is served and take im or her that he or s	en into custody, o she is not under a	complete
Origin	nal-File Copy-24-Hour Facilit	ty Copy-Special Counsel (Over)	Copy-Attorney General		

	B. PATIENT DELIVERY TO	FIRST EXAMINAT	ION SITE			
The respondent was presented	to an authorized examiner as sl	hown below:				
Date Presented	Time AM PM	Name Of Examiner (Type	Or Print)			
Name Of Examining Facility		County Of Examining Fac	ility			
Name Of Law Enforcement Officer (Type Or I	Print)	Signature Of Law Enforce	ment Officer			
Name Of Law Enforcement Agency		Badge No. Of Officer				
C. FOR USE WHEN TRANSPORTING AFTER FIRST EXAMINATION: PATIENT RELEASED OR DELIVERED TO 24-HOUR FACILITY						
or meets the criteria for sub regular residence or the ho	e respondent does not meet the con ostance abuse commitment and sho me of a consenting person and <u>rele</u>	nmitment criteria, or ould be released pen ased respondent fro	meets the criteria for outpa ding a hearing. I returned r <u>m custody</u> .	espondent to his/her		
substance abuse commitme	e respondent is mentally ill and mee ent and should be held pending a dis ty named below for observation and	strict court hearing.				
Name Of 24-Hour Facility			County Of 24-Hour Facility			
recommended inpatient cor examination, an examiner of	ly detained under appropriate super mmitment and a 24-hour facility was determined that the respondent no le eturned the respondent to his/her re	s not immediately ava onger meets inpatier	ailable or medically appropr nt commitment criteria or m	iate. Upon further eets the criteria for		
Date Delivered	Time Delivered	Name Of Examiner (Type	or Print)			
Name Of Examining Facility		County Of Examining Fac	ility			
Name Of Law Enforcement Officer (Type Or H	Print)	Signature Of Law Enforce	ement Officer			
Name Of Law Enforcement Agency		Badge No. Of Officer				
NOTE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT written report (Form No. DMH 5-72 issued (See top of reverse side).	OFFICER: Upon completing this se 2-01) to the Clerk of Superior Court	ection, immediately r of the county where	eturn this form and a copy the petition was filed and th	of the examiner's he custody order		

	County	In T	he General Court Of Justice			
			District Court Division			
IN THE MATTE Name And Address Of Respondent	IN THE MATTER OF: arme And Address Of Respondent		CUSTODY ORDER RY COMMITMENT WHO HAS EXAMINED RESPONDENT)			
Social Security No. Of Respondent	Date Of Birth	Drivers License No. Of Respondent	G.S. 122C-252, -261, -263, -281, -283 State			
		FINDINGS				
The Court finds from the petition in the true and that the respondent is probable (<i>Check all that apply</i>) 1. mentally ill and dangerous to see In addition to being mentally 261(b) and (d) for special in	oly: elf or others. / ill, the respondent probab	ly is also mentally retarded. (If this				
2. a substance abuser and dange						
	II.CUS	STODY ORDER				
TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFI The Court ORDERS you to take the a transport the respondent directly to a present the respondent for custody, ex	bove named respondent ir 24-hour facility designated	by the State for the custody and tre				
Date Time AM	Signature PM		Deputy CSC CSC Assistant CSC Magistrate			
This Order is valid throughout the State of issuance.	e. If the respondent is take	en into custody, this Order is valid fo	r seven (7) days from the date and tim			
		JRN OF SERVICE DY CERTIFICATION				
Respondent WAS NOT taken i						
I certify that this Order was rec	eived and the responder	nt served and taken into custody	as follows:			
Date Respondent Taken Into Custody		Time	AM PM			
lame Of Law Enforcement Officer (Type Or Print)		Signature Of Law Enforcement Officer				
		Badge No. Of Officer				
Name Of Law Enforcement Agency		Dauge No. Of Onicer				

Original-File Copy-24-Hour Facility Copy-Special Counsel Copy-Attorney General

(Over)

HOUR FACILITY NOT IMMED	IATELY AVAILABLE OR MEDICALLY APPROPRIATE
	e. The respondent is being temporarily detained under appropriate
Time AM PM	Name Of Examiner (Type Or Print)
I	County Of Examining Facility
Print)	Signature Of Law Enforcement Officer
	Badge No. Of Officer
IEN RESPONDENT RELEASE	D BEFORE TRANSPORT TO 24-HOUR FACILITY
commitment and a 24-hour facility ned that the respondent no longer d the respondent to his/her regular	at the site of first examination because the first examiner (petitioning was not immediately available or medically appropriate. Upon further meets the inpatient commitment criteria or meets the criteria for residence or the home of a consenting person and released
Time Delivered	Name Of Examiner (Type Or Print)
	County Of Examining Facility
Print)	Signature Of Law Enforcement Officer
	Badge No. Of Officer
lerk of Superior Court of the county	section, immediately return this form and the examiner's written report where the petition was filed and the custody order issued (See top of
	Time Delivered
	County Of 24-Hour Facility
Print)	Signature Of Law Enforcement Officer
	Badge No. Of Officer
	section, immediately return this form to the Clerk of Superior Court of (See top of reverse side).
	y available or medically appropriate elow. Time AM Print) IEN RESPONDENT RELEASE Print) IEN RESPONDENT RELEASE ined under appropriate supervision commitment and a 24-hour facility of the respondent no longer of the respondent to his/her regular Time Delivered Print) Print) COFFICER: Upon completing this and the custody of the county D. PATIENT DELIVE placed him/her in the custody of the custody o

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA Department of Health and Human Services Division of Mental Health. Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services

County		Topinental Disabilities, and	Substance		1005		File #
County		EXAMINATION AND RE	COMME	NDATION	JTO		ГПС #
Client Record #		DETERMIN			10		Film#
NECESSITY FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT							
Name of Respondent:	1		Age	-	Sex	Race	M.S.
			1.8		Sen	1000	
Address (Street, Box Number	er, C	tity, State, Zip (use facility a	ddress after	r 1 year in	Cour	nty:	
facility):					Phon	Phone:	
					1 1101	U.	
Legally Responsible Person		Next of Kin (Name and Ad	dress)		Relat	tionship	:
					Phon	0.	
					1 1101	U.	
Petitioner (Name and address	s)				Relat	tionship	:
					Phon	e	
make an informed decision concer and (2) dangerousness to himself this examination. For telemedicine via telemedicine were the same as a face to face evaluation. (*Statuto	or o e eva s if I l	thers as defined in G.S. 122C-3 (aluations only: □ I certify to a rea nad been personally present with t	11*). The foll asonable deg	owing finding ree of medica	s and rec al certainty	ommenda / that the	ations are made based on results of the examination
		SECTION I - CRITERIA	FOR COMN	IITMENT			
Inpatient. It is my opinion that the re (1 st Exam – Physician or Psychologie) (2 nd Exam – Physician only)		dent is:	ing mentally i			đ	
Outpatient . It is my opinion that: (Physician or Psychologist)		the respondent is mentally ill the respondent is capable of survivin based upon the respondent's treatment to prevent further disability or deter as defined by G.S. 122C-3 (11*) the respondent's current mental stat ability to make an informed decision recommended treatment none of above	ent history, the ioration which us or the nature	respondent is i would predictate of his illness	in need of t ably result limits or no	reatment i in dangero egates his/	n order busness
Substance Abuse. It is my opinion the (1 st Exam – Physician or Psychologie exam done by Physician, 2 nd exam results of the exam from the physician and the exam from	ist; 2	nd Exam – If 1 st	_ 0	ce abuser us to himself or the above	r others		
		SECTION II – DESCRU	DTION OF FI	NDINCS			

Clear description of findings (findings for each criterion checked above in Section I must be described):

Impression/Diagnosis:

SECTION III - RECOMMENDATION FOR DISPOSITION

LME notified of appointment: (Name of LME and date)_

Substance Abuse Commitment (respondent must meet both criteria outlined in Section I, Substance Abuse)

Release respondent pending hearing - Referred to:

□ Hold respondent at 24-hour facility pending hearing – Facility:

Respondent does not meet the criteria for commitment but custody order states that the respondent was charged with a violent crime, including a crime involving assault with a deadly weapon, and that he was found not guilty by reason of insanity or incapable of proceeding: therefore, the respondent will not be released until so ordered following the court hearing.
 Respondent or Legally Responsible Person Consented to Voluntary Treatment

Respondent of Legally Responsible Person Conserted to Voluntary Treatment

Release Respondent and Terminate Proceedings (insufficient findings to indicate that respondent meets commitment criteria)
 Respondent was held 7 days from issuance of custody order but continues to meet commitment criteria. A new petition will be filed.

Other (Specify)

M.D. Physician Signature	This is to certify that this is a true and exact copy of the Examination and Recommendation for Involuntary Commitment
Signature/Title – Eligible Psychologist/Qualified Professional	Original Signature – Record Custodian
Print Name of Examiner	Title
Address or Facility	Address or Facility
City and State	Date
Telephone Number	NOTE: Only copies to be introduced as evidence need to be certified

CC: Clerk of Superior Court where petition was initiated (initial hearing only)

Clerk of Superior Court where 24-hour facility is located or where outpatient treatment is supervised

Respondent or Respondent's Attorney and State's Attorneys, when applicable

Proposed Outpatient Treatment Center or Physician (Outpatient Commitment); Area Program / Physician (Substance Abuse Commitment) NOTE: If it cannot be reasonably anticipated that the clerk will receive the copies within 48 hours of the time that it was signed, the physician or eligible psychologist/qualified professional shall communicate his findings to the clerk by telephone.

***STATUTORY DEFINITIONS**

"Dangerous to self". Within the relevant past: (a) the individual has acted in such a way as to show: (1) that he would be unable without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not otherwise available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability of his suffering serious physical debilitation within the near future unless adequate treatment is given. A showing of behavior that is grossly irrational, of actions that the individual is unable to control, of behavior that is grossly inappropriate to the situation, or of other evidence of severely impaired insight and judgment shall create a **prima facie** inference that the individual is unable to care for himself; or (b) the individual has attempted suicide or threatened suicide and that there is a reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate treatment is given; or (c) the individual has mutilated himself or attempted to mutilate himself and that there is a reasonable probability of serious self-mutilation unless adequate treatment is given. NOTE: Previous episodes of dangerousness to self, when applicable, may be considered when determining reasonable probability of physical debilitation, suicide, or self-mutilation.

"Dangerous to others". Within the relevant past, the individual has inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or has acted in such a way as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, or has engaged in extreme destruction of property; and that there is a reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated. Previous episodes of dangerousness to others, when applicable, may be considered when determining reasonable probability of future dangerous conduct.

"Mental illness:. (a) when applied to an adult, an illness which so lessens the capacity of the individual to use self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under treatment, care, supervision, guidance or control; and (b) when applied to a minor, a mental condition, other than mental retardation alone, that so lessens or impairs the youth's capacity to exercise age adequate self-control and judgment in

the conduct of his activities and social relationships so that he is in need of treatment.

"Substance abuser". An individual who engages in the pathological use or abuse of alcohol or other drugs in a way or to a degree that produces an impairment in personal, social, or occupational functioning. Substance abuse may include a pattern of tolerance and withdrawal.



STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA	File No.
County	In The General Court Of Justice Superior Court Division
IN THE MATTER OF: Name And Address Of Respondent	FINDINGS AND ORDER INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT PHYSICIAN-PETITIONER RECOMMENDS OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT G.S. 122C-261
NOTICE: This form is to be used instead of the Findings And C or psychologist who recommends outpatient commitment or released	Custody Order (AOC-SP-302) only when the petitioner is a physician ase pending hearing for a substance abuser.
FINI	DINGS
The petitioner in this case is a physician/eligible psycholog abuse commitment with the respondent being released pe	gist who has recommended outpatient commitment/substance ending hearing.
The Court finds from the petition in the above matter that t in the petition are true and that the respondent is probably	there are reasonable grounds to believe that the facts alleged y:
mentally ill and in need of treatment in order to prever in dangerousness.	nt further disability or deterioration that would predictably result
a substance abuser and dangerous to himself/herself	or others.
OF	RDER
It is ORDERED that a hearing before the district court judg involuntarily committed.	ge be held to determine whether the respondent will be
Date	Signature
	Deputy CSC Assistant CSC Clerk Of Superior Court Magistrate
NOTE TO CLERK: Schedule an initial hearing for the respond the hearing as required by those statutes.	dent pursuant to G.S. 122C-264 or G.S. 122C-284 and give notice of
AOC-SP-305, Rev. 1/98	

SUPPLEMENT TO SUPPORT IMMEDIATE HOSPITALIZATION (To be used in addition to "Examination and Recommendation for Involuntary Commitment, Form 572-01)

CERTIFICATE

The Respondent, _____ requires immediate hospitalization to prevent harm to self or others because:

I certify that based upon my examination of the Respondent, which is attached hereto,

the Respondent is (check all that apply):

- □ Mentally ill and dangerous to self
- □ Mentally ill and dangerous to others
- □ In addition to being mentally ill, is also mentally retarded

Signature	of Physician or Eligible Psychologist
Address:	
Telephone: Date/Time:	
Name of 24-hour facility: Address of 24-hour facility:	
CC: 24-hour facility Clerk of Court in county of 24-hour facility Note: If it cannot be reasonably anticipated that the clerk will receive the copy within 24 hours (excluding Saturday, Sunday and holidays) of the time that it was signed, the physician or eligible psychologist shall also communicate the findings to the clerk by telephone.	NORTH CAROLINA County Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of, 20 (seal) Notary Public Notary Public Dursuant to G.S. 122C-262 (d), this certificate shall serve as the Custody Order and the law enforcement officer or other person shall provide transportation to a 24-hr. facility in accordance with G.S. 122C-251.

TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: See back side for Return of Service

SUPPLEMENT TO EXAMINATION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR INVOLUNTARY

CERTIFICATE TO SUPPORT IMMEDIATE HOSPITALIZATION

RETURN	OF SERVICE						
□ Respondent WAS NOT taken into custody for the following reason:							
□ I certify that this Order was received and served as follows:							
Date Respondent Taken into Custody	Time		□ AM □ PM				
Name of 24-Hour Facility	Date Delivered	Time Delivered AM PM	_				
Name of Transporting Agency	Signature of Law Enfo	brcement Official					

Administration of Justice Bulletin

2007/05 September 2007

THE MAGISTRATE'S ROLE IN INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT

■ Joan G. Brannon

What is Involuntary Civil Commitment?

Involuntary civil commitment is the process that the state, through its courts, uses to order a person who meets certain statutory criteria to obtain mental health treatment. The person ordered to receive treatment is called "the respondent." Civil commitment is involuntary because the respondent is ordered to submit to mental health treatment without his or her consent.

When a respondent is involuntarily committed, the state has substituted its judgment about what is best for the respondent for the respondent's own judgment. This substituted judgment is a significant intrusion on the respondent's right to liberty, as is the involuntary commitment itself. Despite its intrusiveness, the commitment process before 1973 contained very few safeguards to assure that the respondent was not arbitrarily deprived of freedom. Procedural due process was lacking insofar as a person could be committed for twenty days, without notice or a hearing, if a physician certified that the person was mentally ill or inebriate and dangerous to self or others.¹ Substantive due process was lacking in that a respondent could be committed. The respondent did not need to be dangerous to self or others to be committed.² In 1973 the process was changed so that no respondent could be taken into custody without a hearing in which a magistrate found that the respondent was either mentally ill or "inebriate" (later changed to

1. N.C. G.S. § 122-59 (1971). 2. N.C. G.S. § 122-63 (1971).



[•] The author is a faculty member of the School of Government. She wishes to thank the following people who graciously reviewed this Bulletin: her colleague, Mark Botts, Lisa Corbett and Angel Gray of the Attorney General's Office, and the High Point, North Carolina magistrates.

"substance abuser") and dangerous to self or others.³ In 1975 the United States Supreme Court held that a finding of mental illness alone could not justify involuntary commitment. The state must show some dangerousness. "A state cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of a willing and responsible family members or friends."⁴

Parts six, seven and eight of Article 5, Chapter 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes establish the procedures for involuntary commitment. A brief overview of these procedures is set out below.

Description of Commitment Process

The statutory procedure for an involuntary commitment involves some or all of the following stages:

<u>The Petition for Commitment</u>: A person who has knowledge of someone he or she believes needs mental health or substance abuse treatment petitions the magistrate to begin the involuntary commitment process. ⁵ (Petitions may also be presented to the clerk of superior court. Although this bulletin will refer to magistrates only, the same law and procedure applies if the petition is presented to a clerk.) This petition is an affidavit setting out facts intended to show that the respondent meets the statutory criteria for issuing an order (called a custody order) to take the respondent into custody for examination by a physician or eligible psychologist.

<u>Review of the Petition</u>: The magistrate reviews the petition to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to find that the respondent meets the criteria for a custody order.⁶ If the magistrate does not find reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent meets the criteria, the magistrate must decline to issue the order.

<u>Custody Order</u>: If the magistrate does find reasonable grounds to conclude that the respondent meets the criteria for a custody order, the magistrate must issue an order to a law enforcement officer to take the respondent into custody and transport him or her to a local physician or psychologist for an examination.⁷

Examinations: A local physician or eligible psychologist⁸ examines the respondent and if the examiner finds that the respondent does not meet the criteria for commitment, the respondent is released and the process of involuntary commitment ends.⁹ If. however, the examiner finds that the respondent meets the commitment criteria, the examiner must recommend outpatient,¹⁰ inpatient,¹¹ or substance abuse commitment.¹² If outpatient commitment is recommended, the respondent will then be transported to his or her residence (or the residence of a consenting individual) and released pending a district court hearing.¹³ If the examiner recommends inpatient commitment, the respondent must be transported directly to a designated 24-hour facility for a second examination.¹⁴ This examiner has the same options as the first examiner: if he or she finds that the respondent meets none of the commitment criteria, the respondent will be released; if the

7. Id.

8. Eligible psychologist means a licensed psychologist who holds permanent licensure and certification as a health services provider psychologist issued by the North Carolina Psychology Board. G.S. 122C-3(13d).

9. G.S. 122C-263(d)(3), -283(d)(2).

10. Outpatient commitment means treatment in an outpatient setting and may include medication, individual or group therapy, day or partial day programming activities, services and training including educational and vocational activities, supervision or living arrangements, and any other services prescribed either to alleviate the individual's illness or disability, maintain semi-independent functioning, or to prevent further deterioration that may reasonably be predicted to result in the need for inpatient commitment to a 24-hour facility. G.S. 122C-3(27).

11. Inpatient commitment involves holding the respondent in the custody of a facility the state has designated "24-hour" facilities. A "24-hour facility" is one whose primary purpose is to provide services for the care and treatment of persons who are mentally ill or substance abusers and provides a structured living environment and services for a period of 24 consecutive hours or more. G.S. 122C-3(14)g. Such facilities include state operated psychiatric hospitals, public and private psychiatric and substance abuse hospitals, and general hospitals with inpatient psychiatric or substance abuse services.

12. G.S. 122C-283(d). Substance abuse commitment may result in either outpatient or inpatient treatment.

^{3.} N.C. G.S. §§ 122-58.1, -58.3 (1973). See In re Hayes, 18 N.C. App. 560, 197 S.E.2d 582 (1973) in which the court held the former statutory procedure unconstitutional.

^{4.} O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576, 95
S.Ct. 2486, 2494, 45 L.Ed.2d 396, 407 (1975).
5. G.S. 122C-261(a), -281(a).
6. G.S. 122C-261(b), -281(b).

^{13.} G.S. 122C-263(d)(1), 122C-283(d)(1).

^{14.} G.S. 122C-263(d)(2), 122C-283(d)(1). See supra note 11 for a definition of 24-hour facility.

respondent meets the criteria for outpatient commitment, the respondent will be released pending a district court hearing; if the respondent meets the inpatient commitment criteria, he or she will be held at the hospital pending a hearing before the district court.¹⁵

<u>District Court Hearing</u>: A respondent who is recommended for either outpatient or inpatient commitment is entitled to a hearing in district court. This hearing must occur within 10 days of the date the respondent is taken into custody by order of the magistrate.¹⁶ At the hearing, if the court is persuaded by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the respondent meets the commitment criteria, it will order involuntary commitment.¹⁷

The magistrate's role in the involuntary commitment process is a small but important one. Magistrates decide whether to issue orders to take respondents into custody for examination. Magistrates do not actually commit anyone; district court judges determine whether to commit. The role of the magistrate as an independent and neutral judicial official determining whether to initiate the process for involuntary commitment is a safeguard to provide due process to a person before depriving that person of liberty as required by the United States Constitution.¹⁸

The rest of this bulletin will focus on the magistrate's role in the process that potentially leads to involuntary commitment.

Criteria For Issuing A Custody Order

When a person (called the petitioner) appears before a magistrate to initiate the process of involuntary commitment, the magistrate must determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent meets the statutory criteria for issuing a custody order. Reasonable grounds exist when, taking into consideration all the relevant information, a reasonable person would conclude that there is a fair likelihood that the respondent meets the criteria for a custody order. The "reasonable grounds"

17. G.S. 122C-267(h) (outpatient commitment), - 268(j) (inpatient commitment); 122C-286(h) (substance abuse commitment).

standard is synonymous with the probable cause standard that magistrates use in issuing warrants.¹⁹

There are three situations in which a magistrate can issue a custody order:

- 1. The respondent is mentally ill and dangerous to self or others.
- 2. The respondent is mentally ill and needs court-ordered treatment to prevent further disability or deterioration that would predictably lead to dangerousness.
- 3. The respondent is a substance abuser and dangerous to self or others.²⁰

The first standard, mentally ill and dangerous, is the most complicated of the standards.

Mentally III and Dangerous to Self or Others

Under this standard the magistrate must draw two conclusions from the facts presented before issuing a custody order: first, that the respondent is probably mentally ill; and next, that the respondent is probably dangerous to self or dangerous to others.²¹

Mentally Ill

An adult respondent is mentally ill when his or her capacity to use self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his or her affairs and social relations has been so reduced by an illness that it becomes necessary or advisable for the respondent to be under treatment, care, supervision, guidance, or control.²² A minor respondent is mentally ill when he or she has a mental condition, other than mental retardation alone, that so impairs his or her capacity to exercise age adequate self-control or judgment in the conduct of activities and social relationships that he or she needs treatment.²³ In both cases, the important features of mental illness are: (1) an illness (2) that impairs judgment and self-control and (3) makes treatment advisable. This is a legal standard, not a medical standard, and therefore does not require that the respondent have been diagnosed with a recognized mental illness by a physician or psychologist. Rather,

21. G.S. 122C-261(b). 22. G.S. 122C-3(21)(i). 23. G.S. 122C-3(21)(ii).

^{15.} G.S. 122C-266(a), 122C-285(a).

^{16.} G.S. 122C-267(a), 268(a), -286(a).

^{18.} See In re Reed, 39 N.C. App. 227, 249 S.E.2d 864 (1978).

^{19.} Id. at 229, 249 S.E.2d at 866.

^{20.} A summary of the standards for involuntary commitment is found at Appendix I at the end of this bulletin.

the magistrate must listen for facts that show that the respondent needs treatment because of a mental condition that is impairing his or her ability to make judgments or exercise self-control.

In determining whether there are reasonable grounds to find that the respondent is mentally ill, a magistrate should look for conduct that is on the extreme ends of behaviors. Of course every person can, at times, engage in behavior that might be called extreme: a person can be so hostile that he slams the door in someone's face or so agitated that she drives off from the store with the grocery bags on top of her car. But in a respondent who is mentally ill, this behavior should go one step further: hostility may be taken to the point of attacking someone or anxiety may be manifested by a complete inability to carry on with the other functions of daily life. Also the extreme behavior is continuing rather than a one-time occurrence. The magistrate must examine the information provided about the respondent's behavior, movements, speech, motions and thoughts. For example, is the respondent seeing things that are not really there? Is the respondent in constant motion or is he totally quiet and apathetic? Appendix II at the end of this bulletin gives examples of the kinds of extreme behaviors that might indicate mental illness.

If a magistrate determines that the respondent is probably mentally ill, the next step is to determine whether the respondent is probably dangerous to self or others.

Dangerous to Self

A petitioner can show that the respondent is dangerous to self in three different ways: Respondent is unable to care for himself or herself, is suicidal, or has engaged in self-mutilation.

Respondent is unable to care for self

The first way of proving dangerousness is by showing that, within the relevant past, the respondent has been unable to care for himself or herself and as a result is likely to suffer serious physical debilitation in the near future if treatment is not given.²⁴ Magistrates should note that although the appellate cases cited in this bulletin are instructive, they are based on evidence presented at the district court hearing where the standard of proof—clear, cogent, and convincing evidence—is significantly higher than the reasonable grounds determination that the magistrate must make. The requirement that the behavior have occurred within the "relevant past" does not mean that the behavior must have occurred within the "recent past." There is no specific time within which the past behavior must have occurred to be relevant. (The concept of "relevant past" is discussed more thoroughly below at page 7.)

The test for finding that the respondent is unable to care for self has two prongs and both must be satisfied before issuing a custody order. First, the magistrate must determine that the respondent has acted in such a way as to show that he or she probably would be unable, without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not otherwise available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy the need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety. Put more simply, the first prong requires the magistrate to find that the respondent probably would be unable to care for himself or herself in regard to daily affairs without treatment. For example, a respondent, who required anti-psychotic medication but refused to take it, would not eat properly, and refused recommended outpatient treatment was found dangerous to himself. Failure to care for medical, dietary, and grooming needs meets the test of dangerousness to self, the court said.²⁵ On the other hand, unusual eating habits alone may not show dangerousness to self. The North Carolina Court of Appeals was hesitant to find that a respondent who fasted for a time, then ate a whole chicken or loaf of bread, and also ate about five pounds of sugar every two days was dangerous to himself.26

If the respondent seems unable to care for his or her daily needs, the magistrate must go on to make a second, more specific, finding that this inability to care for self creates a probability that the respondent will suffer serious physical debilitation within the near future. In the example above, where the respondent's dietary habits were irregular, the court noted that it could not find a likelihood of serious debilitation because the state had presented no evidence of the effect of the irregular diet on the respondent, or any evidence on how long he had been eating that way.²⁷ The result might have been different if the respondent was diabetic. On the other

27. Id. at 29, 270 S.E.2d at 540.

^{24.} G.S. 122C-3(11)a.1.

^{25.} In re Lowery, 110 N.C. App. 67, 428 S.E.2d 861 (1993).

^{26.} In re Monroe, 49 N.C. App. 23, 270 S.E.2d 537 (1980). The decision was an appeal from the district court's commitment so the standard of proof that was not met was clear, cogent and convincing rather than the magistrate's standard of reasonable grounds.

hand, where a petitioner presented evidence that the respondent had been living in her car for two weeks during the winter, had been unemployed for the last year, having left her job because she felt she was being harassed, and had no plans for earning income, and that her only means of subsistence was food brought by the petitioner, the court found that the respondent was at risk of serious physical debilitation.²⁸ In determining the reasonable probability of future dangerous conduct, the magistrate may consider previous episodes of dangerousness to self.²⁹

If the petitioner presents evidence that the respondent's behavior is grossly irrational, that the respondent is unable to control his or her actions, that the respondent's behavior is grossly inappropriate to the situation, or that the respondent's insight and judgment are severely impaired, the magistrate may presume that the respondent probably meets this second prong.³⁰

To summarize, a magistrate may find a respondent dangerous to self if the respondent seems unable to take care of his or her daily needs and is likely to suffer serious physical debilitation in the near future if he or she does not receive treatment. However, the respondent cannot be found dangerous to self merely because he or she behaves in a way that may provoke others to harm him or her. For example, a respondent who was not physically violent herself, but who aggressively preached on the street corner, trying to convert all passersby, was not dangerous to herself merely because someone who reacted negatively to her conversion attempt might react in a way that is physically harmful to her.³¹

Respondent is suicidal

A respondent also can be dangerous to self if he or she has attempted or threatened suicide and there is a reasonable probability of suicide unless the respondent receives adequate treatment.³² The magistrate may choose to treat an attempt at suicide, alone, as sufficient evidence that there is a reasonable probability of suicide. The magistrate also may treat a threat of suicide as grounds for issuing a custody order and leave the determination of whether there is a future likelihood of suicide to the examiners. Whether a statement constitutes a threat of suicide will depend on the respondent's history and the context in which the statement was made: for example, a statement like "I could kill myself" probably is not a threat of suicide when it comes from a person who has just done something enormously embarrassing, but it may be when it comes from someone who has suffered a dramatic loss of some kind.

Respondent has engaged in self-mutilation

The third way to show a respondent is dangerous to self is to prove that he or she has mutilated or attempted to mutilate himself or herself and that serious mutilation is likely to occur again unless the respondent is committed.³³ No North Carolina appellate cases have discussed this ground for commitment. Self-harm or self-injurious behavior is fairly prevalent today, ³⁴ particularly among adolescents and may include burning, biting, cutting, head banging, picking at skin, pulling out hair, bruising. But some self-harm, while needing treatment, does not rise to the level of self-mutilation necessary for involuntary commitment, and the magistrate must be careful to distinguish between the two. The involuntary commitment statute requires that the magistrate find that serious self-mutilation is likely to occur unless the respondent is committed. Therefore, the frequency and the severity or seriousness of the injury is critical. The magistrate should also look at other factors such as the reason for the self-harm, whether the respondent has access to weapons to do serious harm, and the progression of seriousness of the injuries. One case from another state in which the facts showed dangerousness to self based on self-mutilative behavior indicated that the patient had a history of cutting himself, injuring

34. About one percent of the United States population uses physical self-injury as a way of dealing with overwhelming feelings or situations, but the problem is more prevalent among teenagers where an estimated ten percent have experimented with self-mutilation. Teenagers and Self Mutilation: The Facts, http://www.psychiatricdisorders.com/warning-signs/self-mutilation.php. A recent study published in the August 2007 issue of the journal, Psychological Medicine, indicated 46% of U.S. high school students surveyed had practiced some form of selfmutilation in the past year. David Andreatta, Self-injury Might Be More Common Than Thought, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, July 2, 2007 at A3.

^{28.} In re Medlin, 59 N.C. App. 33, 295 S.E.2d 604 (1982). The finding that the respondent was mentally ill was not disputed.

^{29.} G.S 122C-3(11)a.

^{30.} G.S. 122C-3(11)a.1.II.

^{31.} In re Hogan, 32 N.C. App. 429, 232 S.E.2d 492

^{(1977).}

^{32.} G.S. 122C-3(11)a.2.

^{33.} G.S. 122C-3(11)a.3.

himself very seriously to the point that he required blood transfusions.³⁵

Dangerous to Others

A magistrate must also issue a custody order for a mentally ill respondent if he or she is dangerous to others. A respondent is dangerous to others if, within the relevant past, he or she has: (1) inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or has acted in a way that creates a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, or has engaged in extreme destruction of property, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated.³⁶

Respondent has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another

Most cases coming before a magistrate probably will be fairly clear cut as to whether the respondent inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another person. But what if the respondent has only threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another? Is the threat a sufficient basis for finding that the respondent is dangerous to others? Courts addressing the issue have concluded that overt dangerous actions are not necessary to conclude that a respondent is dangerous to others. For example, a respondent who threatened his aged and nervous mother and family with increasing frequency over several weeks, saying he was going to "get you all," in conjunction with evidence that he believed his family had sexually seduced him and that he appeared ready to fight any time one of them said something to him, led the court to conclude that the respondent was dangerous to others.³⁷ In another case, a respondent was found dangerous to others based on evidence that he kept an iron pipe and hatchet under his bed and, through threats, had kept his mother in one chair, unmoving, while he screamed, shouted, cursed, and threatened to "bust" her head if she called anybody.³⁸ A respondent who had threatened many people in the neighborhood and had threatened to cut her brother's throat was found dangerous to others.³⁹

In order to find a respondent dangerous to others on the basis of threats alone, however, the petitioner must present specific evidence about the kind of harm the respondent threatened, when the threats were made, and in what context. For example, the mere allegation that the "respondent ha[d] made statements to her husband of a threatening nature," without more, is insufficient.⁴⁰

One issue that sometimes troubles magistrates is commitment of persons who are residing in nursing homes. For example, a resident of the nursing home who suffers from dementia or bipolar disorder becomes violent and attacks another resident of the nursing home and the nursing home staff seeks to have the resident involuntarily committed. The fact that the respondent is in a nursing home or the fact that the respondent suffers from dementia should not result in any different decision by the magistrate. If the magistrate finds reasonable grounds to believe the respondent is mentally ill (i.e., has an illness-and dementia and Alzheimer's disease are mental illnesses--that impairs judgment and self-control and makes treatment advisable) and is dangerous to self or others, the magistrate should issue a custody order.

Respondent's behavior creates a substantial risk of serious harm

There are no reported North Carolina cases that have addressed a respondent whose actions, though not intended to inflict serious bodily harm on another, have nonetheless created a substantial risk of serious harm. Some situations, of course, will be clear cut: if the respondent, while playing with matches, sets fire to an occupied twenty-unit apartment building in the middle of the night, the respondent's behavior creates a substantial risk of serious harm. Other cases will require a judgment call: if the respondent has a habit of digging man-sized holes in a field near his house, whether or not such conduct creates a substantial risk of serious harm depends on the depth of the holes, the amount of pedestrian traffic in the field, and the visibility of the holes to pedestrians who do walk in the field. If the field sees significant pedestrian traffic, and the respondent artfully covers the holes

^{35.} In re Best Interest of M.G. 2002 WL 31854887 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002)

^{36.} G.S. 122C-3(11)(b).

^{37.} In re Monroe, 49 N.C. App. 23, 270 S.E.2d 537 (1980).

^{38.} In re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 271 S.E.2d 72 (1980).

^{39.} In re Jackson, 60 N.C. App. 581, 299 S.E.2d 677 (1983). This respondent had also cut her brother's hand within the last week, but the court did not discuss the seriousness of this cut or its role in the determination that she was dangerous to others.

^{40.} In re Holt, 54 N.C. App. 352, 354, 283 S.E.2d 413, 415 (1981).

with grass, the holes may create a substantial risk, but if the holes are only two inches deep, they may not create a risk of serious physical harm.

Respondent has engaged in extreme destruction of property

The one reported case in North Carolina dealing with dangerousness to others based on engaging in extreme destruction of property emphasized the "extreme" requirement. In that case the respondent had used a hammer to break everything she could find in her house, including the television, the telephone, and all available glass.⁴¹

Reasonable probability of dangerous behavior being repeated

Unlike the second prong of the dangerousness to self test, the second prong of the dangerousness to others test—a reasonable probability that the dangerous behavior will be repeated—has not been emphasized in court cases. The statute provides that the magistrate may consider previous episodes of dangerous behavior in determining future probability of dangerous conduct.⁴² Therefore, as long as the magistrate finds past acts of dangerousness this prong is satisfied.

Within the relevant past

The tests for dangerousness to self and others share the requirement that the respondent's allegedly dangerous behavior has occurred within the relevant past. This requirement is no different than the requirement of relevance in evidence law, generally. That is, any information that tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less likely is relevant.⁴³ In the context of involuntary commitment, the respondent's behavior occurred within the relevant past if the behavior makes it more or less likely that the respondent is dangerous to self or others at the time commitment is considered. "[The] acts are relevant because they occurred close enough in time to the district court [or magistrate's] hearing to have probative value on the ultimate question before the court of whether there was a 'reasonable probability that such [violent] conduct [would] be

41. In re Williamson, 36 N.C. App. 362, 244 S.E.2d 189 (1978). There was also evidence that the respondent threatened to physically injure family members.

repeated.³³⁴ So, for example, if the petitioner presents information that the mentally ill respondent, now thirty years old, went through a period when she was ten where she would only eat dirt, the behavior probably did not occur within the relevant past.

The concept of within the relevant past does not depend solely on the passage of time, however, but on the totality of the circumstances as the petitioner presents them. For example, the petitioner presents evidence that the mentally ill respondent tried to kill his brother three years ago after refusing to take medication prescribed for his mental illness. This information may seem remote in time. However, if the petitioner supplements this evidence with the information that the mentally ill respondent has once again stopped taking his prescription medication and is exhibiting symptoms similar to those that preceded the three-year-old incident, that three-year-old evidence may have occurred within the relevant past. Although most information the magistrate hears will probably not be this remote, the important thing to remember is that there is no bright-line in time beyond which information is no longer relevant. In fact, one of the problems the General Assembly wanted to cure in changing the language of the standard from "within the recent past" to "within the relevant past" was the practice of some judicial officials of setting a specific limit on the time frame for the conduct.⁴⁵

Summary

The magistrate must issue a custody order when he or she finds reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent is probably mentally ill and dangerous to self or others.

- Mental illness has three elements:
- (1) an illness
- (2) that impairs judgment and self-control
- (3) to a degree that makes treatment or supervision advisable.

A respondent is dangerousness to self if he or she:

- (1) is unable to care for self and there is a reasonable probability of serious physical debilitation in the near future or
- (2) has attempted or threatened suicide and there is a reasonable probability of suicide or

^{42.} G.S. 122C-3(11)b.

^{43.} G.S. 8C-1, Rule 401.

^{44.} Davis v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 121 N.C. App. 105, 115, 465 S.E.2d, 2, 8 (1995)

^{45.} See Joan Brannon "Mental Health," NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1989 at 127 (Institute of Government 1990).

- (3) has mutilated, or attempted to mutilate, himself or herself and there is a reasonable probability of serious self-mutilation.
- A respondent is dangerous to others if
 - (1) he or she has:
 - (a) inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another or
 - (b) acted in a way that creates a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another or
 - (c) engaged in extreme destruction of property and
 - (2) there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated.

Mentally III and in Need of Treatment

Even if a mentally ill respondent is not dangerous to self or others, a magistrate still must issue a custody order if the respondent, based on his or her psychiatric history, is in need of treatment to prevent further disability or deterioration that would predictably lead to dangerousness.⁴⁶ Mental illness in this context means the same thing as mental illness in the inpatient commitment context: (1) an illness (2) that impairs judgment and self-control (3) to the extent that treatment or supervision is advisable. Although this standard (unlike the mentally ill and dangerous to self or others standard) does not specifically require the petitioner to show that within the relevant past the respondent has engaged in, attempted, or threatened to engage in conduct that is dangerous to self or others, such evidence seems necessary to show a psychiatric history indicating that deterioration leading to dangerousness is likely. That is, psychiatric history that would make dangerous deterioration predictable is bound to be a history of past instances in which the respondent did become dangerous. For example, if the petitioner presents evidence that the respondent has stopped taking her antipsychotic medication and states that the lack of medication will make the respondent dangerous, this statement alone probably is not sufficient grounds to issue a custody order: it should be supported by information that when the respondent has gone off her medication in the past she has done, attempted, or threatened to do, something dangerous.

Involuntary Commitment of Mentally Retarded Respondents

Special rules apply in issuing custody orders for mentally ill persons who are also mentally retarded. A mentally retarded respondent may be involuntarily committed only if he or she meets one of the standards set out above; that is, the respondent must be mentally ill and dangerous to self or others or must be mentally ill and in need of treatment to prevent deterioration that would predictably lead to dangerousness.⁴⁷ It is often difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the dangerous behavior is caused by the mental retardation or mental illness. If the magistrate finds reasonable grounds to believe the respondent is mentally ill as well as mentally retarded and if the magistrate finds dangerousness to self or others, the magistrate should issue the commitment order and leave it to the professionals to determine whether involuntary commitment is appropriate for the respondent.

Moreover, a mentally retarded person cannot be admitted to a state psychiatric hospital unless the respondent is so extremely dangerous as to pose a serious threat to the community and to other patients in a non-state hospital or is so gravely disabled by both multiple disorders and medical fragility or deafness that alternative care is inappropriate. In both of those situations the determination of whether the respondent meets the criteria for commitment to a state psychiatric hospital is made by the Local Management Entity for the area where the respondent resides or is found.⁴⁸ If a respondent is mentally retarded, the petitioner must produce facts indicating this on the petition, and the magistrate must specifically note it on the custody order.

"Mental retardation" is defined as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before age 22."⁴⁹ Making such a diagnosis is beyond the knowledge of lay petitioners and magistrates alike and should be left to the professional examiner. However, the petition must

48. G.S. 122C-261(f). 49. G.S. 122C-3(22) (1996).

^{46.} G.S. 122C-261(b).

^{47.} G.S. 122C-261(b). In Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 699 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D.N.C. 1988) a federal district court held that North Carolina was inappropriately confining and treating mentally ill retarded persons in the state psychiatric hospitals and ordered the state to provide a full range of habilitative treatment for mentally retarded persons confined in state psychiatric hospitals. The requirement limiting admission to state hospitals was enacted in 1995 in response to that case. See Joan Brannon, 1996 Legislation Amending the Involuntary Commitment and Domestic Violence Laws, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM No. 96/04 at 1.

include facts indicating mental retardation. Four questions can help a magistrate determine whether the respondent is probably mentally retarded:

- (1) Has a doctor or psychologist ever said that the respondent has mental retardation?
- (2) Has the respondent ever been in special education classes for students with mental retardation?
- (3) Has the respondent ever received special services for respondents with mental retardation such as sheltered workshops or group home placement?
- (4) Did the problems relating to intelligence and functioning begin before age 22?

In order to find the respondent mentally retarded, the answer to the fourth question must be "yes" and at least one of the other three questions must also be answered in the affirmative.⁵⁰

The special provisions regarding mentally retarded persons do not apply to substance abuse commitments.

Substance Abuse Commitment

Magistrates may also be asked to issue custody orders for respondents who are substance abusers. The standard for issuing a custody order in these circumstances is: (1) the respondent is a substance abuser who is (2) dangerous to self or others.⁵¹ Substance abuse means the pathological use or abuse of alcohol or other drugs in a way, or to a degree, that produces an impairment in personal, social, or occupational functioning; it may include a pattern of tolerance and withdrawal.⁵² The use does not need to have occurred over any certain length of time or in any certain amount. To be pathological the use need only be habitual or compulsive and have a negative impact on the respondent's functioning. Such functional impairment might mean, for example, that the respondent misses important meetings at work because of alcohol or drugs, verbally abuses friends and family members when drunk, or suffers delusions when she has gone too long without drugs or alcohol.

A magistrate who finds that the respondent is probably a substance abuser and is dangerous to self or others must issue a custody order. The standard for assessing danger to self or others is the same as described under the standard for inpatient commitment of persons with mental illness.

Procedure for Initiating Involuntary Commitment

To begin the process of involuntary commitment a person must petition for an order (the custody order) to have the respondent picked up for examination by a physician. Petitioning for a custody order differs in several significant ways from the usual small claims court procedure. First of all, the procedure is not a trial; it is merely a mechanism to have the respondent taken into custody for examination. Petitioning for a custody order is an ex parte hearing: that is, the hearing takes place without notice to, or the presence of, the opposing party-in this case, the respondent. The respondent normally is not present, but even if respondent is present, the usual procedure for presentation of evidence is not followed. The respondent is not part of the process and does not present evidence in his or her favor or get to cross examine the petitioner or petitioner's witnesses. Also, two fundamental rules of evidence are not followed in petitioning for involuntary commitment. First, the petitioner is deemed a competent witness even in cases where he or she has no personal, firsthand, knowledge of the respondent's state. This departure from the rules of evidence leads to the second, which is that a petitioner can prove his or her case, and the respondent may be taken into custody and transported for examination, entirely on the basis of hearsay evidence.⁵³ In this last respect, hearing a petition for a custody order is like the probable cause determination in issuing criminal process.

Who may initiate a petition?

Anyone with information about the respondent may petition for a custody order.^{.54} The respondent's family members or friends, neighbors, social workers, teachers, physicians or law enforcement officers can all be petitioners. The petitioner's knowledge of the respondent's condition does not have to be firsthand; hearsay information about the respondent is acceptable. For example, a law enforcement officer may petition for a custody order on the basis of information told to him or her by the respondent's neighbor, or a respondent's sister may petition based on information from the respondent's mother. In this respect, the petition resembles an application for a warrant: hearsay evidence can be considered, but at the trial of the matter before a

^{50.} Brannon, supra note 47 at 2-3.

^{51.} G.S. 122C-281.

^{52.} G.S. 122C-3(36). Unlike the definition of mental illness, this definition is a medical one.

^{53.} In re Zollicoffer, 165 N.C. App. 462, 598 S.E.2d 696 (2004).

^{54.} G.S. 122C-261(a), -281(a).

district court, the witness must have personal knowledge of the facts about which he or she is testifying.

Who is subject to a custody order?

Any person may be subject to a custody order (assuming the petitioner presents sufficient evidence), no matter his or her age. Involuntary commitment of minor children may occur less frequently than of adults because parents (or guardians) are given the power to consent to treatment for their minor children and can have them admitted to treatment without showing dangerousness. Involuntary commitment thus generally occurs only when a child's parents do not consent to treatment, the parents cannot be found, or because of the child's dangerousness, the parents believe it is best to involuntarily commit the child. However, if the petitioner presents sufficient facts to commit a minor, the magistrate cannot refuse to issue a custody order for a minor simply because the parent could seek a voluntary admission.

Where is the petition initiated?

Petitions may be made to a magistrate in the county where the respondent lives or in the county where the respondent is found.⁵⁵ For example, if a resident of Cabarrus County is found wandering the streets of downtown Charlotte without proper clothing, speaking to imaginary friends, either a magistrate in Cabarrus County or a magistrate in Mecklenburg County is authorized to issue a custody order for the respondent and the petitioner can go to either place. Most often the petition is brought in the county where the respondent is found. A respondent who is found in North Carolina need not be a resident of the state to be involuntarily committed. A Mecklenburg County magistrate could also issue a custody order for a resident of South Carolina who is found in Mecklenburg County.⁵⁶

How is a petition made?

Personal Appearance

Most petitioners must appear personally before the magistrate to execute the petition.⁵⁷ The magistrate may have the petitioner fill out the petition or may complete it for the petitioner after the petitioner has conveyed the relevant facts about the respondent's condition. Either way, the petitioner must swear to the facts contained in the petition. An unsworn petition cannot serve as the basis for issuance of a custody order.⁵⁸

Physician or Psychologist Petitioner

One group of petitioners does not have to personally appear before the magistrate: when the petitioner is a physician or eligible psychologist⁵⁹ who has examined the respondent, he or she may execute an affidavit before any official authorized to administer oaths (usually a notary public) and submit the affidavit to the magistrate by delivering the original to the magistrate or sending a copy by telefacsimile transmission.⁶⁰ The physician or psychologist examiner need not appear before the magistrate to testify, but the magistrate must have the notarized affidavit or a faxed copy of it in front of him or her and make a determination from the facts contained in the affidavit that the respondent meets the custody order criteria. Because the physician's or psychologist's evaluation must comply with the requirements of an initial examination, the physician or psychologist petitioner frequently will attach a form called "Examination and Recommendation to Determine the Necessity for Involuntary

59. There is a pilot program operating in several western Local Management Entities (LMEs) allowing the initial evaluation to be performed by a licensed clinical social worker, a masters level psychiatric nurse or a masters level certified addictions specialist in addition to a physician or eligible psychologist. In those LMEs when these clinicians perform the initial evaluation, they are treated like physicians and eligible psychologists and do not have to personally appear before the magistrate when they are the petitioner.

60. G.S. 122C-261(d). A similar provision for transmission by telefacsimile is not included in the substance abuse statute. However, since the procedure could be followed without a statutory provision, it can be followed in substance abuse commitments also.

^{55.} G.S. 122C-261(a), -281(a).

^{56.} If a resident of another state is involuntarily committed in North Carolina, the State psychiatric hospital may return the respondent to his or her home state. G.S. 122C-345.

^{57.} G.S. 122C-261(a), -281(a).

^{58.} In re Ingram, 74 N.C. App 579, 328 S.E.2d 588 (1985).

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Commitment^{''61} to the affidavit and the facts may be stated in the attachment.

If the affidavit is submitted by telefacsimile transmission, the physician or psychologist must mail the original no later than five days after transmission to the clerk or magistrate to be filed in the case file. Sometimes rather than mailing the original, the physician or psychologist will give it to the law enforcement officer who comes to the physician or psychologist to take the respondent into custody under the order.

Petition Must Show Facts

The "Affidavit and Petition for Involuntary Commitment" (AOC-SP-300) is a sworn affidavit setting forth facts that show that the respondent meets at least one of the standards for issuance of a custody order. The magistrate must issue a custody order if the petition shows that the respondent is probably: (1) mentally ill and dangerous to self or others; (2) mentally ill and in need of treatment to prevent deterioration that would predictably lead to dangerous to self or others.

The petition must set forth facts in support of petitioner's allegations and not just conclusions. Facts are assertions or statements about something having objective reality-an actual event in time or space. Conclusions are judgments. Statements in a petition such as "the respondent lacks self-control and is unable to provide for himself" or "the respondent is a mentally ill ... person who is dangerous to [her]self or others [and] [r]espondent has strange behavior and irrational in her thinking"62 are conclusions. An example of a statement of facts is: "For the past two weeks the respondent has been hallucinating, claiming that an escaped convict is after him and that his wife is secretly keeping the convict in the basement of their home. On three occasions between April 23 and 25 he threatened to shoot his wife if she does not get rid of the convict. On April 26, the respondent purchased a gun, shot his wife in the arm, and told her that she had three days to get the convict out of the house."

The facts stated in the petition must support all the criteria necessary for a custody order. The statement of facts above, for example, establishes that the respondent is probably mentally ill (hallucinating, claiming that an escaped convict is conspiring with his wife), that he inflicted serious physical harm on someone (shot his wife), and that there is a likelihood such conduct will be repeated (past behavior and still hallucinating indicates conduct likely to reoccur); this statement of facts supports a finding that the respondent is mentally ill and dangerous to others. But recall the example of the mentally ill respondent who fasted for days at a time and then ate a whole loaf of bread or a chicken, and ate five pounds of sugar every two days. While this statement of facts may have supported a finding that the respondent was unable to care for himself, it did not show that he was in danger of serious physical debilitation, as required to find the respondent mentally ill and dangerous to himself. The following petition also was found to be insufficient to allege mental illness and dangerous to self: "Respondent has strange behavior and irrational in her thinking. Leaves home and no one knows of her whereabouts, and at times spends the night away from home. Accuses her husband of improprieties."63 An example of a sufficient petition based on respondent's danger to self is: "Respondent stopped taking her psychiatric medicine (Haldol) three weeks ago. She has begun having trouble sleeping at night and hasn't slept more than one hour in the past 48 hours. She hasn't bathed for a week and has been talking constantly for the last week even though normally she is a quiet person. Last night when it was 25 degrees outside, I found her walking around in the back yard in a short-sleeved shirt saying she was looking for her mother, who died fifteen years ago."

A petition adequate to obtain a custody order for a substance abuser might be the following: "The respondent has been smoking crack cocaine three times daily for the last two weeks; he lost his job two days ago when he showed up at work high and now that he has no income of his own to buy drugs today he beat his mother and father to steal their money."

When a respondent is mentally retarded as well as mentally ill, the petition might allege (in addition to facts necessary to support the other required elements for commitment) something to the effect that the respondent was identified as mentally retarded when she was in second grade and has been receiving special education services for the mentally retarded since that time. It is not clear whether it is necessary to allege facts regarding the mental retardation since that is not a criteria for commitment, but rather a special provision that affects the choice of hospitals for the respondent. However, since the statute requires the magistrate to find that "the respondent is also probably mentally ill"⁶⁴ the safest practice is to include facts supporting that finding.

^{61.} The form number is DMH 5-72-01 (Sept. 2001).

^{62.} In re Ingram, 74 N.C. App. 579, 581, 328 S.E.2d 588, 589 (1985).

^{63.} Id. 64. G.S. 122C-261(b).

Magistrate's Role in Ascertaining Facts

Asking Questions

A petitioner who appears before a magistrate seeking a custody order is often in a state of crisis. Due to this emotional state and the fact that the petitioner is probably not acquainted with the custody order criteria, the magistrate may have to actively participate in getting information from the petitioner and in writing the petition. The magistrate should always feel free to ask specific questions necessary to determine whether to issue a custody order.

Common questions to ask might include:

- 1. Has the respondent harmed or threatened to harm self or others within the past 24 hours? Within the last week? Month? Three months?
 - a. What did the respondent do to himself or herself?
 - b. What did the respondent do to you?
 - c. What did the respondent do to others?
- 2. Is the respondent hallucinating (seeing or hearing things that other people don't)? What kind of things is he or she hearing or seeing?
- 3. Can the respondent identify the day, where he or she is, his or her name or age?
- 4. Does the respondent have unreasonable thoughts that people are talking about him or her or are going to kill or hurt him or her? Tell me what he or she said, or how you learned this information?.
- 5. Is the respondent making exaggerated or elaborate claims, such as:
 - a. being on a special mission;
 - b. being another important and powerful person;
 - c. being part of a powerful organization?
- 6. Does the respondent have trouble sleeping at night? How long since the respondent had a normal night's sleep?
- 7. Has the respondent consumed more than one pint of alcohol per day for the past three to ten days?
- 8. Is the respondent taking any medication?
 - a. what is it?
 - b. has the respondent taken any illegal drugs within the past 24

hours? Month? Three months? What kind of drug? How much?

- 9. Has there been any change in the respondent's appetite? Has it grown or decreased? Is the respondent eating at all?
- 10. Is the respondent doing his or her normal activities? If not, what is the respondent doing differently?
- 11. Is the respondent unable to care for self because of his or her mental condition? Is he or she eating, sleeping, dressing, bathing, using the toilet, staying out of traffic?

Writing Down All the Relevant Facts

The magistrate must make sure that the petition itself contains all the facts about a respondent's present condition as well as information about previous episodes of dangerousness that are relevant to determining that there is a reasonable probability of future dangerous conduct or that would show the current deterioration would predictably result in dangerousness if treatment is not provided.⁶⁵ The facts must support all the bases for commitment that are checked on the order. For example, if the respondent is mentally ill and dangerous to self, the facts must support each of these prongs. If there is not enough space for this information on the petition itself, the magistrate should attach an extra sheet.

Full detail is important for two reasons: First, the district court judge is likely to dismiss the case if the petition is lacking in detail to support a custody order.⁶⁶ "[A custody] order is essentially a judgment by which a person is deprived of his liberty ..., and as a result, he is entitled to the safeguard of a determination by a neutral officer of the court that reasonable grounds exist for his original detention....⁶⁷ Even if the petitioner is a physician or psychologist, the petition must state sufficient facts to support the issuance of a custody order. Giving too much deference to physicians or psychologists, who are required to give facts like other petitioners, may result in the case being dismissed and is an abdication of the magistrate's role as an independent judicial official determining reasonable grounds to proceed.

67. In re Reed, 39 N.C. App. 227, 229, 249 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1978).

^{65.} G.S. 122C-261(a), -281(a).

^{66.} In re Ingram, 74 N.C. App. 579, 328 S.E.2d 588 (1985).

Second, because the physician or psychologist who examines the respondent may not speak to anyone besides the respondent, the petition must convey to the examiner the respondent's current state and past history.

Denying The Custody Order

If, after hearing the petitioner, the magistrate does not find reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent meets one of the custody order standards, the magistrate must not issue a custody order. In this circumstance, the magistrate does not have to fill out a petition (in those cases where the petitioner has not filled out his or her own petition) and is not required to make written findings of fact. The magistrate should give the petitioner the information necessary to contact the local mental health center and pursue whatever treatment options the respondent will voluntarily accept.

Issuing The Custody Order

A magistrate who does find reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent meets one of the custody order standards must issue a custody order. Where the statutory criteria for issuing a custody order are met, the magistrate should issue a custody order even if the respondent, either in person or via the petitioner, agrees to submit to treatment voluntarily. The reason for this result is this: it is possible that the respondent, because of mental illness or substance abuse, may not have the capacity to consent to treatment. Whether the capacity to consent does exist is a determination that should be left to the professional examiner and, if the respondent has capacity to consent, the examiner may convert the involuntary commitment to a voluntary admission. In a case from Florida the respondent agreed to hospitalization but later claimed that he was deprived of his liberty without due process because he didn't have the mental capacity to understand his consent. He successfully claimed that the hospitalization should have occurred under the involuntary commitment process where he would have been afforded the due process safeguards inherent in that procedure.⁶⁸ The bottom line is that if a respondent meets the custody order criteria, the magistrate should issue the order.

The kind of order the magistrate issues will depend on who the petitioner is.

When the Petitioner is Not a Physician or Psychologist

When the petitioner is not a physician or eligible psychologist, the magistrate will use the form entitled "Findings and Custody Order Involuntary Commitment" (AOC-SP-302).

Findings

In issuing the order itself the magistrate must first make "findings" of fact. The order contains three possible findings: (1) the respondent is mentally ill and dangerous to self or others or in need of treatment to prevent deterioration that would predictably lead to dangerousness; (2) the respondent, in addition to being mentally ill, is also mentally retarded; or (3) the respondent is a substance abuser and dangerous to self or others. The magistrate should check all that apply, and it is possible that all three could apply. The magistrate, however, may only check the mental retardation box [box (2)] if the respondent is also mentally ill and that box was also checked. If the respondent is a substance abuser and also mentally retarded, there is no similar requirement to make findings concerning mental retardation.

Order

Under the order the magistrate should check the block that directs "any law enforcement officer" to take the respondent into custody and take the respondent for examination by a person authorized by law to conduct the examination (block 1). The officer must take the respondent to an area facility⁶⁹ for examination; if a proper person to perform the examination is not available in the area facility or no facility is available, the officer takes the respondent to any physician or psychologist locally available,⁷⁰ which typically is the emergency department of the nearest general hospital. If the initial examiner recommends inpatient commitment, the order directs a law enforcement officer to transport the respondent to a designated 24-hour facility for a second examination.

^{68.} Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed. 2d 100 (1990).

^{69.} An "area facility" is a facility operated by or under contract with an area mental health authority. G.S. 122C-3(14).

^{70.} G.S. 122C-263(a), -283(a).

When the Petitioner is a Physician or Psychologist

When the petitioner is a physician or psychologist⁷¹ who has already examined the respondent and has made a specific recommendation as to the respondent's disposition and the magistrate finds reasonable grounds supporting the recommendation, then the order the magistrate issues depends on the examiner's recommendation for disposition, which is found in Section III of "Examination and Recommendation to Determine Necessity for Involuntary Commitment" (DMH 5-72-01). If the examination form is not attached and the physician has not specified the type of commitment—mentally ill and dangerous; mentally ill and in need of treatment; or substance abuser and dangerous-the magistrate must determine which type of commitment the facts support.

When the physician or psychologist recommends inpatient commitment

If the physician or psychologist petitioner recommends inpatient commitment and the magistrate finds reasonable grounds to affirm that recommendation, the magistrate must issue the regular custody order (AOC-SP-302), make the appropriate finding, and check the box in the order directing the law enforcement officer to transport the respondent directly to a designated 24-hour facility for examination and custody pending a district court hearing (box 2).⁷² There is no need to take the respondent to a local examiner because the physician or psychologist petitioner has already performed that examination.

When the physician or psychologist recommends outpatient commitment

If the physician or psychologist petitioner recommends outpatient commitment and the magistrate finds reasonable grounds to affirm the recommendation, the magistrate does not issue a custody order because the respondent will not be taken into custody. Rather, the magistrate issues the order entitled "Findings and Order Involuntary Commitment Physician-Petitioner Recommends Outpatient Commitment" (AOC-SP-305), which requires hearing a district court judge to hold a hearing to determine whether the respondent will be involuntarily committed to outpatient treatment.⁷³ The clerk will issue a notice of hearing to the respondent.⁷⁴

Outpatient commitment means treatment in an outpatient setting and may include medication, individual or group therapy, day or partial day programming activities, services and training including educational and vocational activities, supervision or living arrangements, and any other services prescribed either to alleviate the individual's illness or disability, maintain semi-independent functioning, or to prevent further deterioration that may reasonably be predicted to result in the need for inpatient commitment to a 24-hour facility.⁷⁵

When the physician or psychologist recommends substance abuse commitment

If the physician or psychologist petitioner recommends substance abuse commitment and the magistrate finds reasonable grounds to affirm that recommendation, the type of order issued by the magistrate depends upon the recommendation of the physician or eligible psychologist as stated in the "Examination and Recommendation" form.⁷⁶ If the physician recommends that the respondent be held at a 24-hour facility, the magistrate issues a custody order to transport the respondent directly to the designated 24-hour facility for examination and custody pending a district court hearing AOC-SP-302, block 2). If the physician recommends that the respondent be released pending a hearing, the magistrate issues an order that a hearing before a district court judge be held to determine whether the respondent will be involuntarily committed (AOC-SP-305).

Designate the 24-Hour Facility To Which Respondent Taken

In the final part of the first page of the custody order, the magistrate must fill in the name of the designated 24-hour facility⁷⁷ to which the respondent may be

75. G.S. 122C-3(27).

^{71.} See supra note 59.

^{72.} G.S. 122C-261(d).

^{73.} Id.

^{74.} The form is "Notice of Hearing/Rehearing for Involuntary Commitment," AOC-SP-301.

^{76.} G.S. 122C-281(d). The number of the form is DMH 5-72-01.

^{77.} Under G.S. 122C-252 hospitals must be designated by the Secretary of Health and Human Resources to receive and treat involuntarily committed respondents. Any facility

taken if the first examiner finds that the respondent is an appropriate candidate for inpatient commitment or if the petitioner is a physician or psychologist who recommends inpatient commitment. Note that the magistrate does not put the place for the officer to take the respondent to the first evaluation (in other words the mental health center or local hospital emergency room) in this block. The form and statute require that the magistrate put the designated 24-hour facility to which the respondent will be taken for the second evaluation and at which he or she will be held for a district court hearing.

The Department of Health and Human Services maintains a list of designated 24-hour facilities on its website at http: //www/ ncdhhs.gov/mhddsas/ ivc/ ivcdesignatedfacilities 6-14-07.pdf.

In order to ensure that the respondent will be admitted to any designated 24-hour facility (state psychiatric hospital or local public or private hospital that has been designated by the State to take involuntary commitments) to which he or she might be taken, the magistrate should name the 24-hour facility to which most respondents are sent and then put "any designated 24-hour facility," (e.g. "Broughton Hospital or any designated 24-hr. facility"). Some magistrates merely put "any designated 24-hour facility" without naming any specific facility.

Private Hospital Placements

A respondent who has the resources to pay for the cost of inpatient hospital care without the use of any public funds may select a private facility for treatment and care. In those cases where the respondent is able to choose a private placement, the petitioner must have already have made arrangements with the chosen facility and if it is clear that the private facility has agreed to accept the respondent, the magistrate should fill in the name of that facility on the order.⁷⁸ If the family has not made prior arrangements for admission to a private facility, the magistrate should send the respondent to the usual

designated could take the respondent, but private hospitals may not take indigent respondents.

78. G.S. 122C-263(d)(2) implies that direct commitment to a private hospital is appropriate when it provides that if the first examiner recommends inpatient commitment, "the law enforcement officer ... shall take the respondent to a [designated] 24-hour facility.... If there is no area 24-hour facility and if the respondent is indigent and unable to pay for care at a private 24-hour facility, the law enforcement officer ... shall take the respondent to a State facility for the mentally ill...."

24-hour facility and the Local Management Entity or facility staff can transfer a respondent who qualifies for admission to a private hospital.

Requirement to Contact Area Authority Before Issuing Custody Order

In two different circumstances, the magistrate must contact the local mental health center before issuing a custody order. First, in cases where the magistrate has found that the respondent is probably mentally retarded, in addition to being mentally ill, he or she must contact the area authority (local mental health center) before issuing any order.⁷⁹ When the petitioner is not a physician or an eligible psychologist, the area authority will tell the magistrate where to take the respondent for the initial and second examinations. The magistrate should indicate to the officer where to take the respondent for the first evaluation and should write the location of the second evaluation in the block on the form "name of 24-hr. facility for mentally ill." When the petitioner is a physician or eligible psychologist, the area authority will designate the 24-hour facility to which the respondent should be taken and the magistrate should write this location down on the order in the block for the 24-hour facility for mentally ill. In the event that a mentally retarded person gets beyond the magistrate without the petitioner asserting and the magistrate finding that the person is mentally retarded and the mental retardation is discovered at the first evaluation, the examiner at the first evaluation can fill in a non-state facility in the box designated "or following facility designated by area authority."

Second, some counties have local policies that require the magistrate to contact the local mental health center before issuing a custody order. If the chief district court judge has approved the policy, it should be followed by the magistrates.

Who Serves the Custody Order

When the magistrate issues a custody order, generally a law enforcement officer serves the order. City police officers are responsible for transportation to a location within the county if the respondent resides, or was taken into custody, within city limits. If the respondent resides, or was taken into custody, in the county but outside city limits, the county deputy sheriffs are responsible for transportation, including

^{79.} G.S. 122C-261(b).

transportation to locations outside the county.⁸⁰ This statute is confusing if a respondent resides in the city but is found in the county outside the city limits or vice versa since in those situations both the police and sheriff are designated to transport for evaluations within the county. The local law enforcement agencies must determine which agency transports in those circumstances.

There are two situations where persons other than law enforcement officers may provide transportation under a custody order. The city or county may designate volunteers or other personnel to provide transportation rather than using law enforcement officers.⁸¹ The persons designated by the city or county follow the same procedure as law enforcement officers.

Magistrates may authorize family members or immediate friends of the respondent to carry out the custody order if the following criteria are met: first, a family member or immediate friend must make a request to transport the respondent; and second, the magistrate must find that the respondent does not pose substantial danger to the public.⁸² The critical word is "substantial" since all respondents must be dangerous. For example the second criterion might be met in a case where the respondent is an older person who has been found dangerous to self because he is unable to care for himself but becomes extremely agitated when dealing with law enforcement officers. If the magistrate authorizes transportation by a family member or friend, in addition to completing the custody order, the magistrate must also complete the form entitled "Request and Authorization to Deliver Respondent" (AOC-SP-902M). The magistrate should inform the family member or friend providing the transportation where to take the respondent for the initial evaluation and where to take the respondent for the second evaluation if necessary (which is the 24-hour facility designated by the magistrate on the custody order). The magistrate also should inform the person that he or she must return to the clerk of court the form entitled "Request and Authorization to Deliver Respondent" with the acknowledgement of delivery filled in and the "Custody Order" with the "preliminary examination" section filled in.

Validity of Order

The magistrate's custody order directs any law enforcement officer to take the respondent into custody and transport him or her as directed in the order within 24 hours after the order is issued and without unnecessary delay after assuming custody.83 If the respondent is not taken into custody within 24 hours of issuance of the order, the order is no longer valid and the officer may not take the respondent into custody after that time. What is not clear is the procedure that must be followed if the respondent is not taken into custody within 24 hours and the petitioner still wishes to commit the respondent. One possibility is for the magistrate to issue a second custody order based on the first petition. The other course of action would be to require the petitioner to present evidence of the respondent's continued dangerousness in a new petition and issue a new order based on that petition. The procedure the magistrate follows may depend on the nature of the facts presented in the first petition. Some facts would support the issuance of a custody order even though one or more days might have passed since anyone has seen the respondent and since the issuance of the custody order. Other facts may present a weaker case with the passage of a day or more. If at the time the request for a new custody order is made, the magistrate determines that the facts alleged in the first petition lead the magistrate to find reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent now meets the criteria for commitment, the magistrate can issue a second order based on the first petition.84

Where is the order valid? For example, what if a respondent moves back and forth between counties? As long as the custody order was issued by an appropriate magistrate—one sitting in a county where the respondent either resided or was found-it can be served on the respondent anywhere in North Carolina.⁸⁵ The only difficulty with service is a practical one of getting the order to the appropriate law enforcement agency in the county where the respondent is to be taken into custody. Generally, an officer from the magistrate's county delivers the order to the appropriate agency. Although there are no cases or statute governing the situation, it probably is sufficient for the officer holding the original custody order to fax a copy of the order and petition to a law enforcement agency in the county where the respondent is now believed to be found for service.

^{80.} G.S. 122C-251(a).

^{81.} G.S. 122C-251(g).

^{82.} G.S. 122C-251 (f).

^{83.} G.S. 122C-261(e), -281(e).
84. There are no reported cases in North Carolina dealing with this issue.
85. G.S. 122C-261(e), -281(e).

Inform Petitioner of Next Steps

If the magistrate issues a custody order for a mentally ill respondent, the magistrate must provide the petitioner (and respondent, if present) with information regarding the next steps in the process.⁸⁶ Although the statute containing this requirement does not enumerate specific pieces of information that should be relayed, the magistrate should inform the petitioner that:

- the custody order is a document that initiates the process leading to commitment; it is not the commitment order itself;
- (2) the respondent will be taken into custody by a law enforcement officer and taken to a local facility to be examined by a physician or psychologist who will make one of three recommendations:
 - (a) release the respondent because he or she does not meet the commitment criteria;
 - (b) release the respondent but schedule a district court hearing within 10 days because the respondent meets the criteria for outpatient commitment;
 - (c) take the respondent to a 24-hour facility because he or she meets the criteria for inpatient commitment.
- (3) if the second examiner recommends inpatient commitment, the respondent will be held at the 24-hour facility for observation and treatment pending a district court hearing to be held within 10 days. The facility staff must release the respondent when he or she no longer meets the criteria for involuntary commitment.

A model notice of next steps is found at Appendix III at the end of this bulletin.⁸⁷

Inquiry Into Respondent's Indigence

Upon issuing a custody order for inpatient commitment, the magistrate is required by law to inquire as to whether the respondent is indigent (and thus entitled to have appointed counsel at the district court hearing).⁸⁸ However, many magistrates no longer make this inquiry because indigent respondents who are sent to a state psychiatric hospital are entitled to receive representation from the special counsel and in that situation determining whether a respondent is indigent is the responsibility of the special counsel.⁸⁹ At hearings for mentally ill persons in counties other than where state hospitals are located, counsel is appointed for indigent respondents in accordance with the rules adopted by the Office of Indigent Defense Services.⁹⁰ However, even if a mentally ill respondent is not indigent, but refuses to retain counsel, the Office of Indigent Defense Services must appoint counsel for him or her anyway.⁹¹ Therefore, for most mentally ill respondents counsel is going to be appointed so a magistrate's determination of indigence is unnecessary.

For substance abuse respondents, the statute provides that the clerk of court, upon direction of the district court judge, assigns counsel⁹² who represents the respondent at the trial level, and upon appeal the Office of Indigent Defense Services appoints counsel.⁹³

Respondents who are recommended only for outpatient treatment (that is, those who are not at a state psychiatric hospital) do not have the right to counsel at their district court hearing. However, a judge may appoint counsel for an indigent respondent who is recommended only for outpatient commitment if the judge determines that the issues involved in the outpatient commitment are of significant complexity or that the respondent is unable to speak for himself or herself.⁹⁴

Magistrates who do conduct an indigence inquiry should use the form "Affidavit of Indigency," AOC-CR-226.

Emergency Commitments

In addition to the regular procedure for initiating an involuntary commitment, there are two emergency procedures for circumstances where the respondent requires immediate hospitalization to prevent harm to self or others.

92. G.S. 122C-284(a), -286(d). 93. G.S. 122C-289. 94. G.S. 122C-267(d).

^{86.} G.S. 122C-261(b).

^{87.} The notice is a slightly modified version of one drafted by Mark Botts, a School of Government faculty member who specializes in mental health law.

^{88.} G.S. 122C-261(c), -281(c).

^{89.} G.S. 122C-270(a).
90. G.S. 122C-270(d). Currently the judge or clerk handles the appointments.
91. G.S. 122C-268(d).

Emergency Commitments for Mentally Ill

Magistrates are not involved in emergency commitments of mentally ill respondents. The criteria for the special emergency procedure is that the person not only meet the criteria for a regular commitment but also that person is in need of immediate hospitalization to prevent harm to themselves or others. The emergency commitment procedure allows anyone, including law enforcement officers, to take the respondent directly to a local physician or psychologist or directly to a State facility for examination.⁹⁵ If the examiner finds that the respondent is, in fact, (1) mentally ill, (2) dangerous to self or others, and (3) in need of immediate hospitalization, the examiner will send sworn certification of this finding to the clerk of superior court on the form entitled "Supplement to Support Immediate Hospitalization" (DMH 5-72-01-A). This supplement must accompany the examiner's usual examination form ("Examination and Recommendation To Determine Necessity for Involuntary Commitment," DMH 5-72-01).96 The certification takes the place of the magistrate's custody order and requires a law enforcement officer to transport the respondent to a 24-hour facility for a second examination. If a person comes to the magistrate with an evaluation by a physician and the additional supplement certifying the need for immediate hospitalization, the magistrate should not issue a custody order but should indicate to the law enforcement officer that the certificate takes the place of a custody order.

Emergency Commitment of Substance Abusers

The special procedure for emergency commitment of substance abusers does involve magistrates. Only law enforcement officers may petition for emergency commitment of substance abusers. If a substance abuser is violent and requires restraint, and if delay in taking him or her to a physician or eligible psychologist for examination would probably endanger life or property, the law enforcement officer may take the substance abuser into custody and take him or her immediately before a magistrate to seek a custody order.⁹⁷ If magistrate finds by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence (note that this evidentiary standard is higher than that required in the non-emergency case) that (1) the facts in the affidavit are true, (2) that the respondent is in fact violent and in need of restraint, and (3) that delay in taking the respondent to a physician or eligible psychologist would endanger life or property, the magistrate must issue an emergency commitment order to take the respondent directly to a 24-hour facility, bypassing the first examination. The form is entitled "Petition for Special Emergency Substance Abuse Involuntary Commitment Petition and Custody Order" (AOC-SP-909M).

Transportation Orders

In addition to issuing custody orders that require officers to transport the respondent for examination in response to a petition for involuntary commitment, magistrates may order law enforcement officers to provide transportation in two other situations. First, if a substance abuser who is under an order for outpatient treatment fails to comply with that order, the area mental health authority or supervising physician may, after reasonable efforts to solicit the respondent's compliance, ask the magistrate to order that the respondent be taken into custody and transported to the area authority or physician for examination.⁹⁸ Also if a substance abuser who has been discharged from inpatient commitment and breaches the conditions of his or her release, the area mental health authority or physician may request that the respondent be taken into custody and transported to the area authority or physician for examination.⁹⁹ Upon request, the magistrate must issue an order a law enforcement officer to transport the respondent to a designated physician for examination. The form is "Request for Transportation Order and Order (Committed Substance Abuser Fails to Comply With Treatment or Is Discharged From 24-Hour Facility)" (AOC-SP-223).

The second situation in which the magistrate may be asked to issue a custody order is where transportation is needed to transfer certain respondents from one 24-hour facility to another.¹⁰⁰ In this situation, a respondent being held for a district court hearing or already committed by a district court

97. G.S. 122C-282.
98. G.S. 122C-290(b).
99. Id.
100. G.S. 122C-206(c1).

^{95.} G.S. 122C-262.

^{96.} Both forms are needed because the examiner must give facts supporting the mental illness and dangerousness as well as the need for immediate hospitalization, and the certificate for emergency commitment does not require facts supporting the mental illness and dangerousness. G.S. 122C-262(b), -264(b1).

judge needs to be transferred from the 24-hour facility in which he or she is being held to another 24-hour facility. Frequently this occurs when the respondent was sent to a local hospital but that hospital is unable to handle the respondent and wants the respondent sent to a state psychiatric hospital. The magistrate may also be asked to transfer a minor or incompetent adult who was voluntarily admitted from one facility to another. If a responsible professional at the original facility notifies the magistrate to issue an order, the magistrate must order a law enforcement agency to transfer the respondent. The form is "Notice of Need For Transportation Order and Order (From One 24-Hour Facility to Another)" AOC-SP-222.

Conclusion

After a magistrate has issued an order to take a respondent into custody and transport him or her for examination, the magistrate's involvement in the process of involuntary civil commitment ends. From this point the respondent is examined by two professionals and, if these examinations reveal that the respondent meets the criteria for commitment, the respondent will receive a hearing in the district court, at which time the judge may commit the respondent.

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Appendix I

Summary of Involuntary Commitment Standards

Mentally ill and dangerous to	Mentally ill and in need of	Substance abuser and
self or others	treatment to prevent deterioration	dangerous to self or others
seij or omers	that would predictably lead to	ungerous to self of others
Respondent is mentally ill if he	dangerousness	Respondent is a substance
or she has	uungerousness	abuser if he or she engages in
1) an illness	Respondent is mentally ill if he	1) pathological use or abuse of
2) that impairs judgment and	or she has	alcohol or drugs
self-control and	1) an illness	2) in a way or to a degree that
3) makes treatment advisable	2) that impairs judgment and	produces an impairment in personal,
5) makes treatment advisable	self-control <i>and</i>	social, or occupational functioning
Respondent is dangerous to	3) makes treatment advisable	social, or occupational functioning
self if he or she	5) makes treatment advisable	Respondent is dangerous to
1) is unable to care for self and	Respondent needs treatment to	self if he or she
in danger of suffering serious	prevent deterioration if his or her	1) is unable to care for self and
physical debilitation in the near	psychological history indicates that	in danger of suffering serious
future or	his or her present state would	physical debilitation in the near
2) has attempted or threatened	predictably lead to dangerousness	future or
suicide and is likely to commit	prediction in the data set of the	2) has attempted or threatened
suicide unless treatment is given or		suicide and is likely to commit
3) has mutilated or attempted to		suicide unless treatment is given or
mutilate self and is likely to		3) has mutilated or attempted to
seriously mutilate self unless		mutilate self and is likely to
treatment is given		seriously mutilate self unless
		treatment is given
Respondent is dangerous to		
others if		Respondent is dangerous to
1) he or she has		others if
a) inflicted, attempted to		1) he or she has
inflict, or (in some cases)		a) inflicted, attempted to
threatened to inflict, serious		inflict, or (in some cases)
bodily harm on another or		threatened to inflict, serious
b) acted in a way that creates		bodily harm on another or
a substantial risk of serious harm		b) acted in a way that creates
or		a substantial risk of serious harm
c) engaged in serious		or
destruction of property and		c) engaged in serious
2) there is a reasonable		destruction of property and
probability that such conduct will be		2) there is a reasonable
repeated		probability that such conduct will be
		repeated

Appendix II

Information Useful in Considering Whether Respondent is Mentally Ill

Behaviors

<u>hostile vs. passive</u> -- acting out in destructive ways vs. withdrawn, quiet, apathetic <u>erratic, excitable</u> -- sensitive to slight irritation, unpredictable, agitated <u>combative, violent</u> -- destructive, physically and/or verbally abusive <u>incontinence</u> --poor control of urine and feces <u>inappropriate social judgment</u> -- behaviors usually considered in poor taste and usually rejected or found offensive by other people

Movements

- <u>overactivity, restlessness, agitation</u> -- parts of body in constant motion, repetitive, activity beyond reasonable level
- *involuntary movements* -- parts of body jerk, shake or activated without apparent reason

underactivity -- immobile, stuporous, sluggish

<u>general muscle tension</u> -- parts of body held taut (e.g., clenched teeth), possibly small tremors, rigid posture or walking stance

Speech

<u>overtalkative vs. mute</u> -- constant talking vs. unresponsive, "pressure of speech" <u>unusual speech</u> -- strange words, "word salad," disconnected speech <u>assaultive/suicidal content</u> -- words that suggest harmful intent

Emotions

<u>flat or inappropriate emotions</u> -- little change in expression or expression that doesn't fit occasion (e.g., happy but angry, crying when happy) <u>mood swings</u> -- dramatic changes from dejection to elation <u>general over apprehension</u> --anxiety in most areas of life <u>depression, apathy, hopelessness</u> -- withdrawal and minimal interest in activities of daily life <u>euphoric</u> -- grandiose and unrealistic feelings, often of feeling indestructible

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Thoughts

<u>disturbed awareness</u> -- unaware of self or others or time or place <u>disturbed memory</u> --impairment of short term and/or long term memory <u>disturbed reasoning/judgment</u> -- impaired logic or decisions not tied to common thinking <u>confused thoughts</u> -- inconsistent and/or combination of unrelated thoughts <u>poor concentration and/or attention</u> <u>low intellectual functioning</u> slow mental speed

Abnormal Mental Trends

<u>false perceptions (hallucinations)</u> -- experiences in visual, hearing, smelling, tasting or skin sensations without real basis <u>false beliefs (</u>delusions) -- usually persecutory or grandiose thoughts without real basis <u>paranoid ideas</u> -- involves suspiciousness or belief that one is persecuted or unfairly treated <u>body delusion</u> -- delusion involving body functions (e.g., "my brain is rotting," a 60 year-old insisting she is pregnant) <u>feelings of unreality or depersonalization</u> -- sense of own reality is temporarily lost, so body parts distorted or sensing self from a distance <u>repetitious behaviors/thoughts/speech</u> <u>extreme fears</u> -- especially when seriously impairing activities of daily life

Previous Evidence

psychiatric assessments or treatment prior petitions or associated legal difficulties

Course of Disturbance

chronic gradual onset acute episode

Appendix III

Steps Following the Issuance of a Custody Order for Involuntary Commitment

Upon request, the magistrate or clerk of court has issued an order for custody and transportation of a person alleged to be in need of examination and treatment. This order is not an order of commitment but only authorizes the person to be evaluated and treated until a court hearing is held.

The individual making the request has filed a petition with the court for this purpose and is, therefore, called the "petitioner." The individual to be taken into custody for examination will have an opportunity to respond to the petition and is, therefore, called the "respondent." If you are taken into custody, the word "respondent," below, refers to you. G.S. 122C-261(b) requires that the petitioner and the respondent, if present, be informed of the next steps that will occur for the respondent.

- 1. A law enforcement officer or other person designated in the custody order must take the respondent into custody within 24 hours. If the respondent cannot be found within 24 hours, a new custody order will be required to take the respondent into custody. Custody is not for the purpose of arrest, but for the respondent's own safety and the safety of others, and to determine if the respondent is in need of treatment.
- 2. Without unnecessary delay after assuming custody, the law enforcement officer or other individual designated to provide transportation must take the respondent to a physician or eligible psychologist for examination.
- 3. The respondent must be examined as soon as possible, and in any event within 24 hours, after being presented for examination.
- 4. Upon examination, the physician or psychologist will recommend either outpatient commitment, inpatient commitment, substance abuse commitment, or termination of these proceedings.

• Inpatient commitment: If the examiner finds the respondent meets the criteria for inpatient commitment, the examiner shall recommend inpatient commitment. The law enforcement officer or other designated person shall take the respondent to a 24-hour facility.

• Outpatient commitment: If the examiner finds the respondent meets the criteria for outpatient commitment, the examiner will recommend outpatient commitment and identify the proposed outpatient treatment physician or center in the examination report. The person designated in the order to provide transportation must return the respondent to the respondent's regular residence or, with the respondent's consent, to the home of a consenting individual located in the originating county. The respondent shall be released from custody.

• Substance abuse commitment: If the examiner finds the respondent meets the criteria for substance abuse commitment, the examiner shall recommend commitment and whether the respondent should be released or held at a 24-hour facility pending a district court hearing. Based on the physician's recommendation, the law enforcement officer or other designated individual shall take respondent to a 24-hour facility or release the respondent.

• Termination: If the examiner finds the respondent meets neither of the criteria for commitment, the respondent must be released from custody and the proceedings terminated. If the custody order was based on the finding that respondent was probably mentally ill, then the person designated in the order to provide transportation must return respondent to the respondent's regular residence or, with the respondent's consent, to the home of a consenting individual located in the originating county.

- 5. If inpatient treatment is recommended, the law enforcement officer transports the respondent to a designated 24 hour facility where another evaluation must be performed within 24 hours. This evaluator has the same options as indicated in step 4 above. If the evaluator determines that the respondent needs inpatient treatment, the respondent is admitted to the facility for care and treatment.
- 6. The inpatient treatment provider must release the respondent when in the provider's professional opinion the respondent no longer meets commitment criteria. If the respondent is not released, the respondent will be given a hearing before a district court judge within 10 days of date respondent taken into custody. The hearing is usually held in the county where the 24-hour facility is located unless the respondent request a hearing in the county where the petition was initiated.

TAB:

Language Access Services



Office of Language Access Services (OLAS)

Foreign Language Court Interpreters

Service Offerings

The North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (NCAOC) Office of Language Access Services (OLAS) serves the North Carolina State Court System by helping to facilitate equal access to justice for limited-English proficient (LEP) individuals in our court system by:

- Developing standards for the provision and efficient use of language access services
- Providing daily support and guidance for questions, concerns, and issues involving interpreting and translating services
- Ensuring that proficient and ethical foreign language court interpreters are provided to the courts
- Administering court interpreter training and certification testing for court interpreters provided by the National Center for State Courts

NCAOC offers a number of language access services to meet the needs of LEP individuals including certified staff court interpreters in 11 counties (Buncombe, Chatham, Durham, Forsyth, Guilford, Harnett, Johnston, Lee, Mecklenburg, Orange, and Wake), contract court interpreters, telephone interpreting, remote interpreting, and translation and transcription / translation services. Learn more at http://www.nccourts.org/LanguageAccess.

Terms

- LOTS Language(s) other than Spanish
- Limited English Proficient (LEP) individual a person who speaks a language other than English as his or her primary language and has a limited ability to read, speak, write, or understand English
- Interpretation the accurate and complete unrehearsed transmission of an oral message from one language to an oral message in another language
- Translation the accurate and complete transmission of written text from one language into written text in another language

Proper Role of Court Interpreter

- The interpreter's job is to render everything said in court from the source language into the target language
 - Accurately without any distortion of meaning
 - Without omissions and additions
 - Without changes to style or register
 - With as little delay or interference as possible
- The interpreter's job is NOT
 - To explain anything to anybody

- To fill out forms
- □ To serve as a "go between"
- Interpreters have an ethical obligation to ask for repetition if speech is unclear
- In order to conserve impartiality and confidentiality, the interpreter should not be asked to be alone with any of the parties
- Interpreters may sight translate a form for an LEP individual, but may not advise the individual on how to complete the form or answer the individual's questions.

Do not use untrained bilingual individuals to interpret during court proceedings

- Using an untrained bilingual speaker to interpret during court proceedings creates potential conflicts of interest and may have a negative impact on the case
- Bilingual speakers who are not trained court interpreters are not aware of the role, the demand, the modes of interpreting, the ethics or rules of professionalism required of the court interpreter and therefore cannot interpret accurately and completely, which can significantly impact equal access to justice for the LEP individual

Tips for working with court interpreters

- Speak to the LEP individual directly just as you would an English speaker e.g., "What time did you call the police?"
- Use plain English, avoid jargon, and do not use acronyms
- Speak slowly and clearly with regular pauses between complete thoughts
- Ask one question at a time
- Do not ask interpreter to explain or summarize what is said
- Provide the interpreter with information about the case; the more information an interpreter has about a case, the better he or she can prepare and perform
- Do not ask the interpreter if the LEP individual understands what you are saying; the interpreter's role is to serve as a language conduit, not to assess understanding
- In order to ensure the accuracy of the interpreting services provided throughout the proceeding, provide a team of two interpreters for any proceeding lasting two hours or more
- Interpreters must be given a break every 30 45 minutes to maintain accuracy

Early identification of cases in which an interpreter is needed

- Early identification of the need for interpreting services in an individual case allows for efficient assignment, reduces the number of continuances for lack of an interpreter, and maximizes the possibility that litigants will understand what to do next in their case
- Use interpreter resources efficiently share interpreters between criminal and civil courtroom calendars and schedule an interpreter only for the time the interpreter is needed; do not request interpreters "just in case" because their services are often needed in another county
- Failure to provide sufficient time to secure a qualified interpreter may result in a delay or postponement of the court proceeding if a qualified interpreter is not available

Contacts

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Office of Language Access Services (OLAS)

Quick Reference for North Carolina Magistrates (Version 2015) OLAS@nccourts.org | 919 890-1407

EFFECTIVE MAY 1, 2015:

- Release of the <u>North Carolina Standards for Language Access in the North Carolina Courts</u>
- **Expansion**: Foreign language court interpreters shall be provided at state expense to limited English proficient (LEP) parties in interest in all court proceedings heard before the magistrate

Telephone Interpreting Service – Spoken Foreign Language

- 1. The telephone interpreting service (UTT, Inc.) may be used by magistrates for
 - All criminal court proceedings where the defendant, victim, or witnesses for either the defendant or the State are limited English proficient (LEP) – this includes initial appearances before the magistrate; the magistrate should *not* use law enforcement officers, or friends or family of the LEP individual to interpret during court proceedings
 - **Responding to public inquiries** and assisting the public with general questions of a short duration
 - Brief matters in Small Claims Court, such as notifying parties that a case is continued or to determine the language needed by an LEP party or witness so that a live interpreter can be requested and scheduled for the next setting; a telephone interpreter should not be used for trials or any hearing in small claims court
- 2. To access the service, the following items should be available:
 - Guide to Using the Telephone Interpreting Service
 - Confidential access code specific to your county's office
 - I Speak card (<u>http://www.lep.gov/ISpeakCards2004.pdf</u>)
 - Language List
- 3. Problems with the service
 - To reach a supervisor for technical support, dial 800 428-6149
 - For equipment (telephone) difficulties call the NCAOC Help Desk at 919 890-2407
- 4. If you use any interpreting service and issue a process (criminal summons, warrant for arrest, release order, appearance bond), indicate in NCAWARE that an interpreter was used and the language needed on the court information screen refer to the *Guide to Interpreter Language Needed and Interpreter Used Indicators* (distributed to all Judicial Branch staff in May 2013) for more information

Spoken Foreign Language Court Interpreters - Small Claims Court and Wedding Ceremonies

1. Evaluate the need for a court interpreter

To help determine whether to provide a court interpreter, the judicial official should ask open-ended questions that cannot be answered with a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer. For example:

"Please tell us your birthday, how old you are, and where you were born."

"What kind of work do you do?"

"Tell us about your family."

2. Require and request a live court interpreter

If the judicial official determines that the party is limited English proficient (LEP), the judicial official should:

- Submit a Request for Spoken Foreign Language Court Interpreter to the local Language Access Coordinator (LAC).¹
- The judicial official must only permit registered NCAOC court interpreters to provide interpreting services in the North Carolina courts. The court shall not allow family or friends to interpret in court.

3. Administer interpreter oath from the bench

Sample Oath: "Do you solemnly swear or affirm that you will interpret accurately, completely, and impartially, using your best skill and judgment In accordance with the standards prescribed by law and the Code of Professional Responsibility for Court Interpreters, follow all official guidelines established by the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts for legal interpreting and translating, and discharge all of the solemn duties and obligations of legal interpretation and translation?"

4. Clarify interpreter's role to the witness

The judicial official should explain the role of the interpreter to the witness, including the following points: the interpreter is present to interpret *everything* that is said and he will not add, omit, or summarize anything that is said; the witness should speak directly to the attorney or to the court, not to the interpreter; the interpreter is not permitted to answer questions, give advice, or explain anything; the witness should wait until the entire statement has been interpreted before answering.

Accommodating Persons who are Deaf or Hard of Hearing

- 1. Guidelines: <u>http://www.nccourts.org/LanguageAccess/Documents/GuidelinesdeafandHH.pdf</u>
- 2. The legal requirements governing accommodations for persons who are deaf or hard of hearing arise from:
 - Chapter 8B of the North Carolina General Statutes the Judicial Branch must provide interpreters for *parties and witnesses*, in all *court proceedings*
 - Title II of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) the Judicial Branch must provide accommodations for all court services, programs and activities and extends to persons in addition to just parties and witnesses (for example, jurors)
- 3. **Determine the appropriate accommodation**: sign language interpreter; real-time court reporter (CART or CAN); sound system; oral interpreter; cued speech transliterator; signed English interpreter / transliterator

¹ LACs will be trained and in place by September 1, 2015. Until that time, Magistrates should follow the interpreter scheduling guidance provided in the April 30 expansion memo, found here: http://www.nccourts.org/LanguageAccess/Documents/Expansion Memo to all Magistrate Matters.pdf



4. Local court officials **complete form AOC-G-116** (*"Motion, Appointment and Order Authorizing Payment of Deaf Interpreter or Other Accommodation"*) to appoint and compensate the interpreter and **contact the interpreter directly** to arrange for services (<u>http://ncdhhs.gov/dsdhh/directories.htm</u>)



NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE of the COURTS	

Office of Language Access Services (OLAS)

How to Schedule an Interpreter for a Court Proceeding – Courts

proceedings; incompetency proceedings; Chapter 122C civil commitment proceedings; child custody and child support proceedings; summary ejectment proceedings; Criminal court proceedings; Chapter 50B (domestic violence) court proceedings; Chapter 50C (protective order) court proceedings; child custody mediation; juvenile foreclosure proceedings; eminent domain proceedings; and all proceedings heard before magistrates for LEP parties in interest who require interpreting services This chart applies ONLY to proceedings in which the North Carolina Judicial Branch currently provides an interpreter at state expense:

interiosare proce	פטווופא, פווווויפוון מטוומוון מיטכפפטווופא מוט מון מיו מיו מיטכפטווופא וופמים מפוט	וטרפטטגרב ערטכפטוונצא בווווובות מטתמוו ערטכפטוונצא מוט מון ערטכפטוונג הפמט שבוטרב ווומצואו מרצי עמרובא וו וווברפא שוט רבעיים באיני אוט באינור ארווווג אבו אוכא.
	Staff Interpreter District Buncombe, Chatham, Durham, Forsyth, Guilford, Harnett, Johnston, Lee, Mecklenburg, Orange, Wake	Non-Staff Interpreter District All other counties
Spanish Court Interpreter	Contact the staff court interpreter in your district as soon as a request is received. Submit a <u>Request for Spoken Foreign</u> <u>Language Court Interpreter - Staff Districts ONLY</u> to the staff court interpreter for proceedings expected to last longer than one hour.	The court should access the Office of Language Access Services (OLAS) <u>Registry of Spoken Foreign Language Court Interpreters</u> at <u>www.nccourts.org/LanguageAccess</u> to schedule a Spanish interpreter from the Registry prior to the scheduled court proceeding.
Language Other Than Spanish (LOTS) Court Interpreter	Submit a <u>Request for Spoken Foreign Language Court Interpreter - Staff Districts ONLY</u> form to your district's staff court interpreter. Go to <u>www.nccourts.org/LanguageAccess</u> for the form.	For Language Other Than Spanish (LOTS), submit a <u>Request for Non-Spanish</u> <u>Interpreter</u> form to OLAS at least five business days prior to the scheduled court appearance. Go to <u>www.nccourts.org/LanguageAccess</u> for the form.
Court Interpreter on Short Notice	The court should contact the staff court interpreter. If a qualified interpreter cannot be located with such short notice, the court should continue the proceeding to a date on which an interpreter can be scheduled and the requisite forms can be submitted.	The court should access the OLAS <u>Registry of Spoken Foreign Language Court</u> <u>Interpreters</u> at <u>www.nccourts.org/LanguageAccess</u> and try to schedule a Spanish interpreter from the Registry. OLAS should be contacted for languages other than Spanish. If a qualified interpreter cannot be located with such short notice, the court should continue the proceeding to a date on which an interpreter can be scheduled and the requisite forms can be submitted.
Telephone Interpreting Service	The telephone interpreting service may be used for brief matters in district court, such as continuances, and for first appearances. However, a telephone interpreter should <i>not</i> be used for trials or any hearing in district court expected to last longer than 30 minutes. Telephone interpreting services are not available for superior court matters.	district court, such as continuances, and for first appearances. y hearing in district court expected to last longer than 30 minutes. matters.

NOTE: In order to ensure accuracy of the interpreting services provided, a team of two interpreters must be scheduled for any proceeding lasting two hours or more.




Office of Language Access Services (OLAS)

How to Schedule an Interpreter for a Court Proceeding – Courts



proceedings; incompetency proceedings; Chapter 122C civil commitment proceedings; child custody and child support proceedings; summary ejectment proceedings; Criminal court proceedings; Chapter 50B (domestic violence) court proceedings; Chapter 50C (protective order) court proceedings; child custody mediation; juvenile foreclosure proceedings; eminent domain proceedings; and all proceedings heard before magistrates for LEP parties in interest who require interpreting services.



For further assistance, please contact the NCAOC Office of Language Access Services at (919) 890-1407 or OLAS@nccourts.org

Version 5/2015

2004 C<u>e</u>nsus

Census

	LANGUAGE IDENTIFICATION FLASHCARD	
	ضع علامة في هذا المربع إذا كنت تقرأ أو تتحدث العربية.	1. Arabic
	Խնդրում ենլջ նչում կատարելջ այս ջառակուսում, եթե խոսում կամ կարդում ելջ Հայերեն:	2. Armenian
	যদি আপনি বাংলা পড়েন বা বলেন তা হলে এই বাব্দ্দে দাগ দিন।	3. Bengali
	ឈូមបញ្ជាក់ក្នុងប្រអប់នេះ បើអ្នកអាន ឬនិឃាឃភាសា ខ្មែ ។	4. Cambodian
	Motka i kahhon ya yangin ûntûngnu' manaitai pat ûntûngnu' kumentos Chamorro.	5. Chamorro
	如果你能读中文或讲中文,请选择此框。	6. Simplified Chinese
	如果你能讀中文或講中文,請選擇此框。	7. Traditional Chinese
	Označite ovaj kvadratić ako čitate ili govorite hrvatski jezik.	8.Croatian
	Zaškrtněte tuto kolonku, pokud čtete a hovoříte česky.	9. Czech
	Kruis dit vakje aan als u Nederlands kunt lezen of spreken.	10. Dutch
	Mark this box if you read or speak English.	11. English
	اگر خواندن و نوشتن فارسي بلد هستيد، اين مربع را علامت بزنيد. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE	12. Farsi
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	Cocher ici si vous lisez ou parlez le français.	13. French
	Kreuzen Sie dieses Kästchen an, wenn Sie Deutsch lesen oder sprechen.	14. German
	Σημειώστε αυτό το πλαίσιο αν διαβάζετε ή μιλάτε Ελληνικά.	15. Greek
	Make kazye sa a si ou li oswa ou pale kreyòl ayisyen.	16. Haitian Creole
	अगर आप हिन्दी बोलते या पढ़ सकते हों तो इस बक्स पर चिह्न लगाएँ।	17. Hindi
	Kos lub voj no yog koj paub twm thiab hais lus Hmoob.	18. Hmong
	Jelölje meg ezt a kockát, ha megérti vagy beszéli a magyar nyelvet.	19. Hungarian
	Markaam daytoy nga kahon no makabasa wenno makasaoka iti Ilocano.	20. llocano
	Marchi questa casella se legge o parla italiano.	21. Italian
	日本語を読んだり、話せる場合はここに印を付けてください。	22. Japanese
	한국어를 읽거나 말할 수 있으면 이 칸에 표시하십시오.	23. Korean
	ໃຫ້ໝາຍໃສ່ຊ່ອງນີ້ ຖ້າທ່ານອ່ານຫຼືປາກພາສາລາວ.	24. Laotian
	Prosimy o zaznaczenie tego kwadratu, jeżeli posługuje się Pan/Pani językiem polskim.	25. Polish
DB-3309	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Language Access Services - Page 10 Economics and Statistics Administration U.S. CENSUS BUREAU	1

	Assinale este quadrado se você lê ou fala português.	26. Portuguese
	Însemnați această căsuță dacă citiți sau vorbiți românește.	27. Romanian
	Пометьте этот квадратик, если вы читаете или говорите по-русски.	28. Russian
	Обележите овај квадратић уколико читате или говорите српски језик.	29. Serbian
	Označte tento štvorček, ak viete čítať alebo hovoriť po slovensky.	30. Slovak
	Marque esta casilla si lee o habla español.	31. Spanish
	Markahan itong kuwadrado kung kayo ay marunong magbasa o magsalita ng Tagalog.	32. Tagalog
	ให้กาเครื่องหมายลงในช่องถ้าท่านอ่านหรือพูกภาษาไทย.	33. Thai
	Maaka 'i he puha ni kapau 'oku ke lau pe lea fakatonga.	34. Tongan
	Відмітьте цю клітинку, якщо ви читаєте або говорите українською мовою.	35. Ukranian
	اگرآ پاردو پڑھتے یابولتے ہیں تواس خانے میں نشان لگا ^ن یں۔	36. Urdu
	Xin đánh dấu vào ô này nếu quý vị biết đọc và nói được Việt Ngữ.	37. Vietnamese
	באצייכנט דעם קעסטל אויב איר לייענט אדער רעדט אידיש.	38. Yiddish
DB-3309	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Language Access Services - Page 11 Language Maccess Services - Page 11	1

What judges and attorneys need to know about interpreters in the legal process

Judith Kenigson Kristy

- 1. Use credentialed, preferably certified, court interpreters for in-court and out-of-court events. Verify the interpreter's credentials. If it is an in-court proceeding, make sure the interpreter is sworn in before the proceeding begins.
 - Verify credentials by consulting your state or federal court roster, or by calling your local court (clerk's office or interpreter's office). Judges should conduct a *voir dire* of the interpreter and ask for credentials to be stated on the record.
 - Do not use untrained bilinguals. It is inappropriate to use family members, children, foreign language students or teachers, court staff, or law enforcement officers as interpreters.
 - Don't allow defendants to bring their own interpreters not only does this practice create potential conflicts of interest, but the ad hoc person acting as "interpreter" may not be trained or competent.
 - Don't ask for a translator when you need an interpreter they are not interchangeable. Translators work with written communication. Interpreters work with oral communication.
- 2. Be aware that an interpreter creates an even playing field for limited-English speakers; an interpreter provides no advantage or disadvantage.
 - Interpreters should never interject their own knowledge, comments, or opinions into the interpretation. Interpreters are prohibited from advocating for any party.
 - Don't ask interpreters what they think a defendant or witness might or might not have understood; it is not their area of expertise.
- 3. Use the interpreter to facilitate direct communication with limited-English proficient parties, not as a "go-between."
 - Address the client directly in English, as if he understood everything you are saying. The interpreter will then repeat what you have said in the required language. This avoids the use of indirect speech (e.g., "Ask him if..." or "He says that..."), which can create confusion and a flawed record.
- 4. Check to make sure that all speech, by all parties, is being interpreted.
 - If someone is speaking and the interpreter's mouth is not moving, there is a problem. If someone makes a lengthy statement and the interpretation is a few words, or vice versa, there is a problem. The interpreter's job is to interpret *everything* that is

being said— no omissions, modifications, or additions.

- In court, an interpreter should be interpreting simultaneously for a defendant. If a non-English speaking witness testifies, an interpreter should interpret the questions and answers consecutively so that a clear record may be made.
- 5. To be understood, speak clearly at a moderate speed and an audible volume.
 - Unclear speech cannot be accurately interpreted. Avoid interruptions and overlapping voices. Avoid long, convoluted questions. Unfamiliar jargon or acronyms may cause a problem for the interpreter.
 - Although reluctant to interrupt the give-and-take of courtroom exchanges, interpreters have an ethical obligation to ask for a repetition if speech is too low, too fast, too lengthy or incomprehensible (due to the use of unknown references,

heavy accent, jargon, abbreviations, or acronyms).

Very long or complex questions and answers can result in interruptions or incomplete rendering by the interpreter, causing confusion.

6. The interpreter's only task is to interpret. In order to conserve impartiality and confidentiality, the interpreter should not be asked to be alone with a defendant. Whenever

possible, the interpreter will exit the room when the attorney exits the room.

- Interpreters may not reveal information they have interpreted, but no privilege protects them if communication occurs when the attorney is not present. Any explanations that need to be made should be made by the attorney and then interpreted. The interpreter may, however, note and report to the attorney any confusion due to culture or vocabulary, and make an appropriate request for clarification.
- 7. Provide interpreters with the information and support needed to get the job done.
 - The more information an interpreter has about a case, the better he or she can interpret. Arrange for interpreters to receive or have access to documents related to the assignment: complaints and indictments with supporting documents, investigative reports, motions and responses, witness and exhibit lists, bank and telephone records, PSRs, etc. Whenever possible, try to use the same interpreter for both in-court and out-of-court events in a given case.

LANGUAGE AND LITIGATION continued from page 3

- Whenever possible, inform defendants, court participants, and jurors about the interpreter's role.
- 8. In order to ensure an accurate record, provide a team of two interpreters for any lengthy or complex proceeding.
- Studies have shown that interpreters, no matter how experienced or competent, suffer mental fatigue after about 30 minutes of continuous interpreting. The use of a team prevents interpreter fatigue and ensures accuracy. Teams act as a safety net, so that any errors may be corrected and terminology queries answered. When a large number of defendants will be present at a proceeding, it may be necessary to hire more interpreters to facilitate attorney-client consultations.
- 9. A conflict of interest is not the same for an interpreter as for an attorney. An interpreter can work for either side or both sides of a case. The only prohibition is that an interpreter cannot be a witness in the same case in which he is acting as a proceedings interpreter.
 - Interpreters cannot be advocates or take sides. They are neutral officers of the court and thus may work for either side, or both sides, of a dispute. A proceedings interpreter should reveal to the judge and parties any prior contacts with the case. However, a conflict does arise if an interpreter may be called by one of the parties as a witness. An interpreter cannot testify as an expert

witness and also work as a proceedings interpreter in the same case.

- 10. Foreign-language evidence should be handled appropriately. The party offering the evidence should obtain prior transcription and translation of any tape recordings. Foreign-language documents introduced into evidence should be accompanied by a translation. (The translation may be stipulated, or authenticated through testimony.) A sound file or tape recording should never be translated "on the spot" in court.
 - Just as there are experts in fingerprint identification, there are experts in transcribing and translating recorded material for evidentiary purposes. Find and use an expert for this kind of work. Never ask an interpreter to render a simultaneous interpretation of recorded material in court at best, the results will be approximate and guesswork, not evidence.

Interpreters are support staff for your court: please help promote an atmosphere of consideration, respect, and cooperation among those who work with them. When interpreters work in the judicial system, they need a table in the courtroom for notebooks or laptops, a cup of water, a place to store their belongings, and a place to rest when off duty. Your kindness is much appreciated.

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Guide to Using Our Interpreter Service

- To reach an interpreter, dial 855-258-5696 from any phone.
- When prompted, enter the four-digit Master Account number for the Administrative Office of the Courts (6063).
- You will then be prompted to enter your specific office Access Code.
- At the last prompt, Press 1 for a Legal Environment Trained Spanish interpreter, or Press 2 for any other language, or for a certified Spanish interpreter.
- Give the interpreter your name and the non-English speaker's name. The interpreter is only allowed to give you their first name and ID number.
- Speak clearly in short phrases, pausing to allow for the interpretation.
- Ask one question at a time.
- Use simple language to express your meaning. Remember that slang does not translate.
- Explain any terms you believe may be unclear.
- Allow the interpreter to stop you and seek an explanation when necessary and to repeat back to you any critical information that requires clarification.
- Don't say anything that you do not want interpreted.
- If for any reason you get disconnected during a call, please hang up and call again. You may or may not get connected to the same interpreter.
- All language interpretation sessions are strictly confidential.

To reach a supervisor for technical support dial 800-428-6149.

WORKING WITH COURT INTERPRETERS

A GUIDE FOR JUDGES

POLICY NOTE: The Judicial Branch is committed to expanding state-funded foreign language access services to court proceedings for all case types using a phased implementation approach. This bench card addresses the current status of language access services provided by the Judicial Branch in accordance with the <u>Notice of Expansion and Enhancement of Foreign Language Interpreting Services</u> memorandum dated August 8, 2012, and the subsequent expansion memos found under the <u>Policies and Guidelines for Interpreters</u> at www.nccourts.org.

WHEN SHOULD THE COURT REQUIRE AN INTERPRETER?

The court should require a qualified interpreter for any court proceeding that involves a party in interest who speaks a language other than English as the primary language and has a limited ability to read, speak, or understand English.

WHO IS A PARTY IN INTEREST?

Parties in interest may be any of the following:

- A party
- A victim
- A witness
- The parent, legal guardian, or custodian of a minor party
- The legal guardian or custodian of an adult party

WHO PAYS FOR THE INTERPRETER?

The Judicial Branch will provide an interpreter at state expense in the following types of court proceedings:

- Criminal court proceedings
- Chapter 50B court proceedings
- Chapter 50C court proceedings
- Child custody mediation
- Juvenile proceedings
- Incompetency proceedings
- Civil commitment proceedings before a judicial official
- Child custody and support proceedings
- All proceedings heard before the magistrate
- Foreclosure proceedings
- Other proceedings as expanded by the NCAOC Director

In court proceedings other than those listed above, the court should require the parties to hire a qualified court interpreter from the OLAS Registry. If the parties fail to hire a qualified interpreter, the court may appoint an interpreter and apportion the costs to the parties as the court deems appropriate pursuant to NC Rules of Evidence 604 and 706(b).

EVALUATE THE NEED FOR A COURT INTERPRETER

To help determine whether to require a court interpreter, the court should ask questions that cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. For example:

- "Please tell me about your country of origin."
- "What kind of work do you do?"
- "What is the purpose of your court hearing today?"

ASSIGNMENT OF A COURT INTERPRETER

If the court determines that the party has limited English proficiency (LEP), the court should require a court interpreter. Any doubts should be resolved in favor of the LEP individual and an interpreter should be required.

- The court should only allow an interpreter to provide services in North Carolina courts if the Office of Language Access Services (OLAS) has evaluated and confirmed the interpreter's qualifications
- The court should never allow family or friends to interpret in court

FINDING AN INTERPRETER

Spanish court interpreter

- In a district *without* a staff court interpreter, schedule a Spanish court interpreter from the <u>Registry of Spoken Foreign Language Court Interpreters</u>
- In a district with a staff court interpreter, contact the staff court interpreter

Language other than Spanish (LOTS) court interpreter

- In a district without a staff court interpreter, submit a <u>Request for Non-Spanish</u> <u>Interpreter</u> to OLAS at least 10 business days prior to the scheduled court date
- In a district with a staff court interpreter, submit a <u>Request for Spoken Foreign</u> <u>Language Court Interpreter-Staff Interpreter Districts Only</u> to the staff court interpreter at least 10 business days prior to the scheduled court date

If the court is unable to locate a qualified interpreter, the court should continue the proceeding to a date on which an interpreter can be scheduled.

LANGUAGE ACCESS SERVICES PROVIDED BY OLAS

- In-person interpreting for court proceedings—staff court interpreters in 11 counties: Buncombe, Chatham, Durham, Forsyth, Guilford, Harnett, Johnston, Lee, Mecklenburg, Orange, and Wake; and contract court interpreters
- Telephone interpreting service—use for brief routine matters in district court; use by magistrates and DAs; use in public access areas in clerks' and family court offices
- Translation of court forms and vital court documents
- Transcription / translation of audio / visual evidence for district attorneys and public defenders or assigned counsel (court interpreters are prohibited by their ethics from interpreting audio / visual recordings; upon request to OLAS, all audio / visual recordings must be transcribed and translated *prior to the court proceeding*)



NORTH CAROLINA Administrative Office of the Courts

THE INTERPRETER'S OATH*

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that you will interpret accurately, completely, and impartially, using your best skill and judgment In accordance with the standards prescribed by law and the Code of Professional Responsibility for Court Interpreters, follow all official guidelines established by the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts for legal interpreting and translating, and discharge all of the solemn duties and obligations of legal interpretation and translation?

*There is no statutory or judicially approved oath. This form is recommended for your consideration.

CLARIFYING THE INTERPRETER'S ROLE TO THE JURY*

This court seeks a fair trial for all regardless of the language they speak and regardless of how well they may or may not speak English. Bias against or for persons who have little or no proficiency in English is not allowed. Therefore, do not allow the fact that the party requires an interpreter to in any way influence you.

*There is no pattern jury instruction on this matter. This form is recommended for your consideration.

CLARIFYING THE INTERPRETER'S ROLE TO THE WITNESS

I want you to understand the role of the interpreter. The interpreter is here only to interpret the proceedings. The interpreter will say only what is said in your language and will not add, omit, or summarize anything. The interpreter will say in English everything that you say in your language, so do not say anything you do not want everyone to hear. If you do not understand a question asked of you, request clarification from the person who asked it. Do not ask the interpreter.

You are giving testimony to this court; therefore please speak directly to the attorney or to me (the court). Do not ask the interpreter for advice. Speak in a loud clear voice. If you do not understand the interpreter please tell me. If you need the interpreter to repeat, please make your request to me, not to the interpreter. Please wait until the entire statement has been interpreted before you answer. Do you have any questions?

USE OF INTERPRETER OUTSIDE OF COURT PROCEEDING

Judicial Branch funds *are provided for interpreting services for out-of-court communications* on behalf of the **district attorney, Guardian ad Litem Program**, and, pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between NCAOC and the **Office of Indigent Defense Services (IDS)**, on behalf of public defenders and assigned counsel representing indigent parties for IDS.

- Staff court interpreters are prohibited from providing services out of court
- Spanish interpreters—District attorneys, Guardian ad Litem Program staff, public defenders, and assigned counsel must schedule a Spanish court interpreter from the <u>Registry of Spoken Foreign Language Court Interpreters</u>
- LOTS interpreters—District attorneys, Guardian ad Litem Program staff, public defenders, and assigned counsel must follow the FINDING AN INTERPRETER section on side 1

Language access services required for all out-of-court communications involving private counsel, including all interviews, investigations, and other aspects of general case preparation, are *outside the scope of services provided or funded by the Judicial Department*.

To ensure equal access to justice, private counsel are encouraged to privately
retain the services of an NCAOC-registered and qualified court interpreter by
contacting directly a contract interpreter from the <u>Registry of Spoken Foreign
Language Court Interpreters</u>

CHECKLIST

- □ Evaluate the need for an interpreter.
- □ Require an interpreter approved by OLAS.
- □ Allow the interpreter to meet with the LEP individual briefly prior to the proceeding to confirm the ability to communicate, and to view the court file prior to the proceeding to become familiar with case terminology, names, and dates.
- □ Allow the interpreter to review any documents that will need to be sight translated during the proceeding.
- □ Make sure that the interpreter is located in a position that allows the interpreter to see and hear everything that happens in the courtroom.
- □ Administer the interpreter's oath.
- □ Have the interpreter state his / her name and qualifications on the record.
- □ Explain the role of the interpreter to the parties, witnesses, and the jury on the record.
- □ Advise witnesses to speak clearly and at a moderate pace.
- □ Emphasize that the record produced by the court reporter or court recorder is the official record of the proceeding.
- Provide breaks every 30 minutes for the interpreter or require a team of two interpreters for proceedings expected to last longer than two hours.
- □ Observe the interpreter's conduct, communication, and interaction with participants; if problems arise, use a sidebar conference with attorneys and the interpreter or a recess to address and correct the problems.
- □ Keep in mind that the interpreter may be needed in other courtrooms.

Online resources: <u>www.nccourts.org/LanguageAccess</u>

919 890-1407 | OLAS@nccourts.org | North Carolina Judicial Center | P.O. Box 2448, Raleigh, NC 27602

Language Access Services - Page 18





Office of Language Access Services

Brooke Bogue Crozier Manager

PO Box 2448, Raleigh, NC 27602 T 919 890-1407 F 919 890-1907

MEMORANDUM

To: Superior Court Judges, District Court Judges, Clerks of Superior Court, Trial Court Coordinators, Trial Court Administrators, District Attorneys, Public Defenders, Magistrates, Language Access Stakeholders Committee

From: Brooke B. Crozier

Date: April 30, 2015

Re: Expansion of Language Access Services to All Cases Heard before Magistrates

As indicated in Judge Smith's <u>August 8, 2012, memorandum</u>,¹ the North Carolina unified court system is committed to the continued provision and expansion of language access services to limited English proficient (LEP) persons whom the courts serve. This memorandum announces the expansion of language access services to all civil proceedings before the magistrate, including marriages, effective Friday, May 1, 2015. As of that date, foreign language court interpreters now shall be provided at state expense to LEP parties in interest in all court proceedings heard before the magistrate on or after May 1, and subsequent appeals to district court.

With the cooperation of all judicial officials and court personnel, we should be able to provide services for these cases using existing resources. The key is to ensure that an interpreter is scheduled only when it is clear that the proceeding for which the interpreter is requested is, in fact, going to be heard by the court.

To assist your courts with effective interpreter scheduling, a two-sided chart to assist with scheduling court interpreters for courts is attached. The charts distinguish between districts with staff court interpreters assigned and districts without staff court interpreters, and between Spanish language

¹ Memoranda regarding language access services can be viewed at

North Carolina Judicial Center, 901 Corporate Center Drive, Raleigh, NC 27607

http://www.nccourts.org/LanguageAccess/Interpreters/Policies.asp

needs and LOTS. Please use the one that applies to your district. An updated *Working with Court Interpreters – A Guide for Judges* bench card has also been posted on the website for reference.²

Providing court interpreters and scheduling cases requiring court interpreters may be a new process for many, so the Office of Language Access Services (OLAS) offers the following tips to assist you:

- 1. When actions are filed, the language access needs of either of the parties should be identified and noted in the case file. Remember to always err on the side of caution and provide an interpreter if there is any doubt about a party's ability to read, speak, or understand English at a level sufficient to understand everything that is said during the proceeding, and to communicate effectively. If a request for an interpreter is received by the party, an interpreter should be provided.
- 2. Court personnel and judicial officials in criminal courts and civil courts must **coordinate calendars** to make the most judicious use of the interpreter's time throughout the courthouse. Court interpreters are expected to cover the needs of the entire courthouse for all covered case types, so please expect to share the interpreter and communicate scheduling needs with each other.
- 3. For Spanish language needs before the Magistrate, it may not be necessary to schedule an interpreter specifically for the proceeding. In many cases, a Spanish court interpreter is already scheduled to provide interpreting services in your courthouse for a District Court and / or Superior Court session. If this is the case, please utilize this same interpreter to cover the interpreting needs before the Magistrate. Unless the interpreter is providing services for an LEP party in a trial which requires the interpreter's constant presence, the interpreter will likely have sufficient down time between cases to cover your needs.
- 4. Interpreting services for LOTS must be requested in advance by the parties or attorneys to give OLAS time to locate and assign the appropriate language interpreter for the proceeding. The attached charts provide links to the request forms.
- 5. Failure to provide sufficient time to secure a qualified court interpreter may result in a delay or postponement of the court proceeding if a qualified interpreter is not available.
- 6. If proceedings are identified that require interpreting in the same language, those cases should be **grouped and scheduled on the same day and a single interpreter scheduled to cover all of them**. Requests will be easier to fill, particularly for Spanish language needs, if more than one case is scheduled on the calendar that will utilize the services of the court interpreter.
- 7. **Interpreters are neutral language conduits,** so it is not necessary to schedule an interpreter for each party in a single case if the parties speak the same foreign language.


² Updated Bench Card: http://www.nccourts.org/LanguageAccess/Documents/benchcard.pdf


- 8. Make every effort to **minimize the interpreter's time in the court proceeding** by hearing the cases requiring an interpreter as soon as possible after the interpreter arrives in the courtroom.
- 9. **Notify the interpreter as soon as the case is delayed, continued or otherwise disposed**. The interpreter is entitled to payment if you fail to notify him of cancellation at least 24 hours prior to the scheduled court proceeding.


OLAS will provide technical assistance to court officials to develop and implement procedures for expansion and the efficient allocation of current staff and contract interpreting services.


If you have any questions about this memorandum or future plans, please contact OLAS staff at (919) 890-1407.


TAB: Handling Money






















copies are distribute	an original and three copies. d as follows:	
Original (white)	CSC Cashier/Bookkeeping	
Payor copy (green)	Given to payor	
CSC copy (pink)	Placed in case file at CSC office	
Audit copy (yellow)	Always stays in receipt book	


















Bond. Date Defendant Released Signature Of Custodian Signature Of Custodian Sheriff Deputy Sheriff Other	Date Defendant Released Signature Of Custodian Image: Defendant Released Signature Of Custodian Image: NOTES ON CASH BONDS: Image: Defendant Released (1) To Official Taking The Bond. Use this form for all cash bonds. Only magistrate or clerk may take cash bond. Jailer may not take cash bond. Cont this form as follows: When Cash Deposited By Defendant Or By Another Person Who Intends For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligation Enter defendent's name, address and SS# at the top of Side One. Check "Cash Appearance Bond." Have defendent sign. Do no more. No other person's name should appear on this form. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete If Cash Deposited" Make receipt ou DEFENDANT, not to any other parson. When Cash Deposited By Another Person Who Dees NOT Intend For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligations. Entry other parson. When Cash Deposited By Another Person Who Dees NOT Intend For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligations. Entry other parson. When Cash Deposited By Another Person Who Dees NOT Intend For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligations. Entry defendant's name, address and SS# ot heror. Check "Surry Appearance Bond." Also check "Cash Deposited By Surrey! "Have defendant sign. Enter name, address and SS# ot person depositing cash under "Accommodation Bondsmann." Have that person sign under "Signat ov name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete If Cash Deposited Make receipt our name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete If Cash Deposited If Make receipt over name, sidnees and SS# ot person tay over name, and enter receipt number u		defendant name			DIAN OF DETEN	TION FACILITY	
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(1) To Official Taking The Bond. Use this form for all cash bonds. Only magistrate or clerk may take cash bond, Jailer may not take cash bond. Cot this form as follows: When Cash Deposited By Defendant Or By Another Person Who Intends For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligat Enter clefendant's name, address and SS# at the top of Side One. Check 'Cash Appearance Bond.' Have defendant sign. Do no more. No other person's name should appear on this form. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under 'Complete II Cash Deposited.' Make receipt of DEFENDANT, not to any other person. When Cash Deposited By Another Person Who Does NOT Intend For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligations. E: defendant's name, address and SS# to the top of Side One. Check 'Cash Papeateres Bond.' Also check 'Cash Deposited By Surety'. Have defendant is name, address and SS# to the top of Side One. Check 'Cash Papeateres Bond.' Also check 'Cash Deposited By Surety'. Have defendant is name, address and SS# of person depositing cash under 'Accommodation Bondsman.' Have that person sign under 'Sig of Surety'. 'Complete Inf Cash Deposited By Surety'. Have defendant is on Enter rout to person depositing the cash. (2) To Bookkeeper. When case disposed, disburse cash as follows: (1) If 'Cash Appearance Bond'' checked on Side One, disburse to Defendant's obligation Surety' are checked on Side One, disburse to Defendant's dominant's obligations. E: To Bookkeeper. When case disposed, disburse cash as follows: (1) II 'Cash Appearance Bond'' checked on Side One, disburse to Defendant to defendant's obligations (2) II''.	 To Official Taking The Bond. Use this form for all cash bonds. Only magistrate or clerk may take cash bond. Jailer may not take cash bond. Cont this form as follows: When Cash Deposited By Defendant Or By Another Person Who Intends For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligation Enter defendant's name, address and SS# at the top of Side One. Check "Cash Appearance Bond." Have defendant sign. Do no more. No other person Brame should appearance in the second there receipt number under "Complete II Cash Deposited & Make receipt ou DEFENDANT, not to any other person. When Cash Deposited By Another Person Who Dees NOT Intend For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligations. Ent defendant's name, address and SS# at the top of Side One. Check "Surety Appearance Bond." Also check "Cash Deposited By Surety." Have defendant's name, address and SS# of person depositing cash under "Accommodation Bondsman." Have the Iperson sign under "Signa of Surety." Complete notarization for that person. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete II Cash Deposited M& Receipt ou Cash." "Surety appearance Bond." Also check "Cash Deposited By Surety." Have defendant's onter advectmentation for that person. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete II Cash Deposited." Make receipt ou to person depositing the cash. To Bookkeeper. When case disposed, disburse cash as follows: (1) If "Cash Appearance Bond" checked on Side One, disburse to Defendant to to defendant's obligations if court so orders. (2) If "Surety Appearance Bond" and "Cash Deposited by Surety" are checked on Side One, disburse to person named under "Accommodation Bondsman." Bond With Insurance Company As Surety Same As Cash Except In Child Support. G.S. 154-531(4) provides that an appearance bond erec by a bail of an insurance company is the same as cash bond, except in child suppor contentproceedings where only complete onothare to negating the	Date De	efendant Released	Signature Of Custodian	YMATHROD	Sheriff	Deputy Sheriff	Other
this form as follows: When Cash Deposited By Defendant Or By Another Person Who Intends For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligat Enter defendant's name, address and SS# at the top of Side One. Check "Cash Appearance Bond," Have defendant sign. Do no more. No other person's name should appear on this form. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete II" Cash Deposited By Another Person Who Does NOT Intend For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligat Der ENDANT, not to any other person. When Cash Deposited By Another Person Who Does NOT Intend For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligations. En defendant's name, address and SS# at the top of Side One. Check "Carety Appearance Bond". Have defended by Surety, "Have defendant is name, address and SS# of person depositing cash under "Accommodation Bondsman." Have that person sign under "Sig of Surety." Complete notarization for that person. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete II Cash Deposited." Maker receipt out to person depositing the cash. (2) To Bookkeeper. When case disposed, disburse cash as follows: (1) II "Cash Appearance Bond" ackeeked on Side One, disburse to Defendant to defendant's obligations. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete II Cash Deposited." Maker out to person depositing the cash. (2) To Bookkeeper. When case disposed, disburse cash as follows: (1) II "Cash Appearance Bond" ackeeked on Side One, disburse to Defendant to defendant's obligations. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete II Cash Deposited." Maker out to person depositing the cash.	this form as follows: When Cash Deposited By Defendant Or By Another Person Who Intends For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligation Enter defendant's name, address and SS# at the top of Side One. Check "Cash Appearance Bond." Have defendant sign. Do no more. No other person's name should appear on this form. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete If Cash Deposited." Make receipt ou DEFENDANT, not to any other person. When Cash Deposited By Another Person Who Does NOT Intend For The Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligations. Enter defendant's name, address and SS# at the top of Side One. Check "Cash To Be Used To Satisfy The Defendant's Obligations. Enter defendant's name, address and SS# of person depositing cash under "Accommodation Bondsman." Have that person sign under "Signa of Surely." Complete notarization for that person. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete If Cash Deposited 'Make receipt out to parson dopositing the cash. (3) To Bookkeeper. When case disposed, disburse cash as follows: (1) If "Cash Appearance Bond" and 'Cash Cacked on Side One, disburse to to defendant's obligations ifourt so orders. (2) To Bookkeeper. When case disposed, disburse to sate follows: (1) If "Cash Appearance Bond" and 'Cash Deposited by Surely" are checked on Side One, disburse to person named under "Accommodation Bondsman." (3) Bond With Insurance Company As Surely Same As Cash Except In Child Support. G.S. 15A-531(4) provides that an appearance bond except y a bail gent acting on behalf of an insurance company is the same as a cash bond, except in child support contempt precedings where only c	NOT	ES ON CASH BON	NDS:				
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defendant's name, address and SS# at the top of Side One, Check "Surety Appearance Bond". Also check "Cash Deposited By Surety " Have defendant sign. Enter name, address and SS# of person depositing cash under "Accommodation Bondsman." Have that person sign under "Sig of Surety." Complete notarization for that person. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete If Cash Deposited." Make re out to person depositing the cash. (2) To Bookkeeper. When case disposed, disburse cash as follows: (1) If "Cash Appearance Bond" checked on Side One, disburse to Defendant to defendant's obligations if court so orders. (2) If "Surety Appearance Bond" and "Cash Deposited by Surety" are checked on Side One, disburse to to defendant's obligations if court so orders. (2) If "Surety Appearance Bond" and "Cash Deposited by Surety" are checked on Side One, disburse to to defendant's obligations if court so orders.	 defendant's name, address and SS# at the top of Side One. Check "Surety Appearance Bond" Also check "Cash Deposited By Surety". "Have defendant sign. Enter name, address and SS# of person depositing cash under "Accommodation Bondsman". Have thet person sign under "Signa of Surety." Complete notarization for that person. Enter your name, sign and enter receipt number under "Complete If Cash Deposited." Make reco out to person depositing cash as follows: (1) If "Cash Appearance Bond" checked on Side One, disburse to Defendant on to defendant's obligations if ourt so orders. (2) If "Surety Appearance Bond" and "Cash Deposited De y Surety" are checked on Side One, disburse to person named under "Accommodation Bondsman". (3) Bond With Insurance Company As Surety Same As Cash Except In Child Support. G.S. 154-531(4) provides that an appearance bond even only a sea shond, except in child support content provides mate an ender only ". (3) Bond With Insurance Company As Surety Same As Cash Except In Child Support. G.S. 154-531(4) provides that an appearance bond even only a sea or bond. (3) Bond With Insurance Company is the same as a cash bond, except in child support content proceedings where only content person. 	PD	person's name shou DEFENDANT, not to	Id appear on this form. o any other person.	Enter your name, sign	and enter receipt nun	nber under "Complete	If Cash Deposited." Make receipt out t
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AOC-CR-201, Side Two, Rev. 309	AOC-CR-201, Side Two, Rev. 3/09 © 2009 Administrative Office of the Courts							

10CR 101 YOUR 10CR 101 Name And Mailing Address Of Defendent In The General Court Of Justice TEW MANNY BILLS District Superior Court Division 101 MAIN ST RALEIGH, NC 27602 Telephone No. Of Defendent APPEARANCE BOND FOR Social Security No. Telephone No. Of Defendent PRETRIAL RELEASE Total Bond Required Amount of This Bond \$ 1,000.00 \$ 0,000.00 \$ 0,000.00	
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has anyone for my total band ministery privatived any antimitive empirity or provident for executing this literat	
□ Unsecured Appearance Bond - I, the undersigned defendant, acknowledge that my personal representatives and I an North Carolina the sum shown above, subject to the conditions of this Bond stated on the reverse side. Carolina the sum shown above, subject to the conditions of this Bond stated on the reverse side. Carolina the sum shown above, and hereby deposit the cash identified below as security with the understanding that the deposite of the Court's determination that the conditions of the state of the conditions of this Bond stated on the reverse side. It will be available to satisfy my obligations (and the State of the Court's determination that the conditions of a state of the conditions of this Bond stated on the reverse side, and as security for said Bond have executed to real or personal property. payable to the State of North Carolina the sum chown actions of this Bond stated on the reverse side, and as security for said Bond have executed to real or personal property. Payable to the State of North Carolina and with power of sale conditions during the set side of North Carolina the sum chown above, subject to the conditions of the State of North Carolina the sum chown above, subject to the conditions of the State of North Carolina the sum chown above, subject to the conditions of North Carolina the sum chown above, subject to the conditions of the Bond stated on the reverse side. (and stated on the reverse side) is complete and State of North Carolina the sum shown above, subject to the conditions of the Bond stated on the reverse side. (Carolina the sum chown above, subject to the conditions of the Bond stated on the reverse side.) (Professional bondmann, Bail Agent and Runnerga). The 'Affdavit' on the reverse side. It is complete and Carolina the understanding that the deposited will be returned to us upon the Courts determination that the conditions of the Bond will be returned to us upon the Courts determination that the conditions of the Bond will be returned to usupon the Courts determinatio	way the State of North sosit will be returned upon the reverse side, and the state of North Carolina the a mortgage or deed of the a mortgage or deed of the source of this Bond. atives are bound to pay to true.
been performed, and that it will NOT be available to satisfy defendant's obligations. Date Of Execution Of Bond Signature Of Defendant	

ADC-A2 REV. 11,99				COUNTY)	IOR COURT	RECEIPT NO. I- 150252
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CRTA	FOR ALL MAGISTRATI	E COSTS INDICATE:	Upset Bid	26700	
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CRSC	FACILITY (If municipal facility		CVMC	-	
SB	Magistrates/Clerks	y)	CDDC CVDC	-	
FOR ALL CRIMINAL COSTS	Cash Bond	26210 1000.00	CVBC	-	
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(If municipal facility)	Partial Pay	20100	Alimony	26420	
Miscecllaneous Receipts	Restutitution	26110	Civil Officer Fee	22515	
AAF **	Fines	22700	Child Support	26410	
BC	Jail Fees	22600	Other		
OSA	Other Officer Fees		Other-		-
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STATE OF NOR	TH CAROLINA	File No.	10CR 101
YOU	R County	In The General Court O	
Name And Mailing Address Of Defer			
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101 MAIN ST		APPEARANCE	BOND
RALEIGH, NC 27602		FOR	Y and two most the subscript of the
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Total Bond Required	Amount Of This Bond		
\$ 1,000.00 Offenses And Additional File Numbe	\$ 1,000.00	#	G.S. 15A-531, 15A-534, 15A-544.
North Carolina the sum sho Cash Appearance Bonc Carolina the sum shown abo the Court's determination the it will be available to satisfy Defendant's Property A shown above, subject to the to real or personal property.	wn above, subject to the conditions of d (See note on reverse side), - I, the ove, and hereby deposit the cash idem at the conditions of release have beer my obligations. 	this Bond stated on the reverse side. undersigned defendant, acknowledge tha tiffed below as security with the understar a performed, subject to the conditions of th reverse side, and as security for said Bon and with power of sale conditioned upon	Iding that the deposit will be returned upon his Bond stated on the reverse side, and that and to pay the State of North Carolina the su d have executed a mortgage or deed of trus the breach of any condition of this Bond.
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
	D	Yo		RECEIPT NO. I-	150252
Received of <u>R</u> For <u>Hugh</u>	AISA BADMAN	ADMAN	RALEIGH, NC		
	R 101		- Jarrian Sit, NC	£160 L	
Jeneral Court Fee: Superior Court Criminal Civil Spec Proc Estates District Court Criminal Civil Magistrate-S.F. Misc-Fees & Comm	\$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$	Facility Fee-Co Facility Fee-Mun Officer Fee-Co Officer Fee-Mun Jail Fee-Co Jail Fee-Mun LEOB & RF Fine Other \$	\$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$	Partial Pay Judgment Cash Bond Trust Alim & Supp Total Received \$	\$ \$_ <u>1,000.00</u> \$ \$
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
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File # 10 (R 101	For Hugh Badman	그가면 잘 모고 도망가 하고 그렇게	
Received of Raisa Badmar	300 South St. Laleigh, NC Received	by Cimulin	Sec. 2
Criminal Cost Amou	Int Magistrates Amoun	t Estate/Special Proceeding	Amount
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IFTA	IFMC	Trust 26310	
IFTC	IFWM	SPSC	
CRDC	MMVM	Foreclosure 21445	
CRTC	SBM	Surplus Funds 26600	1. 1. 1. 1
CRDA	Marriage 21330	Widows Allowance 21140	
CRTA	FOR ALL MAGISTRATE COSTS INDICAT		
CRDS	OFFICER FACILITY	Civil Cost CVMC	
MMV	(If municipal facility)	CDDC	
SB	Magistrates/Clerks	CVDC	
FOR ALL CRIMINAL COSTS			
INDICATE:	Cash Bond-Other Cnty 292XX	CVBC	
OFFICER	Purge Pymt 26410	Judgment 26115	
FACILITY	Purge Pymt-Other Cnty 298XX	Rent Bond 26220	
(If municipal facility)	Partial Pay 20100	Alimony 26420	
Miscecllaneous Receipts	Restutitution 26110	Civil Officer Fee 22515	
AAF	* Fines 22700	Child Support 26410	
BC	Jail Fees 22600	Other	
OSA	Other Officer Fees	Other-	
Copies Record Check	FTC Fee 21211	Other-	
Civil Revocation	EXP Community Svc 24202	Other-	
Bad Ck Restitution	Other-	Other-	
AOC-A2 REV. 1/14	Control and Control of		

	CAROLI	NA	File No.	10CR 101	
ANOTHER		County		Court Of Justice perior Court Division	
Name And Mailing Address Of Defendan HUGH BADMAN 101 MAIN ST RALEIGH, NC 27602	d 	enterne of A. S. Conversion of A. S. Series and S. S. S. Series and T. S. S.		ANCE BOND	Copyon the second and a second the second and a second an
Social Security No. XXX-XX-XXXX	Telephone No.		PRETRIA	L RELEASE	
Total Bond Required \$ 1,000.00	Amount Of This	Bond 1.000.00		G S 154	A-531, 15A-534, 15A-544.
Offenses And Additional File Numbers	above, subject to	the conditions of th	is Bond stated on the reverse	side.	Vincen Grand A. C. L. M.
Unsecured Appearance Bo Noth Carolina the sum shown a Cash Appearance Bond (S Carolina the sum shown above, the Court's determination that th	above, subject to ee note on rever and hereby depone e conditions of re	the conditions of the rse side.) - I, the up sit the cash identifi	is Bond stated on the reverse ndersigned defendant, ackno ied below as security with the	side. wledge that I am bound to pa understanding that the depo	bound to pay the State of ay the State of North sait will be returned upon
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10C-A2 REV. 11/99	10	CLERK OF S	UPERIOR COURT	RECEIPT NO. I- 150251
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For File #/0	07 3	K	ALSIGH, NC 2	.160 C
General Court Fee: Superior Court Criminal Civil Spec Proc Estates District Court Criminal Civil Magistrate-S.F. Misc-Fees & Com PAYOR	\$ \$ \$ \$ \$	Facility Fee-Co Facility Fee-Mun Officer Fee-Mun Jail Fee-Co Jaili Fee-Mun LEOB & RF Fine Other S <u>1</u> 2003.0	\$ \$ \$ \$ \$ 2Des Бало Far Альогне R Co Ву	Partial Pay \$ Judgment \$ Cash Bond \$ Trust \$ Alim & Supp \$ Total <u>Received</u> \$ <i>l</i> , DOD:00 WJTY EXERK OF SUPERIOR COURTMAGESTIMATE

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For County Ducham		Cash	Check	мо	
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Received of Hugh Badmay	0.	Received by	Cimun	-	
Criminal Cost Amount	Magistrates	Amount	Estate/Special Proc	eedina	Amount
IFC	CRMC		ESTC		
IFDA	стwм		Other Estate Cost	21140	
IFTA	IFMC		Trust	26310	
IFTC	IFWM	and the second	SPSC		
CRDC	MMVM	1912 1912	Foreclosure	21445	
CRTC	SBM		Surplus Funds	26600	
CRDA	Marriage 2133 FOR ALL MAGISTRATE COS		Widows Allowance Upset Bid	21140 26700	
CRDS	OFFICER	IS INDICATE:	Civil Cost	26700	
CRSC	FACILITY		CVMC		
MMV	(If municipal facility)		CDDC		
SB	Magistrates/Clerks		CVDC		
FOR ALL CRIMINAL COSTS	Cash Bond 2621	0	CVSC		
INDICATE:	Cash Bond-Other Cnty 292X	x 1000."	CVBC		
OFFICER	Purge Pymt 2641		Judgment	26115	
FACILITY	Purge Pymt-Other Cnty 298X		Rent Bond	26220	100 million (100 million)
(If municipal facility)	Partial Pay 2010		Alimony	26420	
Miscecllaneous Receipts	Restutitution 2611		Civil Officer Fee	22515	
AAF	Fines 2270		Child Support	26410	
BC	Jail Fees 2260 Other Officer Fees		Other Other-		
Copies	FTA Fee 2121	1	Other-		
Record Check	FTC Fee 2121		Other-		
Civil Revocation	EXP Community Svc 2420		Other-		
Bad Ck Restitution	Other-	Bross Cantor Sci	Other-		
AOC-A2 REV. 1/14	Paratest contraction of the second seco				







File # (1/23 4/56/7 - 0) vs. General Court Fee: Facility Fee-Mun ys. Partial Pay s	ADC-42 REK. 11,99 	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COUR	RECEIPT NO. 1 = 1 0 0 4 0 Cash ⊠ Check □ M.O. I
General Court Fee: Facility Fee-Co 12.00 Partial Pay Superior Court Facility Fee-Mun Judgment Judgment Criminal 0fficer Fee-Co 5.00 Cash Bond Civil \$ Officer Fee-Mun Trust \$ Spec Proc \$ Jail Fee-Co Alim & Supp \$ Estates \$ Jail Fee-Mun \$ Trust \$ District Court LEOB & RF. \$ 71.50 Total Received \$	A 17746177	T RALEIGH, NC 27602	70-55
Magistrate-S.F. \$ #2.00 LED TRNC \$10.00 65.20	General Court Fee: Superior Court Criminal Spec Proc Estates District Court Criminal S Other S District Court Criminal S Other S Magistrate-S.F.	Facility Fee-Mun \$	Judgment \$
PAYOR By By		Ву	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT/MAGISTRATE


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Received of Haves Frot		Received b		, NO AI	000-	
			- Officer -	anding	Amount	
Criminal Cost Amount	Magistrates CRMC	Amount	Estate/Special Proc ESTC	eeaing	Amount	
IFC	CTWM		Other Estate Cost	21140	Real Property in the second se	
IFTA	IFMC	1720	Trust	26310	The second s	
IFTC	IFWM		SPSC			
CRDC	MMVM	Kan the Providence	Foreclosure	21445	Contraction of the second	
CRTC	SBM	College States 1 all per	Surplus Funds	26600		
CRDA	Marriage	21330	Widows Allowance	21140		
CRTA	FOR ALL MAGISTRAT			26700		
CRDS	OFFICER	SHP	Civil Cost			
CRSC	FACILITY		CVMC			
MMV	(If municipal facility	y)	CDDC			
SB	Magistrates/Clerks		CVDC			
FOR ALL CRIMINAL COSTS	Cash Bond	26210	CVSC CVBC			
INDICATE: OFFICER	Cash Bond-Other Cnty Purge Pymt	26410	Judament	26115		
FACILITY	Purge Pymt Purge Pymt-Other Cnty	298XX	Rent Bond	26220		
(If municipal facility)	Partial Pay	20100	Alimony	26420		
Miscecllaneous Receipts -	Restutitution	26110	Civil Officer Fee	22515		
AAF	Fines	22700 30.00	Child Support	26410		
BC	Jail Fees	22600	Other			
OSA	Other Officer Fees	and the second s	Other-		A DECEMBER OF	
Copies	FTA Fee	21211	Other-			
Record Check	FTC Fee	21213	Other-			
Civil Revocation	EXP Community Svc	24202	Other-			
Bad Ck Restitution	Other-		Other-			
AOC-A2 REV. 1/14						


GS 20-135.2	amounts for waivers in 7A-304) A -Seat Belts -Motorcycle/Moped						
	ourt Infraction IFMC 127.05 IV AG Criminal Fee Mag 245 IV AG Lotinal Fee Mag 245 IV AG Lot OB 200 LEO Training Cert Fee 12.00 Facility Fee Mag 18.00 D CM Madon Confin. Fee 4.00 Judy Phone Syst Fee 5.00 178.00		Court Infaction-Chp 20 IFWM 127.05 MAG Criminal Fee Mag 2.45 MAG LAA 7.50 LEO8 2.00 LEO Training Cert Fee 10.00 Chapter 20 MV Offense 12.00 Facity Fee Mag 18.00 DC Misdm Conto. Fee 4.00 Jud Phone Syst Fee 5.00 Service 188.00		Court Misdemeanor CRMC 127/05 MAS Criminal Fee Mag 245 MAS Lob 245 MAS Lob 200 LEO Training and Cert. Fee 12:00 Facility Fee Mag 200 DIA/Fee 18:00 DC Misdim Confin. Fee 4:00 Jud Phone Syst Fee 5:00 Officer 180:00		Misdemanor-Chp 20 CTWM 127.05 MAG Criminal Fee Mag 2.45 MAG Ltonia 7.50 LEOB 2.00 LEO Training and Cert. Fet 10.00 Chapter 20 MV Offense 12.00 Facility Fee Mag 2.00 DNA Fee 18.00 DC Misdm Confin. Fee 4.00 Jud Phone Syst Fee 5.00 Officer 190.00
	lagistrate Court SBM 127.05 M AG Criminal Fee 2.45 M AG LAA 2.00 LE 0 Training and Cert. Fee 25.50 Fines 4.00 Jud Phone Syst Fee 161.00		Noped - Magistrate Crt MMVM 127.05 MAG Criminal Fee 2.45 MAG IDA Fee 2.00 LEO Training and Cert. Fe 25.50 Fines 4.00 Jud Phone Syst Fee 161.00	Civil Magistr 21320 21321 e 22320 24681 TOTAL	ate Count CVMIC (costs in 77,55 M AG Ciul Fee 2.45 M AG IDA Civil 12.00 Facility Fee 4.00 Jud Fac Fee 96.00	1 7A-305)	
, Performing m 21330	30.00 Officer Fees thy code (23000) if CPD performs servic narriage ceremony 20.00 ion for Year's allowance 8.00 (Magistrate's only)	ce) F	aking a deposition 2130 10.00 (Magistrate's roof of execution or acknowledgmen 21330 2.00 erforming an other statutory function 21330 2.00	t of any instru			


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













































TAB: Avoiding Bias

STRUGGLING TOWARD FAIRNESS

MOST OF US SHARE TWO ASSUMPTIONS:

- 1) That we accurately perceive the world around us; and
- 2) That we are consciously aware—and thus in control—of internal influences on our behavior. That is, we know why we think what we think, and do what we do.

EXERCISE:


How many passes did you count? _____

EXERCISE: INTERVIEW A STRANGER

Notes:

Talking About Groups






IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST

Black Patient	White Patient	Black Patient	White Patient
or	or	ar	a
Bad	Good	Bad	Good
	a		as <i>ure</i> b
White Patient	Black Patient	White Patient	Black Patient
White Patient ल	Black Patient a	White Patient or	Black Patient a
ar	a	a Bad	α

https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/





Why is she blindfolded?

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT OF IMPLICIT BIAS ON YOUR DECISIONS AS A MAGISTRATE

- 1) Heighten awareness of differences, and remind yourself that differences increase the risk of out-group bias.
- 2) Remember that the brain relies on automatic processing when you are
 - a. In a hurry
 - b. Tired
 - c. Upset
 - d. Stressed
 - e. Angry

Slowing down and recognizing how you feel makes a big difference in what you think and do.

- 3) Think about your thinking. Specifically identify categories that you have negative associations to. Be alert to circumstances in which those associations may be triggered. Combat them by pausing to consciously break the associational link.
- 4) Keep learning. Take the IAT. Check out the resources listed in the Appendix. Invite a colleague to watch and discuss one of the online videos with you.

Decision-making and Fairness References

Drennan/School of Government, UNC

October 2013

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- 2. Project Implicit[®] Web site: <u>http://projectimplicit.net/</u>
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August 17, 2011

Do You Suffer From Decision Fatigue?

By JOHN TIERNEY

Three men doing time in Israeli prisons recently appeared before a parole board consisting of a judge, a criminologist and a social worker. The three prisoners had completed at least two-thirds of their sentences, but the parole board granted freedom to only one of them. Guess which one:

Case 1 (heard at 8:50 a.m.): An Arab Israeli serving a 30-month sentence for fraud.

Case 2 (heard at 3:10 p.m.): A Jewish Israeli serving a 16-month sentence for assault.

Case 3 (heard at 4:25 p.m.): An Arab Israeli serving a 30-month sentence for fraud.

There was a pattern to the parole board's decisions, but it wasn't related to the men's ethnic backgrounds, crimes or sentences. It was all about timing, as researchers discovered by analyzing more than 1,100 decisions over the course of a year. Judges, who would hear the prisoners' appeals and then get advice from the other members of the board, approved parole in about a third of the cases, but the probability of being paroled fluctuated wildly throughout the day. Prisoners who appeared early in the morning received parole about 70 percent of the time, while those who appeared late in the day were paroled less than 10 percent of the time.

The odds favored the prisoner who appeared at 8:50 a.m. — and he did in fact receive parole. But even though the other Arab Israeli prisoner was serving the same sentence for the same crime — fraud — the odds were against him when he appeared (on a different day) at 4:25 in the afternoon. He was denied parole, as was the Jewish Israeli prisoner at 3:10 p.m, whose sentence was shorter than that of the man who was released. They were just asking for parole at the wrong time of day.

There was nothing malicious or even unusual about the judges' behavior, which was <u>reported earlier this</u> <u>year</u> by Jonathan Levav of Stanford and Shai Danziger of Ben-Gurion University. The judges' erratic judgment was due to the occupational hazard of being, as George W. Bush once put it, "the decider." The mental work of ruling on case after case, whatever the individual merits, wore them down. This sort of decision fatigue can make quarterbacks prone to dubious choices late in the game and C.F.O.'s prone to disastrous dalliances late in the evening. It routinely warps the judgment of everyone, executive and nonexecutive, rich and poor — in fact, it can take a special toll on the poor. Yet few people are even aware of it, and researchers are only beginning to understand why it happens and how to counteract it.

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Decision fatigue helps explain why ordinarily sensible people get angry at colleagues and families, splurge on clothes, buy junk food at the supermarket and can't resist the dealer's offer to rustproof their new car. No matter how rational and high-minded you try to be, you can't make decision after decision without paying a biological price. It's different from ordinary physical fatigue — you're not consciously aware of being tired — but you're low on mental energy. The more choices you make throughout the day, the harder each one becomes for your brain, and eventually it looks for shortcuts, usually in either of two very different ways. One shortcut is to become reckless: to act impulsively instead of expending the energy to first think through the consequences. (Sure, tweet that photo! What could go wrong?) The other shortcut is the ultimate energy saver: do nothing. Instead of agonizing over decisions, avoid any choice. Ducking a decision often creates bigger problems in the long run, but for the moment, it eases the mental strain. You start to resist any change, any potentially risky move — like releasing a prisoner who might commit a crime. So the fatigued judge on a parole board takes the easy way out, and the prisoner keeps doing time.

Decision fatigue is the newest discovery involving a phenomenon called ego depletion, a term coined by the <u>social psychologist Roy F. Baumeister</u> in homage to a Freudian hypothesis. Freud speculated that the self, or ego, depended on mental activities involving the transfer of energy. He was vague about the details, though, and quite wrong about some of them (like his idea that artists "sublimate" sexual energy into their work, which would imply that adultery should be especially rare at artists' colonies). Freud's energy model of the self was generally ignored until the end of the century, when Baumeister began studying mental discipline in a series of experiments, first at Case Western and then at Florida State University.

These experiments demonstrated that there is a finite store of mental energy for exerting self-control. When people fended off the temptation to scarf down M&M's or freshly baked chocolate-chip cookies, they were then less able to resist other temptations. When they forced themselves to remain stoic during a tearjerker movie, afterward they gave up more quickly on lab tasks requiring self-discipline, like working on a geometry puzzle or squeezing a hand-grip exerciser. Willpower turned out to be more than a folk concept or a metaphor. It really was a form of mental energy that could be exhausted. The experiments confirmed the 19th-century notion of willpower being like a muscle that was fatigued with use, a force that could be conserved by avoiding temptation. To study the process of ego depletion, researchers concentrated initially on acts involving self-control — the kind of self-discipline popularly associated with willpower, like resisting a bowl of ice cream. They weren't concerned with routine decision-making, like choosing between chocolate and vanilla, a mental process that they assumed was quite distinct and much less strenuous. Intuitively, the chocolate-vanilla choice didn't appear to require willpower.

But then a postdoctoral fellow, Jean Twenge, started working at Baumeister's laboratory right after planning her wedding. As Twenge studied the results of the lab's ego-depletion experiments, she remembered how exhausted she felt the evening she and her fiancé went through the ritual of registering for gifts. Did they want plain white china or something with a pattern? Which brand of knives? How many towels? What kind of sheets? Precisely how many threads per square inch?

"By the end, you could have talked me into anything," Twenge told her new colleagues. The symptoms sounded familiar to them too, and gave them an idea. A nearby department store was holding a going-out-

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of-business sale, so researchers from the lab went off to fill their car trunks with simple products — not exactly wedding-quality gifts, but sufficiently appealing to interest college students. When they came to the lab, the students were told they would get to keep one item at the end of the experiment, but first they had to make a series of choices. Would they prefer a pen or a candle? A vanilla-scented candle or an almond-scented one? A candle or a T-shirt? A black T-shirt or a red T-shirt? A control group, meanwhile — let's call them the nondeciders — spent an equally long period contemplating all these same products without having to make any choices. They were asked just to give their opinion of each product and report how often they had used such a product in the last six months.

Afterward, all the participants were given one of the classic tests of self-control: holding your hand in ice water for as long as you can. The impulse is to pull your hand out, so self-discipline is needed to keep the hand underwater. The deciders gave up much faster; they lasted 28 seconds, less than half the 67-second average of the nondeciders. Making all those choices had apparently sapped their willpower, and it wasn't an isolated effect. It was confirmed in other experiments testing students after they went through exercises like choosing courses from the college catalog.

For a real-world test of their theory, the lab's researchers went into that great modern arena of decision making: the suburban mall. They interviewed shoppers about their experiences in the stores that day and then asked them to solve some simple arithmetic problems. The researchers politely asked them to do as many as possible but said they could quit at any time. Sure enough, the shoppers who had already made the most decisions in the stores gave up the quickest on the math problems. When you shop till you drop, your willpower drops, too.

Any decision, whether it's what pants to buy or whether to start a war, can be broken down into what psychologists call the Rubicon model of action phases, in honor of the river that separated Italy from the Roman province of Gaul. When Caesar reached it in 49 B.C., on his way home after conquering the Gauls, he knew that a general returning to Rome was forbidden to take his legions across the river with him, lest it be considered an invasion of Rome. Waiting on the Gaul side of the river, he was in the "predecisional phase" as he contemplated the risks and benefits of starting a civil war. Then he stopped calculating and crossed the Rubicon, reaching the "postdecisional phase," which Caesar defined much more felicitously: "The die is cast."

The whole process could deplete anyone's willpower, but which phase of the decision-making process was most fatiguing? To find out, Kathleen Vohs, a former colleague of Baumeister's now at the University of Minnesota, performed an experiment using the self-service Web site of Dell Computers. One group in the experiment carefully studied the advantages and disadvantages of various features available for a computer — the type of screen, the size of the hard drive, etc. — without actually making a final decision on which ones to choose. A second group was given a list of predetermined specifications and told to configure a computer by going through the laborious, step-by-step process of locating the specified features among the arrays of options and then clicking on the right ones. The purpose of this was to duplicate everything that happens in the postdecisional phase, when the choice is implemented. The third group had to figure out for themselves which features they wanted on their computers and go through the process of choosing them;

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they didn't simply ponder options (like the first group) or implement others' choices (like the second group). They had to cast the die, and that turned out to be the most fatiguing task of all. When self-control was measured, they were the one who were most depleted, by far.

The experiment showed that crossing the Rubicon is more tiring than anything that happens on either bank — more mentally fatiguing than sitting on the Gaul side contemplating your options or marching on Rome once you've crossed. As a result, someone without Caesar's willpower is liable to stay put. To a fatigued judge, denying parole seems like the easier call not only because it preserves the status quo and eliminates the risk of a parolee going on a crime spree but also because it leaves more options open: the judge retains the option of paroling the prisoner at a future date without sacrificing the option of keeping him securely in prison right now. Part of the resistance against making decisions comes from our fear of giving up options. The word "decide" shares an etymological root with "homicide," the Latin word "caedere," meaning "to cut down" or "to kill," and that loss looms especially large when decision fatigue sets in.

Once you're mentally depleted, you become reluctant to make trade-offs, which involve a particularly advanced and taxing form of decision making. In the rest of the animal kingdom, there aren't a lot of protracted negotiations between predators and prey. To compromise is a complex human ability and therefore one of the first to decline when willpower is depleted. You become what researchers call a cognitive miser, hoarding your energy. If you're shopping, you're liable to look at only one dimension, like price: just give me the cheapest. Or you indulge yourself by looking at quality: I want the very best (an especially easy strategy if someone else is paying). Decision fatigue leaves you vulnerable to marketers who know how to time their sales, as Jonathan Levav, the Stanford professor, demonstrated in experiments involving tailored suits and new cars.

The idea for these experiments also happened to come in the preparations for a wedding, a ritual that seems to be the decision-fatigue equivalent of Hell Week. At his fiancée's suggestion, Levav visited a tailor to have a bespoke suit made and began going through the choices of fabric, type of lining and style of buttons, lapels, cuffs and so forth.

"By the time I got through the third pile of fabric swatches, I wanted to kill myself," Levav recalls. "I couldn't tell the choices apart anymore. After a while my only response to the tailor became 'What do you recommend?' I just couldn't take it."

Levav ended up not buying any kind of bespoke suit (the \$2,000 price made that decision easy enough), but he put the experience to use in a pair of experiments conducted with Mark Heitmann, then at Christian-Albrechts University in Germany; Andreas Herrmann, at the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland; and Sheena Iyengar, of Columbia. One involved asking M.B.A. students in Switzerland to choose a bespoke suit; the other was conducted at German car dealerships, where customers ordered options for their new sedans. The car buyers — and these were real customers spending their own money had to choose, for instance, among 4 styles of gearshift knobs, 13 kinds of wheel rims, 25 configurations of the engine and gearbox and a palette of 56 colors for the interior.

As they started picking features, customers would carefully weigh the choices, but as decision fatigue set in, they would start settling for whatever the default option was. And the more tough choices they encountered early in the process — like going through those 56 colors to choose the precise shade of gray or brown — the quicker people became fatigued and settled for the path of least resistance by taking the default option. By manipulating the order of the car buyers' choices, the researchers found that the customers would end up settling for different kinds of options, and the average difference totaled more than 1,500 euros per car (about \$2,000 at the time). Whether the customers paid a little extra for fancy wheel rims or a lot extra for a more powerful engine depended on when the choice was offered and how much willpower was left in the customer.

Similar results were found in the experiment with custom-made suits: once decision fatigue set in, people tended to settle for the recommended option. When they were confronted early on with the toughest decisions — the ones with the most options, like the 100 fabrics for the suit — they became fatigued more quickly and also reported enjoying the shopping experience less.

Shopping can be especially tiring for the poor, who have to struggle continually with trade-offs. Most of us in America won't spend a lot of time agonizing over whether we can afford to buy soap, but it can be a depleting choice in rural India. Dean Spears, an economist at Princeton, offered people in 20 villages in Rajasthan in northwestern India the chance to buy a couple of bars of brand-name soap for the equivalent of less than 20 cents. It was a steep discount off the regular price, yet even that sum was a strain for the people in the 10 poorest villages. Whether or not they bought the soap, the act of making the decision left them with less willpower, as measured afterward in a test of how long they could squeeze a hand grip. In the slightly more affluent villages, people's willpower wasn't affected significantly. Because they had more money, they didn't have to spend as much effort weighing the merits of the soap versus, say, food or medicine.

Spears and other researchers argue that this sort of decision fatigue is a major — and hitherto ignored — factor in trapping people in poverty. Because their financial situation forces them to make so many tradeoffs, they have less willpower to devote to school, work and other activities that might get them into the middle class. It's hard to know exactly how important this factor is, but there's no doubt that willpower is a special problem for poor people. Study after study has shown that low self-control correlates with low income as well as with a host of other problems, including poor achievement in school, divorce, crime, alcoholism and poor health. Lapses in self-control have led to the notion of the "undeserving poor" — epitomized by the image of the welfare mom using food stamps to buy junk food — but Spears urges sympathy for someone who makes decisions all day on a tight budget. In one study, he found that when the poor and the rich go shopping, the poor are much more likely to eat during the shopping trip. This might seem like confirmation of their weak character — after all, they could presumably save money and improve their nutrition by eating meals at home instead of buying ready-to-eat snacks like Cinnabons, which contribute to the higher rate of obesity among the poor. But if a trip to the supermarket induces more decision fatigue in the poor than in the rich — because each purchase requires more mental trade-offs — by the time they reach the cash register, they'll have less willpower left to resist the Mars bars and Skittles.

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Not for nothing are these items called impulse purchases.

And this isn't the only reason that sweet snacks are featured prominently at the cash register, just when shoppers are depleted after all their decisions in the aisles. With their willpower reduced, they're more likely to yield to any kind of temptation, but they're especially vulnerable to candy and soda and anything else offering a quick hit of sugar. While supermarkets figured this out a long time ago, only recently did researchers discover why.

The discovery was an accident resulting from a failed experiment at Baumeister's lab. The researchers set out to test something called the Mardi Gras theory — the notion that you could build up willpower by first indulging yourself in pleasure, the way Mardi Gras feasters do just before the rigors of Lent. In place of a Fat Tuesday breakfast, the chefs in the lab at Florida State whipped up lusciously thick milkshakes for a group of subjects who were resting in between two laboratory tasks requiring willpower. Sure enough, the delicious shakes seemed to strengthen willpower by helping people perform better than expected on the next task. So far, so good. But the experiment also included a control group of people who were fed a tasteless concoction of low-fat dairy glop. It provided them with no pleasure, yet it produced similar improvements in self-control. The Mardi Gras theory looked wrong. Besides tragically removing an excuse for romping down the streets of New Orleans, the result was embarrassing for the researchers. Matthew Gailliot, the graduate student who ran the study, stood looking down at his shoes as he told Baumeister about the fiasco.

Baumeister tried to be optimistic. Maybe the study wasn't a failure. Something had happened, after all. Even the tasteless glop had done the job, but how? If it wasn't the pleasure, could it be the calories? At first the idea seemed a bit daft. For decades, psychologists had been studying performance on mental tasks without worrying much about the results being affected by dairy-product consumption. They liked to envision the human mind as a computer, focusing on the way it processed information. In their eagerness to chart the human equivalent of the computer's chips and circuits, most psychologists neglected one mundane but essential part of the machine: the power supply. The brain, like the rest of the body, derived energy from glucose, the simple sugar manufactured from all kinds of foods. To establish cause and effect, researchers at Baumeister's lab tried refueling the brain in a series of experiments involving lemonade mixed either with sugar or with a diet sweetener. The sugary lemonade provided a burst of glucose, the effects of which could be observed right away in the lab; the sugarless variety tasted quite similar without providing the same burst of glucose. Again and again, the sugar restored willpower, but the artificial sweetener had no effect. The glucose would at least mitigate the ego depletion and sometimes completely reverse it. The restored willpower improved people's self-control as well as the quality of their decisions: they resisted irrational bias when making choices, and when asked to make financial decisions, they were more likely to choose the better long-term strategy instead of going for a quick payoff. The ego-depletion effect was even demonstrated with dogs in two studies by Holly Miller and Nathan DeWall at the University of Kentucky. After obeying sit and stay commands for 10 minutes, the dogs performed worse on self-control tests and were also more likely to make the dangerous decision to challenge another dog's turf. But a dose of glucose restored their willpower.

Despite this series of findings, brain researchers still had some reservations about the glucose connection. Skeptics pointed out that the brain's overall use of energy remains about the same regardless of what a person is doing, which doesn't square easily with the notion of depleted energy affecting willpower. Among the skeptics was Todd Heatherton, who worked with Baumeister early in his career and eventually wound up at Dartmouth, where he became a pioneer of what is called social neuroscience: the study of links between brain processes and social behavior. He believed in ego depletion, but he didn't see how this neural process could be caused simply by variations in glucose levels. To observe the process — and to see if it could be reversed by glucose - he and his colleagues recruited 45 female dieters and recorded images of their brains as they reacted to pictures of food. Next the dieters watched a comedy video while forcing themselves to suppress their laughter - a standard if cruel way to drain mental energy and induce ego depletion. Then they were again shown pictures of food, and the new round of brain scans revealed the effects of ego depletion: more activity in the nucleus accumbens, the brain's reward center, and a corresponding decrease in the amygdala, which ordinarily helps control impulses. The food's appeal registered more strongly while impulse control weakened — not a good combination for anyone on a diet. But suppose people in this ego-depleted state got a quick dose of glucose? What would a scan of their brains reveal?

The results of the experiment were announced in January, during Heatherton's speech accepting the leadership of the <u>Society for Personality and Social Psychology</u>, the world's largest group of social psychologists. In his presidential address at the annual meeting in San Antonio, Heatherton reported that administering glucose completely reversed the brain changes wrought by depletion — a finding, he said, that thoroughly surprised him. Heatherton's results did much more than provide additional confirmation that glucose is a vital part of willpower; they helped solve the puzzle over how glucose could work without global changes in the brain's total energy use. Apparently ego depletion causes activity to rise in some parts of the brain and to decline in others. Your brain does not stop working when glucose is low. It stops doing some things and starts doing others. It responds more strongly to immediate rewards and pays less attention to long-term prospects.

The discoveries about glucose help explain why dieting is a uniquely difficult test of self-control — and why even people with phenomenally strong willpower in the rest of their lives can have such a hard time losing weight. They start out the day with virtuous intentions, resisting croissants at breakfast and dessert at lunch, but each act of resistance further lowers their willpower. As their willpower weakens late in the day, they need to replenish it. But to resupply that energy, they need to give the body glucose. They're trapped in a nutritional catch-22:

1. In order not to eat, a dieter needs willpower.

2. In order to have willpower, a dieter needs to eat.

As the body uses up glucose, it looks for a quick way to replenish the fuel, leading to a craving for sugar. After performing a lab task requiring self-control, people tend to eat more candy but not other kinds of snacks, like salty, fatty potato chips. The mere expectation of having to exert self-control makes people hunger for sweets. A similar effect helps explain why many women yearn for chocolate and other sugary treats just before menstruation: their bodies are seeking a quick replacement as glucose levels fluctuate. A sugar-filled snack or drink will provide a quick improvement in self-control (that's why it's convenient to use in experiments), but it's just a temporary solution. The problem is that what we identify as sugar doesn't help as much over the course of the day as the steadier supply of glucose we would get from eating proteins and other more nutritious foods.

The benefits of glucose were unmistakable in the study of the Israeli parole board. In midmorning, usually a little before 10:30, the parole board would take a break, and the judges would be served a sandwich and a piece of fruit. The prisoners who appeared just before the break had only about a 20 percent chance of getting parole, but the ones appearing right after had around a 65 percent chance. The odds dropped again as the morning wore on, and prisoners really didn't want to appear just before lunch: the chance of getting parole at that time was only 10 percent. After lunch it soared up to 60 percent, but only briefly. Remember that Jewish Israeli prisoner who appeared at 3:10 p.m. and was denied parole from his sentence for assault? He had the misfortune of being the sixth case heard after lunch. But another Jewish Israeli prisoner serving the same sentence for the same crime was lucky enough to appear at 1:27 p.m., the first case after lunch, and he was rewarded with parole. It must have seemed to him like a fine example of the justice system at work, but it probably had more to do with the judge's glucose levels.

It's simple enough to imagine reforms for the parole board in Israel — like, say, restricting each judge's shift to half a day, preferably in the morning, interspersed with frequent breaks for food and rest. But it's not so obvious what to do with the decision fatigue affecting the rest of society. Even if we could all afford to work half-days, we would still end up depleting our willpower all day long, as Baumeister and his colleagues found when they went into the field in Würzburg in central Germany. The psychologists gave preprogrammed BlackBerrys to more than 200 people going about their daily routines for a week. The phones went off at random intervals, prompting the people to report whether they were currently experiencing some sort of desire or had recently felt a desire. The painstaking study, led by Wilhelm Hofmann, then at the University of Würzburg, collected more than 10,000 momentary reports from morning until midnight.

Desire turned out to be the norm, not the exception. Half the people were feeling some desire when their phones went off — to snack, to goof off, to express their true feelings to their bosses — and another quarter said they had felt a desire in the past half-hour. Many of these desires were ones that the men and women were trying to resist, and the more willpower people expended, the more likely they became to yield to the next temptation that came along. When faced with a new desire that produced some I-want-to-but-I-really-shouldn't sort of inner conflict, they gave in more readily if they had already fended off earlier temptations, particularly if the new temptation came soon after a previously reported one.

The results suggested that people spend between three and four hours a day resisting desire. Put another way, if you tapped four or five people at any random moment of the day, one of them would be using willpower to resist a desire. The most commonly resisted desires in the phone study were the urges to eat and sleep, followed by the urge for leisure, like taking a break from work by doing a puzzle or playing a

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game instead of writing a memo. Sexual urges were next on the list of most-resisted desires, a little ahead of urges for other kinds of interactions, like checking Facebook. To ward off temptation, people reported using various strategies. The most popular was to look for a distraction or to undertake a new activity, although sometimes they tried suppressing it directly or simply toughing their way through it. Their success was decidedly mixed. They were pretty good at avoiding sleep, sex and the urge to spend money, but not so good at resisting the lure of television or the Web or the general temptation to relax instead of work.

We have no way of knowing how much our ancestors exercised self-control in the days before BlackBerrys and social psychologists, but it seems likely that many of them were under less ego-depleting strain. When there were fewer decisions, there was less decision fatigue. Today we feel overwhelmed because there are so many choices. Your body may have dutifully reported to work on time, but your mind can escape at any instant. A typical computer user looks at more than three dozen Web sites a day and gets fatigued by the continual decision making — whether to keep working on a project, check out TMZ, follow a link to YouTube or buy something on Amazon. You can do enough damage in a 10-minute online shopping spree to wreck your budget for the rest of the year.

The cumulative effect of these temptations and decisions isn't intuitively obvious. Virtually no one has a gut-level sense of just how tiring it is to decide. Big decisions, small decisions, they all add up. Choosing what to have for breakfast, where to go on vacation, whom to hire, how much to spend — these all deplete willpower, and there's no telltale symptom of when that willpower is low. It's not like getting winded or hitting the wall during a marathon. Ego depletion manifests itself not as one feeling but rather as a propensity to experience everything more intensely. When the brain's regulatory powers weaken, frustrations seem more irritating than usual. Impulses to eat, drink, spend and say stupid things feel more powerful (and alcohol causes self-control to decline further). Like those dogs in the experiment, ego-depleted humans become more likely to get into needless fights over turf. In making decisions, they take illogical shortcuts and tend to favor short-term gains and delayed costs. Like the depleted parole judges, they become inclined to take the safer, easier option even when that option hurts someone else.

"Good decision making is not a trait of the person, in the sense that it's always there," Baumeister says. "It's a state that fluctuates." His studies show that people with the best self-control are the ones who structure their lives so as to conserve willpower. They don't schedule endless back-to-back meetings. They avoid temptations like all-you-can-eat buffets, and they establish habits that eliminate the mental effort of making choices. Instead of deciding every morning whether or not to force themselves to exercise, they set up regular appointments to work out with a friend. Instead of counting on willpower to remain robust all day, they conserve it so that it's available for emergencies and important decisions.

"Even the wisest people won't make good choices when they're not rested and their glucose is low," Baumeister points out. That's why the truly wise don't restructure the company at 4 p.m. They don't make major commitments during the cocktail hour. And if a decision must be made late in the day, they know not to do it on an empty stomach. "The best decision makers," Baumeister says, "are the ones who know when *not* to trust themselves." Do You Suffer From Decision Fatigue? - NYTimes.com

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Implicit Bias

A Primer for Courts

Jerry Kang

Prepared for the National Campaign to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America's State Courts

August 2009

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ABOUT THE PRIMER

This Primer was produced as part of the National Campaign to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America's State Courts. The Campaign seeks to mobilize the significant expertise, experience, and commitment of state court judges and court officers to ensure both the perception and reality of racial and ethnic fairness across the nation's state courts. The Campaign is funded by the Open Society Institute, the State Justice Institute, and the National Center for State Courts. Points of view or opinions expressed in the Primer are those of the author and do not represent the official position of the funding agencies. To learn more about the Campaign, visit www.ncsconline.org/ref.

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Implicit Bias: A Primer

Schemas and Implicit Cognitions (or "mental shortcuts")

Stop for a moment and consider what bombards your senses every day. Think about everything you see, both still and moving, with all their color, detail, and depth. Think about what you hear in the background, perhaps a song on the radio, as you decode lyrics and musical notes. Think about touch, smell, and even taste. And while all that's happening, you might be walking or driving down the street, avoiding pedestrians and cars, chewing gum, digesting your breakfast, flipping through email on your smartphone. How does your brain do all this simultaneously?

It does so by processing through schemas, which are templates of knowledge that help us organize specific examples into broader categories. When we see, for example, something with a flat seat, a back, and some legs, we recognize it as a "chair." Regardless of whether it is plush or wooden, with wheels or bolted down, we know what to do with an object that fits into the category "chair." Without spending a lot of mental energy, we simply sit. Of course, if for some reason we have to study the chair carefully--because we like the style or think it might collapse--we can and will do so. But typically, we just sit down.

We have schemas not only for objects, but also processes, such as how to order food at a restaurant. Without much explanation, we know what it means when a smiling person hands us laminated paper with detailed descriptions of food and prices. Even when we land in a foreign airport, we know how to follow the crazy mess of arrows and baggage icons toward ground transportation. These schemas are helpful because they allow us to operate without expending valuable mental resources. In fact, unless something goes wrong, these thoughts take place automatically without our awareness or conscious direction. In this way, most cognitions are <u>implicit</u>.

Implicit Social Cognitions (or "thoughts about people you didn't know you had")

What is interesting is that schemas apply not only to objects (e.g., "chairs") or behaviors (e.g., "ordering food") but also to human beings (e.g., "the elderly"). We naturally assign people into various social categories divided by salient and chronically accessible traits, such as age, gender, race, and role. And just as we might have implicit cognitions that help us walk and drive, we have implicit social cognitions that guide our thinking about social categories. Where do these schemas come from? They come from our experiences with other people, some of them direct (i.e., real-world encounters) but most of them vicarious (i.e., relayed to us through stories, books, movies, media, and culture).

If we unpack these schemas further, we see that some of the underlying cognitions include <u>stereotypes</u>, which are simply traits that we associate with a category. For instance, if we think that a particular category of human beings is frail--such as the elderly--we will not raise our guard. If we think that another category is foreign--such as Asians--we will be surprised by their fluent English. These cognitions also include <u>attitudes</u>, which are overall, evaluative feelings that are positive or negative. For instance, if we identify someone as having graduated from our beloved alma mater, we will feel more at ease. The term "<u>implicit bias</u>" includes both <u>implicit stereotypes</u> and <u>implicit</u> <u>attitudes</u>.

Though our shorthand schemas of people may be helpful in some situations, they also can lead to discriminatory behaviors if we are not careful. Given the critical importance of exercising fairness and equality in the court system, lawyers, judges, jurors, and staff should be particularly concerned about identifying such possibilities. Do we, for instance, associate aggressiveness with Black men, such that we see them as more likely to have started the fight than to have responded in self-defense? Or have we already internalized the lessons of Martin Luther King, Jr. and navigate life in a perfectly "colorblind" (or gender-blind, ethnicity-blind, class-blind, etc.) way?

Asking about Bias (or "it's murky in here")

One way to find out about <u>implicit bias</u> is simply to ask people. However, in a post-civil rights environment, it has become much less useful to ask explicit questions on sensitive topics. We run into a "willing and able" problem.

First, people may not be willing to tell pollsters and researchers what they really feel. They may be chilled by an air of political correctness.

Second, and more important, people may not know what is inside their heads. Indeed, a wealth of cognitive psychology has demonstrated that we are lousy at introspection. For example, slight environmental changes alter our judgments and behavior without our realizing. If the room smells of Lysol, people eat more neatly. People holding a warm cup of coffee (versus a cold cup) ascribe warmer (versus cooler) personality traits to a stranger described in a vignette. The experiments go on and on. And recall that by definition, <u>implicit biases</u> are those that we carry without awareness or conscious direction. So how do we know whether we are being biased or fair-and-square?

Implicit measurement devices (or "don't tell me how much you weigh, just get on the scale")

In response, social and cognitive psychologists with neuroscientists have tried to develop instruments that measure <u>stereotypes</u> and <u>attitudes</u>, without having to rely on potentially untrustworthy self-reports. Some instruments have been linguistic, asking folks to write out sentences to describe a certain scene from a newspaper article. It turns out that if someone engages in stereotypical behavior, we just describe what happened. If it is counter-typical, we feel a need to explain what happened. (<u>Von</u> <u>Hippel 1997</u>; Sekaquaptewa 2003).

Others are physiological, measuring how much we sweat, how our blood pressure changes, or even which regions of our brain light up on an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) scan. (<u>Phelps 2000</u>).

Still other techniques borrow from marketers. For instance, conjoint analysis asks people to give an overall evaluation to slightly different product bundles (e.g., how do you compare a 17" screen laptop with 2GB memory and 3 USB ports, versus a 15" laptop with 3 GB of memory and 2 USB ports). By offering multiple rounds of choices, one can get a measure of how important each feature is to a person even if she had no clue to the question "How much would you pay for an extra USB port?" Recently, social cognitionists have adapted this methodology by creating "bundles" that include demographic attributes. For instance, how would you rank a job with the title Assistant Manager that paid \$160,000 in Miami working for Ms. Smith, as compared to another job with the title Vice President that paid \$150,000 in Chicago for Mr. Jones? (<u>Caruso 2009).</u>

Scientists have been endlessly creative, but so far, the most widely accepted instruments have used reaction times--some variant of which has been used for over a century to study psychological phenomena. These instruments draw on the basic insight that any two concepts that are closely associated in our minds should be easier to sort together. If you hear the word "moon," and I then ask you to think of a laundry detergent, then "Tide" might come more quickly to mind. If the word "RED" is painted in the color red, we will be faster in stating its color than the case when the word "GREEN" is painted in red.

Although there are various reaction time measures, the most thoroughly tested one is the Implicit Association Test (IAT). It is a sort of video game you play, typically on a computer, where you are asked to sort categories of pictures and words. For example, in the Black-White race attitude test, you sort pictures of European American faces and African American faces, Good words and Bad words in front of a computer. It turns out that most of us respond more guickly when the European American face and Good words are assigned to the same key (and African American face and Bad words are assigned to the other key), as compared to when the European American face and Bad words are assigned to the same key (and African American face and Good words are assigned to the other key). This average time differential is the measure of implicit bias. [If the description is hard to follow, try an IAT yourself at **Project Implicit**.]

Pervasive implicit bias (or "it ain't no accident")

It may seem silly to measure bias by playing a sorting game (i.e. the IAT). But, a decade of research using the IAT reveals pervasive reaction time differences in every country tested, in the direction consistent with the general social hierarchies: German over Turk (in Germany), Japanese over Korean (for Japanese), White over Black, men over women (on the <u>stereotype</u> of "career" versus "family"), lightskinned over dark skin, youth over elderly, straight over gay, etc. These time differentials, which are taken to be a measure of <u>implicit</u> <u>bias</u>, are systematic and pervasive. They are statistically significant and not due to random chance variations in measurements.

These pervasive results do not mean that everyone has the exact same bias scores. Instead, there is wide variability among individuals. Further, the social category you belong to can influence what sorts of biases you are likely to have. For example, although most Whites (and Asians, Latinos, and American Indians) show an <u>implicit attitude</u> in favor of Whites over Blacks, African Americans show no such preference on average. (This means, of course, that about half of African Americans do prefer Whites, but the other half prefer Blacks.)

Interestingly, <u>implicit biases</u> are <u>dissociated</u> from <u>explicit</u> biases. In other words, they are related to but differ sometimes substantially from <u>explicit</u> biases--those <u>stereotypes</u> and <u>attitudes</u> that we expressly self-report on surveys. The best understanding is that <u>implicit</u> and <u>explicit</u> biases are related but different mental constructs. Neither kind should be viewed as the solely "accurate" or "authentic" measure of bias. Both measures tell us something important.

Real-world consequences (or "why should we care?")

All these scientific measures are intellectually interesting, but lawyers care most about realworld consequences. Do these measures of implicit bias predict an individual's behaviors or decisions? Do milliseconds really matter>? (Chugh 2004). If, for example, well-intentioned people committed to being "fair and square" are not influenced by these implicit biases, then who cares about silly video game results?

There is increasing evidence that <u>implicit biases</u>, as measured by the IAT, do predict behavior in the real world--in ways that can have real effects on real lives. Prof. John Jost (NYU, psychology) and colleagues have provided a recent literature review (in press) of ten studies that managers should not ignore. Among the findings from various laboratories are:

- <u>implicit bias</u> predicts the rate of callback interviews (<u>Rooth 2007</u>, based on <u>implicit</u> <u>stereotype</u> in Sweden that Arabs are lazy);
- implicit bias predicts awkward body language (McConnell & Leibold 2001), which could influence whether folks feel that they are being treated fairly or courteously;
- <u>implicit bias</u> predicts how we read the friendliness of facial expressions (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen 2003);
- <u>implicit bias</u> predicts more negative evaluations of ambiguous actions by an African American (Rudman & Lee 2002), which could influence decisionmaking in hard cases;
- <u>implicit bias</u> predicts more negative evaluations of agentic (i.e. confident, aggressive, ambitious) women in certain hiring conditions (<u>Rudman & Glick 2001</u>);

- <u>implicit bias</u> predicts the amount of shooter bias--how much easier it is to shoot African Americans compared to Whites in a videogame simulation (<u>Glaser & Knowles</u> <u>2008</u>);
- <u>implicit bias</u> predicts voting behavior in Italy (Arcari 2008);
- <u>implicit bias</u> predicts binge-drinking (<u>Ostafin</u> <u>& Palfai 2006</u>), suicide ideation (<u>Nock &</u> <u>Banaji 2007</u>), and sexual attraction to children (<u>Gray 2005</u>).

With any new scientific field, there remain questions and criticisms--sometimes strident. (Arkes & Tetlock 2004; Mitchell & Tetlock 2006). And on-the-merits skepticism should be encouraged as the hallmark of good, rigorous science. But most scientists studying implicit bias find the accumulating evidence persuasive. For instance, a recent meta-analysis of 122 research reports, involving a total of14,900 subjects, revealed that in the sensitive domains of stereotyping and prejudice, implicit bias IAT scores better predict behavior than explicit selfreports. (Greenwald et al. 2009).

And again, even though much of the recent research focus is on the IAT, other instruments and experimental methods have corroborated the existence of <u>implicit biases</u> with real world consequences. For example, a few studies have demonstrated that criminal defendants with more Afro-centric facial features receive in certain contexts more severe criminal punishment (Banks et al. 2006; <u>Blair 2004</u>).

Malleability (or "is there any good news?")

The findings of real-world consequence are disturbing for all of us who sincerely believe that we do not let biases prevalent in our culture infect our individual decisionmaking. Even a little bit. Fortunately, there is evidence that <u>implicit biases</u> are malleable and can be changed.

- An individual's motivation to be fair does matter. But we must first believe that there's a potential problem before we try to fix it.
- The environment seems to matter. Social contact across social groups seems to have a positive effect not only on <u>explicit</u> <u>attitudes</u> but also <u>implicit</u> ones.
- Third, environmental exposure to countertypical exemplars who function as "debiasing agents" seems to decrease our bias.
 - In one study, a mental imagery exercise of imagining a professional business woman (versus a Caribbean vacation) decreased <u>implicit stereotypes</u> of women. (<u>Blair et al. 2001</u>).
 - Exposure to "positive" exemplars, such as Tiger Woods and Martin Luther King in a history questionnaire, decreased <u>implicit bias</u> against Blacks. (Dasgupta & Greenwald 2001).
 - Contact with female professors and deans decreased <u>implicit bias</u> against women for college-aged women. (Dasgupta & Asgari 2004).
- Fourth, various procedural changes can disrupt the link between <u>implicit bias</u> and discriminatory behavior.
 - In a simple example, orchestras started using a blind screen in auditioning new musicians; afterwards women had much greater success. (Goldin & Rouse 2000).
 - In another example, by committing beforehand to merit criteria (is book smarts or street smarts more important?), there was less gender

discrimination in hiring a police chief. (Uhlmann & Cohen 2005).

 In order to check against bias in any particular situation, we must often recognize that race, gender, sexual orientation, and other social categories may be influencing decisionmaking. This recognition is the opposite of various forms of "blindness" (e.g., colorblindness).

In outlining these findings of malleability, we do not mean to be Pollyanish. For example, mere social contact is not a panacea since psychologists have emphasized that certain conditions are important to decreasing prejudice (e.g., interaction on equal terms; repeated, non-trivial cooperation). Also, fleeting exposure to countertypical exemplars may be drowned out by repeated exposure to more typical <u>stereotypes</u> from the media (<u>Kang 2005</u>).

Even if we are skeptical, the bottom line is that there's no justification for throwing our hands up in resignation. Certainly the science doesn't require us to. Although the task is challenging, we can make real improvements in our goal toward justice and fairness.

The big picture (or "what it means to be a faithful steward of the judicial system")

It's important to keep an eye on the big picture. The focus on <u>implicit bias</u> does not address the existence and impact of <u>explicit</u> bias--the <u>stereotypes</u> and <u>attitudes</u> that folks recognize and embrace. Also, the past has an inertia that has not dissipated. Even if all <u>explicit</u> and <u>implicit biases</u> were wiped away through some magical wand, life today would still bear the burdens of an unjust yesterday. That said, as careful stewards of the justice system, we should still strive to take all forms of bias seriously, including <u>implicit bias</u>.

After all, Americans view the court system as the single institution that is most unbiased, impartial, fair, and just. Yet, a typical trial courtroom setting mixes together many people, often strangers, from different social backgrounds, in intense, stressful, emotional, and sometimes hostile contexts. In such environments, a complex jumble of <u>implicit</u> and <u>explicit</u> biases will inevitably be at play. It is the primary responsibility of the judge and other court staff to manage this complex and bias-rich social situation to the end that fairness and justice be done--and be seen to be done.

Glossary

Note: Many of these definitions draw from Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, A Future History of Law and Implicit Social Cognition (unpublished manuscript 2009)

Attitude

An attitude is "an association between a given object and a given evaluative category." R.H. Fazio, et al., Attitude accessibility, attitudebehavior consistency, and the strength of the object-evaluation association, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 339, 341 (1982). Evaluative categories are either positive or negative, and as such, attitudes reflect what we like and dislike, favor and disfavor, approach and avoid. See also <u>stereotype</u>.

Behavioral realism

A school of thought within legal scholarship that calls for more accurate and realistic models of human decision-making and behavior to be incorporated into law and policy. It involves a three step process:

First, identify advances in the mind and behavioral sciences that provide a more accurate model of human cognition and behavior.

Second, compare that new model with the latent theories of human behavior and decisionmaking embedded within the law. These latent theories typically reflect "common sense" based on naïve psychological theories.

Third, when the new model and the latent theories are discrepant, ask lawmakers and legal institutions to account for this disparity. An accounting requires either altering the law to comport with more accurate models of thinking and behavior or providing a transparent explanation of "the prudential, economic, political, or religious reasons for retaining a less accurate and outdated view." Kristin Lane, Jerry Kang, & Mahzarin Banaji, <u>Implicit Social Cognition and the Law</u>, 3 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 19.1-19.25 (2007)

Dissociation

Dissociation is the gap between <u>explicit</u> and <u>implicit</u> biases. Typically, <u>implicit</u> biases are larger, as measured in standardized units, than <u>explicit</u> biases. Often, our <u>explicit</u> biases may be close to zero even though our <u>implicit biases</u> are larger.

There seems to be some moderate-strength relation between <u>explicit</u> and <u>implicit biases</u>. See Wilhelm Hofmann, <u>A Meta-Analysis on the</u> <u>Correlation Between the Implicit Association</u> <u>Test and Explicit Self-Report Measures</u>, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1369 (2005) (reporting mean population correlation r=0.24 after analyzing 126 correlations). Most scientists reject the idea that <u>implicit biases</u> are the only "true" or "authentic" measure; both <u>explicit</u> and <u>implicit</u> biases contribute to a full understanding of bias.

Explicit

Explicit means that we are aware that we have a particular thought or feeling. The term sometimes also connotes that we have an accurate understanding of the source of that thought or feeling. Finally, the term often connotes conscious endorsement of the thought or feeling. For example, if one has an explicitly positive attitude toward chocolate, then one has a positive attitude, knows that one has a positive attitude, and consciously endorses and celebrates that preference. See also implicit.

Implicit

Implicit means that we are either unaware of or mistaken about the source of the thought or feeling. R. Zajonc, Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences, 35 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 151 (1980). If we are unaware of a thought or feeling, then we cannot report it when asked. See also <u>explicit</u>.

Implicit Association Test

The IAT requires participants to classify rapidly individual stimuli into one of four distinct categories using only two responses (for example, in a the traditional computerized IAT, participants might respond using only the "E" key on the left side of the keyboard, or "I" on the right side). For instance, in an age attitude IAT, there are two social categories, YOUNG and OLD, and two attitudinal categories, GOOD and BAD. YOUNG and OLD might be represented by black-and-white photographs of the faces of young and old people. GOOD and BAD could be represented by words that are easily identified as being linked to positive or negative affect, such as "joy" or "agony". A person with a negative implicit attitude toward OLD would be expected to go more quickly when OLD and BAD share one key, and YOUNG and GOOD the other, than when the pairings of good and bad are switched.

The IAT was invented by Anthony Greenwald and colleagues in the mid 1990s. Project Implicit, which allows individuals to take these tests online, is maintained by Anthony Greenwald (Washington), Mahzarin Banaji (Harvard), and Brian Nosek (Virginia).

Implicit Attitudes

"<u>Implicit</u> attitudes are introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects." Anthony Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, <u>Implicit social cognition: attitudes, self-</u> <u>esteem, and stereotypes</u>, 102 Psychol. Rev. 4, 8 (1995). Generally, we are unaware of our implicit attitudes and may not endorse them upon self-reflection. See also <u>attitude; implicit</u>.

Implicit Biases

A bias is a departure from some point that has been marked as "neutral." Biases in <u>implicit</u> <u>stereotypes</u> and <u>implicit attitudes</u> are called "implicit biases."

Implicit Stereotypes

"<u>Implicit</u> stereotypes are the introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate attributions of qualities to members of a social category" Anthony Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, <u>Implicit</u> <u>social cognition: attitudes, self-esteem, and</u> <u>stereotypes</u>, 102 Psychol. Rev. 4, 8 (1995). Generally, we are unaware of our <u>implicit</u> <u>stereotypes</u> and may not endorse them upon self-reflection. See also <u>stereotype</u>; <u>implicit</u>.

Implicit Social Cognitions

Social cognitions are <u>stereotypes</u> and <u>attitudes</u> about social categories (e.g., Whites, youths, women). <u>Implicit</u> social cognitions are <u>implicit</u> <u>stereotypes</u> and <u>implicit attitudes</u> about social categories.

Stereotype

A stereotype is an association between a given object and a specific attribute. An example is "Norwegians are tall." Stereotypes may support an overall attitude. For instance, if one likes tall people and Norwegians are tall, it is likely that this attribute will contribute toward a positive orientation toward Norwegians. See also attitude.

Validities

To decide whether some new instrument and findings are valid, scientists often look for various validities, such as statistical conclusion validity, internal validity, construct validity, and predictive validity.

- Statistical conclusion validity asks whether the correlation is found between independent and dependent variables have been correctly computed.
- Internal validity examines whether in addition to correlation, there has been a demonstration of causation. In particular, could there be potential confounds that produced the correlation?
- Construct validity examines whether the concrete observables (the scores registered by some instrument) actually represent the abstract mental construct that we are interested in. As applied to the IAT, one could ask whether the test actually measures the strength of mental associations held by an individual between the social category and an <u>attitude</u> or <u>stereotype</u>
- Predictive validity examines whether some test predicts behavior, for example, in the form of evaluation, judgment, physical movement or response. If predictive validity is demonstrated in realistic settings, there is greater reason to take the measures seriously.

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TAB: Marriage

OUTLINE ON PERFORMING MARRIAGES

I. Capacity to Marry

- A. Must be single.
- B. Must be 18 or older or between 16 and 18 with consent of parent or guardian. A 14 or 15 year old female who is pregnant or has a child or a 14 or 15 year old who is father of child or baby not yet born can petition the district court for a judge to authorize that person to marry.
- C. Persons of nearer kin than first cousins cannot marry.
- D. Common law marriages are not recognized.

II. Marriage Licenses

- A. Do not perform ceremony without a valid license.
- B. License may be issued by Register of Deeds of any county in North Carolina.
- C. Marriage ceremony must be conducted within 60 days after license issued.
- D. Must be at least two witnesses to ceremony.
- E. Every magistrate who marries a couple without a valid license or fails to return the license to the Register of Deeds within 10 (ten) days shall forfeit and pay \$200 to any person who sues and shall be guilty of a midemeanor.
 - 1. There is no specific procedure for "returning" marriage certificates to an out-of-county register of deeds. However, if magistrate mails them by first class mail, that should be sufficient. As an extra precaution, the magistrate might want to make a copy for his or her records with a notation of the date mailed.

III. Marriage Ceremony

- A. Customarily man and woman stand facing magistrate with man to the woman's right, but no statutorily required positions.
- B. Couple must orally consent to take each other as husband and wife, freely, seriously and plainly.
- C. Must be in the presence of each other and authorized ordained minister or a magistrate.
- D. Officer must declare such persons as husband and wife.
- E. There must be two witnesses to the ceremony; witnesses may be under the age of 18 but must be able to sign their name and to relate and understand what they are observing.

IV. Fees and certificates

- A. A \$20.00 fee is collected by the magistrate for performing marriage ceremony. No other fee may be taken. Can go to the couple's party, reception.
- B. Fee is to be remitted to the Clerk of Superior Court for use of State in support of General Court of Justice.
- C. The magistrate must fill out and sign <u>both</u> copies of the certificate and <u>return both</u> copies to register of deeds within 10 days. Failure to do so subjects magistrate to \$200 penalty.

V. Miscellaneous Issues

- A. Do you have to perform marriages?
 - 1. It is a duty of your office and you can't refuse to marry a couple for a reason personal to you. For example, a magistrate who has very strong religious beliefs cannot refuse to marry a couple who want a purely civil ceremony with no reference to God. Nor may a magistrate refuse to perform a marriage because the magistrate doesn't like the looks of the couple or doesn't think the marriage will last.
 - 2. However, because the couple must be able to consent freely, seriously and plainly to the marriage, magistrate may ask couple to come back later if intoxicated to point that cannot give valid consent.
- B. Where **must** you perform marriages? If a couple comes to you with a valid license and wants to be married in your office while you are on duty.
- C. Where **may** you perform marriages? You have the authority to perform a marriage ceremony anywhere in the State of North Carolina.
 - 1. You may go anywhere in your county to perform the ceremony, but usually that means you have to be off-duty (unless you don't have to be physically in the office while on duty). You don't have to go out of the office to perform a ceremony; the choice is yours. However, the chief district judge, who has the authority to set times and places at which you perform your duties, may direct you to perform ceremonies out of the office as part of your obligations while on duty.
 - 2. You may conduct a marriage ceremony in any other county in North Carolina.
 - a) It is always best practice to notify your chief district judge before you perform an out-of-county marriage.
 - b) Return license to Register of Deeds in county where issued. However, turn the \$20 into your clerk and indicate on the receipt the county in which the marriage was performed.

Marriage Problems—J

- John and Mary come to your office and give you a copy of the ceremony they'd like you to use, which includes an opportunity for them to recite their own vows. You look over the ceremony and confirm that it looks fairly standard, but note that it contains numerous references to "God." Is there a legal problem with using the ceremony they provide? Can you refuse?
- John and Mary have Mary's children with them to serve as witnesses. Jamie is 13, and Joanie is
 Is there a legal problem with using the kids as witnesses?
- 3. Jake is stationed in Iraq, and his fiancée, Julie, will give birth any day now. The two desperately want to get married before the baby is born. Jake's unit has the technical capability of establishing a video real-time link, so that he could participate in the wedding from Iraq. Julie asks you what she needs to do to work this out. What do you say?
- 4. Your best friend Glen lives in the same county as you, but wants to get married in Cherokee. He asks you to perform the ceremony. Can you? Must you? What do you do with the money? With the license? Glen is reserving rooms at a resort hotel for the few members of his family and friends who will be attending. Can you accept a room? Reimbursement for mileage? An iPod given as a gift to all members of the wedding party?