VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION

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Thanks to Ann Roan and many other fine defenders for their advice and input.
LOOKING FOR A DIFFERENT, MORE EFFECTIVE WAY OF CHOOSING A JURY

For more than twenty years, I have been privileged to teach public defenders all over the country. And it pains me to conclude that when it comes to jury selection, almost all of us are doing a lousy job.

What passes for good voir dire is often glibness and a personal style that is comfortable with talking to strangers. The lawyer looks good and feels good but ends up knowing very little that is useful about the jurors.

More typically, voir dire is awkward, and consists of bland questions that tell us virtually nothing about how receptive a juror will be to our theory of defense, or whether the juror harbors some prejudice or belief that will make him deadly to our client.

We ask lots of leading questions about reasonable doubt, or presumption of innocence, or juror unanimity, or self defense, or witness truth-telling. Then when a juror responds positively to one of these questions, we convince ourselves that we have successfully “educated” the juror about our defense or about a principle of law. In reality, the juror is just giving us what she knows we want to hear, and we don’t know anything about her.

Because the questions we are comfortable with asking elicit responses that don’t help us evaluate the juror, we fall back on stereotypes (race, gender, age, ethnicity, class, employment, hobbies, reading material) to decide which jurors to keep and which to challenge. Or even worse, we go with our “gut feeling” about whether we like the juror or the juror likes us.

And then we are surprised when what seemed like a good jury convicts our client.

This short treatise, and the seminar it is meant to supplement, are a first effort at finding a more effective way of selecting jurors. It draws on:

- Scientific research done over the last decade or two about juror behavior and attitudes.
- Excellent work done by defenders in Colorado in devising a new and very effective method for voir dire in both capital and non-capital cases.
- Some very creative work done by defense lawyers all over the country.
- My own observations of too many trial transcripts from too many jurisdictions, in which good lawyers delude themselves into thinking that a comfortable voir dire has been an effective voir dire.
I. SOME BASIC THINGS ABOUT VOIR DIRE –
WHY JURY SELECTION IS HARD. WHY WE FAIL.

A. It is suicidal to just “take the first twelve.” It is arrogant and stupid to choose jurors based on stereotypes of race, gender, age, ethnicity, or class.

Every study ever done of jurors and their behavior tells us several things:

- People who come to jury duty bring with them many strong prejudices, biases, and preconceived notions about crime, trials, and criminal justice.

- Jurors are individuals. There is very little correlation between the stereotypical aspects of a juror’s makeup (race, gender, age, ethnicity, education, class, hobbies, reading material) and whether a particular juror may have one of those strong biases or preconceived notions in any individual case.

- The prejudices and ideas jurors bring to court affect the way they decide cases – even if they honestly believe they will be fair and even if they honestly believe they can set their preconceived notions aside.

- Jurors will decide cases based on their prejudices and preconceived notions regardless of what the judge may instruct them. Rehabilitation and curative instructions are completely meaningless.

- Many jurors don’t realize it, but they have made up their minds about the defendant’s guilt before they hear any evidence. In other words . . .

- Many trials are over the minute the jury is seated.

For this reason it is absolutely essential that we do a thorough and meaningful voir dire – not to convince jurors to abandon their biases, but to find out what those biases are and get rid of the jurors who hold them.

The lawyer who waives voir dire, or just asks some perfunctory, meaningless questions, or relies on stereotypes or “gut feelings” to choose jurors is not doing his or her job.

B. Traditional voir dire is structured in a way that makes it very hard to disclose a juror’s preconceived notions

The very nature of jury selection forces potential jurors into an artificial setting that is itself an impediment to obtaining honest and meaningful answers to typical voir dire questions. Here is how the voir dire process usually looks from the jurors’ perspective:

1. When asked questions about the criminal justice system, prospective jurors know what
the “right,” or expected answer is. Sometimes they know this from watching television. Sometimes the trial judge has given them preliminary instructions that contain the “right” answers to voir dire questions. Sometimes the questions are couched in terms of “can you follow the judge’s instructions,” which tells the jurors that answering “no” means that they are defying the judge. Jurors will almost always give the “right” answer to avoid getting in trouble with the court, to avoid seeming to be a troublemaker, and to avoid looking stupid in front of their peers.

EX: Q: The judge has told you that my client has a right to testify if he wishes and a right not to testify if he so wishes. Can you follow those instructions and not hold it against my client if he chooses not to testify?

A: Yes.

While it would be nice to believe that the juror’s answer is true, there is just no way of knowing. The judge has already told the juror what the “correct” answer is, and the way we phrased our question has reinforced that knowledge. All the juror’s answer tells us is that he or she knows what we want to hear.

2. Jurors view the judge as a very powerful authority figure. If the judge suggests the answer she would like to hear, most jurors will give that answer.

EX: Q: Despite your belief that anyone who doesn’t testify must be hiding something, can you follow the judge’s instructions and not take any negative inferences if the defendant does not take the stand?

A: Yes.

The juror may be trying his best to be honest, but does anyone really believe this answer?

3. When asked questions about opinions they might be embarrassed to reveal in public (such as questions about racial bias or sex), jurors will usually avoid the possibility of public humiliation by giving the socially acceptable answer – even if that answer is false.

4. When asked about how they would behave in future situations, jurors will usually give an aspirational answer. This means they will give the answer they hope will be true, or the answer that best comports with their self-image. These jurors are not lying. Their answers simply reflect what they hope (or want to believe or want others to believe) is the truth, even if they may be wrong.

EX: Q: If you are chosen for this jury, and after taking a first vote you find that the vote is 11-1 and you are the lone holdout, would you change your vote simply because the others all agree that you are wrong?

A: No.

We all know that this juror’s response is not a lie – the juror may actually believe that he
or she would be able to hold out (or at least would like to believe it). On the other hand, we also know there is nothing in the juror’s response that should make us believe he or she actually has the courage to hold out as a minority of one.

C. The judge usually doesn’t make it any easier

1. Judges frequently restrict the time for voir dire. Often this is a result of cynicism – their experience tells them that most voir dire is meaningless, so why not cut it short and get on with the trial?

2. Judges almost always want to prevent defense counsel from using voir dire as a means of indoctrinating jurors about the facts of the case or about their theory of defense. And the law says they are allowed to limit us this way.

D. And we often engage in self-defeating behavior by choosing comfort and safety over effectiveness

1. Voir dire is the only place in the trial where we have virtually no control over what happens. Jurors can say anything in response to our questions. We are afraid of “bad” answers to voir dire questions that might taint the rest of the pool or expose weaknesses in our case. We are afraid of the judge cutting us off and making us look bad in front of the jury. We are afraid of saying something that might alienate a juror or even the entire pool of jurors.

2. If a juror gives a “bad” answer we rush to correct or rehabilitate him to make sure the rest of the panel is not infected by the bias.

3. As a result of these fears, we often ask bland meaningless questions that we know the judge will allow and that we know the jurors will give bland, non-threatening answers to.

4. We then fall back on stereotypes of race, age, gender, ethnicity, employment, education, and class to decide who to challenge. Or worse, we persuade ourselves that our “gut feelings” about whether we like a juror or whether the juror likes us are an intelligent basis for exercising our challenges.

Given all these obstacles to effective jury selection, how can we start figuring out how to do it better? My suggestion is to start with some of the things social scientists and students of human behavior have taught us about jurors.
II. THE PRIME DIRECTIVE:  
VOIR DIRE’S MOST IMPORTANT BEHAVIORAL PRINCIPLE

It is impossible to “educate” or talk a complete stranger out of a strongly held belief in the time available for voir dire.

Think about this for a moment. Everyone in the courtroom tells the juror what the “right” answers are to voir dire questions. Everyone tries hard to lead the juror into giving the “right” answer. And if the juror is honest enough to admit to a bias or preconceived notion about the case, everyone tries to rehabilitate him until he says he can follow the correct path (the judge’s instructions, the Constitution, the law). And if we are honest with ourselves, everyone knows this is pure garbage.

Assume a juror says that she would give police testimony more weight than civilian testimony. The judge or a lawyer then “rehabilitates” her by getting her to say she can follow instructions and give testimony equal weight. When this happens, even an honest juror will deliberate, convince herself that she is truly weighing all testimony, and then reach the conclusion that the police were telling the truth. The initial bias, which the juror acknowledged and tried hard to tell us about, determines the outcome every time. It is part of the juror’s personality, a product of her upbringing, education, and daily life. And no matter how good a lawyer you are, you can’t talk her out of it.

Imagine, though, what would happen if we gave up on the idea of “educating” the juror, or “rehabilitating” her – If we admitted to ourselves that it is impossible to get that juror beyond her bias. We would then be able to completely refocus the goal of our voir dire:

III. THE ONLY PURPOSE OF VOIR DIRE

The only purpose of voir dire is to discover which jurors are going to hurt our client, and to get rid of them.

When a juror tells us something bad, there are only two things we should do:

☐ Believe them
☐ Get rid of them

This leads us to the most important revision we must make in our approach to voir dire:

We Are Not Selecting Jurors – We Are De-Selecting Jurors

The purpose of voir dire is not to “establish a rapport,” or “educate them about our defense,” or “enlighten them about the presumption of innocence or reasonable doubt.” It is not to figure out whether we like them or they like us. To repeat:
The only purpose of voir dire is to discover which jurors are going to hurt our client, and to get rid of them.

IV. HOW TO ASK QUESTIONS IN VOIR DIRE

Once we accept that the only purpose of voir dire is to get rid of impaired jurors, we have a clear path to figuring out what questions to ask and how to ask them. The only reason to ask a question on voir dire is to give the juror a chance to reveal a reason for us to challenge him. These reasons fall into two categories:

- The juror is unable or unwilling to accept our theory of defense in this case.
- The juror has some bias that impairs his or her ability to sit on any criminal case.

This leads us to two more principles of human behavior that will guide us in asking the right questions on voir dire:

The best predictor of what a person will do in the future is not what they say they will do, but what they have done in the past in analogous situations.

The more removed a question is from a person’s normal, everyday experience, the more likely the person will give an aspirational answer rather than an honest one. Factual questions about personal experiences get factual answers. Theoretical questions about how they will behave in hypothetical courtroom situations get aspirational answers.

A. Stop talking and listen – the goal of voir dire is to get the juror talking and to listen to his or her answers. You should not be doing most of the talking. You should start by asking open-ended, non-leading questions. Leading questions will get the juror to verbally agree with you but won’t let you learn anything about the juror. Voir dire is not cross-examination.

B. Let the jurors do most of the talking. Your job is to listen to them.

C. You can’t do the same voir dire in every case

1. Your voir dire must be tailored to your factual theory of defense in each individual case.

2. You must devise questions that will help you understand how each juror will respond to your theory of defense. This means asking questions about how the juror has responded in the
past when faced with an analogous situation.

D. Our tactics should not be aimed at asking the jurors how they would behave if certain situations come up during the trial or during deliberations. That kind of question only gets aspirational answers (how the juror hopes he would behave) or false answers (how the juror would like us to think he would behave). They tell us nothing about how the juror will actually behave. They also invite the judge to shut us down.

E. Our tactics should be aimed at asking jurors about how they behaved in the past when faced with situations analogous to the situation we are dealing with at trial.

1. It is essential that our questions not be about the same situation the juror is going to be considering at trial or about a crime or criminal justice situation – such questions only get aspirational answers.

2. Instead the question should be about an analogous, non-law related situation the juror was actually in. And we must be careful to ask about events that are really analogous to the issues we are interested in learning about.

EX: Your theory of defense is that the police planted evidence to frame your client because the investigating officer is a racist and your client is black. (Remember OJ?)

a. Asking jurors, “are you a racist?” or “do you think it is possible that the police would frame someone because of his race?” will get you nowhere. Most jurors will say “I am not a racist,” and “Of course it’s possible the police are lying. Anything is possible. I will keep an open mind.” And you will have no way of knowing what they are actually thinking.

b. You have a much better chance of learning something useful about the juror by asking an analogous question about the juror’s experience with racial bias.

EX: Asking the juror to, “tell us about the most serious incident you ever saw where someone was treated badly because of their race” will help you learn a lot about whether that juror is willing to believe your theory of defense. If the juror tells you about an incident, you will be able to gauge her response and decide how a similar response would affect her view of your case. If the juror says she has never seen such an incident, you have also learned a lot about her view of race.

F. You must consider and treat every prospective juror as a unique individual. It is your job on voir dire to find out about that unique person.
IV. WHAT SUBJECTS SHOULD YOU ASK ABOUT?

A. Look to Your Theory of Defense --

1. What do you really need a juror to believe or understand in order to win the case?

2. What do you really need to know about the juror to decide whether he or she is a person you want on the jury for this particular case?

B. What kind of life experiences might a juror have that are analogous to the thing you need a juror to understand about your case or to the things you really need to know about the jurors?

EX: Assume that your client is accused of sexually molesting his 9 year old daughter. Your theory of defense is that your client and his wife were in an ugly divorce proceeding, and the wife got the kid to lie about being abused.

The things you really need to get jurors to believe are:

1. A kid can be manipulated into lying about something this serious.

2. The wife would do something this evil to get what she wanted in the divorce.

The kind of questions you might ask the jurors should focus on analogous situations they may have experienced or seen, such as:

1. Situations they know of where someone in a divorce did something unethical to get at their ex-spouse.

2. Situations they know of where someone got really carried away because they became obsessed with holding a grudge.

3. Situations they know of where an adult convinced a kid to do something she probably knew was wrong.

4. Situations they know of where an adult convinced a kid that something that is really wrong is right.

A fact you really need to know about the jurors is whether they have any experience with child sex abuse that might affect their ability to be fair. Therefore, you must ask them:

5. If they or someone close to them had any personal experience with sexual abuse.

C. When you are choosing which question to ask a particular juror, you should build on the answers the juror gave to the standard questions already asked by the judge and the prosecutor. Often the things you learn about the juror from these questions will give you the opening you need to decide how to ask for a life-experience analogy. Areas that are often fertile ground for
seeking analogies are:

1. Does the juror have kids?
2. Does the juror supervise others at work?
3. Is the juror interested in sports?
4. Who does the juror live with?
5. What are the juror’s interests?

D. Another reason to pay attention to the court’s and prosecutor’s voir dire is that it will often lead you to general subjects that may cause the juror to be biased or impaired. Judges and prosecutors always spend a lot of time talking about reasonable doubt, presumption of innocence, elements of crimes, unanimity, etc. It can be very effective to refer back to the answers the juror gave to the court or prosecutor, and follow up with an open-ended question that allows the juror to elaborate on his answer or explain what those principles mean to him.

V. HOW TO ASK THE QUESTIONS

Although the substance of the questions must be individually tailored to your theory of defense and to the individual jurors, there is a pretty simple formula for effectively structuring the form of the questions:

A. Start with an IMPERATIVE COMMAND:

1. “Tell us about”
2. “Share with us”
3. “Describe for us”

The reason we start the question with an imperative command is to make sure that the juror feels it is proper and necessary to give a narrative answer, not just a “yes” or “no.”

B. Use a SUPERLATIVE to describe the experience you want them to talk about:

1. “The best”
2. “The worst”
3. “The most serious”

The reason we ask the question in terms of a superlative is to make sure we do not get a trivial experience from the juror.

C. ASK FOR A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

1. “That you saw”
2. “That happened to you”
3. “That you experienced”
This is the crucial part of the question where you ask the juror to relate a personal experience. Be sure to keep the question open-ended, not leading.

D. ALLOW THEM TO SAVE FACE

1. “That you or someone close to you saw”
2. “That happened to you or someone you know”
3. “That you or a friend or relative experienced”

The reason we ask for the personal experience in this way is:

a. Give the juror the chance to relate an experience that had an effect on their perceptions but may not have directly happened to them.

b. To give the juror the chance to relate an experience that happened to them but to avoid embarrassment by attributing it to someone else.

VI. PUTTING THE QUESTION TOGETHER

EX: Assume we are dealing with the same hypothetical about the child sex case and the divorcing parents. Some of the questions might come out like this:

1. “Tell us about the worst situation you’ve ever seen where someone involved in a divorce went way over the line in trying to hurt their ex.”

2. “Please describe for us the most serious situation when as a child, you or someone you know had an adult try to get you to do something you shouldn’t have done.”

VII. GETTING JURORS TO TALK ABOUT SENSITIVE SUBJECTS

If you are going to ask about sex, race, drugs, alcohol, or anything else that might be a sensitive topic there are several ways of making sure the jurors aren’t offended.

A. Before you introduce the topic, tell the jurors that if any of them would prefer to answer in private or at the bench, they should say so.

B. Explain to them why you have to ask about the subject.

C. It often helps to share a personal experience or observation you have had with the subject you will be asking questions about. By doing so, you legitimize the juror’s willingness to speak, and show that you are not asking them to do anything that you are not willing to do. If you decide to use this kind of self-revelation as a tool, be sure to follow these rules:

2. Make sure your story is exactly relevant to the point of the voir dire.

D. If you are going to voir dire on sensitive subjects, prepare those questions in advance, and try them out on others, to make sure you are asking them in a non-offensive way. Don’t make this stuff up in the middle of voir dire.

E. If a juror reveals something that is very personal, painful, or embarrassing, it is essential that you immediately say something that acknowledges their pain and thanks them for speaking so honestly. You cannot just go on with the next question, or even worse, ask something meaningless like, “how did that make you feel.”

VIII. SOME SAMPLE QUESTIONS ON IMPORTANT SUBJECTS

A. Race

1. “Tell us about the most serious incident you ever saw where someone was treated badly because of their race.”

2. “Tell us about the worst experience you or someone close to you ever had because someone stereotyped you because of your (race, gender, religion, etc.).

3. Tell us about the most significant interaction you have ever had with a person of a different race.

4. Tell us about the most difficult situation where you, or someone you know, stereotyped someone, or jumped to a conclusion about them because of their (race, gender, religion) and turned out to be wrong.

B. Alcohol/Alcoholism

1. “Tell us about a person you know who is a wonderful guy when sober, but changes into a different person when they’re drunk.”

2. “Share with us a situation where you or a person you know of was seriously affected because someone in the family was an alcoholic.”

C. Self-Defense

1. Tell me about the most serious situation you have ever seen where someone had no choice but to use violence to defend themselves (or someone else).

2. Tell us about the most frightening experience you or someone close to you had when they were threatened by another person.
3. Tell us about the craziest thing you or someone close to you ever did out of fear.

4. Tell us about the bravest thing you ever saw someone do out of fear.

5. Tell us about the bravest thing you ever saw someone do to protect another person.

D. Jumping to Conclusions

1. Tell us about the most serious mistake you or someone you know has ever made because you jumped to a snap conclusion.

E. False Suspicion or Accusation

1. Tell us about the most serious time when you or someone close to you was accused of doing something bad that you had not done.

2. Tell us about the most difficult situation you were ever in, where it was your word against someone else’s, and even though you were telling the truth, you were afraid that no one would believe you.

3. Tell us about the most serious incident where you or someone close to you mistakenly suspected someone else of wrongdoing.

F. Police Officers Lying/Being Abusive

1. Tell us about the worst encounter you or anyone close to you has ever had with a law enforcement officer.

2. Tell us about the most serious experience you or a family member or friend had with a public official who was abusing his authority.

3. Tell us about the most serious incident you know of where someone told a lie, not for personal gain, but because they thought it would ultimately bring about a fair result.

G. Lying

1. Tell us about the worst problem you ever had with someone who was a liar.

2. Tell us about the most serious time that you or someone you know told a lie to get out of trouble.

3. Tell us about the most serious time that you or someone you know told a lie out of fear.

4. Tell us about the most serious time that you or someone you know told a lie to protect someone else.
5. Tell us about the most serious time that you or someone you know told a lie out of greed.

6. Tell us about the most difficult situation you were ever in where you had to decide which of two people were telling the truth.

7. Tell us about the most serious incident where you really believed someone was telling the truth, and it turned out they were lying.

8. Tell us about the most serious incident where you really believed someone was lying, and it turned out they were telling the truth.

H. Prior Convictions/Reputation

1. Tell us about the most inspiring person you have known who had a bad history or reputation and really turned himself around.

2. Tell us about the most serious mistake you or someone close to you every made by judging someone by their reputation, when that reputation turned out to be wrong.

I. Persuasion/Gullibility/Human Nature

1. Tell us about the most important time when you were persuaded to believe that you were responsible for something you really weren’t responsible for.

2. Tell us about the most important time when you or someone close to you was persuaded to believe something about a person that wasn’t true.

3. Tell us about the most important time when you or someone close to you was persuaded to believe something about yourself that wasn’t true.

J. Desperation

1. Tell us about the most dangerous thing you or someone you know did out of hopelessness or desperation.

2. Tell us about the most out-of-character thing you or someone you know ever did out of hopelessness or desperation.

3. Tell us about the worst thing you or someone you know did out of hopelessness or desperation.

IX. HOW TO FOLLOW-UP WHEN A JUROR SHOWS BIAS

This is the crucial moment of voir dire. Having defined the purpose of voir dire as
identifying and challenging biased or impaired jurors, we now have to figure out what to do when our questions have revealed bias or impairment.

The key to success is counter-intuitive. When a juror gives an answer that suggests (or openly states) some prejudice or preconceived notion about the case, our first instinct is to run away from the answer. We don’t want the rest of the panel to be tainted by it. We want to show the juror the error of his ways. We want to convince him to be fair. Actually we should do the exact opposite.

- There is no such thing as a bad answer. An answer either displays bias or it doesn’t. If it does, we should welcome an opportunity to establish a challenge for cause.

- If an answer displays or hints at bias, we must immediately address and confront it. Colorado defenders have referred to this strategy as “Run to the Bummer.”

A. How To “Run to the Bummer”

Steps to take when a juror suggests some bias or impairment:

1. Mirror the juror’s answer: “So you believe that . . .”
   a. Use the juror’s exact language
   b. Don’t paraphrase
   c. Don’t argue

2. Then ask an open-ended question inviting the juror to explain:
   “Tell me more about that”
   “What experiences have you had that make you believe that?”
   “Can you explain that a little more?”

   No leading questions at this point.

3. Normalize the impairment
   a. Get other jurors to acknowledge the same idea, impairment, bias, etc.
   b. Don’t be judgmental or condemn it.

4. Now switch to leading questions to lock in the challenge for cause:
   a. Reaffirm where the juror is:
      “So you would need the defendant to testify that he acted in self-defense before you could decide that this shooting was in self-defense”
b. If the juror tries to weasel out of his impairment, or tries to qualify his bias, you must strip away the qualifications and force him back into admitting his preconceived notion as it applies to this case:

   Q: “So you would need the defendant to testify that he acted in self-defense before you could decide that this shooting was in self-defense.”

   A: “Well, if the victim said it might be self-defense, or if there was some scientific evidence that showed it was self-defense, I wouldn’t need your client to testify.”

   Q: “How about where there was no scientific evidence at all, and where the supposed victim absolutely insisted that it was not self-defense. Is that the situation where you would need the defendant to testify before finding self-defense?”

c. Reaffirm where the juror is not (i.e., what the law requires).

   “And it would be very difficult, if not impossible for you to say this was self-defense unless the defendant testified that he acted in self-defense.”

d. Get the juror to agree that there is a big difference between these two positions.

   “And you would agree that there is a big difference between a case where someone testified that he acted in self-defense and one where the defendant didn’t testify at all.”

e. Immunize the juror from rehabilitation

   “It sounds to me like you are the kind of person who thinks before they form an opinion, and then won’t change that opinion just because someone might want you to agree with them. Is that correct?”

   “You wouldn’t change your opinion just to save a little time and move this process along?”

   “You wouldn’t let anyone intimidate you into changing your opinion just to save a little time and move the process along?”

   “Are you comfortable swearing an oath to follow a rule 100% even though it’s the opposite of the way you see the world?”

   “Did you know that the law is always satisfied when a juror gives an honest opinion, even if that opinion might be different from that of the lawyers or even the judge? All the law asks is that you give your honest opinion and feelings.”
Regional Training for Indigent Defense: Jury Selection
Sponsored by the UNC School of Government and
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Workshop Aids

Compiled by John Rubin, based on materials
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Voir Dire

How to Ask Life Experience Questions on Voir Dire

A. Start with an IMPERATIVE COMMAND:

   “Tell us about,” “Share with us,” “Describe for us”

The reason we start the question with an imperative command is to make sure that the juror feels it is proper and necessary to give a narrative answer, not just a “yes” or “no.”

B. Use a SUPERLATIVE to describe the experience you want them to talk about:

   “The best,” “The worst,” “The most serious”

The reason we ask the question in terms of a superlative is to make sure we do not get a trivial experience from the juror.

C. Ask for a PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

   “That you saw,” “That happened to you,” “That you heard of,” “That you know of”

This is the crucial part of the question where you ask the juror to relate a personal experience. Be sure to keep the question open-ended, not leading.

D. Or ask for an EXPERIENCE OF A FAMILY MEMBER OR SOMEONE CLOSE to the juror

   “That you or someone close to you saw,” “That happened to you or someone you know”

This gives the jurors the chance to relate an experience that had an effect on their perceptions but may not have directly happened to them. It also lets the jurors avoid embarrassment by attributing one of their experiences to someone else.

E. PUTTING THE QUESTION TOGETHER

   See sample questions, below.
Some Sample Life Experience Voir Dire Questions

A. Race

1. Tell us about the most serious incident you ever saw where someone was treated badly because of his or her race (or gender, religion, etc.).

2. Tell us about the worst experience you or someone close to you ever had because someone stereotyped you or someone close to you because of your race (or gender, religion, etc.).

3. Tell us about the most significant interaction you have ever had with a person of a different race.

4. Tell us about the most difficult situation where you, or someone you know, stereotyped someone, or jumped to a conclusion about them because of his or her race (or gender, religion, etc.) and turned out to be wrong.

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1. Tell us about a person you know who is a wonderful guy when sober, but changes into a different person when drunk.

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1. Tell us about the most serious time when you or someone close to you was accused of doing something bad that you had not done.

2. Tell us about the most difficult situation you were ever in, where it was your word against someone else’s, and even though you were telling the truth, you were afraid that no one would believe you.

3. Tell us about the most serious incident where you or someone close to you mistakenly suspected someone else of wrongdoing.

F. Police Officers Lying/Being Abusive

1. Tell us about the worst encounter you or anyone close to you has ever had with a law enforcement officer.

2. Tell us about the most serious experience you or a family member or friend had with a public official who was abusing his authority.

3. Tell us about the most serious incident you know of where someone told a lie, not for personal gain, but because he or she thought it would ultimately bring about a fair result.

G. Lying

1. Tell us about the worst problem you ever had with someone who was a liar.

2. Tell us about the most serious time that you or someone you know told a lie to get out of trouble.

3. Tell us about the most serious time that you or someone you know told a lie out of fear.

4. Tell us about the most serious time that you or someone you know told a lie to protect someone else.

5. Tell us about the most serious time that you or someone you know told a lie out of greed.
6. Tell us about the most difficult situation you were ever in where you had to decide which of two people were telling the truth.

7. Tell us about the most serious incident where you really believed someone was telling the truth, and it turned out he or she was lying.

8. Tell us about the most serious incident where you really believed someone was lying, and it turned out he or she was telling the truth.

H. Prior Convictions/Reputation

1. Tell us about the most inspiring person you have known who had a bad history or reputation and really turned himself around.

2. Tell us about the most serious mistake you or someone close to you every made by judging someone by his or her reputation, when that reputation turned out to be wrong.

I. Persuasion/Gullibility/Human Nature

1. Tell us about the most important time when you were persuaded to believe that you were responsible for something you really weren’t responsible for.

2. Tell us about the most important time when you or someone close to you was persuaded to believe something about a person that wasn’t true.

3. Tell us about the most important time when you or someone close to you was persuaded to believe something about yourself that wasn’t true.

J. Desperation

1. Tell us about the most dangerous thing you or someone you know did out of hopelessness or desperation.

2. Tell us about the most out-of-character thing you or someone you know ever did out of hopelessness or desperation.

3. Tell us about the worst thing you or someone you know did out of hopelessness or desperation.
How to Lock in a Challenge for Cause

**Step #1.** Mirror the juror’s answer: “So you believe that . . . .”

a. Use the juror’s exact language
b. Don’t paraphrase
c. Don’t argue

**Step #2.** Then ask an open-ended question inviting the juror to explain (no leading questions at this point):

“Tell me more about that”

“What experiences have you had that make you believe that?”

“Can you explain that a little more?”

**Step #3.** Normalize the impairment

a. Get other jurors to acknowledge the same idea, impairment, bias, etc.

“Ms. Smith feels that the police would not arrest a person if he were not guilty. Do you feel that way as well, Mr. Barnes?”

b. Don’t be judgmental or condemn it.

“I see. Thank you for sharing that, Ms. Smith.”

**Step #4.** Now switch to leading questions to lock in the challenge for cause:

a. Reaffirm where the juror is:

“So you would need the defendant to testify that he acted in self-defense before you could decide that this shooting was in self-defense”

b. If the juror tries to weasel out of his impairment, or tries to qualify his bias, you must strip away the qualifications and force him back into admitting his preconceived notion as it applies to this case:

Q: “So you would need the defendant to testify that he acted in self-defense before you could
decide that this shooting was in self-defense.”

A: “Well, if the victim said it might be self-defense, or if there was some scientific evidence that showed it was self-defense, I wouldn’t need your client to testify.”

Q: “How about where there was no scientific evidence at all, and where the supposed victim absolutely insisted that it was not self-defense. Is that the situation where you would need the defendant to testify before finding self-defense?”

c. Reaffirm where the juror is not (i.e., what the law requires).

“And it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for you to say this was self-defense unless the defendant testified that he acted in self-defense.”

d. Get the juror to agree that there is a big difference between these two positions.

“And you would agree that there is a big difference between a case where someone testified that he acted in self-defense and one where the defendant didn’t testify at all.”

e. Immunize the juror from rehabilitation

“It sounds to me like you are the kind of person who thinks before they form an opinion, and then won’t change that opinion just because someone might want you to agree with them. Is that correct?”

“You wouldn’t change your opinion just to save a little time and move this process along?”

“You wouldn’t let anyone intimidate you into changing your opinion just to save a little time and move the process along?”

“Are you comfortable swearing an oath to follow a rule 100% even though it’s the opposite of the way you see the world?”

“Did you know that the law is always satisfied when a juror gives an honest opinion, even if that opinion might be different from that of the lawyers or even the judge? All the law asks is that you give your honest opinion and feelings.”
A Rating System for Non-Capital Jurors

1. **LEGALLY EXCLUDABLE AS BIASED FOR THE DEFENSE.** This juror openly expresses the view that he will or cannot vote for conviction.

2. This juror overtly expresses views favorable to accused people in general (“I see the police shooting/framing too many people in my community”), or favorable to what your client is accused of doing (“I don’t think anyone should go to jail for marijuana,”), but also says she will follow the judge’s instructions and convict if the evidence warrants.

3. This juror comes across as truly open-minded. He is willing to convict, but is aware of and concerned with the effect of a conviction on the client’s life. He may be an intelligent abstract thinker, or a less analytical but compassionate, person. He will be tolerant of and listen to the views of those he disagrees with.

4. Moderately pro-prosecution. This juror believes that crime is a serious problem and generally thinks the police do a good job. She does not, however, have any particular axe to grind concerning your client or the kind of crime your client is accused of committing. She wants to be sure of guilt before convicting and can recount experiences/stories of someone being falsely accused about a serious matter.

5. **Pro-prosecution.** This juror not only believes that crime is a serious problem, but has a personal experience, connection, or belief that gives him an axe to grind concerning your client or the kind of crime your client is accused of committing. Often, she will have had very little personal contact with members of your client’s racial or ethnic group and, if she has had contact, she recalls it in the context of a negative experience. This juror is often afraid: afraid of crime, afraid of people of different races and backgrounds, afraid of poor people. It is important to get these jurors talking about their experiences. They will often say something that establishes a challenge for cause.

6. Very pro-prosecution. This juror is a version of #5 on steroids. She not only believes crime is a very serious problem, but talks aggressively about the need to do something about it. She speaks in cop-talk (as derived from television) and speaks in general terms about the importance of holding people responsible for their actions. These jurors may also associate themselves (at least figuratively, sometimes literally) with law-enforcement issues, institution, and people. They may get their news and information from right-wing talk radio and may blame specific classes of people (liberals, minorities) for problems of crime and lawlessness.

7. **LEGALLY EXCLUDABLE AS BIASED FOR THE STATE.** This juror either openly expresses the view that he will vote for conviction or will not follow the judge’s instructions; or has some factual characteristic that makes him automatically disqualified (involved with the prosecution or police investigation of this case, etc.).
I. GENERAL PURPOSE OF VOIR DIRE

“Voir dire examination serves the dual purpose of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising peremptory challenges.” MuMin v Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991). The N.C. Supreme Court explained that a similar “dual purpose” was to ascertain whether grounds exist for cause challenges and to enable the lawyers to intelligently exercise their peremptory challenges. State v. Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 462 SE2d 191, 202 (1995).

“A defendant is not entitled to any particular juror. His right to challenge is not a right to select but to reject a juror.” State v. Harris, 338 N.C. 211, 227 (1994).

The purpose of voir dire and the exercise of challenges “is to eliminate extremes of partiality and to assure both...[parties]...that the persons chosen to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused will reach that decision solely upon the evidence produced at trial.” State v. Conner, 335 N.C. 618, 440 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1994).

Jurors, like all of us, have natural inclinations and favorites, and they sometimes, at least on a subconscious level, give the benefit of the doubt to their favorites. So jury selection, in a real sense, is an opportunity for counsel to see if there is anything in a juror’s yesterday or today that would make it difficult for that juror to view the facts, not in an abstract sense, but in a particular case, dispassionately. State v Hedgepath, 66 N.C. App. 390 (1984).
“Where an adversary wishes to exclude a juror because of bias, …it is the adversary seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, through questioning, that the potential juror lacks impartiality.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 423 (1985).

II. PROCEDURAL RULES OF VOIR DIRE

Overall: The trial court has the duty to control and supervise the examination of prospective jurors. Regulation of the extent and manner of questioning during voir dire rests largely in the trial court’s discretion. Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 462 S.E.2d 191, 202 (1995).

Group v. Individual Questions: “The prosecutor and the…defendant…may personally question prospective jurors individually concerning their competency to serve as jurors….” NCGS 15A-1214(c).

The trial judge has the discretion to limit individual questioning and require that certain general questions be submitted to the panel as a whole in an effort to expedite jury selection. State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 268 S.E.2d 452 (1980).

Same or Similar Questions: The defendant may not be prohibited from asking a question merely because the court [or prosecutor] has previously asked the same or similar question. N.C.G.S. 15A-1214(c); State v. Conner, 335 N.C. 618, 440 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1994).

Leading Questions: Leading questions are permitted during jury voir dire [at least by the prosecutor]. State v. Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455, 468, 555 S.E.2d 534, 542 (2001).

Re-Opening Voir Dire: N.C.G.S. 15A-1214(g) permits the trial judge to reopen the examination of a prospective juror if, at any time before the jury has been impaneled, it is discovered that the juror has made an incorrect statement or that some other good reason exists. Whether to reopen the examination of a passed juror is within the judge’s discretion. Once the trial court reopens the examination of a juror, each party has the absolute right to use any remaining peremptory challenges to excuse such a juror. State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 678, 473 S.E.2d 291, 297 (1996). For example, in State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 607-610 (2002), the prosecution passed a “death qualified” jury to the defense. During defense questioning, a juror said that he would automatically vote for LWOP over the death penalty. The trial judge re-opened the State’s questioning of this juror and allowed the prosecutor to remove the juror for cause.

Preserving Denial of Challenges for Cause: In order to preserve the denial of a challenge for cause for appeal, the defendant must adhere to the following procedure:
1) The defendant must have exhausted the peremptory challenges available to him;
2) After exhausting his peremptory challenges, the defendant must move (orally or in writing) to renew a challenge for cause that was previously denied if he either:
   a) Had peremptorily challenged the juror in question, or
b) Stated in the motion that he would have peremptorily challenged the juror if he had not already exhausted his peremptory challenges; and

3) The judge denied the defendant’s motion for renewal of his cause challenge. N.C.G.S 15A-1214(h) and (i).

Renewal of Requests for Disallowed Questions: Counsel may renew its requests to ask questions that were previously denied. Occasionally, a trial court may change its mind. See, State v. Polke, 361 N.C. 65, 68-69 (2006); State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 164-65 (1994).

III. SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF INQUIRY

Accomplice Liability: Prosecutor properly asked about jurors’ abilities to follow the law regarding acting in concert, aiding and abetting, and the felony murder rule by the following “non-stake-out” questions in State v. Cheek, 351 N.C. 48, 65-68, 520 S.E.2d 545, 555-557 (1999):

“[I]f you were convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt, even though he didn’t actually pull the trigger or strike the match or strike the blow in the murder, but that he was guilty of aiding and abetting and shared the intent that the victim be killed—could you return a verdict of guilty on that?”

“[T]he fact that one person may not have actually struck the blow or pulled the trigger or lit the match, but yet he could be guilty under the felony murder rule if he was jointly acting together with someone else in the kidnapping or committing an armed robbery?”

“[C]ould you follow the law...under the felony murder rule and find someone guilty of first-degree murder, if you were convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they had engaged in the underlying felony of either kidnapping or armed robbery, and find them guilty, even though they didn’t actually strike the blow or pull the trigger or light the match...that caused [the victim’s] death...?”

Accomplice/Co-Defendant (or Interested Witness) Testimony:

It is proper to ask about prospective jurors’ abilities to follow the law with respect to interested witness testimony...When an accomplice is testifying for the State, the accomplice is considered an interested witness, and his testimony is subject to careful [or the highest of] scrutiny. State v. Jones, 347 N.C. 193, 201-204 (1997). See, NCPI-Crim. 104.21, 104.25 and 104.30.

The following were proper questions (asked by the prosecutor) about a co-defendant/accomplice with a plea arrangement from State v. Jones, 347 N.C. 193, 201-202, 491 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1997):

a) There may be a witness who will testify...pursuant to a plea arrangement, plea bargain, or “deal” with the State. Would the mere fact that there is a plea bargain with one of the State’s witnesses affect your decision or your verdict in this case?
b) Could you listen to the court’s instructions of how you are to view accomplice or interested witness testimony, whether it came from the State or the defendant....?

c) After having listened to that testimony and the court’s instructions as to what the law is, and you found that testimony believable, could you give it the same weight as you would any other uninterested witness?

[According to the N.C. Supreme Court, these 3 questions were proper and not stake-out questions...They were designed to determine if jurors could follow the law and be impartial and unbiased. Jones, 347 N.C. at 204. The prosecutor accurately stated the law. An accomplice testifying for the State is considered an interested witness and his testimony is subject to careful scrutiny. The jury should analyze such testimony in light of the accomplice’s interest in the outcome of the case. If the jury believes the witness, it should give his testimony the same weight as any other credible witness. Jones, 347 N.C. at 203-204.]

You may hear testimony from a witness who is testifying pursuant to a plea agreement. This witness has pled guilty to a lesser degree of murder in exchange for their promise to give truthful testimony in this case. Do you have opinions about plea agreements that would make it difficult or impossible for you to believe the testimony of a witness who might testify under a plea agreement? The prosecutor’s inquiry merely (and properly) sought to determine whether a plea agreement would have a negative effect on prospective jurors’ ability to believe testimony from such witnesses. State v. Gell, 351 N.C. 192, 200-01 (2000).

Age of Juror and Effects of It: N.C.G.S. 9-6.1 allows jurors age 72 years or older to request excusal or deferral from jury service but it does not prohibit such jurors from serving. In State v. Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 408 (2006), the Court recognized that it is sensible for trial judges to consider the effects of age on the individual juror since the adverse effects of growing old do not strike all equally or at the same time. [Based on this, it appears that the trial court and the parties should be able to inquire into the effects of aging with older jurors.]

Circumstantial Evidence/Lack of Eyewitnesses:

Prosecutor informed prospective jurors that “only the three people charged with the crimes know what happened to the victims...and...none of the three would testify against the others and therefore the State had no eyewitness testimony to offer.” He then asked: “Knowing that this is a serious case, a first degree murder case, do you feel like you have to say to yourself, well, the case is just too serious...to decide based upon circumstantial evidence and I would require more than circumstantial evidence to return a verdict of first degree murder?” The court found that these statements properly (1) informed the jury that the state would be relying on circumstantial evidence and (2) inquired as to whether the lack of eyewitnesses would cause them problems. (Also, it was not a stake-out question.) State v. Teague, 134 N.C. App. 702 (1999).

It was proper in first degree murder case for State to tell the jury that they will be relying upon circumstantial evidence with no witnesses to the shooting and then ask them

**Child Witnesses:** Trial judge erred in not allowing the defendant to ask prospective jurors “if they thought children were more likely to tell the truth when they allege sexual abuse.” State v Hatfield, 128 N.C. App. 294 (1998)

**Defendant’s Prior Record:** In State v Hedgepath, 66 N.C. App. 390 (1984), the trial court erred in refusing to allow counsel to question jurors about their willingness and ability to follow judge’s instructions that they are to consider defendant’s prior record only for purposes of determining credibility.

**Defenses (i.e., Specific Defenses):** A prospective juror who is unable to accept a particular defense...recognized by law is prejudiced to such an extent that he can no longer be considered competent. Such jurors should be removed from the jury when challenged for cause. State v Leonard, 295 N.C. 58, 62-63 (1978).

  a) **Accident:** Defense counsel is free to inquire into the potential jurors’ attitudes concerning the specific defenses of accident or self-defense. State v. Parks, 324 N.C. 420, 378 S.E.2d 785 (1989).

  b) **Insanity:** It was reversible error for trial court to fail to dismiss juror who indicated he was not willing to return a verdict of NGRI even though defendant introduced evidence that would satisfy them that the defendant was insane at the time of the offense. State v Leonard, 295 N.C. 58, 62-63 (1978); see also Vinson.

  c) **Mental Health Defense:** The defendant has the right to question jurors about their attitudes regarding a potential insanity or lack of mental capacity defense, including questions about: “courses taken and books read on psychiatry, contacts with psychiatrist or persons interested in psychiatry, members of family receiving treatment, inquiry into feelings on insanity defense and ability to be fair.” U.S. v Robinson, 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973); U.S. v Jackson, 542 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1976).

  d) **Self-Defense:** Defense counsel is free to inquire into the potential jurors’ attitudes concerning the specific defenses of accident or self-defense. Parks, 324 N.C. 420, 378 S.E.2d 785 (1989).

**Drug-Related Context of Non-Drug Offense:** In a prosecution for common law robbery and assault, there was no error in allowing prosecutor (after telling prospective jurors that a proposed sale of marijuana was involved) to inquire into whether any of them would be unable to be fair and impartial for that reason. State v Williams, 41 N.C. App. 287, disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 699 (1979).

The following was not a “stake-out” question and was a proper inquiry to determine the impartiality of the jurors: “Do you feel like you will automatically turn off the rest of the case and predicate your verdict of not guilty solely upon the fact that these
people were out looking for drugs and involved in the drug environment, and became victims as a result of that?” State v Teague, 134 N.C. App. 702 (1999)

**Eyewitness Identification:** The following prosecutor’s question was upheld as proper (and non-stake-out): “Does anyone have a per se problem with eyewitness identification? Meaning, it is in and of itself going to be insufficient to deem a conviction in your mind, no matter what the judge instructs you as to the law?” The prosecutor was “simply trying to ensure that the jurors could follow the law with respect to eyewitness testimony…that is treat it no differently that circumstantial evidence.” State v. Roberts, 135 N.C. App. 690, 697, 522 S.E.2d 130 (1999).

**Expert Witness:** “If someone is offered as an expert in a particular field such as psychiatry, could you accept him as an expert, his testimony as an expert in that particular field.” According to State v Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 131 (1991), this was not an attempt to stake out jurors.

It was not an abuse of discretion for the judge to prevent defense counsel from asking jurors “whether they would automatically reject the testimony of mental health professionals.” This was apparently a stake out question. State v. Neal, 346 N.C. 608, 618 (1997).

**Focusing on “The Issue”:**
In a child homicide case, the prosecutor was allowed to ask a prospective juror “if he could look beyond evidence of the child’s poor living conditions and lack of motherly care and focus on the issue of whether the defendant was guilty of killing the child.” The Supreme Court found that this was not a stake-out question. State v. Burr, 341 N.C. 263, 285-86 (1995).

**Following the Law:** “The right to an impartial jury contemplates that each side will be allowed to make inquiry into the ability of prospective jurors to follow the law. Questions designed to measure a prospective juror’s ability to follow the law are proper within the context of jury selection.” State v. Jones, 347 N.C. 193, 203 (1997), citing State v. Price, 326 N.C. 56, 66-67, 388 S.E.2d 84, 89, vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 802 (1990).

If a juror’s answers about a fundamental legal concept (such as the presumption of innocence) demonstrated either confusion about, or a fundamental misunderstanding of the principles…or a simple reluctance to apply those principles, its effect on the juror’s inability to give the defendant a fair trial remained the same. State v. Cunningham, 333 N.C. 744, 754-756, 429 S.E.2d 718 (1993).

**Hold-Out Jurors During Deliberations:** Generally, questions designed to determine how well a prospective juror would stand up to other jurors in the event of a split decision amounts to impermissible “stake-out” questions. State v. Call, 353 N.C. 400, 409-410, 545 S.E.2d 190, 197 (2001).
It is permissible, however, to ask jurors “if they understand that, while the law requires them to deliberate with other jurors in order to try to reach a unanimous verdict, they have the right to stand by their beliefs in the case.” (Note that, if this permissible question is followed by the question, “And would you do that?,” this crosses the line into an impermissible stake-out question.) State v. Elliott, 344 N.C. 242, 262-63, 475 S.E.2d 202, 210 (1997); see also, State v. Maness, 363 N.C. 261 (2009).

Where defense counsel had already inquired into whether jurors could follow the law as specified in N.C.G.S. 15A-1235 by asking if they could “independently weigh the evidence, respect the opinion of other jurors, and be strong enough to ask other jurors to to respect his opinion,” the trial judge properly limited a redundant question that was based on an Allen jury instruction. (N.C.P.I.-Crim. 101-40). State v. Maness, 363 N.C. 261 (2009).

**Identifying Family Members:** Not error to allow the prosecutor during jury selection to identify members of the murder victim’s family who are in the courtroom. State v Reaves, 337 N.C. 700 (1994).

**Intoxication:** Proper for Prosecutor to ask prospective jurors whether they would be sympathetic toward a defendant who was intoxicated at the time of the offense. “If it is shown to you from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged shooting, would this cause you to have sympathy for him and allow that sympathy to affect your verdict.” State v McKoy, 323 N.C. 1 (1988).

**Law Enforcement Witness Credibility:** If a juror would automatically give enhanced credibility or weight to the testimony of a law enforcement witness (or any particular class of witness), he would be excused for cause. State v. Cummings, 361 N.C. 438, 457-58 (2007); State v. McKinnon, 328 N.C. 668, 675-76, 403 S.E.2d 47 (1991).

**Legal Principles:** Defense counsel may question jurors to determine whether they completely understood the principles of reasonable doubt and burden of proof. Once counsel has fully explored an area, however, the judge may limit further inquiry. Parks, 324 N.C. 420, 378 S.E.2d 785 (1989).

“The right to an impartial jury contemplates that each side will be allowed to make inquiry into the ability of prospective jurors to follow the law. Questions designed to measure a prospective juror’s ability to follow the law are proper within the context of jury selection.” State v. Jones, 347 N.C. 193, 203 (1997), citing State v. Price, 326 N.C. 56, 66-67, 388 S.E.2d 84, 89, vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 802 (1990).

**Defendant Not Testifying:** It is proper for defense counsel to ask questions concerning a defendant’s failure to testify in his own defense. A court, however, may disallow questioning about the defendant’s failure to offer evidence in his defense. State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543, 447 S.E.2d 727 (1994).

Court erred in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause of juror who
repeatedly said that the defendant’s failure to testify would stick in the back of my mind while he was deliberating (in response to question “whether the defendant’s failure to testify would affect his ability to give him a fair trial”). State v Hightower, 331 N.C. 636 (1992).

**Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof:** A juror gave conflicting and ambiguous answers about whether she could presume the defendant innocent and whether she would require him to prove his innocence. The Supreme Court awarded the defendant a new trial because the trial judge denied the defendant’s challenge for cause. The Supreme Court said that the juror’s answers demonstrated either confusion about, or a fundamental misunderstanding of the principles of the presumption of innocence, or a simple reluctance to apply those principles. Regardless whether the juror was confused, had a misunderstanding, or was reluctant to apply the law, its effect on her ability to give the defendant a fair trial remained the same. State v. Cunningham, 333 N.C. 744, 754-756, 429 S.E.2d 718 (1993).

**Pretrial Publicity:** Inquiry should be made regarding the effect of the publicity upon jurors’ ability to be impartial or keep an open mind. Mu’min, 500 U.S. 415, 419-421, 425 (1991). Although “Questions about the content of the publicity…might be helpful in assessing whether a juror is impartial,” they are not constitutionally required. Id. at 425. The constitutional question is whether jurors had such fixed opinions that they could not be impartial, not whether or what they remembered about the publicity. It is not required that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. Id., 500 U.S. at 426 and 430.

It was deemed proper for a prosecutor to describe some of the “uncontested” details of the crime before he asked jurors whether they knew or read anything about the case. State v. Nobles, 350 N.C. 483, 497-498, 515 S.E.2d 885, 894-895 (1999) (ADA noted that defendant was charged with discharging a firearm into a vehicle occupied by his wife and three small children). It was not a “stake-out” question.

**Racial/Ethnic Background:** Trial courts must allow questions regarding whether any jurors might be prejudiced against the defendant because of his race or ethnic group where the defendant is accused of a violent crime and the defendant and the victim were members of different racial or ethnic groups. (If this criteria is not met, racial and ethnic questions are discretionary.) Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981). Such questions must be allowed in capital cases involving a charge of murder of a white person by a black defendant. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1783, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986).

**Sexual Offense/Medical Evidence:** In a sexual offense case, the prosecutor asked, “To be able to find one guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, are you going to require that there be medical evidence that affirmatively says an incident occurred?” This was a proper, non-stake-out question. Since the law does not require medical evidence to corroborate a victim’s story, the prosecutor’s question was a proper attempt to measure prospective jurors’ ability to follow the law. State v. Henderson, 155 N.C. App. 719, 724-727 (2003).
Sexual Orientation: Proper for prosecutor to question jurors regarding prejudice against homosexuality for the purpose of determining whether they could impartially consider the evidence knowing that the State’s witnesses were homosexual.  


IV. IMPROPER QUESTIONS OR IMPROPER PURPOSES

Answers to Legal Questions: Counsel should not “fish” for answers to legal questions before the judge has instructed the juror on applicable legal principles by which the juror should be guided.  


[Does this mean can counsel get judge to give preliminary instructions before voir dire, and then ask questions about the law?]  

Arguments that are Prohibited: A lawyer (even a prosecutor) may not make statements during jury selection that would be improper if they were later argued to the jury.  

State v. Hines, 286 N.C. 377, 385, 211 S.E.2d 201 (1975) (reversible error for the prosecutor to make improper statements during voir dire about how the death penalty is rarely enforced).

Confusing and Ambiguous Questions: Hypothetical questions so phrased to be ambiguous and confusing are improper. For example, “Now, everyone on the jury is in favor of capital punishment for this offense...Is there anyone on the jury, because the nature of the offense, feels like you might be a little bit biased or prejudiced, either consciously or unconsciously, because of the type or the nature of the offense involved; is there anyone on the jury who feels that they would be in favor of a sentence other than death for rape?” (see, Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 215 S.E.2d 60 (1975)); or, “Would you be willing to be tried by one in your present state of mind if you were on trial in this case?”  


Inadmissible Evidence: An attorney may not ask prospective jurors about inadmissible evidence.  


Incorrect Statements of Law: Questions containing incorrect or inadequate statements of the law are improper.  


Indoctrination of Jurors: Counsel should not engage in efforts to indoctrinate jurors and counsel should not argue the case in any way while questioning jurors. State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 268 S.E.2d 452 (1980).  In order to constitute an attempt to indoctrinate potential jurors, the improper question would be aimed at indoctrinating jurors with views favorable to the [questioning party]...or...advancing a particular position.  


Overbroad and General Questions: “Would you consider, if you had the opportunity,
evidence about this defendant, either good or bad, other than that arising from the incident here?” This question was overly broad and general, and not proper for voir dire.  *State v. Washington*, 283 N.C. 175, 195 S.E.2d 534 (1973).

**Rapport Building:** Counsel should not visit with or establish “rapport” with jurors.  *State v. Phillips*, 300 NC 678, 268 SE2d 452 (1980).

**Repetitive Questions:** The court may limit repetitious questions.  *Vinson*, 287 N.C. 326, 215 S.E.2d 60 (1975).  Where defense counsel had already inquired into whether jurors could “independently weigh the evidence, respect the opinion of other jurors, and be strong enough to ask other jurors to to respect his opinion,” the trial judge properly limited a redundant question that was based on an Allen jury instruction.  *State v. Maness*, 363 N.C. 261 (2009).

**Stake-Out Questions:**


“Staking out” defined: *Questions that tend to commit prospective jurors to a specific future course of action in the case.*  *Chapman*, 359 N.C. 328, 345-346 (2005).

  Counsel may not pose hypothetical questions designed to elicit in advance what the jurors’ decision will be under a certain state of the evidence or upon a given state of facts...The court should not permit counsel to question prospective jurors as to the kind of verdict they would render, or how they would be inclined to vote, under a given state of facts.  *State v Vinson*, 287 N.C. 326, 336-37 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 902 (1976).

**Examples of Stake-Out Questions:**

1) “Is there anyone on the jury who feels that because the defendant had a gun in his hand, no matter what the circumstances might be, that if that-if he pulled the trigger to that gun and that person met their death as result of that, that simply on those facts alone that he must be guilty of something?”  *Parks*, 324 N.C. 420, 378 S.E.2d 785 (1989).

2) Improper “reasonable doubt” questions:
   a) *What would your verdict be if the evidence were evenly balanced?*
   b) *What would your verdict be if you had a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt?*
   c) *What would your verdict be if you were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt?*  *State v. Vinson*, 287 N.C. 326, 215 S.E.2d 60 (1975).
   d) The judge will instruct you that “you have to find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.  Mr. [Juror], if you hear the evidence that comes in and find three elements beyond a reasonable doubt, but you don’t find on the
fourth element, what would your verdict be?”  
*State v. Johnson, ___*  
N.C.App. __, 706 S.E.2d. 790, 796 (2011)  

3) Whether you would vote for the death penalty [...in a specified hypothetical situation...]?  
*State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 215 S.E.2d 60 (1975).*  

4) If you find from the evidence a conclusion which is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations; that is, one leading to innocence and one leading to guilt, will you adopt the interpretation which points to innocence and reject that of guilt?  
*State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 215 S.E.2d 60 (1975).*  

5) If it was shown...that the defendant couldn’t control his actions and didn’t know what was going on..., would you still be inclined to return a verdict which would cause the imposition of the death penalty?  
*State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 215 S.E.2d 60 (1975).*  

6) If you are satisfied from the evidence that the defendant was not conscious of his act at the time it allegedly was committed, would you still feel compelled to return a guilty verdict?  
*State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 215 S.E.2d 60 (1975).*  

7) If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the act but you believed that he did not intentionally or willfully commit the crime, would you still return a guilty verdict knowing that there would be a mandatory death sentence?  
*State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 215 S.E.2d 60 (1975).*  

8) Improper Burden of Proof Questions:  
a) If the defendant chose not to put on a defense, would you hold that against him or take it as an indication that he has something to hide?  
b) Would you feel the need to hear from the defendant in order to return a verdict of not guilty?  
c) Would the defendant have to prove anything to you before he would be entitled to a not guilty verdict?  
*State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543, 447 S.E.2d 727 (1994); State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 268 S.E.2d 452 (1980), or*  
d) Would the fact that the defendant called fewer witnesses than the State make a difference in your decision as to her guilt?  
*State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986).*  

9) Improper Insanity Questions:  
a) Do you know what a dissociative period is and do you believe that it is possible for a person not to know because some mental disorder where they actually are, and do things that they believe they are doing in another place and under circumstances that are not actually real?  
b) Are you thinking, well if the defendant says he has PTSD, for that reason alone, I would vote that he is guilty?  
*State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d 786 (1985).*  

10) Improper “Hold-out” Juror Questions:  
a) A question designed to determine how well a prospective juror would stand up
to other jurors in the event of a split decision amounts to an impermissible “stake-out.” State v. Call, 353 N.C. 400, 409-410, 545 S.E.2d 190, 197 (2001). For example, “if you personally do not think that the State has proved something beyond a reasonable doubt and the other 11 jurors have, could you maintain the courage of your convictions and say, they’ve not proved that?”

b) It is permissible to ask jurors “if they understand that, while the law requires them to deliberate with other jurors in order to try to reach a unanimous verdict, they have the rights to stand by their beliefs in the case.” If this permissible question is followed by the question, “And would you do that?” this crosses the line into an impermissible stake-out question. State v. Elliott, 344 N.C. 242, 263, 475 S.E.2d 202, 210 (1996).

c) The following hypothetical inquiry was deemed an improper stake-out question: “If you were convinced that life imprisonment without parole was the appropriate penalty after hearing the facts, the evidence, and the law, could you return a verdict of life imprisonment without parole even if you fellow jurors were of different opinions?” State v. Maness, 363 N.C. 261, 269-70 (2009).

11) Improper Questions about Witness Credibility:
   a) “What type of facts would you look at to make a determination if someone’s telling the truth?”
   b) In determining whether to believe a witness, “would it be important to you that a person could actually observe or hear what they said [that] they have [seen or heard] from the witness stand?” State v. Johnson, __ N.C.App. __, 706 S.E.2d 790, 793-94 (2011).

Examples of NON-Stake Out Questions:
1) Prosecutor asked the jurors “if they would consider that the defendant voluntarily consumed alcohol in determining whether the defendant was entitled to diminished capacity mitigating factor.” The Supreme Court stated, “This was a proper question. He did not attempt to stake the jury out as to what their answer would be on a hypothetical question.” State v. Reeves, 337 N.C. 700 (1994)

2) Prosecutor informed prospective jurors that “only the three people charged with the crimes know what happened to the victims...and...none of the three would testify against the others and therefore the State had no eyewitness testimony to offer.” He then asked: Knowing that this is a serious case, a first degree murder case, do you feel like you have to say to yourself, well, the case is just too serious...to decide based upon circumstantial evidence and I would require more than circumstantial evidence to return a verdict of first degree murder? Court found that these statements properly (1) informed the jury that the state would be relying on circumstantial evidence and (2) inquired as to whether the lack of eyewitnesses would cause them problems. (Also, it was not a stake-out question.) State v. Teague, 134 N.C. App. 702 (1999).
3) “Do you feel like you will automatically turn off the rest of the case and predicate your verdict of not guilty solely upon the fact that these people were out looking for drugs and involved in the drug environment, and became victims as a result of that?” *State v Teague*, 134 N.C. App. 702 (1999).

4) “If someone is offered as an expert in a particular field such as psychiatry, could you accept him as an expert, his testimony as an expert in that particular field.” According to *State v Smith*, 328 N.C. 99, 131 (1991), this was NOT an attempt to stake out jurors.

5) Proper “non-stake-out” questions (by the prosecutor) about a co-defendant/accomplice with a plea arrangement from *State v. Jones*, 347 N.C. 193, 201-202, 204, 491 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1997):

   a) There may be a witness who will testify...pursuant to a plea arrangement, plea bargain, or “deal” with the State. Would the mere fact that there is a plea bargain with one of the State’s witnesses affect your decision or your verdict in this case?

   b) Could you listen to the court’s instructions of how you are to view accomplice or interested witness testimony, whether it came from the State or the defendant....?

   c) After having listened to that testimony and the court’s instructions as to what the law is, and you found that testimony believable, could you give it the same weight as you would any other uninterested witness?


   a) As you sit here now, do you know how you would vote at the penalty phase...regardless of the facts or circumstances in the case?

   b) Do you feel like in any particular case you are more likely to return a verdict of life imprisonment or the death penalty?

   c) Can you imagine a set of circumstances in which...your personal beliefs [for or against the death penalty] conflict with the law? In that situation, what would you do?

A federal court in *United States v. Johnson*, 366 F.Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Iowa 2005), explained how to avoid improper stakeout questions in framing proper case-specific questions. A proper question should address the juror’s ability to consider both life and death instead of seeking to secure a juror’s pledge vote for life or death under a certain set of facts. 366 F.Supp. 2d at 842-844. For example, questions about 1) whether a juror could find (instead of would find) that certain facts call for the imposition of life or death, or 2) whether a juror could fairly consider both life and death in light of particular facts are appropriate case-specific inquiries. 366 F.Supp. 2d at 845, 850. Case-specific questions should be prefaced on “if the evidence shows,” or some other reminder that an ultimate determination must be based on the evidence at trial and the court’s instructions. 366 F.Supp. 2d at 850.
7) The prosecutor’s question, “Would you feel sympathy towards the defendant simply because you would see him here in court each day...?” was NOT a stake-out attempt to get jurors to not consider defendant’s appearance and humanity in capital sentencing hearing. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 346-347 (2005).

8) Prosecutor properly asked “non-stake-out” questions about jurors’ abilities to follow the law regarding acting in concert, aiding and abetting, and the felony murder rule in State v. Cheek, 351 N.C. 48, 65-68, 520 S.E.2d 545, 555-557 (1999):

   a) “[I]f you were convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt, even though he didn’t actually pull the trigger or strike the match or strike the blow in the murder, but that he was guilty of aiding and abetting and shared the intent that the victim be killed—could you return a verdict of guilty on that?”

   b) “[T]he fact that one person may not have actually struck the blow or pulled the trigger or lit the match, but yet he could be guilty under the felony murder rule if he was jointly acting together with someone else in the kidnapping or committing an armed robbery?”

   c) “[C]ould you follow the law...under the felony murder rule and find someone guilty of first-degree murder, if you were convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they had engaged in the underlying felony of either kidnapping or armed robbery, and find them guilty, even though they didn’t actually strike the blow or pull the trigger or light the match...that caused [the victim’s] death...?”

9) In a sexual offense case, the prosecutor asked, “To be able to find one guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, are you going to require that there be medical evidence that affirmatively says an incident occurred?” This was NOT a stake-out question. Since the law does not require medical evidence to corroborate a victim’s story, the prosecutor’s question was a proper attempt to measure prospective jurors’ ability to follow the law. State v. Henderson, 155 N.C. App. 719, 724-727 (2003) (The court said that the following question would have been a stake-out if the ADA had asked it, “If there is medical evidence stating that some incident has occurred, will you find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”).

10) In a case involving eyewitness identification, the prosecutor asked: “Does anyone have a per se problem with eyewitness identification? Meaning, it is in and of itself going to be insufficient to deem a conviction in your mind, no matter what the judge instructs you as to the law?” The Court said that this question did NOT cause the jurors to commit to a future course of action. The prosecutor was “simply trying to ensure that the jurors could follow the law with respect to eyewitness testimony...that is treat it no differently that circumstantial evidence.” State v. Roberts, 135 N.C. App. 690, 697, 522 S.E.2d 130 (1999).

11) In a child homicide case, the prosecutor was allowed to ask a prospective juror “if he could look beyond evidence of the child’s poor living conditions and lack of motherly care and focus on the issue of whether the defendant was guilty of killing the child.”
Supreme Court found that this was not a stake-out question. State v. Burr, 341 N.C. 263, 285-86 (1995).

JURY SELECTION IN DEATH PENALTY CASES

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Both the defendant and the state have the right to question prospective jurors about their views on capital punishment...The extent and manner of the inquiry by counsel lies within the trial court’s discretion and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 430 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1993).

A defendant on trial for his life should be given great latitude in examining potential jurors. State v Conner, 335 N.C. 618 (1995).

[C]ounsel may seek to identify whether a prospective juror harbors a general preference for a life or death sentence or is resigned to vote automatically for either sentence....A juror who is predisposed to recommend a particular sentence without regard for the unique facts of a case or a trial judge’s instruction on the law is not fair and impartial. State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 345 (2005) (citation omitted).

“Part of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors...Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his constitutional right to an impartial jury will be honored.” Morgan v Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 733 (1992)

Voir dire must be available “to lay bare the foundation” of a challenge for cause against a prospective juror. Were voir dire not available to lay bare the foundation of petitioner’s challenge for cause against those prospective jurors who would always impose death following conviction, his right not to be tried by such jurors would be rendered as nugatory and meaningless as the State’s right, in the absence of questioning, to strike those who would never do so. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 733-34.

In voir dire, “what matters is how...[the questions regarding capital punishment] might be understood-or misunderstood-by prospective jurors.” For example, “a general question as to the presence of reservations [against the death penalty] is far from the inquiry which separates those who would never vote for the ultimate penalty from those who would reserve it for the direst cases.” One cannot assume the position of a venireman regarding this issue absent his own unambiguous statement of his beliefs. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 515, n. 9.

The trial court must allow a defendant to go beyond the standard “fair and impartial” question: “As to general questions of fairness and impartiality, such jurors could in all truth and candor respond affirmatively, personally confident that such dogmatic views are fair and impartial, while leaving the specific concern unprobed...It
may be that a juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining such dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent him or her from doing so. A defendant on trial for his life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective jurors function under such misconception.” Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735-36.

It is not necessary for the trial court to explain or for a juror to understand the process of a capital sentencing proceeding before the juror can be successfully challenged for his answers to questions. An understanding of the process should not affect one’s beliefs regarding the death penalty. Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 462 SE2d 191, 202, 206 (1995).

II. Death Qualification: General Opposition to Death Penalty Not Enough

Under the “impartial jury” guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, death penalty jurors may not be excused “for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction”…, or “that there are some kinds of cases in which they would refuse to recommend capital punishment. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522, 512-13.

The Supreme Court recognized that “A man who opposes the death penalty…can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the state and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror.” Id., 391 U.S. at 519.

“Not all [jurors] who oppose the death penalty are subject to removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors…so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.” Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766, 90 L.Ed.2d 137, 149 (1986). [Note that the Court in Lockhart reaffirmed its position that death-qualified juries are not conviction-prone, and it is constitutional for a death-qualified jury to decide the guilt/innocence phase. The Court rejected the “fair-cross-section” argument against death-qualified juries deciding guilt.]

“A juror is not automatically excluded from jury service merely because that juror may have an opinion about the propriety of the death penalty.” State v. Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 410 (2006). General opposition to the death penalty will not support a challenge for cause for a potential juror who will “conscientiously apply the law to the facts adduced at trial.” Such a juror may be properly excluded “if he refuses to follow the statutory scheme and truthfully answer the questions put by the trial judge.” State v. Brogden, 430 S.E.2d at 907-08 (1993)(citing Witt, Adams v. Texas, and Lockhart).

III. Death Qualification Rules: Witherspoon and Witt Standards

The State may excuse jurors who make it "unmistakably clear” that (1) they
would “automatically vote against the death penalty” no matter what the facts of the case were, or (2) “their attitude about the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision” regarding the defendant’s guilt. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522, n. 21 (1968).

A . . . prospective juror cannot be expected to say in advance of trial whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case before him. The most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances...” that might emerge during the trial. Witherspoon v. Illinoi, 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.21 (1968).

The proper standard for excusing a prospective juror for cause because of his views on capital punishment is: “Whether the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction or his oath.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424.

Note that considerable confusion regarding the law on the part of the juror could amount to “substantial impairment.” Utticht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 127. S.Ct. 2218, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 1029 (2007).

Prospective jurors may not be excused for cause simply because of the possibility “of the death penalty may affect what their honest judgment of the facts will be or what they may deem to be a reasonable doubt.” The fact that the possible imposition of the death penalty would “affect” their deliberations by causing them to be more emotionally involved or to view their task with greater seriousness is not grounds for excusal. The same rule against exclusion for cause applies to jurors who could not confirm or deny that their deliberations would be affected by their views about the death penalty or by the possible imposition of the death penalty. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1980).

The State may excuse for cause a juror if he affirmatively answers the following question: “Is your conviction [against the death penalty] so strong that you cannot take an oath [to fairly try this case and follow the law], knowing that a possibility exists in regard to capital punishment.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1978). This ruling was based on the impartiality prong of the Witherspoon standard (i.e., their attitudes toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt.)

The N.C. Supreme Court has upheld the removal of potential jurors who equivocate or who state that although they believe generally in the death penalty, they indicate that they personally would be unable or would find it difficult to vote for the death penalty. Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 462 S.E.2d 191, 206 (1995); State v. Gibbs, 335 NC 1, 436 SE2d 321 (1993), cert. denied, 129 L.Ed.2d 881 (1994).

The following questions by the prosecutor were found to be proper:
1) [Mr. Juror…], how do you feel about the death penalty, sir, are you opposed to it or [do] you feel like it is a necessary law?

2) Do you feel that you could be part of the legal machinery which might bring it about in this particular case?  


IV. Rehabilitation of Death Challenged Juror

It is not an abuse of for the trial court to deny the defendant the chance to rehabilitate a juror who has expressed clear and unequivocal opposition to the death penalty in response to questions asked by the prosecutor and judge when further questioning by defendant would not have likely produced different answers. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 430 SE2d 905, 908-09 (1993); see also State v. Taylor, 332 N.C. 372, 420 S.E.2d 414 (1992).  [In Brogden, a juror said that he could consider the evidence, was not predisposed either way, and could vote for death in an appropriate case. The same juror also said his feelings about the death penalty would “partially” or “to some extent” affect his performance as a juror. The trial court erroneously denied the defendant the opportunity to rehabilitate this juror.]

It is error for a trial court to enter “a general ruling, as a matter of law,” a defendant will never be allowed to rehabilitate a juror when the juror’s answers…have indicated that the juror may be unable to follow the law and fairly consider the possibility of recommending a sentence of death.  


V. Life Qualifying Questions: Morgan v. Illinois

“If you found [the defendant] guilty, would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts were?”  

Morgan, 504 U.S. at 723. A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail to follow the law about considering aggravating and mitigating evidence, and has already formed an opinion on the merits of the case.  Id. at 504 U.S. at 729, 738.

“Clearly, the extremes must be eliminated-i.e., those who, in spite of the evidence, would automatically vote to convict or impose the death penalty or automatically vote to acquit or impose a life sentence.”  

Morgan, 504 U.S. at 734, n. 7.

“General fairness and follow the law questions” are not sufficient.  A capital defendant is entitled to inquire and ascertain a potential juror’s predeterminations regarding the imposition of the death penalty.  

Morgan, 504 U.S. at 507; State v. Conner, 335 N.C. 618, 440 S.E.2d 826, 840 (1994).

[For a good summary of Morgan, see U.S. v. Johnson, 366 F.Supp. 2d 822, 826-831 (N.D. Iowa 2005).]
Proper Questions:

1) As you sit here now, do you know how you would vote at the penalty phase...regardless of the facts or circumstances in the case? Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 344-345 (2005).

2) Do you feel like in any particular case you are more likely to return a verdict of life imprisonment or the death penalty? [According to the Supreme Court, these general questions (asked by the prosecutor, i.e., #1 and #2 herein) did not tend to commit jurors to a specific future course of action. Instead, the questions helped to clarify whether the jurors’ personal beliefs would substantially impair their ability to follow the law. Such inquiry is not only permissible, it is desirable to safeguard the integrity of a fair and impartial jury” for both parties. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 344-345 (2005).]

3) Can you imagine a set of circumstances in which...your personal beliefs [...] conflict with the law? In that situation, what would you do? [While a party may not ask questions that tend to “stake out” the verdict a prospective juror would render on a particular set of facts..., counsel may seek to identify whether a prospective juror harbors a general preference for a life or death sentence or is resigned to vote automatically for either sentence....A juror who is predisposed to recommend a particular sentence without regard for the unique facts of a case or a trial judge’s instruction on the law is not fair and impartial. State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 345 (2005) (citation omitted)....The Supreme Court said that, although the prosecutor’s questions (numbered 1-3 above) were hypothetical, they did not tend to commit jurors to a specific future course of action in this case, nor were they aimed at indoctrinating jurors with views favorable to the State. These questions do not advance any particular position. In fact, the questions address a key criterion of juror competency, i.e., ability to apply the law despite of their personal views. In addition, the questions were simple and clear. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 345-346 (2005).]

4) Is your support for the death penalty such that you would find it difficult to consider voting for life imprisonment for a person convicted of first-degree murder? Approved in State v Conner, 335 N.C. 618 (1994)

5) Would your belief in the death penalty make it difficult for you to follow the law and consider life imprisonment for first-degree murder? Approved in State v Conner, 335 N.C. 618 (1994). [The gist of the above two questions (numbered 4 and 5) was to determine whether the juror was willing to consider a life sentence in the appropriate circumstances or would automatically vote for death upon conviction. Conner, 440 SE2d at 841.]

6) If at the first stage of the trial you voted guilty for first-degree murder, do you think that you could at sentencing consider a life sentence or would your feelings about the death penalty be so strong that you could not consider a life sentence? State v Conner, 335 N.C. 618, 643-45 (1994) (referring to State v Taylor).

7) If you had sat on the jury and had returned a verdict of guilty, would you then presume that the penalty should be death? State v Conner, 335 N.C. 618, 643-45 (1994). [Referring to questions used in State v Taylor, 304 N.C. at 265, would now be acceptable]. Also approved in State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 254, 555 S.E.2d 251, 266 (2001) when asked by the prosecutor.]
8) If the State convinced you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of premeditated murder and you had returned a verdict of guilty, do you think then that you would feel that the death penalty was the only appropriate punishment? State v Conner, 335 N.C. 618, 643-45 (1994). [The Court recognized that questions (numbered here as 6-8) that were deemed inappropriate in State v Taylor, 304 N.C. at 265, would now be acceptable.]


**Improper Questions:**

1) Improper questions due to “form” (according to Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 462 S.E.2d 191, 203 (1995)):

   a) Do you think that a sentence to life imprisonment is a sufficiently harsh punishment for someone who has committed cold-blooded, premeditated murder?

   b) Do you think that before you would be willing to consider a death sentence for someone who has committed cold-blooded, premeditated murder, that they would have to show you something that justified that sentence?

2) Questions that were argumentative, incomplete statement of the law, and “stake-outs” are improper. Simpson, 341 N.C. at 339-340.

3) The following question was properly disallowed under Morgan because it was overly broad and called for a legislative/policy decision: Do you feel that the death penalty is the appropriate penalty for someone convicted of first-degree murder? Conner, 335 N.C. at 643.

4) Defense counsel was not allowed to ask the following questions because they were hypothetical stake-out questions designed to pin down jurors regarding the kind of fact scenarios they would deem worthy of LWOP or the death penalty:

   a) Have you ever heard of a case where you thought that LWOP should be the appropriate punishment?

   b) Have you ever heard of a case where you thought that the death penalty should be the punishment?

   c) Whether you could conceive of a case where LWOP ought to be the punishment? What type of case is that? State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 610-613 (2002).

**Case-Specific Questions under Morgan:**

The court in United States v. Johnson, 366 F.Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Iowa 2005) addressed the issue of whether Morgan allows for case-specific questions (i.e., questions that ask whether jurors can consider life or death in a case involving stated facts). The court decided that Morgan did not preclude (or even address) case-specific questions. 366 F.Supp. 2d at 844-845. The essence of the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan was that, in order to empanel a fair and impartial jury, a defendant must be afforded the opportunity to question jurors about their ability to consider life and death sentences based on the facts and law in a particular case rather than automatically imposing a particular sentence no matter what the facts were. Therefore, the court in
Johnson found that case-specific questions (other than stake-out questions) are appropriate under Morgan. 366 F.Supp. 2d at 845-846.

In fact case-specific questions may be constitutionally required since a prohibition on such questions could impede a party’s ability to determine whether jurors are unwaveringly biased for or against a death sentence. 366 F.Supp. 2d at 848.

The Johnson court explained how to avoid improper stakeout questions in framing proper case-specific questions. A proper question should address the juror’s ability to consider both life and death instead of seeking to secure a juror’s pledge vote for life or death under a certain set of facts. 366 F.Supp. 2d at 842-844. For example, questions about 1) whether a juror could find (instead of would find) that certain facts call for the imposition of life or death, or 2) whether a juror could fairly consider both life and death in light of particular facts are appropriate case-specific inquiries. 366 F.Supp. 2d at 845, 850. Case-specific questions should be prefaced on “if the evidence shows,” or some other reminder that an ultimate determination must be based on the evidence at trial and the court’s instructions. 366 F.Supp. 2d at 850.

VI. Consideration of MITIGATION Evidence

General Principles:

Pursuant to Morgan v. Illinois, capital jurors must be able to consider and give weight to mitigating circumstances. “Any juror who states that he or she will automatically vote for the death penalty without regard to the mitigating evidence is announcing an intention not to follow the instructions to consider mitigating evidence and to decide if it is sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty.” Morgan, 504 U.S. at 738, 119 L.Ed.2d at 508. Such jurors “not only refuse to give such evidence any weight but are also plainly saying that mitigating evidence is not worth their consideration and that they will not consider it.” Morgan, 504 U.S. at 736, 119 L.Ed.2d at 507. “Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial.” Morgan, 504 U.S. at 739, 119 L.Ed.2d at 509.

Not only must the defendant be allowed to offer all relevant mitigating circumstance, “the sentencer [must] listen—that is the sentencer must consider the mitigating circumstances when deciding the appropriate sentence. Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.10 (1982)

Jurors] may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence...[b]ut they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration. Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)

[The] decision to impose the death penalty is a reasoned moral response to the
defendant’s background, character and crime...Jurors make individualized assessments of the appropriateness of the death penalty.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2948-9 (1988)

Procedure must require the sentencing body to consider the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense.  Woodsen v North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)

In a capital sentencing proceeding before a jury, the jury is called upon to make a highly subjective, unique individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves.  Turner v Murray, 476 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1985) (quoting Caldwell v Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 n.7 (1985).

Potential Inquiries into Mitigation Evidence:

[The N.C. Supreme Court] conclude[d] that, in permitting defendant to inquire generally into jurors' feelings about mental illness and retardation and other mitigating circumstances, he was given an adequate opportunity to discover any bias on the part of the juror...[That, combined with questions] asking jurors if they would automatically vote for the death penalty...and if they could consider mitigating circumstances...satisfies the constitutional requirements of Morgan.  State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 21-22 (1994).  [Note that the only restriction...was whether a juror could “consider” a specific mitigating circumstance in reaching a decision.  State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 21 (1994)]

The Supreme Court had the following to say about the following question (and two other questions) originally asked by a prosecutor: “Can you imagine a set of circumstances in which...your personal beliefs [about __?] conflict with the law?  In that situation, what would you do?” Although the prosecutor’s questions were hypothetical, they did not tend to commit jurors to a specific future course of action in this case, nor were they aimed at indoctrinating jurors with views favorable to the State.  These questions do not advance any particular position.  In fact, the questions address a key criterion of juror competency, i.e., ability to apply the law despite of their personal views.  In addition, the questions were simple and clear.  Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 345-346 (2005).

Note, however, the following questions were deemed improper because 1) they “fished” for answers to legal questions before the judge instructed the jury about the applicable law, and 2) the questions “staked-out” jurors about what kind of verdict they would render under certain named circumstances:

a) “If the State is able to prove that the defendant premeditatedly and deliberately killed three people..., would you be able to fairly consider things like sociological background, the way he grew up, if he had an alcohol problem, things like that in weighing whether he should get death or LWOP?”;

b) “Assuming the State proves three cold-blooded P&D murders, can you conceive in your own mind the mitigating factors that would let you find your ability for a
penalty less than death?”  


The following question was allowed by the trial court: “Do you feel like whatever we propose to you as a potential mitigating factor that you can give that fair consideration and not already start out dismissing those and saying those don’t count because of the severity of the crime.”  


An inquiry into jurors’ 
latent bias against any type of mitigation evidence may be appropriate. In Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 340-341, 462 S.E.2d 191, 205 (1995), the “majority” of the following questions were deemed improper questions about whether jurors could consider certain mitigating circumstances due to “form” or “staking out”:

a) “Do you think that the punishment that should be imposed for anyone in a criminal case in general should be effected [sic] by their mental or emotional state at the time that the crime was committed?”

b) “If you were instructed by the Court that certain things are mitigating, that is they are a basis for rendering or returning a verdict of life imprisonment as opposed to death and were those circumstances established you must give them some weight or consideration, could you do that?”

c) “Mr. [Juror], in this case if there was evidence to support, evidence to show that the defendant was under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the commission of the murder and if the Court instructed you that was a mitigating circumstance, if proven, that must be given some weight, could you follow that instruction?”

d) “If the Court advises you that by the preponderance of the evidence that if you are shown that the capability of the defendant to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired at the time of the murder, and the Court instructed you that was a circumstance to which you must give some consideration, could you follow that instruction?”

e) “Do you believe that a psychologist or a psychiatrist can be successful in treating people with mental or emotional disturbances?”

f) “Do you personally believe, and I am talking about your personal beliefs, that if by the preponderance of evidence, that is evidence that is established, that a person who committed premeditated murder was under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance at the time that the crime was committed, do you personally consider that as mitigating, that is as far as supporting a sentence of less than the death penalty?”

g) “Now if instructed by the Court and if it is supported by the evidence, could you take into account the defendant's age at the time of the commission of the crime?”

h) “Do you believe that you could fairly and impartially listen to the evidence and consider whether any mitigating circumstances the judge instructs you on are found in the jury consideration at the end of the case?”

In finding “most” of the above-cited questions improper, it was important to the Supreme Court that the trial court had allowed the defense lawyers to asked jurors about their experiences with mental problems, mental health professions, and foster care. Such questions allowed the defendant to explore whether jurors had any latent bias

See discussion of U.S. v. Johnson, 366 F.Supp. 822 (N.D. Iowa 2005) above for authority or argument that case-specific inquiry about mitigation should be allowed under Morgan.

*For more mitigation questions, see below for “specific areas of inquiry.”

**VII. Specific Areas of Inquiry**

**Accomplice Liability:** It was proper for prosecutor to ask prospective juror if he would be able to recommend the death penalty for someone who did not actually pull the trigger since it was uncontroverted that the defendant was an accessory. The State could inquire about the jurors’ ability to impose the death penalty for an accessory to first-degree murder. State v Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 14-17, 478 S.E.2d 163 (1996):

a) “The evidence will show [the defendant] did not actually pull the trigger. Would any of you feel like simply because he did not pull the trigger, you could not consider the death penalty and follow the law concerning the death penalty.”

b) “Regardless of the facts and circumstances concerning the case, you could not recommend the death penalty for anyone unless it was the person who pulled the trigger.”

**Age of Defendant:**

The following question was asked by defense counsel: “[T]he defendant will introduce things that he contends are mitigating circumstances, things like his age at the time of the crime...Do you feel like you can consider the defendant’s age at the time the crime was committed ...and give it fair consideration?” The Supreme Court assumed it was error for the trial court to sustain the State’s objection to this question. In finding it harmless, however, the Court stated, “[i]n the context that this question was propounded, the juror is bound to have known the circumstance to which the defendant referred was the age of the defendant.” State v Jones, 336 N.C. 229, 241 (1994)

Note, however, the question “Would you consider the age of the defendant to be of any importance in this case [in deciding whether the death penalty is appropriate]?” was found to be a “stake-out” question in State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 682 473 S.E.2d 291, 299 (1996).

**Aggravating Circumstances:**

The Supreme Court has held that questions about a specific aggravating circumstance that will arise in the case amounts to a stake-out question. State v. Richmond, 347 N.C. 412, 424, 495 S.E.2d 677 (1998)(“could you still consider mitigating circumstances knowing that the defendant had a prior first-degree murder conviction”); State v. Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455, 465-66 (2001)(in a re-sentencing in which
the first-degree murder conviction was accompanied by a burglary conviction, counsel asked, the State has “to prove at least one aggravating factor, that is...the fact that the murder was part of a burglary. That’s true in this case because [the defendant] was also convicted of burglary. Knowing that about this case, could you still consider a life sentence...?”

**Cost of Life Sentence vs. Death Sentence**

In *State v. Elliott*, 360 N.C. 400, 409-10 (2006), the Supreme Court held that “we cannot say that the trial court clearly abused its discretion” when it did not allow defense counsel to ask, “Do you have any preconceived notions about the costs of executing someone compared to the cost of keeping him in prison for the rest of his life.” The Supreme Court admitted that the question was “relevant” but, in light of the inquiry the trial court allowed, it was not a clear abuse of discretion to disallow the question. See also, *State v. Cummings*, 361 N.C. 438, 465 (2007). On the other hand, a trial court may reverse its previous denial and allow the “costs” question. *State v. Polke*, 361 N.C. 65, 68 (2006).

**Course of Conduct Aggravator (or Multiple Murders):**

Prosecutor was not staking out juror when asking: “If the State satisfied you... that the aggravating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty, then I take it you could give the defendant the death penalty for beating two humans to death with a hammer, is that correct?” *State v Laws*, 325 N.C. 81 (1989).

**Felony Murder Defined:**

Prosecutor properly defined felony murder as “a killing which occurs during the commission of a violent felony, such as _____” (the felony in this case was discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle). *State v. Nobles*, 350 N.C. 483, 498, 515 S.E.2d 885, 895 (1999).

**Forecast of Aggravating or Mitigating Circumstance(s):**

In *State v Payne*, 328 N.C. 377, 391 (1991), the defendant argued it was improper for the prosecutor to forecast to the jury during voir dire that they might consider HAC as an aggravating factor. The Court found no error and stated: [I]t is permissible for a prosecutor during voir dire to state briefly what he or she anticipates the evidence may show, provided the statements are made in good faith and are reasonably grounded in the evidence available to the prosecutor.

A defendant is not entitled to put on a mini-trial of his evidence during voir dire by using hypothetical situations to determine whether a juror would cast his vote for his theory. The trial court in *Cummings* allowed defense counsel to question prospective jurors about whether they had been personally involved in any of those situations [such as domestic violence, child abuse, and alcohol and drug abuse], however, the judge properly refused to allow defense counsel to ask hypothetical and speculative questions that were being used to try the mitigation evidence during jury selection. *State v. Cummings*, 361 N.C. 438, 464-65 (2007).
Foster Care:
It was proper to ask, Whether any jurors have had any experience with foster care? Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 462 S.E.2d 191, 205 (1995).

Gender of Defendant [or Victim?):
The prosecutor properly asked, “Would the fact that the Defendant is a female in any way affect your deliberations with regard to the death penalty?” This was not a stake-out question. It was appropriate to inquire into the possible sensitivities of prospective jurors toward a female defendant facing the death penalty in an effort to ferret out any prejudice arising out of defendant’s gender. State v. Anderson, 350 N.C. 152, 170-171, 513 S.E.2d 296, 307-308 (1999).

HAC Aggravator:
In State v Payne, 328 N.C. 377, 391 (1991), the defendant argued it was improper for the prosecutor to forecast to the jury during voir dire that they might consider HAC as an aggravating factor. The Court found no error and stated: [I]t is permissible for a prosecutor during voir dire to state briefly what he or she anticipates the evidence may show, provided the statements are made in good faith and are reasonably grounded in the evidence available to the prosecutor.

Impaired Capacity (f)(6):
Could the juror consider impaired capacity due to intoxication by drugs or alcohol as a mitigating circumstance and give the evidence such weight as you believe it is due? Would your feelings about drugs or alcohol prevent you from considering the evidence? State v Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 127 (1991). (See, where Court found that the following was a stake-out question: “How many of you think that drug abuse is irrevelant to punishment in this case.” State v. Ball, 344 N.C. 290, 304, 474 S.E.2d 345, 353 (1996).

Prosecuting attorney asked the jurors, “If they would consider that the defendant voluntarily consumed alcohol in determining whether the defendant was entitled to diminished capacity mitigating factor. The Supreme Court stated: “This was a proper question. He did not attempt to stake the jury out as to what their answer would be on a hypothetical question.” State v. Reeves, 337 N.C. 700 (1994).

It was proper for prosecutor to ask prospective jurors whether they would be sympathetic toward a defendant who was intoxicated at the time of the offense. (If it is shown to you from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged shooting, would this cause you to have sympathy for him and allow that sympathy to affect your verdict.) State v McKoy, 323 N.C. 1 (1988).

Lessened Juror Responsibility:
In closing argument and during jury selection, it is improper for a prosecutor to make statements that lessens the jury’s role or responsibility in imposing a potential death penalty or lessens the seriousness or reality of a death sentence. State v. Hines, 286 N.C. 377, 381-86, 211 S.E.2d 201 (1975) (reversible error for the prosecutor to tell a
prospective juror, “to ease your feelings [about imposing the death penalty], I might say...that one [person] has been put to death in N.C. since 1961”; State v. White, 286 N.C. 395, 211 S.E.2d 445 (1975), State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 495, 497-502 (1979) (it is error for a prosecutor to suggest that the appellate process or executive clemency will correct any errors in a jury’s verdict); State v. Jones, 296 N.C. at 501-502 (prosecutor improperly discussed how 15A-2000(d) provides for an automatic appeal and how the Supreme Court must overturn a death sentence if it makes certain findings. This had the effect of minimizing in the jurors’ minds their role in recommending a death sentence).

Life Sentence (Without Parole):
During jury selection, a prospective juror indicated that he did not feel that a life sentence actually meant life (prior to LWOP statute). The trial court then instructed the jury that they should consider a life sentence to mean that defendant would be imprisoned for life and that they should not take the possibility of parole into account in reaching a verdict. The juror indicated that he would have trouble following that instruction and was excused for cause. Defense counsel requested that he be allowed to ask the other prospective jurors whether they could follow the court’s instructions on parole. The trial court erroneously refused to allow the question. The Supreme Court held that the defendant has a right to inquire as to whether a prospective juror will follow the court’s instruction (i.e., life means life). State v Jones, 336 N.C. 229, 239-40 (1994).

In several cases, the Supreme Court has upheld the refusal to allow defense counsel to ask about jurors’ “understanding of the meaning of a sentence of life without parole”, “conceptions of the parole eligibility of a defendant serving a life sentence”, or their feelings about whether the death penalty is more or less harsh than life in prison without parole.” State v. Neal, 346 N.C. 608, 617-18 (1997); State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 330 (2004); State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 30-32 (2009). These decisions were based on the principle that a defendant does not have the constitutional right to question the venire about parole. State v. Neal, 346 N.C. at 617.

In light of this, a safe inquiry might avoid the topic of “parole” and simply ask jurors about “their views of a life sentence for first-degree murder.”

Another safe inquiry might be based on 15A-2002 which provides that “the judge shall instruct the jury...that a sentence of life imprisonment means a sentence of life without parole.” There is no doubt that the jury will hear this instruction and, generally, the parties should be allowed to inquire whether jurors hold misconceptions that will affect their ability to “follow the law.” “Questions designed to measure a prospective juror’s ability to follow the law are proper within the context of jury selection voir dire.” See, State v. Jones, 347 N.C. 193, 203 (1997), citing State v. Price, 326 N.C. 56, 66-67, 388 S.E.2d 84, 89, vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 802 (1990); State v. Henderson, 155 N.C.App. 719, 727 (2003)

A juror’s misperception about a life sentence with no possibility of parole may substantially impair his or her ability to follow the law. Uttech v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007). In Uttech, despite a juror being informed four
or five times that a life sentence meant “life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,” the juror continued to say that he would support the death penalty if the defendant would be released to re-offend. That juror was properly removed for cause.

167 L.E.d2d at 1025-30.

In a pre-LWOP case, the prosecutor improperly argued that the defendant could be paroled in 20 years if the jury awarded him a life sentence. The Supreme Court stated that, “The jury’s sentence recommendation should be based solely on their balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors before them. The possibility of parole is not such a factor, and it has no place in the jury’s recommendation of their sentence to be imposed.” State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 495, 502-503 (1979). This principle might provide authority for inquiring into jurors’ erroneous beliefs about parole to determine if they can follow the law.

**Mental or Emotional Disturbance:**

If the court instructs you that you should consider whether or not a person is suffering from mental or emotional disturbance in deciding whether or not to give someone the death penalty, do you feel like you could follow the instruction? State v Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 20 (1994).

The following were proper mental health related questions as found in Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 462 S.E.2d 191, 205 (1995):

1) Whether the jurors had any background or experience with mental problems in their families?

2) Whether the jurors have any bias against or problem with any mental health professionals?

**Murder During Felony Aggravator (e)(5):**

Prosecutor informed jury about aggravating factors and indicated that the State is relying upon...the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an aider and abettor in the commission of, or attempt to commit...any homicide, robbery, rape.... Supreme Court said that the prosecutor during jury voir dire should limit reference to aggravating factors, including the underlying felonies listed in G.S. 15A-2000(e)(5), to those of which there will be evidence and upon which the prosecutor intends to rely. Payne, 328 N.C. 377 (1991)

**No Significant Criminal Record:**

The following question was deemed improper as hypothetical and an impermissible attempt to indoctrinate a juror: “Would the fact that the defendant had no significant history of any criminal record, would that be something that you would consider important in determining whether or not to impose the death penalty?” State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989).

**Personal Strength to Vote for Death:**

Prosecutor asked: “Are you strong enough to recommend the death penalty?”

Prosecutors were allowed to ask jurors “whether they possessed the intestinal fortitude [or “courage”, or “backbone”] to vote for a sentence of death.” When jurors equivocated on the imposition of the death penalty, prosecutors were allowed to ask these questions to determine whether they could comply with the law.  State v. Murrell, 362 N.C. 375, 389-91 (2008); State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 355 (1983); State v. Flippen, 349 N.C. 264, 275 (1998); State v. Hinson, 310 N.C. 245, 252 (1984).

Religious Beliefs:

The defendant’s “right of inquiry” includes “the right to make appropriate inquiry concerning a prospective juror’s moral or religious scruples, morals, beliefs and attitudes toward capital punishment.”  State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 337, 215 S.E.2d 60, 69 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 902, 49 L.Ed.2d 1206 (1976).  The issue is whether the prospective juror’s religious views would impair his ability to follow the law.  State v. Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455, 467 (2001).  This right of inquiry does not extend to all aspects of the jurors’ private lives or of their religious beliefs.  State v. Laws, 325 N.C. 81, 109, 381 S.E.2d 609, 625 (1989).

General questions about the effect of a juror’s religious views on his ability to follow the law are favored over detailed questions about Biblical concepts or doctrines.  It was held improper to ask about a juror’s “understanding of the Bible’s teachings on the death penalty.”  State v. Mitchell, 353 N.C. 309, 318, 543 S.E.2d 830, 836 (2001).  The Defendant, however, was allowed to ask the juror about her religious affiliation and whether any teachings of her church would interfere with her ability to perform her duties as a juror.  In State v. Laws, 325 N.C. 81, 109, 381 S.E.2d 609, 625-626 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 1465, 108 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990), the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing defense counsel to ask a juror “whether she believed in a literal interpretation of the Bible.”

In State v. Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455, 467, 555 S.E.2d 534, 542 (2001), defense counsel was allowed to inquire into a juror’s religious affiliation and his activities with a Bible distributing group, but the trial court properly disallowed the question, whether the juror is a person “who believes in the Biblical concept of an eye for an eye.”  On the other hand, another trial court did not allow counsel to ask questions about jurors’ “church affiliations and the beliefs espoused by others [about the death penalty] representing their churches.”  State v. Anderson, 350 N.C. 152, 171-172, 513 S.E.2d 296, 308 (1999).

Sympathy for the Defendant [or the Victim?]::

An inquiry into the sympathies of prospective jurors is part of the exercise of (the prosecutor’s) right to secure an unbiased jury.  State v. Anderson, 350 N.C. 152, 170-171, 513 S.E.2d 296, 307-308 (1999).  (Arguably, the same right applies to the defendant.)
Prosecutor properly asked, "Would you feel sympathy towards the defendant simply because you would see him here in court each day...?" Jurors may consider a defendant’s demeanor in recommending a sentence. The question did not “stake out” jurors so that they could not consider the defendant’s appearance and humanity. The question did not address definable qualities of the defendant’s appearance and demeanor. It addressed jurors’ feelings toward the defendant, notwithstanding his courtroom appearance or behavior. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 346-347.

LIST OF CASES

Federal Courts
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)
United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1976)
United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973)

North Carolina Courts
State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d 786 (1985) (note 6-7)
State v Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 478 S.E.2d 163 (1996)
State v Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 430 S.E.2d 905 (1993) (notes 1-2)
State v Call, 353 N.C. 400, 545 S.E.2d 190 (2001)
State v Cheek, 351 N.C. 48, 520 S.E.2d 545 (1999)
State v Clark, 319 N.C. 215 (1987)
State v Conner, 335 N.C. 618, 440 S.E.2d 826 (1994) (notes 1-4, 7-9, 19-21)
State v Cunningham, 333 N.C. 744, 429 S.E.2d 718 (1993)
State v Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989) (notes 5, 8)
State v Denny, 294 N.C. 294, 240 S.E.2d 437 (1978) (note 1)
State v Edwards, 27 N.C. App. 369 (1975)
State v Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 628 S.E.2d 735 (2006)
State v Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455, 555 S.E.2d 534 (2001)
State v Garcell, 363 N.C. 10 (2009)
State v Gel, 351 N.C. 192 (2000)
State v Green, 336 N.C. 142, 161 (1994)
State v Hatfield, 128 N.C. App. 294 (1998)
State v Hightower, 331 N.C. 636 (1992)
State v Hines, 286 N.C. 377, 381-86, 211 S.E.2d 201 (1975)
State v Johnson, __ N.C.App. __, 706 S.E.2d 790 (2011)
State v Jones, 296 N.C. 495, 497-502 (1979)
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State v Mitchell, 353 N.C. 309, 543 S.E.2d 830 (2001)
State v Murrell, 362 N.C. 375 (1008)
State v Parks, 324 N.C. 420, 378 S.E.2d 785 (1989) (notes 1-2)
State v Payne, 328 N.C. 377 (1991)
State v Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 268 S.E.2d 452 (1980) (note 1)
State v Polke, 361 N.C. 65 (2006)
State v Reaves, 337 N.C. 700 (1994)
State v Richmond, 347 N.C. 412, 424, 495 S.E.2d 677 (1998)
State v Roberts, 135 N.C. App. 690, 522 S.E.2d 130 (1999)
State v Robinson, 339 N.C. 263 (1994)
State v Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986) (note 12)
State v Skipper, 337 N.C. 1 (1994)
State v Smith, 328 N.C. 99 (1991)
State v Teague, 134 N.C. App. 702 (1999)
State v Thomas, 294 N.C. 105 (1978)
State v. Washington, 283 N.C. 175, 195 S.E.2d 534 (1973) (note 7)
State v. White, 286 N.C. 395, 211 S.E.2d 445 (1975)
State v Williams, 41 N.C. App. 287, disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 699 (1979)
State v Willis, 332 N.C. 151 (1992)
ONLINE RESOURCES FOR INDIGENT DEFENDERS

ORGANIZATIONS

NC Office of Indigent Defense Services
http://www.ncids.org/

UNC School of Government
http://www.sog.unc.edu/

Indigent Defense Education at the UNC School of Government
https://www.sog.unc.edu/resources/microsites/indigent-defense-education

TRAINING

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https://www.sog.unc.edu/resources/microsites/indigent-defense-education/calendar-live-events

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MANUALS

Orientation Manual for Assistant Public Defenders

Indigent Defense Manual Series (collection of reference manuals addressing law and practice in areas in which indigent defendants and respondents are entitled to representation of counsel at state expense)
http://defendermanuals.sog.unc.edu/

UPDATES

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http://civil.sog.unc.edu/

NC Criminal Law Blog
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Criminal Law in North Carolina Listserv (to receive summaries of criminal cases as well as alerts regarding new NC criminal legislation)
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