The Criminal Indictment: Fatal Defect, Fatal Variance, and Amendment

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I. Introduction

To pass constitutional muster, an indictment “must allege lucidly and accurately all the essential elements of the [crime] . . . charged.” 1 This requirement ensures that the indictment will (1) identify the offense charged; (2) protect the accused from being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; (3) enable the accused to prepare for trial; and (4) enable the court, on conviction or plea of nolo contendere or guilty, to pronounce sentence according to the rights of the case. 2 If the indictment satisfies this requirement, it will not be quashed for “informality or refinement.” 3 However, if it fails to meet this requirement, it suffers from a fatal defect and cannot support a conviction.

As a general rule, an indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient if it charges the offense in the words of the statute. 4 However, an indictment charging a statutory offense need not exactly track the statutory language, provided that it alleges the essential elements of the crime charged. 5 If the words of the statute do not unambiguously set out all of the elements of the offense, the indictment must supplement the statutory language. 6 Statutory short form indictments, such as for murder, rape, and sex offense, are excepted from the general rule that an indictment must state each element of the offense charged. 7

Although G.S. 15A-923(e) states that a bill of indictment may not be amended, the term “amendment” has been construed to mean any change in the indictment that “substantially

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7. See Hunt, 357 N.C. at 272-73; see also infra pp. 21-23 (discussing short form for murder in more detail) and pp. 38-41 (discussing short forms for rape and sex offense in more detail).
alter[s] the charge set forth in the indictment.”⁸ Thus, amendments that do not substantially alter the charge are permissible.

Even an indictment that is sufficient on its face may be challenged. Specifically, an indictment may fail when there is a fatal variance between its allegation and the evidence introduced at trial. In order for a variance to be fatal, it must pertain to an essential element of the crime charged.⁹ If the variance pertains to an allegation that is merely surplusage, it is not fatal.¹⁰

Fatal defects in indictments are jurisdictional, and may be raised at any time.¹¹ However, a dismissal based on a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof at trial or based on a fatal defect does not create a double jeopardy bar to a subsequent prosecution.¹²

The sections below explore these rules. For a discussion of the use of the conjunctive term “and” and the disjunctive term “or” in criminal pleadings, see Robert Farb, The “Or” Issue in Criminal Pleadings, Jury Instructions, and Verdicts; Unanimity of Jury Verdict (Faculty Paper, Jan. 1, 2008) (available on-line at www.iogcriminal.unc.edu/verdict.pdf).

II. General Matters

A. Date or Time of Offense

G.S. 15A-924(a)(4) provides that a criminal pleading must contain “[a] statement or cross reference in each count indicating that the offense charged was committed on, or on or about, a designated date, or during a designated period of time.” Also, G.S. 15-144 (essentials of bill for

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Also, G.S. 20-138.1(c) allows a short form pleading for impaired driving. G.S. 20-138.2(c) does the same for impaired driving in a commercial vehicle.

¹⁰ See infra pp. 4-70 (citing many cases distinguishing between fatal and non-fatal defects).
¹² See State v. Stinson, 263 N.C. 283, 286-92 (1965) (prior indictment suffered from fatal variance); State v. Whitley, 264 N.C. 742, 745 (1965) (prior indictment was fatally defective); see also State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 339-41 (1994) (noting that proper procedure when faced with a fatal variance is to dismiss the charge and grant the State leave to secure a proper bill of indictment); State v. Blakney, 156 N.C. App. 671 (2003) (noting that although the indictment was fatally defective, the State could re-indict).
homicide), G.S. 15-144.1 (essentials of bill for rape), and G.S. 15-144.2 (essentials of bill for sex offense) require that the date of the offense be alleged.\textsuperscript{13} However, a judgment will not be reversed when the indictment fails to allege or incorrectly alleges a date or time, if time is not of the essence of the offense and the error or omission did not mislead the defendant.\textsuperscript{14} Likewise, when time is not of the essence of the offense charged, an amendment as to date does not substantially alter the charge. Time becomes of the essence when an omission or error regarding the date deprives a defendant of an opportunity to adequately present his or her defense,\textsuperscript{15} such as when the defendant relies on an alibi defense\textsuperscript{16} or when a statute of limitations is involved.\textsuperscript{17} The cases summarized below apply these rules.

1. **Homicide**

   *State v. Price*, 310 N.C. 596, 598-600 (1984) (no error to allow the State to amend date of murder from February 5, 1983—the date the victim died—to December 17, 1982—the date the victim was shot).

   *State v. Wissink*, 172 N.C. App. 829, 835-36 (2005) (trial court did not err by allowing the State to amend a murder indictment on the morning of trial; the original indictment alleged that the murder occurred on or about June 26, 2000, and the evidence showed that the murder actually occurred on June 27, 2000), *rev’d in part on other grounds*, 361 N.C. 418 (2007).

2. **Burglary**

   *State v. Davis*, 282 N.C. 107, 114 (1972) (no fatal variance when indictment alleged that offense occurred on November 13 but evidence showed it took place on November 14 of [Footnotes]

\textsuperscript{13} The short forms for impaired driving also require an allegation regarding the time of the offense. See G.S. 20-138.1(c) (impaired driving); G.S. 20-138.2(c) (impaired driving in a commercial vehicle).

\textsuperscript{14} See G.S. 15-155; G.S. 15A-924(a)(4); *Price*, 310 N.C. at 599.

\textsuperscript{15} *Price*, 310 N.C. at 599.

\textsuperscript{16} See *State v. Stewart*, 353 N.C. 516, 518 (2001). *But see* *State v. Custis*, 162 N.C. App. 715 (2004) (explaining that time variances do not always prejudice a defendant, even when an alibi is involved; such is the case when the allegations and proof substantially correspond, the alibi evidence does not relate to either the date charged or that shown by the evidence, or when the defendant presents an alibi defense for both dates).

\textsuperscript{17} See *State v. Davis*, 282 N.C. 107, 114 (1972) (variance of one day “is not material where no statute of limitations is involved”).
the same year; “variance between allegation and proof as to time is not material where no statute of limitations is involved”) (quotation omitted).

*State v. Mandina*, 91 N.C. App. 686, 690 (1988) (“[a]lthough nighttime is clearly ‘of the essence’ of the crime of burglary, an indictment for burglary is sufficient if it avers that the crime was committed in the nighttime;” failure to allege the hour the crime was committed or the specific year does render not the indictment defective).

*State v. Campbell*, 133 N.C. App. 531, 535-36 (1999) (no error to allow the State to amend burglary indictment to change date of offense from June 2, 1997 to May 27, 1997; time is not an essential element of the crime; defendant was neither misled nor surprised by the change—in fact, defendant was aware that the date on the indictment was incorrect).

3. Sexual Assault

In a sexual assault case involving a child, leniency is allowed regarding the child’s memory of specific dates of the offense.18 The rule of leniency is not limited to very young children, and has been applied to older children as well.19 Unless the defendant demonstrates that he or she was deprived of his or her defense because of the lack of specificity, this policy of leniency governs.20 The following cases illustrate these rules.

*Cases Finding a Fatal Defect or Variance/Error With Respect to an Amendment*

*State v. Stewart*, 353 N.C. 516, 517-19 (2001) (indictment alleged that statutory sex offense occurred between July 1, 1991 and July 31, 1991; the State’s evidence encompassed a 2 1/2 year period but did not include an act within the time period alleged in the indictment; defendant relied on the dates in the indictment to prepare an alibi defense and presented evidence of his whereabouts for each of those days; noting that a rule of leniency generally applies in child sexual abuse cases but holding that the “dramatic variance” between the dates resulted in a fatal variance).

*State v. Whittemore*, 255 N.C. 583, 592 (1961) (time was of the essence in statutory rape case in which indictment alleged that offenses occurred on a specific date and in its case in chief, the State’s witnesses confirmed that date; after defendant presented an alibi defense, the State offered rebuttal evidence showing that the crime occurred on a

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20. See *Stewart*, 353 N.C. at 518.
different date; the rule that time is generally not an essential ingredient of the crime charged cannot be used to “ensnare” a defendant).

*State v. Custis*, 162 N.C. App 715 (2004) (fatal variance existed between dates alleged in sex offense and indecent liberties indictment and evidence introduced at trial; the indictment alleged that the defendant committed the offenses on or about June 15, 2001; at trial there was no evidence of sexual acts or indecent liberties occurring on or about that date; evidence at trial suggested sexual encounters over a period of years some time prior to the date listed in the indictment; defendant relied on the date alleged in the indictment to build an alibi defense for the weekend of June 15).

**Cases Finding No Fatal Defect or Variance/No Error With Respect to an Amendment**

*State v. Sills*, 311 N.C. 370, 375-77 (1984) (variance between actual date of rape, March 14, 1983, and the date alleged in the indictment as “on or about March 15, 1983” was not fatal; defendant was not deprived of his ability to present his alibi defense; defendant had notice that the offense date could not be pinpointed due to the victim’s youth).

*State v. Baxley*, 223 N.C. 210, 211-12 (1943) (although indictment charged that offense was committed in April, 1942, victim testified at trial that the acts took place about September, 1942, in December, 1941, and in April, 1942; time is not of the essence of the offense of rape of a female under the age of sixteen).

*State v. Ware*, __ N.C. App. __, 656 S.E.2d 662 (2008) (in a case involving statutory rape and incest, the court applied the rule of leniency with respect to a 15-year-old victim; the court noted that on all of the dates alleged, the victim would have been 15 years old).

*State v. Wallace*, 179 N.C. App. 710, 716-18 (2006) (trial judge did not err by allowing a mid-trial amendment of an indictment alleging sex offenses against a victim who was 13, 14, or 15 years old; original dates alleged were June through August 2000, June through August 2002, and November 2001; amendment, which replaced the date of November 2001 with June through August 2001, did not substantially alter the charges against defendant when all of the alleged acts occurred while the victim was under the age of fifteen; although the defendant presented evidence that the victim was in another state during November 2001, no other alibi or reverse alibi evidence was presented).

*State v. Whitman*, 179 N.C. App. 657, 665 (2006) (trial court did not err by allowing, on the first day of trial, the State to amend the dates specified in the indictment for statutory rape and statutory sexual offense of a 13, 14, or 15-year-old from “January 1998 through June 1998” to “July 1998 through December 1998”; because the victim would have been fifteen under the original dates and under the amended dates, time was not of the essence to the State’s case; the amendment did not impair the defendant’s ability to present an alibi defense because the incest indictment, which was not amended, alleged dates from “January 1998 through June 1999” a time span including the entire 1998 calendar year, and thus the defendant was on notice that if he wished to present an alibi defense, he was going to have to address all of 1998).

State v. Poston, 162 N.C. App. 642 (2004) (no fatal variance between first-degree sexual offense indictment alleging that acts took place between June 1, 1994 and July 31, 1994 and evidence at trial suggesting that the incident occurred when the victim “was seven” or “[a]round seven” and that victim’s seventh birthday was on October 8, 1994; no fatal variance between first-degree sexual offense indictment alleging that acts took place between October 8, 1997 and October 16, 1997 and evidence at trial suggesting that it occurred when victim was “[a]round 10” and maybe age eleven, while she was living at a specified location and that victim turned ten on October 8, 1997 and lived at the location from 1997 until August 1999).

State v. McGriff, 151 N.C. App. 631, 634-38 (2002) (no error to allow amendment of the dates of offense in statutory rape and indecent liberties indictment; indictment alleged that the offenses occurred on or between January 1,1999 though January 27, 1999; when the evidence introduced at trial showed that at least one of the offenses occurred between December 1, 1998 and December 25, 1998, the trial court allowed the State to amend the indictment to conform to the evidence; rejecting the defendant’s argument that the change in dates prejudiced his ability to present an alibi defense).

State v. Crockett, 138 N.C. App. 109, 112-13 (2000) (indictments charging statutory rape during the period from November 22, 1995 to February 19, 1996, were not impermissibly vague; evidence showed that the act occurred in January 1996 when the victim was fourteen years old; “the exact date that defendant had sex with [the victim] is immaterial”).

State v. Campbell, 133 N.C. App. 531, 535-36 (1999) (no error to allow the State to amend a statutory rape indictment to change date of offense from June 2, 1997 to May 27, 1997; time is not an essential element of the crime; the defendant was neither misled nor surprised by the change).

State v. Hatfield, 128 N.C. App. 294, 299 (1998) (first degree sexual offense and indecent liberties indictments were not impermissibly vague, although they alleged that the acts occurred “on or about dates in August 1992” and required defendant to explain where he was during the entire summer in order to present an alibi defense).

State v. McKinney, 110 N.C. App. 365, 370-71 (1993) (first-degree rape indictments alleging the date of the offenses against child victims as “July, 1985 thru July, 1987” were not fatally defective; time is not an element of the crime and is not of the essence of the crime).

State v. Norris, 101 N.C. App. 144, 150-51 (1990) (no fatal variance between indictment alleging that rape of child occurred in “June 1986 or July 1986” and child’s testimony that rape occurred in 1984 or 1985; child’s mother fixed the date as June or July, 1986, and the date is not an essential element of the crime).

State v. Cameron, 83 N.C. App. 69, 71-74 (1986) (no error in allowing the State to amend date of offense in an incest indictment involving a child victim from “on or about 25 May 1985,” to “on or about or between May 18th, 1985, through May 26th, 1985;” change did not substantially alter the charge; no unfair surprise because defendant knew that the
conduct at issue allegedly occurred during a weekend when an identified family friend was visiting).

4. Failure to Register as a Sex Offender

State v. Harrison, 165 N.C. App. 332 (2004) (an indictment charging failure to register as a sex offender is not defective for failing to allege the specific dates that the defendant changed residences).

5. Larceny

State v. Osborne, 149 N.C. App. 235, 245-46 (no fatal variance between the date of the offense alleged in the larceny indictment and the evidence offered at trial; indictment alleged date of offense as “on or about May 3, 1999,” the date the item was found in the defendant’s possession; defendant argued that the evidence did not establish that the item was stolen on this date; variance did not deprive the defendant of an opportunity to present a defense when defendant did not rely on an alibi), aff’d 356 N.C. 424 (2002).

6. False Pretenses

State v. May, 159 N.C. App. 159, 163 (2003) (no error by permitting amendment of the date in a false pretenses indictment to accurately reflect the date of the offense rather than the date of arrest; time is not an essential element of the crime).

State v. Simpson, 159 N.C. App. 435, 438 (2003) (trial court did not err in granting the State’s motion to amend the false pretenses indictment to change the date of the offense), aff’d, 357 N.C. 652 (2003).

State v. Tesenair, 35 N.C. App. 531, 533-34 (1978) (no error in granting the State’s motion to amend date of offense in a false pretenses indictment from November 18, 1977, a date subsequent to the trial, to November 18, 1976; time was not of the essence of the offense charged and defendant was “completely aware” of the nature of the charge and the dates on which the transactions giving rise to the charge occurred).

7. Possession of a Firearm by a Felon

State v. Coltrane, ___ N.C. App. ___, 656 S.E.2d 322 (2008) (trial court did not err in allowing the State to amend an indictment that alleged the offense date as “on or about the 9th day of December, 2004” and change it to April 25, 2005; the date of the offense is not an essential element of this crime).

8. Impaired Driving

For cases pertaining to date issues with respect to prior offenses alleged for habitual impaired driving, see page 66 below.
State v. Watson, 122 N.C. App. 596, 602 (1996) (no fatal variance caused by Trooper’s mistaken statement at trial that events occurred on June 25 when they actually occurred on June 5; defendant himself testified that the events occurred on June 5; “this mistake on the part of the officer was just that and not a fatal variance”).

9. Conspiracy

State v. Christopher, 307 N.C. 645, 648-50 (1983) (fatal variance existed and resulted in “trial by ambush;” conspiring to commit larceny indictment alleged that the offense occurred “on or about” December 12, 1980; defendant prepared an alibi defense; the State’s trial evidence indicated the crime might have occurred over a three month period from October, 1980 to January, 1981).

State v. Kamtsiklis, 94 N.C. App. 250, 254-55 (1989) (no error in allowing amendment of conspiracy indictments to change dates of offense from “on or about May 6, 1987 through May 12, 1987” to “April 19, 1987 until May 12, 1987,” “[o]rdinarily, the precise dates of a conspiracy are not essential to the indictment because the crime is complete upon the meeting of the minds of the confederates”).

10. Habitual and Violent Habitual Felon

In habitual felon and violent habitual felon cases, date issues arise with respect to the felony supporting the habitual felon indictment (“predicate felony”) as well as the prior convictions. The court of appeals has allowed the State to amend allegations pertaining to the date of the predicate felony, reasoning that the essential issue is whether the predicate felony was committed, not its specific date.21

G.S. 14-7.3 provides, in part, that an indictment charging habitual felon must, as to the prior felonies, set forth the date that the prior felonies were committed and the dates that pleas of guilty were entered or convictions returned. Similarly, G.S. 14-7.9 provides, in part, that an indictment charging violent habitual felon must set forth that prior violent felonies were

21. State v. May, 159 N.C. App. 159, 163 (2003) (no error in allowing amendment of the date of the felony offense accompanying the habitual felon indictment; the date of that offense is not an essential element of establishing habitual felon status); State v. Locklear, 117 N.C. App. 255, 260 (1994) (no error by allowing the State to amend a habitual felon indictment to change the date of the commission of the felony supporting the habitual felon indictment from December 19, 1992 to December 2, 1992; the fact that another felony was committed, not its specific date, was the essential question).
committed and the conviction dates for those priors. Notwithstanding these provisions, the court of appeals has allowed amendment of indictment allegations as to the prior conviction dates and has held that errors with regard to the alleged dates of the prior felonies do not create a fatal defect or fatal variance.22

B. Victim’s Name

Several general rules can be stated regarding errors in indictments with respect to the victim’s name: (1) a charging document must name the victim;23 (2) a fatal variance results when an indictment incorrectly states the name of the victim;24 and (3) it is error to allow the State to amend an indictment to change the name of the victim.25

22. State v. Lewis, 162 N.C. App. 277 (2004) (no error in allowing the State to amend habitual felon indictment which mistakenly noted the date and county of defendant’s probation revocation instead of the date and county of defendant’s conviction for the prior felony; because the indictment correctly stated the type of offense and the date of its commission, it sufficiently notified defendant of the particular prior being alleged; also, defendant stipulated to the conviction); State v. Gant, 153 N.C. App. 136, 142 (2002) (error in indictment that listed prior conviction date as April 16, 2000 instead of April 16, 1990 was “technical in nature”); State v. Hargett, 148 N.C. App. 688, 693 (2002) (trial court did not err in allowing the State to amend conviction dates); State v. Smith, 112 N.C. App. 512, 516 (1993) (habitual felon indictment that failed to allege the date of defendant’s guilty plea to a prior conviction was not fatally defective; indictment alleged that defendant plead guilty to the offense in 1981 and was sentenced on December 7, 1981); State v. Spruill, 89 N.C. App. 580, 582 (1988) (no fatal variance when indictment alleged that one of the three prior felonies occurred on October 28, 1977 and defendant stipulated prior to trial that it actually occurred on October 7, 1977; time was not of the essence and the stipulation established that defendant was not surprised by the variance).

23. State v. Powell, 10 N.C. App. 443, 448 (1971) (in order to charge an assault, there must be a victim named; by failing to name the person assaulted, the defendant would not be protected from subsequent prosecution); see also State v. Scott, 237 N.C. 432, 434 (1953) (indictment that named the assault victim in one place as George Rogers and in another as George Sanders was void on its face).

24. State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 424 (1998) (fatal variance between indictment charging defendant with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury upon Gabriel Hernandez Gervacio and evidence at trial revealing that the victim’s correct name was Gabriel Gonzalez); State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25, 29 (1967) (fatal variance existed between the robbery indictment and the evidence at trial; indictment alleged that the name of the robbery victim was Jean Rogers but the evidence showed that the victim was Susan Rogers); State v. Overman, 257 N.C. 464, 468 (1962) (fatal variance between the hit-and-run indictment and the proof; indictment alleged that Frank E. Nutley was the victim but the evidence showed the victim was Frank E. Hatley).

25. State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 339-41 (1994) (error to allow the State to amend an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill indictment to change name of victim from Carlse Antoine Lattter to Joice Hardin; “[w]here an indictment charges the defendant with a crime against someone other than the actual victim, such a variance is fatal;” court notes that proper procedure is to dismiss the charge and grant the state leave to secure a proper bill of indictment).
The appellate courts find no fatal defect or variance or bar to amendment when a name error falls within the doctrine of idem sonans. Under this doctrine, a variance in a name is not material if the names sound the same. Other cases hold that the error in name is immaterial if it can be characterized as a typographical error or if it did not mislead the defendant. The cases summarized below illustrate these exceptions to the general rules stated above. Note that when these cases are compared to those cited in support of the general rules, some inconsistency appears.

State v. Williams, 269 N.C. 376, 384 (1967) (indictment spelled victim’s first name as “Mateleane;” evidence at trial indicated it was “Madeleine;” there was no uncertainty as to victim’s identity, the variance came within the rule of idem sonans, and was not material).

State v. Gibson, 221 N.C. 252, 254 (1942) (variance between victim’s name as alleged in indictment—“Robinson”—and victim’s real name—“Rolison”—came within the rule of idem sonans).

State v. Hewson, 182 N.C. App. 196, 211 (2007) (no error in allowing the State to amend first-degree murder and shooting into an occupied dwelling indictment to change victim’s name to “Gail Hewson Tice” to “Gail Tice Hewson”).

State v. Holliman, 155 N.C. App. 120, 125-27 (2002) (no error to allow the State to change name of murder victim from “Tamika” to “Tanika”).

State v. McNair, 146 N.C. App. 674, 677-78 (2001) (no error by allowing the State to amend two of seven indictments to correct typographical error and change victim’s name from Donald Dale Cook to Ronald Dale Cook; victim’s correct name appeared twice in one of the two challenged indictments and the defendant could not have been misled or surprised as to the nature of the charges).

State v. Wilson, 135 N.C. App. 504, 508 (1999) (no fatal variance between indictment that alleged assault victim’s name as “Peter M. Thompson” and the evidence at trial indicating that the victim’s name was “Peter Thomas;” arrest warrant correctly named victim, defendant’s testimony revealed that he was aware that he was charged with assaulting Peter Thomas, and the names are sufficiently similar to fall within the doctrine of idem sonans).

State v. Bailey, 97 N.C. App 472, 475-76 (1990) (no error in allowing the State to amend the victim’s name in three indictments from “Pettress Cebron” to “Cebron Pettress;” the

errors in the indictments were inadvertent and defendant could not have been misled or surprised as to the nature of the charges against him").

*State v. Marshall*, 92 N.C. App. 398, 401-02 (1988) (no error to allow amendment of rape indictment to change victim’s name from Regina Lapish to Regina Lapish Foster; defendant was indicted for four criminal violations, three indictments correctly alleged the victim’s name, and only one “inadvertently” omitted her last name).

*State v. Isom*, 65 N.C. App. 223, 226 (1983) (no fatal variance between indictments naming the victim as Eldred Allison and proof at trial; although victim testified at trial that his name was “Elton Allison,” his wallet identification indicated his name was Eldred and the defendant referred to the victim as Elred Allison; the names Eldred, Elred, and Elton are sufficiently similar to fall within the doctrine of *indem sonans* and the variance is immaterial).

The courts have recognized other exceptions to the general rules that an indictment must correctly allege the victim’s name and that an amendment as to the victim’s name substantially alters the charge. For example, *State v. Sisk*, held that the State properly could amend an indictment charging uttering a forged instrument, changing the name of the party defrauded or intended to be defrauded from First Union National Bank to Wachovia Bank. *Sisk* reasoned that the bank’s name did not speak to the essential elements of the offense charged and that the defendant did not rely on the identity of the bank in framing her defense. Also, *State v. Bowen* held that the trial court did not err in allowing the state to change the victim’s last name in a sex crimes indictment to properly reflect a name change that occurred because of an adoption subsequent to when the indictment was issued. And finally, *State v. Ingram* held that it was not error to allow the state to amend a robbery indictment by deleting the name of one of two victims alleged.

For a discussion of defects regarding the victim’s name for larceny, embezzlement, and other offenses that interfere with property rights, see *infra* pp. 42-46.

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C. Defendant’s Name

G.S. 15A-924(a)(1) provides that a criminal pleading must contain a name or other identification of the defendant. Consistent with this provision, State v. Simpson30 held that an indictment that fails to name or otherwise identify the defendant, if his or her name is unknown, is fatally defective. Distinguishing Simpson, the court of appeals has found no error when the defendant’s name is omitted from the body of the indictment but is included in a caption that is referenced in the body of the indictment.31 Similarly, that court has found no error when the defendant’s name is misstated in one part of the indictment but correctly stated in another part. In State v. Sisk,32 for example, the court of appeals held that it was not error to allow the State to amend the defendant’s name, as stated in the body of an uttering a forged instrument indictment. In Sisk, the indictment’s caption correctly stated the defendant’s name as the person charged, the indictment incorporated that identification by reference in the body of the indictment, and the body of the indictment specifically identified defendant as the named payee of the forged document before mistakenly referring to her as Janette Marsh Cook instead of Amy Jane Sisk. The Sisk court also noted that the defendant was not prejudiced by the error.

As with errors in the victim’s name, the courts have applied the doctrine of idem sonans to errors in the defendant’s name, when the two names sound the same.33 The court of appeals has allowed amendment of the defendant’s name when the error was clerical.34

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33. See supra pp. 11-13 (discussing idem sonans); State v. Vincent, 222 N.C. 543, 544 (1943) (Vincent and Vinson); see also State v. Higgs, 270 N.C. 111, 113 (1967) (Burford Murril Higgs and Beauford Merrill Higgs).
34. See State v. Grigsby, 134 N.C. App. 315, 317 (1999) (trial court did not err in allowing the State to amend the indictment to correct the spelling of defendant’s last name by one letter; “[a] change in the spelling of defendant’s last name is a mere clerical correction of the truest kind”), reversed on other grounds, 351 N.C. 454 (2000).
D. Address or County

G.S. 15A-924(a)(3) provides that a pleading must contain a statement that the offense was committed in a designated county. This allegation establishes venue. In State v. Spencer, the court of appeals held that the fact that the indictment alleged that the crime occurred in Cleveland County but the evidence showed it occurred in Gaston County was not a fatal defect, because the variance was not material. When the issue arose in another case, the court looked to the whole body of the indictment to hold that the county of offense was adequately charged.

A related issue was presented in State v. James. There, the defendant argued that a murder indictment was fatally defective because it omitted the defendant’s county of residence. G.S. 15-144 sets out the essentials for a bill of homicide and provides that the indictment should state, among other things, the name of the person accused and his or her county of residence. That provision also states, however, that in these indictments, it is not necessary to allege matter not required to be proved at trial. Relying on this language, James held that “[s]ince the county of . . . residence need not be proved, the omission of this fact does not make the indictment fatally defective.”

The following cases deal with other issues pertaining to incorrect county names or addresses or omission of one of those facts.

36. See State v. Almond, 112 N.C. App. 137, 147-48 (1993) (false pretenses indictments not fatally defective for failing to allege the county in which the offense occurred; indictments were captioned as from Wilkes County and all but one contained the incorporating phrase “in the county named above;” although, the name of the county was not in the body of the indictment, the indictment contained sufficient information to inform defendant of the charges; as to the one indictment that did not include incorporating language, it is undisputed that the named victim was located in Wilkes County and thus defendant had full knowledge of the charges against him; finally, when all of the indictments are taken together, there is no question that the activities for which defendant was charged took place within Wilkes County).
38. See also infra pp. 26-30 (discussing burglary and related crimes).
**State v. Harrison,** 165 N.C. App. 332 (2004) (indictment charging failure to register as a sex offender was not defective by failing to identify defendant’s new address).

**State v. Hyder,** 100 N.C. App. 270, 273-74 (1990) (trial court did not err by allowing the State to amend a delivery of a controlled substance indictment; top left corner of indictment listed Watauga as the county from which the indictment was issued; amendment replaced “Watauga County” with “Mitchell County;” error was typographical and in no way misled the defendant as to the nature of the charges).

**State v. Lewis,** 162 N.C. App. 277 (2004) (State was properly allowed to amend a habitual felon indictment, which mistakenly noted the date and county of defendant’s probation revocation instead of the date and county of defendant’s previous conviction; there also was an error as to the county seat).


**E. Use of the Word “Feloniously”**

The use of the word “feloniously” in charging a misdemeanor will be treated as harmless surplusage.39 However, felony indictments that do not contain the word “feloniously” are fatally defective, “unless the Legislature otherwise expressly provides.”40 **State v. Blakney**41 explored the meaning of the phrase “unless the Legislature otherwise expressly provides.” In that case, the defendant was charged with possession of more than one and one-half ounces of marijuana, among other charges. Although the possession charge did not contain the word “feloniously,” the defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of marijuana. The defendant then appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the possession charge, arguing that because it did not contain the word “feloniously,” it was invalid. Reviewing the case law, the court of appeals indicated that the rule regarding inclusion of the word feloniously in felony indictments developed when a felony was defined as an offense punishable by either death or imprisonment. This definition made felonies difficult to distinguish from misdemeanors, unless denominated as such in the

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indictment. In 1969, however, G.S. 14-1 was amended to define a felony as a crime that: (1) was a felony at common law; (2) is or may be punishable by death; (3) is or may be punishable by imprisonment in the state’s prison; or (4) is denominated as a felony by statute. The court noted that “[w]hile the felony-misdemeanor ambiguity that prompted the [older] holdings . . . remains in effect today with respect to subsections (1) through (3), subsection (4) now expressly provides for statutory identification of felonies.” Thus, it concluded, subsection (4) affords a defendant notice of being charged with a felony, even without the use of the word “feloniously,” provided the indictment gives notice of the statute denoting the alleged crime as a felony. The court added, however, it is still better practice to include the word “feloniously” in a felony indictment.

Turning to the case before it, the court noted that the indictment charging the defendant with possession referred only to G.S. 90-95(a)(3), making it “unlawful for any person . . . [t]o possess a controlled substance,” but not stating whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor. Because the indictment stated that defendant possessed “more than one and one-half ounces of marijuana[,] a controlled substance which is included in Schedule VI of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act,” it contained a reference to G.S. 90-95(d)(4). That provision states that if the quantity of the marijuana possessed exceeds one and one-half ounces, the offense is a Class I felony. The court concluded, however, that although the indictment’s language would lead a defendant to G.S. 90-95(d)(4), it failed to include express reference the relevant statutory provision on punishment and as such did not provide defendant with specific notice that he was being charged with a felony. Because the indictment failed to either use the word “feloniously” or to state the statutory section indicating the felonious nature of the charge, the court held that

40. State v. Whaley, 262 N.C. 536, 537 (1964) (per curiam); see also State v. Fowler, 266 N.C. 528, 530-31 (1966) (noting that the State may proceed on a sufficient bill of indictment).
the indictment was invalid. Finally, the court noted that the State could re-indict defendant, in accordance with its opinion.

**F. Statutory Citation**

G.S. 15A-924(a)(6) provides that each count of a criminal pleading must contain “a citation of any applicable statute, rule, regulation, ordinance, or other provision of law” alleged to have been violated. That subsection also provides, however, that an error in the citation or its omission is not ground for dismissal of the charges or for reversal of a conviction.42 The case law is in accord with the statute and holds (1) that there is no fatal defect when the body of the indictment properly alleges the crime but there is an error in the statutory citation;43 and (2) that a statutory citation may be amended when the body of the indictment puts the defendant on notice of the crime charged.44

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42. For pleading city ordinances, see G.S. 160A-79 (codified ordinances must be pleaded by both section number and caption; non-codified ordinances must be pleaded by caption). See also State v. Pallet, 283 N.C. 705, 712 (1973) (ordinance must be pleaded according to G.S. 106A-79).

43. State v. Lockhart, 181 N.C. App. 316 (2007) (an indictment that tracked the statutory language of G.S. 148-45(g) properly charge the defendant with a work-release escape even though it contained an erroneous citation to G.S. 148-45(b)); State v. Mueller, ___ N.C. App. ___, 647 S.E.2d 440 (2007) (indictments cited G.S. 14-27.7A (statutory rape of a 13, 14, or 15 year old) as the statute allegedly violated but the body of instrument revealed that the intended statute was G.S. 14-27.4 (first-degree statutory rape of a child under 13); citing Jones and Reavis, the court noted that “although an indictment may cite to the wrong statute, when the body of the indictment is sufficient to properly charge defendant with an offense, the indictment remains valid and the incorrect statutory reference does not constitute a fatal defect” and held that the indictments were valid and properly put the defendant on notice that he was being charged under G.S. 14-27.4); State v. Jones, 110 N.C. App. 289, 291 (1993) (indictment sufficiently charged arson; “Even though the statutory reference was incorrect, the body of the indictment was sufficient to properly charge a violation. The mere fact that the wrong statutory reference was used does not constitute a fatal defect as to the validity of the indictment.”). Cf. State v. Reavis, 19 N.C. App. 497, 498 (1973) (“[E]ven, assuming arguendo, that reference to the wrong statute is made in the bill of indictment . . ., this is not a fatal flaw in the sufficiency of the bill of indictment.”); see also State v. Anderson, 259 N.C. 499, 501 (1963) (“Reference to a specific statute upon which the charge in a warrant is laid is not necessary to its validity. Likewise, where a warrant charges a criminal offense but refers to a statute that is not pertinent, such reference does not in validate the warrant.”); State v. Smith, 240 N.C. 99, 100-01 (1954) (warrant erroneously cited G.S. 20-138 when it should have cited G.S. 20-139; “reference . . . to the statute is not necessary to the validity of the warrant”) (citing G.S. 15-153); In Re Stoner, 236 N.C. 611, 612 (1952) (warrant erroneously cited G.S. 130-255.1 when correct provisions was G.S. 130-225.2; “reference . . . to a statute not immediately pertinent would be regarded as surplusage”).

44. State v. Hill, 362 N.C. 169 (2008) (trial court did not err by allowing the State to amend indictments to correct a statutory citation; the indictments incorrectly cited a violation of G.S. 14-27.7A (sexual offense against a
G. Case Number

The court of appeals has held that the State may amend the case numbers included in the indictment.\textsuperscript{45}

H. Completion By Grand Jury Foreperson

G.S. 15A-623(c) requires the grand jury foreperson to indicate on the indictment the witness or witnesses sworn and examined before the grand jury. It also provides, however, that failure to comply with this requirement does not vitiate a bill of indictment. The cases are in accord.\textsuperscript{46}

G.S. 15A-644(a) requires that the indictment contain the signature of the foreperson or acting foreperson attesting to the concurrence of twelve or more grand jurors in the finding of a true bill. However, failure to check the appropriate box on the indictment for “True Bill” or “Not a True Bill” is not a fatal defect, when there is either evidence that a true bill was presented or no evidence indicating that it was not a true bill, in which case a presumption of validity has been applied.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{45} See State v. Rotenberry, 54 N.C. App. 504, 510 (1981) (no error to allow the State to amend the case number listed in the indictment).

\textsuperscript{46} See State v. Wilson, 158 N.C. App. 235, 238 (2003) (indictment for common law robbery was not fatally defective even though grand jury foreperson failed to indicate that the witnesses identified on the face of the indictment appeared before the grand jury and gave testimony; failure to comply with G.S. 15A-623(c) does not vitiate a bill of indictment or presentment) (citing State v. Mitchell, 260 N.C. 235 (1963) (indictment is not fatally defective when the names of the witnesses to the grand jury are not marked)); State v. Allen, 164 N.C. App. 665 (2004) (citing Mitchell).

\textsuperscript{47} See State v. Midyette, 45 N.C. App. 87, 89 (1980) (“an indictment is not invalid merely because there is no specific expression in the indictment that it is a “true bill;” record revealed that indictments were returned as true bills); State v. Hall, 131 N.C. App. 427 (1998) (because the parties provided no evidence of the presentation of the bill of indictment to the trial court, the court relied on the presumption of validity of the trial court’s decision to go forward with the case; defendant provided no evidence that the trial court was unjustified in assuming jurisdiction), aff’d, 350 N.C. 303 (1999).
I. Prior Convictions

G.S. 15A-928(a) provides that when a prior conviction increases the punishment for an offense and thereby becomes an element it, the indictment or information may not allege the previous conviction. If a reference to a prior conviction is contained in the statutory name or title of the offense, the name or title be not be used in the indictment or information; rather an improvised name or title must be used which labels and distinguishes the crime without reference to the prior conviction. G.S. 15A-928(b) provides that the indictment or information for the offense must be accompanied by a special indictment or information, filed with the principal pleading, charging that the defendant was previously convicted of a specified offense. At the prosecutor’s option, the special indictment or information may be incorporated into the principal indictment as a separate count. Similar rules apply for misdemeanors tried de novo in superior court when the fact of the prior conviction is an element of the offense. In one case, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err by allowing the State to amend a felony stalking indictment that had alleged the prior conviction that elevated the offense to a felony in the same count as the substantive felony. The trial court had allowed the State to amend the indictment to separate the allegation regarding the prior conviction into a different count, thus bringing the indictment into compliance with G.S. 15A-928. Other cases dealing with charging of a previous conviction are discussed in the offense specific sections below under section III.

49. G.S. 15A-928(b).
50. G.S. 15A-928(d).
J. “Sentencing Factors”

In Blakely v. Washington53 the United States Supreme Court held that any factor, other than a prior conviction, that increases a sentence above the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The case had significant implications on North Carolina’s sentencing procedure. For a full discussion of the impact of Blakely on North Carolina’s sentencing schemes, see Jessica Smith, North Carolina Sentencing after Blakely v. Washington and the Blakely Bill (September 2005) (available on-line at http://www.iogcriminal.unc.edu/Blakely%20Update.pdf). Post-Blakely, the new statutory rules for felony sentencing under Structured Sentencing provide that neither the statutory aggravating factors in G.S. 15A-1340.16(d)(1) – (19) nor the prior record point in G.S. 15A-1340.14(b)(7) need to be included in an indictment or other charging instrument.54 However, the “catch-all” aggravating factor under G.S. 15A-1340.16(d)(20) must be charged.55 Additionally, other notice requirements apply.56 For the pleading and notice requirements for aggravating factors that apply in sentencing of impaired driving offenses, see G.S. 20-179.

III. Offense Specific Issues

A. Homicide57

G.S. 15-144 prescribes a short-form indictment for murder and manslaughter. It provides:

In indictments for murder and manslaughter, it is not necessary to allege matter not required to be proved on the trial; but in the body of the indictment, after naming the person accused, and the county of his residence, the date of the

54. G.S. 15A-1340.16(a4) – (a5). The statute sets out other prior record points, see G.S. 15A-1340.14(b), but only this one must be pleaded.
55. G.S. 15A-1340.16(a4).
56. G.S. 15A-1340.16(a6).
57. For case law pertaining to the date of offense in homicide indictments, see supra p. 5.
offense, the averment “with force and arms,” and the county of the alleged commission of the offense, as is now usual, it is sufficient in describing murder to allege that the accused person feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder (naming the person killed), and concluding as is now required by law; and it is sufficient in describing manslaughter to allege that the accused feloniously and willfully did kill and slay (naming the person killed), and concluding as aforesaid; and any bill of indictment containing the averments and allegations herein named shall be good and sufficient in law as an indictment for murder or manslaughter as the case may be.

A murder indictment that complies with the requirements of G.S. 15-144 will support a conviction for first- or second-degree murder.\textsuperscript{58} A first-degree murder indictment that conforms to G.S. 15-144 need not allege the theory of the offense, such as premeditation and deliberation,\textsuperscript{59} or aiding and abetting.\textsuperscript{60} It also will support a conviction for attempted first-degree murder,\textsuperscript{61} even if the short-form has been modified with the addition of the words “attempt to.”\textsuperscript{62} If the indictment otherwise conforms with G.S. 15-144 but alleges a theory, the State will not be limited to that theory at trial.\textsuperscript{63} A short-form murder indictment will not support a conviction for simple assault, assault inflicting serious injury, assault with intent to kill, or assault with a deadly weapon.\textsuperscript{64}

The North Carolina appellate courts repeatedly have upheld the short form murder indictment as constitutionally valid.\textsuperscript{65} That does not mean, however, that short-form murder

\textsuperscript{59} See, e.g., State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 174-75 (2000); see generally G.S. 14-17 (proscribing first-degree murder).
\textsuperscript{60} State v. Glynn, 178 N.C. App. 689, 694-95 (2006).
\textsuperscript{62} Jones, 359 N.C. at 838.
indictments are completely insulated from challenge. In *State v. Bullock*,66 for example, the court held that although the short form murder indictment is authorized by G.S. 15-144, the indictment for attempted first-degree murder was invalid because of the omission of words “with malice aforethought.”67

The following cases deal with other types of challenges to homicide pleadings.

*State v. Hall*, 173 N.C. App. 735, 737-38 (2005) (magistrate’s order properly charged the defendant with misdemeanor death by vehicle; the order clearly provided that the charge was based on the defendant’s failure to secure the trailer to his vehicle with safety chains or cables as required by G.S. 20-123(b)).

*State v. Dudley*, 151 N.C. App. 711, 716 (2002) (in a felony murder case, the State is not required to secure a separate indictment for the underlying felony) (citing *State v. Carey*, 288 N.C. 254, 274 (1975), vacated in part by, 428 U.S. 904 (1976)).

*State v. Sawyer*, 11 N.C. App. 81, 84 (1971) (indictment charging that defendant ―did, unlawfully, willfully and feloniously kill and slay one Terry Allen Bryan‖ sufficiently charged involuntary manslaughter).

**B. Arson**

Consistent with the requirement that the indictment must allege all essential elements of the offense, *State v. Scott*,68 held that a first-degree arson indictment was invalid because it failed to allege that the building was occupied. Also consistent with that requirement is *State v. Jones*,69 holding that an indictment alleging that the defendant maliciously burned a mobile home that was the dwelling house of a named individual was sufficient to charge second-degree arson.

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67. Note the contrast between this case and *State v. McGee*, 47 N.C. App. 280, 283 (1980), which dealt with a charge of second-degree murder. *Id.* In *McGee*, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that a bill for second-degree murder should be quashed because it did not contain the word “aforethought” modifying malice. *Id.* (while second-degree murder requires malice as an element, it does not require malice aforethought; “aforethought” means “with premeditation and deliberation” as required in murder in the first-degree; aforethought is not an element of second-degree murder) (citing *State v. Duboise*, 279 N.C. 73 (1971)).
An indictment charging a defendant with arson is sufficient to support a conviction for burning a building within the curtilage of the house; the specific outbuilding need not be specified in the indictment.70

C. Kidnapping and Related Offenses

In order to properly indict a defendant for first-degree kidnapping, the State must allege the essential elements of kidnapping in G.S. 14-39(a),71 and at least one of the elements of first-degree kidnapping in G.S. 14-39(b).72 An indictment that fails to allege one of the elements of first-degree kidnapping in G.S. 14-39(b) will, however, support a conviction of second-degree kidnapping.73

Kidnapping requires, in part, that the defendant confine, restrain, or remove the victim. A number of cases hold that the trial judge only may instruct on theories of kidnapping alleged in

71. G.S. 14-39(a) provides:

Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove from one place to another, any other person 16 years of age or over without the consent of such person, or any other person under the age of 16 years without the consent of a parent or legal custodian of such person, shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint or removal is for the purpose of:

(1) Holding such other person for a ransom or as a hostage or using such other person as a shield; or
(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person following the commission of a felony; or
(3) Doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person so confined, restrained or removed or any other person; or
(4) Holding such other person in involuntary servitude in violation of G.S. 14-43.12.
(5) Trafficking another person with the intent that the other person be held in involuntary servitude or sexual servitude in violation of G.S. 14-43.11.
(6) Subjecting or maintaining such other person for sexual servitude in violation of G.S. 14-43.13.


There shall be two degrees of kidnapping as defined by subsection (a). If the person kidnapped either was not released by the defendant in a safe place or had been seriously injured or sexually assaulted, the offense is kidnapping in the first degree and is punishable as a Class C felony. If the person kidnapped was released in a safe place by the defendant and had not been seriously injured or sexually assaulted, the offense is kidnapping in the second degree and is punishable as a Class E felony.

73. See Bell, 311 N.C. at 137.
the indictment. Although contrary case law exists, it has been called in question. If the indictment alleges confinement, restraint, and removal (in the conjunctive), no reversible error occurs if the trial court instructs the jury on confinement, restraint, or removal (the disjunctive).

In addition to the element described above, kidnapping requires that the confinement, restraint, or removal be done for one of the following purposes: holding the victim as a hostage or for ransom, using the victim as a shield, facilitating the commission of a felony or flight following commission of a felony, doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the victim or any other person, holding the victim in involuntary servitude, trafficking a person with the intent that the person be held in involuntary or sexual servitude, or subjecting or maintaining the person for sexual servitude. If the evidence at trial regarding the purpose of the kidnapping does not conform to the indictment, there is a fatal variance. Thus, for example, a fatal variance occurs if

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74. State v. Tucker, 317 N.C. 532, 536-40 (1986) (plain error to instruct on restraint when indictment alleged only removal); State v. Bell, 166 N.C. App. 261, 263-65 (2004) (trial court erred in instructing on restraint or removal when indictment alleged confinement and restraint but not removal); State v. Smith, 162 N.C. App. 46 (2004) (trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully confined, restrained, or removed the victim when the indictment only alleged unlawful removal); State v. Dominie, 134 N.C. App. 445, 447 (1999) (when indictment alleged only removal, trial judge improperly instructed that the jury could convict if defendant confined, restrained, or removed the victim).

75. See State v. Raynor, 128 N.C. App. 244, 247-49 (1998) (although indictment alleged restraint, there was no plain error in the instructions that allowed conviction on either restraint or removal).

76. The later case of State v. Dominie, 134 N.C. App. 445, 449 (1999), recognized that Raynor is inconsistent with Tucker, discussed above.


78. See G.S. 14-39.

79. State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 574-75 (2004) (the trial court erred when it charged the jury that it could find the defendants guilty if they removed two named victims for the purpose of facilitating the commission of robbery or doing serious bodily injury when the indictment alleged only the purpose of facilitating the commission of a felony; the trial court also erred when it instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of kidnapping a third victim if they removed the victim for the purpose of facilitating armed robbery or doing serious bodily injury but the indictment alleged only the purpose of doing serious bodily injury; errors however did not rise to the level of plain error); State v. Morris, __ N.C. App. __, 648 S.E.2d 909 (2007) (the trial court erred when it allowed the State to amend an indictment changing the purpose from facilitating a felony to facilitating inflicting serious injury; rejecting the State’s argument that the additional language in the indictment stating that the victim was seriously injured charged the amended purpose and concluding that such language was intended merely to elevate the charge to first-degree kidnapping); State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 100, 108 (1979) (fatal variance between indictment alleging purpose of facilitating flight and evidence that showed kidnapping for the purpose of facilitating rape); State v. Morris, 147 N.C. App. 247, 250-53 (2001) (fatal variance between indictment alleging purpose of facilitating the
the indictment alleges a purpose of facilitating flight from a felony but the evidence at trial shows a purpose of facilitating a felony.\textsuperscript{80}

When the indictment alleges that the purpose was to facilitate a felony, the indictment need not specify the crime that the defendant intended to commit.\textsuperscript{81} The fact that the jury does not convict the defendant of the crime alleged to have been facilitated does not create a fatal variance.\textsuperscript{82}

Regarding the related offense of felonious restraint, \textit{State v. Wilson},\textsuperscript{83} held that transportation by motor vehicle or other conveyance is an essential element that must be alleged in an indictment in order to properly charge that crime, even if the indictment properly charged kidnapping.\textsuperscript{84}

\section*{D. Burglary, Breaking or Entering, and Related Crimes}

\subsection*{1. Burglary and Breaking or Entering}

Both burglary and felonious breaking or entering require that the defendant’s acts be committed with an intent to commit a felony or larceny in the dwelling or building. Indictments for these offenses need not allege the specific felony or larceny intended to be committed

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\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Faircloth}, 297 N.C. 100.
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{State v. Freeman}, 314 N.C. 432, 434-37 (1985) (rejecting defendant’s argument that first-degree kidnapping indictment was defective because it failed to specify the felony that defendant intended to commit at the time of the kidnapping); \textit{State v. Escoto}, 162 N.C. App. 419 (2004) (burglary and kidnapping indictments need not allege the specific felony a defendant intended to commit at the time of the criminal act; \textit{Apprendi} does not require a different result).
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{State v. Quinn}, 166 N.C. App. 733 (2004) (the indictment alleged that the defendant’s actions were taken to facilitate commission of statutory rape; the court rejected the defendant’s argument that because the jury could not reach a verdict on the statutory rape charge, there was a fatal variance; the court explained that the statute is concerned with the defendant’s intent and that there was ample evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict).
\textsuperscript{83} 128 N.C. App. 688, 694 (1998).
\textsuperscript{84} The court rejected the State’s argument that its holding circumvented the provision in G.S. 14-43.3 that felonious restraint is a lesser included offense of kidnapping.
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therein. However, if the indictment alleges a specific felony, that allegation may not be amended and a variance between the charge and the proof at trial will be fatal. For example, in *State v. Silas*, the indictment alleged that the defendant broke and entered with the intent to commit the felony of murder. At the charge conference, the trial judge allowed that State to amend the indictment to allege an intent to commit assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury or assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. On appeal, the court held that because the State indicted the defendant for felonious breaking or entering based upon a theory of intended murder, it was required to prove defendant intended to commit murder upon breaking or entering the apartment and that, therefore, the amendment to the original indictment was a substantial alteration.

If the indictment alleges a specific intended felony and the trial judge instructs on an intended felony that is a greater offense (meaning that the intended felony that was charged in the indictment is a lesser-included offense of the intended felony included in the jury instructions), the variance does not create prejudicial error.

When the intended felony is a larceny, the indictment need not describe the property that the defendant intended to steal, or allege its owner.

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85. State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 424-25 (1999) (indictment alleging that defendant broke and entered an apartment “with the intent to commit a felony therein” was not defective; a burglary indictment need not specify the felony that defendant intended to commit); State v. Worsley, 336 N.C. 268, 279-281 (1994) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the indictment charging him with first-degree burglary was defective because it failed to specify the felony he intended to commit when he broke into the apartment); Escoto, 162 N.C. App. 419 (2004) (burglary and kidnapping indictments need not allege the specific felony a defendant intended to commit at the time of the criminal act; *Apprendi* does not require a different result).


87. See also State v. Goldsmith, __ N.C. App. __, 652 S.E.2d 336 (2007) (because the State indicted the defendant for first-degree burglary based upon the felony of armed robbery, it was required to prove defendant intended to commit armed robbery upon breaking and entering into the residence).

88. State v. Farrar, 361 N.C. 675 (2007) (no prejudicial error when the indictment alleged that the intended felony was larceny and the judge instructed the jury that the intended felony was armed robbery).


At least one case has held that indictments for these offenses will not be considered defective for failure to properly allege ownership of the building. However, the indictment must identify the building “with reasonable particularity so as to enable the defendant to prepare [a] defense and plead his [or her] conviction or acquittal as a bar to further prosecution for the same offense.” Ideally, indictments for these offenses would allege the premise’s address. Examples of cases on point are summarized below.

**Cases Finding a Fatal Defect or Variance/Error With Respect to an Amendment**

*State v. Miller*, 271 N.C. 646, 653-54 (1967) (fatal variance between indictment charging felony breaking and entering a building “occupied by one Friedman’s Jewelry, a corporation” and evidence that building was occupied by “Friedman’s Lakewood, Incorporated;” evidence showed that there were three Friedman’s stores in the area and that each was a separate corporation).

*State v. Smith*, 267 N.C. 755, 756 (1966) (indictment charging defendant with breaking and entering “a certain building occupied by one Chatham County Board of Education” was defective; although “it appears . . . that he actually entered the Henry Siler School in Siler City but under the general description of ownership in the bill, it could as well been any other school building or other property owned by the Chatham County Board of Education”).

*State v. Benton*, 10 N.C. App. 280, 281 (1970) (fatal variance between indictment charging defendant with breaking and entering “the building located 2024 Wrightsville Ave., Wilmington, N.C., known as the Eakins Grocery Store, William Eakins, owner/possessor” and evidence which related to a store located at 2040 Wrightsville Avenue in the City of Wilmington, owned and operated by William Adkins).

**Cases Finding No Fatal Defect or Variance/No Error With Respect to an Amendment**

*State v. Coffey*, 289 N.C. 431, 438 (1976) (upholding a burglary indictment that charged that the defendant committed burglary “in the county aforesaid [Rutherford], the dwelling

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91. See Norman, 149 N.C. App. at 591-92 (felonious breaking or entering indictment need not allege ownership of the building; it need only identify the building with reasonable particularity; indictment alleging that defendant broke and entered a building occupied by Quail Run Homes located at 4207 North Patterson Avenue in Winston-Salem, North Carolina was sufficient). But see State v. Brown, 263 N.C. 786 (1965) (fatal variance between the felony breaking or entering indictment and the proof at trial; indictment identified property as a building occupied by “Stroup Sheet Metal Works, H.B. Stroup, Jr., owner” and evidence at trial revealed that the occupant and owner was a corporation).

92. See Norman, 149 N.C. App. at 592 (quotation omitted).

93. See id.
house of one Doris Matheny there situate, and then and there actually occupied by one Doris Matheny;” distinguishing *State v. Smith*, 267 N.C. 755 (1966), discussed above, on grounds that there was no evidence that Doris Matheny owned and occupied more than one dwelling house in Rutherford County).

*State v. Davis*, 282 N.C. 107, 113-14 (1972) (no fatal variance between indictment alleging breaking and entering of a “the dwelling house of Nina Ruth Baker located at 840 Washington Drive, Fayetteville, North Carolina” and evidence that Baker lived at 830 Washington Drive; an indictment stating simply “dwelling house of Nina Ruth Baker in Fayetteville, North Carolina” would have been sufficient).

*State v. Sellers*, 273 N.C. 641, 650 (1968) (upholding breaking and entering indictment that identified the building as “occupied by one Leesona Corporation, a corporation”).

*State v. Ly*, ___ N.C. App. ___, 658 S.E.2d 300 (2008) (breaking or entering indictment sufficiently alleged the location and identity of the building entered; indictment alleged that the defendants broke and entered “a building occupied by [the victim] used as a dwelling house located at Albermarle, North Carolina;” although the victim owned several buildings, including six rental houses, the evidence showed there was only one building where the victim actually lived).

*State v. Vawter*, 33 N.C. App. 131, 134-36 (1977) (no fatal variance between breaking and entering indictment that identified the premises as “a building occupied by E.L. Kiser (sic) and Company, Inc., a corporation d/b/a Shop Rite Food Store used as retail grocery located at Old U.S. Highway #52, Rural Hall, North Carolina” and evidence that showed that the Kiser family owned and operated the Shop Rite Food Store located on Old U.S. 52 at Rural Hall; no evidence was presented regarding the corporate ownership or occupancy of the store).

*State v. Shanklin*, 16 N.C. App. 712, 714-15 (1972) (felonious breaking or entering indictment that identified the county in which the building was located and the business in the building was not defective; court noted that “better practice” would be to identify the premises by street address, highway address, rural road address or some clear description or designation).

*State v. Paschall*, 14 N.C. App. 591, 592 (1972) (indictment charging breaking and entering a building occupied by one Dairy Bar, Inc, Croasdaile Shopping Center in the County of Durham was not fatally defective).

*State v. Carroll*, 10 N.C. App. 143, 144-45 (1970) (no fatal defect in felonious breaking or entering indictment that specified a “building occupied by one Duke Power Company, Inc;” although the indictment must identify the building with reasonable particularity, “[i]t would be contrary to reason to suggest that the defendant could have . . . thought that the building . . . was one other than the building occupied by Duke Power Company in which he was arrested;” noting that “[i]n light of the growth in population and in the number of structures (domestic, business and governmental), the prosecuting officers of this State would be well advised to identify the subject premises by street address, highway address, rural road address, or some clear description and designation to set the subject premises apart”).
State v. Cleary, 9 N.C. App. 189, 191 (1970) ("building occupied by one Clarence Hutchens in Wilkes County" was sufficient description).

State v. Melton, 7 N.C. App. 721, 724 (1970) (approving of an indictment that failed to identify the premises by street address, highway address, or other clear designation; noting that a "practically identical" indictment was approved in Sellers, 273 N.C. 641, discussed above).

State v. Roper, 3 N.C. App. 94, 95-96 (1968) (felonious breaking or entering indictment that identified building as "in the county aforesaid, a certain dwelling house and building occupied by one Henry Lane" was sufficient).

One case held that there was no fatal variance when a felony breaking or entering indictment alleged that the defendant broke and entered a building occupied by "Lindsay Hardison, used as a residence" but the facts showed that the defendant broke and entered a building within the cartilage of Hardison’s residence.94 The court reasoned that the term residence includes buildings within the cartilage of the dwelling house, the indictment enabled the defendant to prepare for trial, and the occupancy of a building was not an element of the offense charged. Thus, it concluded that the word "residence" in the indictment was surplusage and the variance was not material.

2. Breaking into Coin- or Currency-Operated Machine

An indictment alleging breaking into a coin- or currency-operated machine in violation of G.S. 14-56.1 need not identify the owner of the property, as that is not an element of the crime charged.95

E. Robbery

A robbery indictment need not allege that the victim did not consent to the taking, that defendant knew he or she was not entitled to the property, or that defendant intended to

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permanently deprive the victim of the property. Additionally, because the gist of the offense of robbery is not the taking of personal property, but a taking by force or putting in fear, the actual legal owner of the property is not an essential element of the crime. As the following cases illustrate, the indictment need only negate the idea that the defendant was taking his or her own property.

_State v. Thompson_, 359 N.C. 77, 108 (2004) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the robbery indictment because it failed to allege that the victim, Domino’s Pizza, was a legal entity capable of owning property; an indictment for armed robbery is not fatally defective simply because it does not correctly identify the owner of the property taken; additionally the description of the property in the indictment was sufficient to demonstrate that the property did not belong to the defendant).

_State v. Pratt_, 306 N.C. 673, 681 (1982) (“As long as it can be shown defendant was not taking his own property, ownership need not be laid in a particular person to allege and prove robbery.”).

_State v. Jackson_, 306 N.C. 642, 653-54 (1982) (variance between indictment charging that defendant took property belonging to the Furniture Buyers Center and evidence that the property belonged to Albert Rice could not be fatal because “[a]n indictment for robbery will not fail if the description of the property is sufficient to show it to be the subject of robbery and negates the idea that the accused was taking his own property”) (quotation omitted).


_State v. Rogers_, 273 N.C. 208, 212-13 (1968) (variance between indictment and evidence as to ownership of property was not fatal; “it is not necessary that ownership of the property be laid in any particular person in order to allege and prove . . . armed robbery”), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Hurst, 320 N.C. 589 (1987).

_State v. Burroughs_, 147 N.C. App. 693, 695-96 (2001) (robbery indictment was not fatally defective; indictment properly specified the name of the person from whose presence the property was attempted to be taken, whose life was endangered, and the place that the offense occurred).

_State v. Bartley_, 156 N.C. App. 490, 500 (2003) (robbery indictment not defective for failure to sufficiently identify the owner of the property allegedly stolen, “the key inquiry is whether the indictment … is sufficient to negate the idea that the defendant was taking his own property”).

Relying on the gist of the offense—a taking by force or putting in fear—the courts have been lenient with regard to variances between the personal property alleged in the indictment and the personal property identified by the evidence at trial, and amendments to the charging language describing the personal property are allowed.98

A robbery indictment must name a person who was in charge of or in the presence of the property at the time of the robbery.99 When a store is robbed, this person is typically the store clerk, not the owner.100

Finally, no error occurs when a trial court allows an indictment for attempted armed robbery to be amended to charge the completed offense of armed robbery; the elements of the offenses are the same and G.S. 14-87 punishes the attempt the same as the completed offense.101

98. State v. McCallum, ___ N.C. App. __, 653 S.E.2d 915 (2007) (the trial court did not err by permitting the State to amend the indictments to remove allegations concerning the amount of money taken during the robberies; the amendments left the indictments alleging that defendant took an unspecified amount of “U.S. Currency;” the allegations as to the value of the property were mere surplusage); State v. McCree, 160 N.C. App. 19, 30-31 (2003) (no fatal variance in armed robbery indictment alleging that defendant took a wallet and its contents, a television, and a VCR; the gist of the offense is not the taking of personal property, but rather a taking or attempted taking by force or putting in fear of the victim by the use of a dangerous weapon; evidence showed that defendant took $50.00 in cash from the victim upstairs and his accomplice took the television and VCR from downstairs; indictment properly alleged a taking by force or putting in fear); State v. Poole, 154 N.C. App. 419, 422-23 (2002) (no fatal variance when robbery indictment alleged that defendant attempted to steal “United States currency” from a named victim; at trial, the state presented no evidence identifying what type of property the defendant sought to obtain; the gravamen of the offense charged is the taking by force or putting in fear, while the specific owner or the exact property taken or attempted to be taken is mere surplusage).

99. State v. Burroughs, 147 N.C. App. 693, 696 (2001) (“While an indictment for robbery … need not allege actual legal ownership of property, the indictment must at least name a person who was in charge or in the presence of the property at the time of the robbery…”) (citations omitted); State v. Moore, 65 N.C. App. 56, 61, 62 (1983) (robbery indictment was fatally defective; “indictment must at least name a person who was in charge or in the presence of the property”).

100. State v. Matthews, 162 N.C. App. 339 (2004) (indictment was not defective by identifying the target of the robbery as the store employee and not the owner of the store); State v. Setzer, 61 N.C. App. 500, 502-03 (1983) (indictment alleging that by use of a pistol whereby the life of Sheila Chapman was endangered and threatened, the defendant took personal property from The Pantry, Inc., sufficiently alleges the property was taken from Sheila Chapman; it is clear from this allegation that Sheila Chapman was the person in control of the corporation’s property and from whose possession the property was taken).

An indictment for robbery with a dangerous weapon must name the weapon and allege either that the weapon was a dangerous one or facts that demonstrate its dangerous nature.\textsuperscript{102}

F. Assaults

1. Generally

Although it is better practice to include allegations describing the assault,\textsuperscript{103} a pleading sufficiently charges assault by invoking that term in the charging language.\textsuperscript{104} If the indictment adds detail regarding the means of the assault (e.g., by shooting) and that detail is not proved at trial, the language will be viewed as surplusage and not a fatal variance.\textsuperscript{105} A simple allegation of “assault” is insufficient when the charge rests on a particular theory of assault, such as assault by show of violence or assault by criminal negligence.\textsuperscript{106}

2. Injury Assaults

When the assault involves serious injury, the injury need not be specifically described.\textsuperscript{107} It is, however, better practice to describe the injury.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{102} State v. Marshall, __ N.C. App. __, 656 S.E.2d 709 (2008) (armed robbery indictment was defective; indictment alleged that the defendant committed the crime “by means of an assault consisting of having in possession and threatening the use of an implement, to wit, keeping his hand in his coat demanding money”).

\textsuperscript{103} See Farb, ARREST WARRANT & INDICTMENT FORMS (UNC School of Government 2005) at G.S. 14-33(a) (simple assault).

\textsuperscript{104} State v. Thorne, 238 N.C. 392, 395 (1953) (warrant charging that the defendant “unlawfully, willfully violated the laws of North Carolina . . . by . . . assault on . . . one Harvey Thomas” was sufficient to charge a simple assault).

\textsuperscript{105} State v. Pelham, 164 N.C. App. 70 (2004) (indictment alleging that defendant assaulted the victim “by shooting at him” was not fatally defective even though there was no evidence of a shooting; the phrase was surplusage and should be disregarded); State v. Muskelley, 6 N.C. App. 174, 176-77 (1969) (indictment charging “assault” with a deadly weapon was sufficient; words “by shooting him” were surplusage).

\textsuperscript{106} State v. Hines, 166 N.C. App. 202, 206-08 (2004) (the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could convict on a theory of criminal negligence when the indictment for aggravated assault on a handicapped person alleged that the defendant “did . . . assault and strike” the victim causing trauma to her head); State v. Garcia, 146 N.C. App. 745, 746-47 (2001) (warrant insufficiently alleged assault by show of violence; warrant alleged an assault and listed facts supporting the elements of a show of violence and a deviation from normal activities by the victim but failed to allege facts supporting the element of “reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm or injury on the part of the person assailed”).

\textsuperscript{107} See State v. Gregory, 223 N.C. 415, 420 (1943) (indictment charging that defendant assaulted the victim and inflicted “serious injuries” is sufficient).
3. Deadly Weapon Assaults

A number of assault offenses involve deadly weapons. Much of the litigation regarding the sufficiency of assault indictments pertains to the charging language regarding deadly weapons. As the cases annotated below reveal, an indictment must name the weapon and either state that it was a “deadly weapon” or include facts demonstrating its deadly character. The leading case on point is *State v. Palmer*, in which the court upheld an indictment charging that defendant committed an assault with “a stick, a deadly weapon.” The indictment did not contain any description of the size, weight, or other properties of the stick that would reveal its deadly character. Reviewing prior case law, the court held:

> it is sufficient for indictments … seeking to charge a crime in which one of the elements is the use of a deadly weapon (1) to name the weapon and (2) either to state expressly that the weapon used was a “deadly weapon” or to allege such facts as would necessarily demonstrate the deadly character of the weapon.

The cases applying this rule are summarized below.

**Cases Finding a Fatal Defect or Variance/Error With Respect to an Amendment**

*State v. Moses*, 154 N.C. App. 332, 334-37 (2002) (count of indictment charging assault with deadly weapon was invalid because it did not identify the deadly weapon; charge was not saved by allegation of the specific deadly weapon in a separate count in the indictment).

**Cases Finding No Fatal Defect or Variance/No Error With Respect to an Amendment**

*State v. Brinson*, 337 N.C. 764, 766-69 (1994) (original assault with deadly weapon indictment stated that defendant assaulted the victim with his fists, a deadly weapon, by hitting the victim over the body with his fists and slamming his head against the cell bars and floor; was not error for the trial court to allow the State to amend the indictment on the day of trial to charge that defendant assaulted the victim with his fists by hitting the victim over the body with his fists and slamming his head against the cell bars, a deadly weapon, and floor; original indictment satisfied the *Palmer* test: it specifically referred to

109. 293 N.C. 633, 634-44 (1977)
the cell bars and floor and recited facts that demonstrated their deadly character; identifying fists as deadly weapons did not preclude the state from identifying at trial other deadly weapons when the indictment both describes those weapons and demonstrates their deadly character).

State v. Grumbles, 104 N.C. App. 766, 769-70 (1991) (indictment “more than adequately” charged assault with a deadly weapon; indictment named defendant’s hands as the deadly weapon and expressly stated defendant’s hands were used as “deadly weapons”).

State v. Everhardt, 96 N.C. App. 1, 10-11 (1989) (indictment sufficiently alleged the deadliness of “drink bottles” by stating that defendant assaulted the victim by inserting them into her vagina), aff’d on other grounds, 326 N.C. 777 (1990).

State v. Hinson, 85 N.C. App. 558, 564 (1987) (“Each of the indictments … names the two and one-half ton truck as the weapon used by defendant in committing the assault and expressly alleges that it was a ‘deadly weapon.’ The indictments were, therefore, sufficient to support the verdicts of guilty of felonious assault with a deadly weapon and the judgments based thereon.”).

State v. Jacobs, 61 N.C. App. 610, 611 (1983) (since defendant’s fists could have been a deadly weapon in the circumstances of this assault, the indictment was sufficient; the indictment specifically stated that defendant used his fists as a deadly weapon and gave facts demonstrating their deadly character).

Even when the indictment is valid on its face, challenges are sometimes made regarding a fatal variance between the deadly weapon charged in the indictment and the proof at trial. The cases summarized below are illustrative.

**Cases Finding a Fatal Defect or Variance/Error With Respect to an Amendment**

State v. Skinner, 162 N.C. App. 434 (2004) (fatal variance existed between the indictment and the evidence at trial; indictment alleged that defendant assaulted the victim with his hands, a deadly weapon; evidence at trial indicated that the deadly weapon used was a hammer or some sort of iron pipe; although indictment was sufficient on its face, variance was fatal).

**Cases Finding No Fatal Defect or Variance/No Error With Respect to an Amendment**

State v. Shubert, 102 N.C. App. 419, 428 (1991) (no fatal variance; rejecting defendant’s argument that while the indictment charged defendant with “unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did assault Lizzie Price with his feet, a deadly weapon, with the intent to kill and inflicting serious injury,” the evidence proved only the use of defendant’s fists; the evidence that the victim was hit with something harder than a fist and that human blood
was found on defendant’s shoes is sufficient to justify an inference that the assault was in part committed with defendant’s feet).

*State v. Everhardt*, 96 N.C. App. 1, 10-11 (1989) (no fatal variance between indictment alleging that defendant assaulted the victim with a “table leg, a deadly weapon” and the evidence, showing that the deadly weapon was the leg of a footstool; “This is more a difference in semantics than in substance. The defendant had fair warning that the State sought to prosecute him for assaulting his wife with the leg of a piece of furniture, and the State explicitly called it a deadly weapon . . . .”), *aff’d on other grounds*, 326 N.C. 777 (1990).

*State v. Jones*, 23 N.C. App. 686, 687-88 (1974) (no fatal variance in indictment charging assault with a firearm on a law enforcement officer; indictment charged that defendant used a .16 gauge automatic rifle and evidence showed that defendant fired a .16 gauge automatic shotgun); “the indictment[] charged assault with a firearm and clearly an automatic shotgun comes within that classification”).

*State v. Muskelly*, 6 N.C. App. 174, 176-77 (1969) (no fatal variance between indictment alleging that defendant assaulted the victim “with a certain deadly weapon, to wit: a pistol . . . by shooting him with said pistol” and proof which showed that although shots were fired by the defendants, the victim was not struck by a bullet but was in fact beaten about the head with a pistol; the words “by shooting him with said pistol” were superfluous and should be disregarded).

### 4. Assault on a Government Official

Indictments alleging assault on a law enforcement officer need not allege the specific duty that the officer was performing at the time of the assault. Nor are they required to allege that the defendant knew the victim was a law enforcement officer, provided they allege the act was done willfully, a term that implies that knowledge.

### 5. Habitual Misdemeanor Assault

An indictment for habitual misdemeanor assault must conform to G.S. 15A-928.

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110. See *State v. Bethea*, 71 N.C. App. 125, 128-29 (1984) (indictment charging that defendant assaulted a law enforcement officer who “was performing a duty of his office” was sufficiently specific to permit entry of judgment for felony assault with a firearm on a law enforcement officer; the indictment need not specify the particular duty the officer was performing; indictment only needs to allege that the law enforcement officer was performing a duty of his office at the time the assault occurred).

111. See *State v. Thomas*, 153 N.C. App. 326, 335-336 (2002) (indictment charging assault with deadly weapon on law enforcement officer did not need to allege that the defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the victim was a law enforcement officer; indictment alleged that defendant “willfully” committed an assault on a law enforcement officer, a term that indicates defendant knew that the victim was a law enforcement officer).
6. Malicious Conduct by Prisoner

In *State v. Artis*,\(^{112}\) the court of appeals held that an indictment charging malicious conduct by a prisoner under G.S. 14-258.4 was not defective even though it failed to allege that the defendant was in custody when the conduct occurred. The court held that the defendant had adequate notice of the charges because he was an inmate in the county detention center, was incarcerated when he received notice of the charges, and raised no objection that he was unaware of the facts giving rise to the charges.

G. Stalking

*State v. Stephens*, __ N.C. App. __, 655 S.E.2d 435 (2008) (the trial court did not err by allowing amendment of a stalking indictment; the amendment did not change the language of the indictment, but rather separated out the allegation regarding the prior conviction that elevated punishment to a felony, as required by G.S. 15A-928)).

H. Resist, Delay, and Obstruct Officer

Indictments charging resisting, delaying, and obstructing an officer must identify the officer by name, indicate the duty being discharged (e.g., “searching the premises”), and indicate generally how the defendant resisted the officer (e.g., “using his body to block the officer’s entry into the premises”).\(^{113}\)


\(^{113}\) See *State v. Smith*, 262 N.C. 472, 474 (1964) (pleading alleging that the defendant “did obstruct, and delay a police officer in the performance of his duties by resisting arrest” by striking, hitting and scratching him was fatally defective; a warrant or indictment charging a violation of G.S. 14-223 must identify the officer by name and indicate the official duty he was discharging or attempting to discharge, and should note the manner in which defendant resisted, delayed or obstructed); *In Re J.F.M.*, 168 N.C. App. 144 (2005) (juvenile petition properly alleged resist, delay and obstruct by charging that “[T]he juvenile did unlawfully and willfully resist, delay and obstruct (name officer) S.L. Barr, by holding the office of (name office) Deputy (describe conduct) delay and obstructing a public [officer] in attempting to discharge a duty of his office. At the time, the officer was discharging and attempting to discharge a duty of his/her (name duty) investigate and detain [TB] whom was involved in an affray[]. This offense is in violation of G.S. 14-233.”); *State v. Swift*, 105 N.C. App. 550, 552-54 (1992) (indictment charging resisting an officer was not fatally defective; such an indictment must identify the officer by name, indicate the official duty being discharged and indicate generally how defendant resisted the officer); see also *State v. White*, 266 N.C. 361 (1966) (resisting warrant charging that defendant “did unlawfully and willfully resist, delay and
I. Disorderly Conduct

In State v. Smith, the court held that an indictment under G.S. 14-197 charging that the defendant “appeared in a public place in a rude and disorderly manner and did use profane and indecent language in the presence of two or more persons” was fatally defective. The indictment failed to allege that (1) the defendant used indecent or profane language on a public road or highway and (2) such language was made in a loud and boisterous manner.

J. Child Abuse

In State v. Qualls, the court held that there was no fatal variance when an indictment alleged that the defendant inflicted a subdural hematoma and the evidence showed that the injury was an epidural hematoma. The court explained that to indict a defendant for felonious child abuse all that is required is an allegation that the defendant was the parent or guardian of the victim, a child under the age of sixteen, and that the defendant intentionally inflicted any serious injury upon the child. The court regarded the indictment’s reference to the victim suffering a subdural hematoma as surplusage.

K. Sexual Assault

G.S. 15-144.1 prescribes a short form indictment for rape and G.S. 15-144.2 prescribes a short form indictment for sexual offense. The statutes provide that the short form indictments may be used for a number of listed offenses. For example, G.S. 15-144.1(a) provides the short

116. See also State v. Daniels, 164 N.C. App. 558 (2004) (holding that the short form in G.S. 15-144.2(a) may be used to charge statutory sex offense against a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old).
form for forcible rape and states that any indictment “containing the averments and allegations herein named shall be good and sufficient in law as an indictment for rape in the first degree and will support a verdict of guilty of rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, attempted rape or assault on a female.” However, when a rape indictment specifically alleges all of the elements of first-degree rape under G.S. 14-27.2 and does not contain the specific allegations or averments of G.S. 15-144.1, the court may instruct the jury only on that offense and any lesser included offenses.\textsuperscript{117}

The appellate courts repeatedly have upheld both the rape and sexual offense short form indictments.\textsuperscript{118} This does not mean, however, that all indictments conforming to the statutory short form language are insulated from attack. In \textit{State v. Miller},\textsuperscript{119} for example, the court of appeals found the statutory sex offense indictments invalid. In that case, although the indictments charged first-degree statutory sex offense in the language of G.S. 15-144.2(b), they also cited G.S. 14-27.7A (statutory rape or sexual offense of a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old) instead of G.S. 14-27.4 (first-degree sexual offense). Moreover, the indictments included other allegations that pertained to G.S. 14-27.7A. Based on the “very narrow circumstances presented by [the] case,” the court held that the short form authorized by G.S. 15-144.2 was not sufficient to cure the fatal defects.\textsuperscript{120}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{117. See State v. Hedgepeth, 165 N.C. App. 321 (2004) (reasoning that the short form was not used and that assault on a female is not a lesser included offense of rape).}
\footnote{119. 159 N.C. App. 608 (2003), \textit{aff’d}, 358 N.C. 133 (2004).}
\footnote{120. See \textit{id.} at 614; see \textit{supra} p. 18 & n. 43 (discussing other sexual assault cases involving amendments to the statutory citation).}
\end{footnotes}
The effect of the short form is that although the State must prove each and every element of these offenses at trial, every element need not be alleged in a short form indictment.\(^{121}\) A defendant may, of course, request a bill of particulars to obtain additional information about the charges.\(^{122}\) The trial court’s decision to grant or deny that request is reviewed for abuse of discretion.\(^{123}\) An indictment that conforms to the statutory short form need not allege:

- That the victim was a female;\(^{124}\)
- The defendant’s age;\(^{125}\)
- The aggravating factor or factors that elevate a second-degree forcible offense to a first-degree forcible offense;\(^{126}\) or
- The specific sex act alleged to have occurred.\(^{127}\)

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\(^{121}\) G.S. 15-144.1 (“In indictments for rape, it is not necessary to allege every matter required to be proved on the trial . . . .”); G.S. 15-144.2 (same for sexual offenses); Lowe, 295 N.C. at 600.


\(^{123}\) See id.

\(^{124}\) See State v. Bell, 311 N.C. 131, 137-38 (1984) (indictments for attempted rape were sufficient even though they did not allege that the victims were females).

\(^{125}\) See Lowe, 295 N.C. at 600 (short form for rape “clearly authorizes an indictment … which omits [the] averment[] … [regarding] the defendant’s age”); State v. Wiggins, 161 N.C. App. 583 (2003) (defendant’s age in statutory rape case); State v. Hunter, 299 N.C. 29, 37-38 (1980) (same). Note that under prior law both first-degree statutory and first-degree forcible rape required that the defendant be more than 16 years of age. See G.S. 14-21(1) (repealed). Under current law, although first-degree statutory rape requires that the defendant be at least 12 years old, first-degree forcible rape no longer has an element pertaining to the defendant’s age. See G.S. 14-27.2.

\(^{126}\) See State v. Roberts, 310 N.C. 428, 432-34 (1984) (rejecting defendant’s argument that a short form rape indictment was insufficient to charge first-degree rape because it did not allege that “defendant displayed a dangerous weapon or that he caused serious injury or that he was aided and abetted by another, essential elements of first degree rape”); Lowe, 295 N.C. at 600 (indictment is valid even if it does not indicate whether offense was perpetrated by means of a deadly weapon or by inflicting serious bodily injury).

\(^{127}\) See State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 23-25 (1987) (indictments charging that defendant engaged in a sex offense with the victim without specifying the specific sexual act were valid); State v. Edwards, 305 N.C. 378, 380 (1982) (sexual offense indictment drafted pursuant to G.S. 15-144.2(b) need not specify the sexual act committed); State v. Burgess, 181 N.C. App. 27 (2007) (same); State v. Mueller, ___ N.C. App. __, 647 S.E.2d 440 (2007) (indictments charging sexual crimes were sufficient even though they did not contain allegations regarding which specific sexual act was committed); State v. Youngs, 141 N.C. App. 220, 229-31 (2000) (no defect in indictments charging indecent liberties with a minor and statutory sex offense; an indictment charging statutory sex offense need not contain a specific allegation regarding which sexual act was committed; an indictment charging indecent liberties need not indicate exactly which of defendant’s acts constitute the indecent liberty).

Although the State is not required to allege a specific sex act in the indictment, if it does so, it may be bound by that allegation, at least with respect to prosecutions under G.S. 14-27.7. See State v. Loudner, 77 N.C. App. 453, 453-54 (1985) (indictment pursuant to G.S. 14-27.7 (intercourse and sexual offenses with certain victims) charged that defendant engaged “in a sexual act, to wit: performing oral sex” and the evidence showed only that defendant engaged in digital penetration of the victim; “While the State was not required to allege the specific nature of the sex act in the indictment, having chosen to do so, it is bound by its allegations…” (citation omitted); State v. Bruce, 90 N.C. App. 547, 549-50 (1988) (fatal variance in indictment pursuant to G.S. 14-27.7 indicating that charge was based on defendant’s having engaged in vaginal intercourse with the victim and evidence at trial that showed attempted rape, attempted anal intercourse and fellatio but not vaginal intercourse).
The statutes require that short form indictments for both forcible rape and forcible sexual offense include an averment that the assault occurred “with force and arms.”\(^{128}\) However, failure to include that averment is not a fatal defect.\(^{129}\) The short forms for both forcible rape and forcible sexual offense also require an allegation that the offense occurred “by force and against her will.”\(^{130}\) However, in *State v. Haywood*,\(^{131}\) the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err by allowing the State to amend a first-degree sex offense indictment by adding the words “by force.” The court reasoned that because the indictment already included the terms “feloniously” and “against the victim’s will,” the charge was not substantially altered by the addition of the term “by force.”

For first-degree statutory rape and first-degree statutory sex offense, the short forms state that it is sufficient to allege the victim as “a child under 13.”\(^{132}\) Although that allegation need not follow the statute verbatim,\(^{133}\) it must clearly allege that the victim is under the age of thirteen.\(^{134}\)

For cases dealing with challenges to sexual assault indictments regarding the date of the offense, see *supra* pp. 6-9.

\(^{128}\) G.S. 15-144.1(a); G.S. 15-144.2(a).


\(^{130}\) See G.S. 15-144.1(a); G.S. 15-144.2(a).

\(^{131}\) 144 N.C. App. 223, 228 (2001).

\(^{132}\) G.S. 15-144.1(b); G.S. 15-144.2(b).

\(^{133}\) See *State v. Ollis*, 318 N.C. 370, 374 (1986) (allegation that the victim is “a female child eight (8) years old” sufficiently alleges that she is “a child under 12” and satisfies the requirement of G.S. 15-144.1(b) as it existed at the time; the additional allegation that the child was “thus of the age of under thirteen (13) years” is surplusage [Note: at the time of the alleged offense in this case, first-degree statutory rape applied to victims under the age of 12; the statute now applies to victims under the age of 13]).

\(^{134}\) See *id.*; *State v. Howard*, 317 N.C. 140, 140-41 (1986) (defendant was tried and convicted under G.S. 14-27.2 of rape of a “child under the age of 13 years” upon a bill of indictment which alleged that the offense occurred when the old version of G.S. 14-27.2, applying to victims under the age of 12, was in effect; although valid for offenses occurring after amendment of the statute, the indictment did not allege a criminal offense for a rape allegedly occurring before the amendment); *State v. Trent*, 320 N.C. 610, 612 (1987) (same).
L. Indecent Liberties

An indictment charging taking indecent liberties with a child under G.S. 14-202.1 need not specify the act that constituted the indecent liberty.135

M. Larceny, Embezzlement, and Related Crimes Interfering with Property Rights

Larceny and embezzlement indictments must allege a person who or entity that has a property interest in the property stolen. That property interest may be ownership, or it may be some special property interest such as that of a bailee or custodian.136 Although the name of a person or entity with a property interest must be alleged in the indictment, the exact nature of the property interest, e.g., owner or bailee, need not be alleged.137 G.S. 15-148 sets out the rule for alleging joint ownership of property. It provides that when the property belongs to or is in the possession of more than one person, “it is sufficient to name one of such persons, and to state such property to belong to the person so named, and another or others as the case may be.”

As the cases summarized below illustrate,138 failure to allege the name of one with a property interest in the item will render the indictment defective. Similarly, a variance between the person or entity alleged to hold a property interest and the evidence at trial is often fatal. And finally, amendments as to this allegation generally are not permitted.

**Cases Finding a Fatal Defect or Variance/Error With Respect to an Amendment**

*State v. Downing*, 313 N.C. 164, 166-68 (1985) (fatal variance between felony larceny indictment alleging that items were the personal property of a mother who owned the

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137. See Greene, 289 N.C. at 586-86 (no fatal variance between indictment alleging that Welborn and Greene had a property interest in the stolen property and evidence showing that Greene was the owner and Welborn merely a bailee).
138. Many cases on point exist. The cases annotated here are meant to be illustrative.
building and evidence showing that items were owned by the daughter’s business, which was located in the building).

*State v. Eppley*, 282 N.C. 249, 259-60 (1972) (fatal variance between larceny indictment alleging that property belonged to James Ernest Carriker and evidence showing that although the property was taken from Carriker’s home, it was owned by his father).


*State v. Craycraft*, 152 N.C. App. 211, 213-14 (2002) (fatal variance between felony larceny indictment alleging that stolen property belonged to one Montague and evidence showing that items belonged to defendant’s father; Montague, the landlord, did not have a special possessory interest in the items, although he was maintaining them for his former tenant).

*State v. Salters*, 137 N.C. App. 553, 555-57 (2000) (fatal variance between felony larceny indictment charging defendant with stealing property owned by Frances Justice and evidence showing that the property belonged to Kedrick (Justice’s eight-year-old grandson); noting that had Justice been acting *in loco parentis*, “there would be no doubt” that Justice would have been in lawful possession or had a special custodial interest in the item).

*State v. Johnson*, 77 N.C. App. 583, 585 (1985) (indictment charging defendant with breaking or entering a building occupied by Watauga Opportunities, Inc. and stealing certain articles of personal property was fatally defective because it was silent as to ownership, possession, or right to possess the stolen property; fatal variance existed between second indictment charging defendant with breaking or entering a building occupied by St. Elizabeth Catholic Church and stealing two letter openers, the personal property of St. Elizabeth Catholic Church and evidence that did not show that the church either owned or had any special property interest in the letter openers but rather established that the articles belonged to Father Connolly).

**Cases Finding No Fatal Defect or Variance/No Error With Respect to an Amendment**

*State v. Green*, 305 N.C. 463, 474 (1982) (no fatal variance between larceny indictment alleging that the stolen item was “the personal property of Robert Allen in the custody and possession of Margaret Osborne” and the evidence; rejecting defendant’s argument that the evidence conclusively showed that Terry Allen was the owner and concluding that even if there was no evidence that Robert Allen owned the item, there would be no fatal variance because the evidence showed it was in Osborn’s possession; as such the allegation of ownership in the indictment was mere surplusage).

*State v. Liddell*, 39 N.C. App. 373, 374-75 (1979) (no fatal variance between indictments charging defendant with stealing “the property of Lees-McRae College under the custody of Steve Cummings” and evidence showing that property belonged to Mackey Vending Company and ARA Food Services; Lees-McRae College was in lawful possession of the items as well as having custody of them as a bailee).
When a variance between the indictment’s allegation regarding the owner or individual or entity with a possessory interest and the evidence can be characterized as minor or as falling within the rule of *idem sonans*, it has been overlooked.

Larceny and embezzlement indictments must allege ownership of the property in a natural person or a legal entity capable of owning property. When the property owner is a business, the words “corporation,” “incorporated,” “limited,” and “company,” as well as abbreviations for those terms such as “Inc.” and “Ltd.” sufficiently designate an entity capable of owning property. The following cases illustrate this rule.

*Cases Finding a Fatal Defect or Variance/Error With Respect to an Amendment*

*State v. Thornton*, 251 N.C. 658, 660-62 (1960) (embezzlement indictment charging embezzlement from “The Chuck Wagon” was defective because it contained no allegation that the victim was a legal entity capable of owning property; although the victim’s name was given, there was no allegation that it was a corporation and the name itself did not indicate that it was such an entity).

*State v. Brown*, __ N.C. App. __, 646 S.E.2d 590 (2007) (larceny indictment stating that stolen items were the personal property of “Smoker Friendly Store, Dunn, North Carolina” was defective because it did not state that the store was a legal entity capable of owning property; rejecting the State’s argument that when count one and two were read together the indictment alleged a legal entity capable of owning property; although count two referenced a corporation as the owner, that language was not incorporated into count one and each count of an indictment must be complete in itself).

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139. *See supra* pp. 11-13.
140. State v. Weaver, 123 N.C. App. 276, 291 (1996) (no fatal variance between attempted larceny indictment alleging that the stolen items were “the personal property of Finch-Wood Chevrolet-Geo Inc.” and evidence; evidence showed that Finch-Wood Chevrolet had custody and control of the car but did not show that entity was incorporated or that it also was known as Finch-Wood Chevrolet-Geo); State v. Cameron, 73 N.C. App 89, 92 (1985) (no fatal variance between indictment alleging that stolen items belonged to “Mrs. Narest Phillips” and evidence showing that the owner was “Mrs. Ernest Phillips;” names are sufficiently similar to fall within the doctrine of *idem sonans*, and the variance was immaterial); State v. McCall, 12 N.C. App. 85, 87-88 (1971) (no fatal variance between indictment and proof; indictment charged the larceny of money from “Piggly Wiggly Store #7,” and witnesses referred to the store as “Piggly Wiggly in Wilson,” “Piggly Wiggly Store,” “Piggly Wiggly,” and “Piggly Wiggly Wilson, Inc.”); *see also* State v. Smith, 43 N.C. App. 376, 378 (1979) (no fatal variance between warrant charging defendant with stealing the property of “K-Mart Stores, Inc., Lenoir, N.C.” and testimony at trial that the name of the store was “K-Mart, Inc.,” “K-Mart Corporation,” or “K-Mart Corporation”).
State v. Price, 170 N.C. App. 672, 673 (2005) (indictment for larceny was defective when it named the property owner as “City of Asheville Transit and Parking Services,” which was not a natural person; the indictment did not allege that this entity was a legal entity capable of owning property).

State v. Phillips, 162 N.C. App. 719 (2004) (larceny indictments were fatally defective because they failed to give sufficient indication of the legal ownership of the stolen items; indictment alleged that items were the personal property of “Parker’s Marine;” Parker’s Marine was not an individual and the indictment failed allege that it was a legal entity capable of ownership; defective count cannot be read together with non-defective count when defective count does not incorporate by reference required language).

State v. Norman, 149 N.C. App. 588, 593 (2002) (felony larceny indictment alleging that defendant took the property of “Quail Run Homes Ross Dotson, Agent” was fatally defective because it lacked any indication of the legal ownership status of the victim (such as identifying the victim as a natural person or a corporation); “Any crime that occurs when a defendant offends the ownership rights of another, such as conversion, larceny, or embezzlement, requires proof that someone other than a defendant owned the relevant property. Because the State is required to prove ownership, a proper indictment must identify as victim a legal entity capable of owning property.”) (quotation omitted).

State v. Linney, 138 N.C. App. 169, 172-73 (2000) (fatal variance existed in embezzlement indictment alleging that rental proceeds belonged to an estate when in fact they belonged to the decedent’s son; also, an estate is not a legal entity capable of holding property).

State v. Woody, 132 N.C. App. 788, 790 (1999) (indictment for conversion by bailee alleging that the converted property belonged to “P&R unlimited” was defective because it lacked any indication of the legal ownership status of the victim; while the abbreviation “ltd” or the word “limited” is a proper corporate identifier, “unlimited” is not).

State v. Hughes, 118 N.C. App. 573, 575-76 (1995) (embezzlement indictments alleged that gasoline belonged to “Mike Frost, President of Petroleum World, Incorporated, a North Carolina Corporation;” evidence showed that gasoline was actually owned by Petroleum World, Incorporated, a corporation; trial judge improperly allowed the State to amend the indictments to delete the words Mike Frost, President; because an indictment for embezzlement must allege ownership of the property in a person, corporation or other legal entity able to own property, the amendment was a substantial alteration).

State v. Strange, 58 N.C. App. 756, 757-58 (1982) (arresting judgment ex mero moto where the defendant was charged and found guilty of the larceny of a barbeque cooker “the personal property of Granville County Law Enforcement Association” because indictment failed to charge the defendant with the larceny of the cooker from a legal entity capable of owning property).

State v. Perkins, 57 N.C. App. 516, 518 (1982) (larceny indictment was defective because it failed to allege that “Metropolitan YMCA t/d/b/a Hayes-Taylor YMCA Branch” was a corporation or other legal entity capable of owning property and name did not indicate that it was a corporation or natural person).
Cases Finding No Fatal Defect or Variance/No Error With Respect to an Amendment

*State v. Cave,* 174 N.C. App. 580, 582 (2005) (larceny indictment was not defective; the indictment named the owner as “N.C. FYE, Inc.;” the indictment was sufficient because the abbreviation “Inc.” imports the entity’s ability to own property).

*State v. Day,* 45 N.C. App. 316, 317-18 (1980) (no fatal variance between the indictment alleging that items were the property of “J. Riggings, Inc., a corporation” and evidence; witnesses testified that items were owned by “J. Riggings, a man’s retailing establishment,” “J. Riggins Store,” and “J. Riggings” but no one testified that J. Riggings was a corporation).

One case that appears to be an exception to the general rule that the owner must be identified as one capable of legal ownership is *State v. Wooten.* 142 That case upheld a shoplifting indictment that named the victim simply as “Kings Dept. Store.” Noting that indictments for larceny and embezzlement must allege ownership in either a natural person or legal entity capable of owning property, the *Wooten* court distinguished shoplifting because it can only be committed against a store. At least one case has declined to extend *Wooten* beyond the shoplifting context. 143

A larceny indictment must describe the property taken. The cases annotated below explore the level of detail required in the description. When the larceny is of any money, United States treasury note, or bank note, G.S. 15-149 provides that it is sufficient to describe the item “simply as money, without specifying any particular coin [or note].” G.S. 15-150 provides a similar rule for embezzlement of money.

*Cases Finding a Fatal Defect or Variance/Error With Respect to an Amendment*

*State v. Ingram,* 271 N.C. 538, 541-44 (1967) (larceny indictment that described stolen property as “merchandise, chattels, money, valuable securities and other personal property” was insufficient).

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State v. Nugent, 243 N.C. 100, 102-03 (1955) (“meat” was an insufficient description in larceny and receiving indictment of the goods stolen).

State v. Simmons, 57 N.C. App. 548, 551-52 (1982) (fatal variance between larceny indictment and the proof at trial as to what item or items were taken; property was alleged as “eight (8) Imperial, heavy duty freezers, Serial Numbers: 02105, 02119, 01075, 01951, 02024, 02113, 02138, 02079, the personal property of Southern Food Service, Inc., in the custody and possession of Patterson Storage Warehouse Company, Inc., a corporation;” however, the property seized was a 21 cubic foot freezer, serial number “W210TSSC-030-138”).

Cases Finding No Fatal Defect or Variance/No Error With Respect to an Amendment

State v. Hartley, 39 N.C. App. 70, 71-72 (1978) (larceny indictments alleging property taken as “a quantity of used automobile tires, the personal property of Jerry Phillips and Tom Phillips, and d/b/a the Avery County Recapping Service, Newland, N.C.” was sufficient; indictments named property (tires), described them as to type (automobile), condition (used), ownership, and location).

State v. Monk, 36 N.C. App. 337, 340-41 (1978) (indictment alleging “assorted items of clothing, having a value of $504.99 the property of Payne’s, Inc.” was sufficient).

State v. Boomer, 33 N.C. App. 324, 330 (1977) (“When describing an animal, it is sufficient to refer to it by the name commonly applied to animals of its kind without further description. A specific description of the animal, such as its color, age, weight, sex, markings or brand, is not necessary. The general term ‘hogs’ in the indictment sufficiently describes the animals taken so as to identify them with reasonable certainty.”) (citation omitted).

State v. Coleman, 24 N.C. App. 530, 532 (1975) (no fatal variance between indictment describing property as “a 1970 Plymouth” with a specific serial number, owned by George Edison Biggs and evidence which showed a taking of a 1970 Plymouth owned by George Edison Biggs but was silent as to the serial number).

State v. Foster, 10 N.C. App. 141, 142-43 (1970) (larceny indictment alleging “automobile parts of the value of $300.00 . . . of one Furches Motor Company” was sufficient).

State v. Mobley, 9 N.C. App. 717, 718 (1970) (indictment alleging “an undetermined amount of beer, food and money of the value of $25.00 . . . of the said Evening Star Grill” was sufficient).
*State v. Chandler*\(^{144}\) held that when the charge is attempted larceny, it is not necessary to specify the particular goods and chattels the defendant intended to steal. The court reasoned that the offense of attempted larceny is complete “when there is a general intent to steal and an act in furtherance thereof.” Thus, it concluded, an allegation as to the specific articles intended to be taken is not essential to the crime.\(^{145}\)

A larceny indictment need not describe the manner of the taking, even if the larceny was by trick.\(^{146}\) Nor is it necessary for a larceny indictment to expressly allege that the defendant intended to convert the property to his own use, that the taking was without consent, or that the defendant had an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property of its use.\(^{147}\)

In order to properly charge felony larceny, the indictment must specifically allege one of the factors that elevate a misdemeanor larceny to a felony.\(^{148}\) Thus, if the factor elevating the offense to a felony is that the value of the items taken exceeds $1,000, this fact must be alleged in the indictment. However, a variance as to this figure will not be fatal, provided that the evidence establishes that the value of the items is $1,000 or more.\(^{149}\) An indictment alleging that the larceny was committed “pursuant to a violation of G.S. 14-51” is sufficient to charge felony

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\(^{144}\) 342 N.C. 742, 753 (1996).

\(^{145}\) See id.

\(^{146}\) See State v. Barbour, 153 N.C. App. 500, 503 (2002) (“It is not necessary for the State to allege the manner in which the stolen property was taken and carried away, and the words ‘by trick’ need not be found in an indictment charging larceny.”); State v. Harris, 35 N.C. App. 401, 402 (1978).

\(^{147}\) See State v. Osborne, 149 N.C. App. 235, 244-45 (indictment properly charged larceny even though it did not allege that item was taken without consent or that defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner; charge that defendant “unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did ‘[s]teal, take, and carry away’” was sufficient), aff’d, 356 N.C. 424 (2002); State v. Miller, 42 N.C. App. 342, 346 (1979) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the indictment was fatally defective because it failed to state a felonious intent to appropriate the goods taken to the defendant’s own use; allegation that defendant “unlawfully and willfully did feloniously steal, take, and carry away” the item was sufficient); see also State v. Wesson, 16 N.C. App. 683, 685-88 (1972) (warrant’s use of the term “steal” in charging larceny sufficiently charged the required felonious intent).

\(^{148}\) See G.S. 14-72 (delineating elements that support a felony charge); State v. Wilson, 315 N.C. 157, 164-65 (1985) (agreeing with defendant’s contention that the indictment failed to allege felonious larceny because it did not specifically state that the larceny was pursuant to or incidental to a breaking or entering and the amount of money alleged to have been stolen was below the statutory amount necessary to constitute a felony).
larceny committed pursuant to a burglary.\textsuperscript{150} Also, a defendant properly may be convicted of felony larceny pursuant to a breaking and entering when the indictment charged felony larceny pursuant to a burglary,\textsuperscript{151} because breaking or entering is a lesser included offense of burglary.\textsuperscript{152}

\textbf{N. Receiving or Possession of Stolen Property}

Unlike larceny, indictments charging receiving or possession of stolen property need not allege ownership of the property.\textsuperscript{153} The explanation for this distinction is that the name of the person from whom the goods were stolen is not an essential element of these offenses.\textsuperscript{154}

\textbf{O. Injury to Personal Property}

An indictment for injury to personal property must allege the owner or person in lawful possession of the injured property.\textsuperscript{155} If the entity named in the indictment is not a natural person, the indictment must allege that the victim was a legal entity capable of owning property.\textsuperscript{156} These rules follow those for larceny, discussed above.\textsuperscript{157}

\begin{footnotes}

\footnotetext[149]{\textsuperscript{149}. See State v. McCall, 12 N.C. App. 85, 88 (1971) (indictment alleged larceny of $1948 and evidence showed larceny of $1748).}
\footnotetext[150]{\textsuperscript{150}. See State v. Mandina, 91 N.C. App. 686, 690-91 (1988).}
\footnotetext[151]{\textsuperscript{151}. See State v. McCoy, 79 N.C. App. 273, 277 (1986); State v. Eldgridge, 83 N.C. App. 312, 316 (1986).}
\footnotetext[152]{\textsuperscript{152}. See McCoy, 79 N.C. App. at 277.}
\footnotetext[153]{\textsuperscript{153}. See State v. Jones, 151 N.C. App. 317, 327 (2002) (variance between ownership of property alleged in indictment and evidence of ownership introduced at trial is not fatal to charge of felonious possession of stolen goods); State v. Medlin, 86 N.C. App. 114, 123-24 (1987) (“In cases of receiving stolen goods, it has never been necessary to allege the names of persons from whom the goods were stolen, nor has a variance between an allegation of ownership in the receiving indictment and proof of ownership been held to be fatal. We now hold that the name of the person from whom the goods were stolen is not an essential element of an indictment alleging possession of stolen goods, nor is a variance between the indictments’ allegations of ownership of property and the proof of ownership fatal.”) (citations omitted).}
\footnotetext[154]{\textsuperscript{154}. See Jones, 151 N.C. App at 327.}
\footnotetext[155]{\textsuperscript{155}. See State v. Price, 170 N.C. App. 672, 673-74 (2005).}
\footnotetext[156]{\textsuperscript{156}. See id. at 674 (indictment for injury to personal property was defective when it named the property owner as “City of Asheville Transit and Parking Services,” which was not a natural person; the indictment did not allege that it was a legal entity capable of owning property).}
\footnotetext[157]{\textsuperscript{157}. See supra pp. 44-46.}
\end{footnotes}
P. False Pretenses and Forgery

1. False Pretenses

One issue in false pretenses cases is how the false representation element should be alleged in the indictment. In *State v. Perkins*, the court of appeals held that an allegation that the defendant used a credit and check card issued in the name of another person, wrongfully obtained, and without authorization sufficiently apprised the defendant that she was accused of falsely representing herself as an authorized user of the cards. In *State v. Parker*, the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to allow the State to amend a false pretenses indictment by changing the items that the defendant represented as his own from “two (2) cameras and photography equipment” to a “Magnavox VCR.” The court held that the amendment was not a substantial alteration because the description of the item or items that the defendant falsely represented as his own was irrelevant to proving the essential elements of the crime charged. Those essential elements were simply that the defendant falsely represented a subsisting fact, which was calculated and intended to deceive, which did in fact deceive, and by which defendant obtained something of value from another.

In false pretenses cases, the thing obtained must be described with reasonable certainty. This standard was satisfied in *State v. Walston*, where the court held that there was no fatal variance between a false pretenses indictment alleging that the defendant obtained

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159. *Id.* (the indictment alleged that the defendant “unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did knowingly and designedly, with the intent to cheat and defraud, attempted to obtain BEER AND CIGARETTES from FOOD LION by means of a false pretense which was calculated to deceive. The false pretense consisted of the following: THIS PROPERTY WAS OBTAINED BY MEANS OF USING THE CREDIT CARD AND CKECK [sic] CARD OF MIRIELLE CLOUGH WHEN IN FACT THE DEFENDANT WRONGFULLY OBTAINED THE CARDS AND WAS NEVER GIVEN PERMISSION TO USE THEM”).
161. *See id.* at 719.
$10,000 in U.S. currency and the evidence that showed that the defendant deposited a $10,000 check into a bank account. The court reasoned that “whether defendant received $10,000.00 in cash or deposited $10,000.00 in a bank account, he obtained something of monetary value which is the crux of the offense.” Although early cases indicate that a false pretenses indictment should describe money obtained by giving the amount in dollars and cents, more modern cases have been flexible on this rule. Thus, an indictment alleging that the defendant falsely represented to a store clerk that he had purchased a watch band in order to obtain “United States currency” was held to be sufficient, although a dollar amount was not stated. The court distinguished the earlier cases noting that in the case before it, the indictment alleged the item – the watch band – which the defendant used to obtain the money.

G.S. 15-151 provides that in any case in which an intent to defraud is required for forgery or any other offense, it is sufficient to allege an intent to defraud, without naming the person or entity intended to be defrauded. That provision goes on to state that at trial, it is sufficient and not a variance if there is an intent to defraud a government, corporate body, public officer in his or her official capacity, or any particular person. Without citing this provision, at least one case has held that a false pretenses indictment need not specify the alleged victim.

2. Identity Theft

Identity theft is a relatively new crime and few cases have dealt with indictment issues regarding this offense. One case that has is State v. Dammons, in which the indictment alleged

164. Id. at 334-36
167. See id. at 318.
168. State v. McBride, __ N.C. App. __, 653 S.E.2d 218 (2007) (the court concluded that the statute proscribing the offense, G.S. 14-100, does not require that the State prove an intent to defraud any particular person).
that the defendant had fraudulently represented himself as William Artis Smith “for the purpose of making financial or credit transactions and for the purpose of avoiding legal consequences in the name of Michael Anthony Dammons.” The State’s evidence at trial indicated that the defendant assumed Smith’s identity without consent in order to avoid legal consequences in the form of felony charges. The appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument of fatal variance, concluding that the charging language about the financial transaction was unnecessary and was properly regarded as surplusage.\textsuperscript{171}

3. Forgery

In North Carolina, there are common law and statutory offenses for forgery.\textsuperscript{172} For offenses charged under G.S. 14-119 (forgery of notes, checks, and other securities; counterfeiting instruments), the indictment need not state the manner in which the instrument was forged.\textsuperscript{173}

Q. Perjury and Related Offenses

G.S. 15-145 provides the form for a bill of perjury. G.S. 15-146 does the same for a bill of subornation of perjury. G.S. 14-217(b) specifies the contents of an indictment for bribery of officials.

\textsuperscript{170} 159 N.C. App. 284 (2003).
\textsuperscript{171} Id. at 293.
\textsuperscript{173} State v. King, 178 N.C. App. 122 (2006) (indictment alleged that “on or about the 19th day of March, 2004, in Wayne County Louretha Mae King unlawfully, willfully, feloniously and with the intent to injure and defraud, did forge, falsely make, and counterfeit a Wachovia withdrawal form, which was apparently capable of effecting a fraud, and which is as appears on the copy attached hereto as Exhibit “A” and which is hereby incorporated by reference in this indictment as if the same were fully set forth;” rejecting the defendant’s argument that the indictment was defective because it failed to allege how the defendant committed the forgery; concluding that the indictment clearly set forth all of the elements of the offense and that furthermore a copy of the withdrawal slip was attached to the indictment as an exhibit showing the date and time of day, amount of money withdrawn, account number, and particular bank branch from which the funds were withdrawn).
R. Habitual and Violent Habitual Felon

In North Carolina, being a habitual felon or a violent habitual felon is not a crime but a status, the attaining of which subjects a defendant thereafter convicted of a crime to an increased punishment. The status itself, standing alone, will not support a criminal conviction. Put another way, an indictment for habitual or violent habitual felon must be “attached” to an indictment charging a substantive offense. Focusing on the distinction between a status and a crime, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has stated that because being a habitual felon is not a substantive offense, the requirement in G.S. 15A-924(a)(5) that each element of the crime be pleaded does not apply. It went on to indicate that as a status, “the only pleading requirement is that defendant be given notice that he is being prosecuted for some substantive felony as a recidivist.”

The relevant statutes provide that the indictment charging habitual felon or violent habitual felon status shall be separate from the indictment charging the substantive felony.

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174. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 292 N.C. 431, 433-35 (1977) (“Properly construed the [habitual felon] act clearly contemplates that when one who has already attained the status of an habitual felon is indicted for the commission of another felony, that person may then be also indicted in a separate bill as being an habitual felon. It is likewise clear that the proceeding by which the state seeks to establish that defendant is an habitual felon is necessarily ancillary to a pending prosecution for the ‘principal,’ or substantive felony. The act does not authorize a proceeding independent from the prosecution of some substantive felony for the sole purpose of establishing a defendant’s status as an habitual felon.”).

175. See, e.g., id. at 435.

176. Compare id. at 436 (holding that habitual felon indictment was invalid because there was no pending felony prosecution to which the habitual felon proceeding could attach) and State v. Davis, 123 N.C. App. 240, 243-44 (1996) (trial court erred by sentencing defendant as an habitual felon after arresting judgment in all the underlying felonies for which defendant was convicted) with State v. Oakes, 113 N.C. App. 332, 339 (1994) (until judgment was entered upon defendant’s conviction of the substantive felony, there remained a pending, uncompleted felony prosecution to which a new habitual felon indictment could attach) and State v. Mewborn, 131 N.C. App. 495, 501 (1998) (after the original violent habitual felon indictment was quashed, prayer for judgment continued was entered on the substantive felony, a new indictment was issued, and defendant stood trial under that indictment as a violent habitual felon; because defendant had not yet been sentenced for the substantive felony and because the original indictment placed him on notice that he was being tried as a violent habitual felon, the subsequent indictment attached to the ongoing felony proceeding and defendant was properly tried as a violent habitual felon).


178. Id. at 698 (quotation omitted and emphasis deleted).

179. See G.S. 14-7.3 (habitual felon); 14-7.9 (violent habitual felon).
Although it has not ruled on the issue, the North Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that this language requires separate indictments. However, in State v. Young, the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld an indictment that charged the underlying felony and habitual felon in separate counts of the same indictment. Young held that G.S. 14-7.3 does not require that a habitual felon indictment be contained in a separate bill of indictment; rather it held that the statute requires merely that the indictment charging habitual felon status “be distinct, or set apart, from the charge of the underlying felony.”

The indictment for the substantive felony need not charge or refer to the habitual felon status. Nor must the habitual felon indictment allege the substantive felony. If the substantive felony is alleged in the habitual felon indictment and an error is made with regard to that allegation, the allegation will be treated as surplusage and ignored. Finally a separate habitual felon indictment is not required for each substantive felony indictment.

A number of issues have arisen regarding the timing of habitual and violent habitual felon indictments. The basic rule is that an indictment for habitual felon or violent habitual felon must be obtained before the defendant enters a plea at trial to the substantive offense. The reason for this rule is “so that defendant has notice that he [or she] will be charged as a recidivist before

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184. See, e.g., Bowens, 140 N.C. App. at 224-25.
186. See State v. Allen, 292 N.C. 431, 436 (1977); State v. Little, 126 N.C. App. 262, 269 (1997). The court of appeals has rejected the argument that the “cut off” is when a defendant enters a plea at an arraignment. State v. Cogdell, 165 N.C. App. 368 (2004). The court concluded that “the critical event . . . is the plea entered before the actual trial.” Id. at 373.
pleading to the substantive felony, thereby eliminating the possibility that he [or she] will enter a guilty plea without a full understanding of the possible consequences of conviction.”\textsuperscript{187} A habitual or violent habitual indictment may be obtained before an indictment on the substantive charge is obtained, provided there is compliance with the statutes’ notice and procedural requirements.\textsuperscript{188} Once a guilty plea has been adjudicated on a habitual felon indictment or information, that particular pleading has been “used up” and cannot support sentencing the defendant as a habitual felon on another felony; this is so even if the sentencing on the original pleading has been continued.\textsuperscript{189}

The most common challenges to habitual felon and violent habitual felon indictments are to the prior felonies alleged. G.S. 14-7.3 (charge of habitual felon), provides that indictments “must set forth the date that prior felony offenses were committed, the name of the state or other sovereign against whom said felony offenses were committed, the dates that pleas of guilty were entered to or convictions returned in said felony offenses, and the identity of the court wherein said pleas or convictions took place.” G.S. 14-7.9 (charge of violent habitual felon) contains similar although not identical language. The prior convictions are treated as elements; thus, it is error to allow the State to amend an indictment to replace an alleged prior conviction.\textsuperscript{190} Similarly, an indictment will be deemed defective if one of the alleged priors is a misdemeanor,

\begin{itemize}
\item[187.] State v. Oakes, 113 N.C. App. 332, 338 (1994). The court of appeals has deviated from the basic timing rule in two cases. However, in both cases, (1) the habitual felon indictment was obtained before the defendant entered a plea at trial and was later replaced with either a new or superseding indictment; thus there was some notice as to the charge; and (2) both cases described the defects in the initial indictment as “technical;” thus, both probably could have been corrected by amendment. See Oakes, 113 N.C. App. 332; Mewborn, 131 N.C. App. 495.
\item[188.] See State v. Blakney, 156 N.C. App. 671, 675 (2003); see also State v. Murray, 154 N.C. App. 631, 638 (2002).
\item[189.] State v. Bradley, 175 N.C. App. 234 (2005) (when the defendant pleaded guilty to two crimes and having attained habitual felon status as to each but sentencing was continued, the original habitual felon informations could not be used to support habitual felon sentencing for a subsequent felony charge).
\item[190.] State v. Little, 126 N.C. App. 262, 269-70 (1997) (the State should not have been allowed to obtain a superseding indictment which changed one of the three felony convictions listed as priors; the court concluded that a change in the prior convictions was substantive and altered an allegation pertaining to an element of the offense).
\end{itemize}
not a felony, even if defense counsel stipulates that the prior convictions were felonies.\textsuperscript{191} By contrast, the courts are lenient with regard to the statutory requirement that the indictment identify the state or other sovereign against whom the prior felonies were committed.\textsuperscript{192}

Cases dealing with date issues regarding prior convictions in these indictments are summarized above, see \textit{supra} pp. 10-11. The summaries below explore other challenges that have been asserted against the prior felony allegations in habitual felon and violent habitual felon indictments.

\textit{State v. McIlwaine}, 169 N.C. App. 397, 399-499 (2005) (habitual felon indictment alleged that the defendant had been previously convicted of three felonies including “the felony of possession with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver [S]chedule I controlled substance, in violation of N.C.G.S. [§] 90-95;” the indictment was sufficient to charge

\textsuperscript{191} State v. Moncree, __ N.C. App. __, 655 S.E.2d 464 (2008) (habitual felon indictment was defective where one of the prior crimes was classified as a misdemeanor in the state where it was committed; defense counsel’s stipulations that all of the priors were felonies did not foreclose relief on appeal).

\textsuperscript{192} State v. Montford, 137 N.C. App. 495, 500-01 (2000) (trial court did not err in allowing the State to amend the habitual felon indictment; original indictment listed three previous felonies, but did not state that they had been committed against the State of North Carolina, instead listing that they had occurred in Carteret County; State amended the indictment by inserting “in North Carolina” after each listed felony; “we need not even address the amendment issue, as we conclude that the original indictment itself was not flawed;” although the statute requires the indictment to allege the name of the state or sovereign, we have not required rigid adherence to this rule; “the name of the state need not be expressly stated if the indictment sufficiently indicates the state against whom the felonies were committed;” the original indictment sufficiently indicated the state against whom the prior felonies were committed because “State of North Carolina" explicitly appears at the top of the indictment, followed by “Carteret County,” thus, Carteret County is clearly linked with the state name); State v. Mason, 126 N.C. App. 318, 323 (1997) (indictment stated the prior assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury occurred in “Wake County, North Carolina” and that judgment was entered in Wake County Superior Court and listed voluntary manslaughter as occurring in “Wake County” and that judgment was entered in Wake County Superior Court, but did not list a state; indictment was sufficient “because the description of the assault conviction indicates Wake County is within North Carolina, and the indictment states both judgments were entered in Wake County Superior Court, we believe this, along with the dates of the offenses and convictions, is sufficient to give defendant the required notice”); State v. Young, 120 N.C. App. 456, 462 (1995) (rejecting defendant’s argument that habitual felon indictment inadequately alleged the name of the state or other sovereign against whom the prior felonies were committed); State v. Hodge, 112 N.C. App. 462, 467 (1993) (upholding indictment that alleged that the felony of common law robbery was committed in “Wake County, North Carolina,” and that the other priors were committed in “Wake County,” descriptions which were in the same sentence; the use of “Wake County” to describe the sovereignty against which the felonies were committed was clearly a reference to Wake County, North Carolina); State v. Williams, 99 N.C. App. 333, 334-35 (1990) (habitual felon indictment setting forth each of the prior felonies of which defendant was charged and convicted as being in violation of an enumerated “North Carolina General Statutes” contained a sufficient statement of the state or sovereign against whom the felonies were committed).
habitual felon even though it did not allege the specific name of the controlled substance).

_**State v. Briggs**, 137 N.C. App. 125, 130-31 (2000) (habitual felon indictment listing conviction for “felony of breaking and entering buildings in violation of N.C.G.S. 14-54” and containing the date the felony was committed, the court in which defendant was convicted, the number assigned to the case, and the date of conviction was sufficient).

_**State v. Hicks**, 125 N.C. App. 158, 160 (1997) (no error by allowing State to amend habitual felon indictment; original indictment alleged that all of the previous felony convictions were committed after the defendant reached the age of eighteen; the State amended to allege that all but one of the previous felony convictions were committed after the defendant reached the age of eighteen; the three underlying felonies remained the same).

**S. Drug Offenses**

1. **Sale or Delivery**

Indictments charging sale or delivery of a controlled substance in violation of G.S. 90-95(a)(1) must allege a controlled substance that is included in the schedules of controlled substances. Such indictments also must allege the name of the person to whom the sale or delivery was made, when that person’s name is known, or allege that the person’s name was unknown. One exception to this rule has been recognized by the court of appeals in cases

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194. _See_ State v. Bennett, 280 N.C. 167, 168-69 (1971) (an indictment for sale of a controlled substance must state the name of the person to whom the sale was made or that his or her name was unknown) (decided under prior law); State v. Calvino, 179 N.C. App. 219, 221-222 (2006) (the indictment alleged that defendant sold cocaine to “a confidential source of information” and it was undisputed that the State knew the name of the individual to whom defendant allegedly sold the cocaine in question; the indictment was fatally defective); State v. Smith, 155 N.C. App. 500, 512-13 (2002) (fatal variance in indictment alleging that defendant sold marijuana to Berger; facts were that Berger and Chadwell went to defendant’s bar to purchase marijuana; Berger waited in the car while Chadwell went into the building and purchased marijuana on their behalf; there was no substantial evidence that defendant knew he was selling marijuana to Berger); State v. Wall, 96 N.C. App. 45, 49-50 (1989); (fatal variance between indictment charging sale and delivery of cocaine to McPhatter, an undercover officer, and evidence showing that McPhatter gave Riley money to purchase cocaine, which she did; there was no substantial evidence that defendant knew Riley was acting on McPhatter’s behalf); State v. Pulliman, 78 N.C. App. 129, 131-33 (1985) (no fatal variance between indictment charging sale and delivery to Walker, an undercover officer, and evidence; evidence showed that although the sale was made to Cobb, defendant knew Cobb was buying the drugs for Walker); State v. Sealey, 41 N.C. App. 175, 176 (1979) (fatal variance between indictment charging defendant with selling dilaudid to Mills and evidence showing that defendant made the sale to Atkins); State v. Ingram, 20 N.C. App. 464, 465-66 (1974) (fatal variance between indictment charging that defendant sold to Gooche and evidence showing that the
involving middlemen. *State v. Cotton*\(^{195}\) is illustrative. In *Cotton*, the sale and delivery indictment charged that the defendant sold the controlled substance to Todd, an undercover officer. Defendant moved to dismiss on grounds of fatal variance, arguing that, at most, the evidence showed a sale from defendant to Morrow rather than to Todd. Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals noted that the State could overcome the motion by producing substantial evidence that the defendant knew the cocaine was being sold to a third party, and that the third party was named in the indictment. Turning to the facts before it, the court noted that the evidence showed that Todd accompanied Morrow to the defendant’s house and was allowed to stay in the house while Morrow and defendant had a discussion. Todd was brought upstairs with them and waited in the bedroom when they went into the bathroom. Morrow then came out and told Todd to give him the money because the defendant was paranoid, went back into the bathroom, and came out with the cocaine. The court concluded that this was substantial evidence that the defendant knew that Morrow was acting as a middleman, and that the cocaine was actually being sold to Todd.\(^{196}\) When there is insufficient evidence showing that the defendant knew that the intermediary was buying or taking delivery for the purchaser named in the indictment, a fatal variance results.\(^{197}\)

If the charge is conspiracy to sell or deliver, the person with whom the defendant conspired to sell and deliver need not be named.\(^{198}\)

2. **Possession and Possession With Intent to Manufacture, Sell or Deliver**

\(^{196}\) See also *Pulliman*, 78 N.C. App. at 131-33.
\(^{197}\) See *Wall*, 96 N.C. App. at 49-50; *Smith*, 155 N.C. App. at 512-13.
An indictment for possession of a controlled substance must identify the controlled substance allegedly possessed. However, time and place are not essential elements of the offense of unlawful possession. Indictments charging possession with intent to sell or deliver need not allege the person to whom the defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance.

For case law pertaining to drug quantity, see infra p. 61. For case law pertaining to the name of the controlled substance, see infra pp. 62-63.

3. Trafficking

An indictment charging conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances by sale or delivery is sufficient even if it does not identify the person with whom the defendant conspired to sell or deliver the controlled substance.

For case law pertaining to drug quantity in trafficking cases, see infra p. 61.

4. Maintaining a Dwelling

The specific address of the dwelling need not be alleged in an indictment charging the defendant with maintaining a dwelling.

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198. See, e.g., State v. Lorenzo, 147 N.C. App. 728, 734-35 (2001) (indictment charging conspiracy to traffic in marijuana by delivery was not defective for failing to name the person to whom defendant allegedly conspired to sell or deliver the marijuana).
200. See Bennett, 280 N.C. at 169.
202. See Lorenzo, 147 N.C. App. at 734.
203. See State v. Grady, 136 N.C. App. 394, 396-98 (2000) (no error in allowing amendment of dwelling’s address in indictment for maintaining dwelling for use of controlled substance; address changed from “919 Dollard Town Road” to “929 Dollard Town Road;” because the specific designation of the dwelling’s address need not be alleged in an indictment for this offense, the amendment did not “substantially alter the charge set forth in the
5. Drug Paraphernalia

In *State v. Moore*, an indictment charging possession of drug paraphernalia alleged that the defendant possessed “drug paraphernalia, to wit: a can designed as a smoking device.” However, none of the evidence at trial related to a can; rather, it described crack cocaine in a folded brown paper bag with a rubber band around it. After denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the trial court granted the State’s motion to amend the indictment striking “a can designed as a smoking device” and replacing it with “drug paraphernalia, to wit: a brown paper container.” The court of appeals held that because this change constituted a substantial alteration of the indictment, it was impermissible and the motion to dismiss should have been granted. It reasoned: “As common household items and substances may be classified as drug paraphernalia when considered in the light of other evidence, in order to mount a defense to the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia, a defendant must be apprised of the item or substance the State categorizes as drug paraphernalia.” Without citing Moore, a later case held that no plain error occurred when the indictment charged the defendant with possessing “drug paraphernalia, SCALES FOR PACKAGING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,” but the trial court instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty if it concluded that he knowingly possessed drug paraphernalia, without mentioning scales or packaging.

6. Obtaining Controlled Substance by Fraud or Forgery

Cases involving challenges to indictments charging obtaining a controlled substance by forgery are annotated below.

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When the amount of the controlled substance is an essential element of the offense, it must be properly alleged in the indictment. Amount is an essential element with felonious possession of marijuana, felonious possession of hashish, and trafficking in controlled substances. Quantity is not an element of an offense under 90-95(a)(1).

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206. See State v. Partridge, 157 N.C. App. 568, 570-71 (2003) (indictment charging felonious possession of marijuana was defective because it did not state drug quantity; the weight of the marijuana is an essential element of this offense); State v. Perry, 84 N.C. App. 309, 311 (1987) (the elements of felony possession were set out with sufficient clarity in indictment that specifically mentioned drug quantity).


208. See State v. Outlaw, 159 N.C. App. 423 (trafficking indictment that failed to allege weight of cocaine was invalid) (citing State v. Epps, 95 N.C. App. 173 (1989)); State v. Trejo, 163 N.C. App. 512 (2004) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the indictments charging him with trafficking in marijuana by possession and trafficking in marijuana by transportation were fatally defective because each failed to correctly specify the quantity of marijuana necessary for conviction; indictment charging trafficking in marijuana by possession alleged that defendant “possess[ed] 10 pounds or more but less than 50 pounds” of marijuana; the indictment charging defendant with trafficking in marijuana by transportation alleged that defendant “transport[ed] 10 pounds or more but less than 50 pounds” of marijuana; indictments, although overbroad, did allege the required amount of marijuana; fact that
8. Drug Name

When the identity of the controlled substance is an element of the offense, the indictment must allege a substance that is included in the schedules of controlled substances. Thus, when an indictment alleged that the defendant possessed “Methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA), a controlled substance included in Schedule I,” and no such controlled substance by that name is listed in Schedule I, the indictment was defective. Similarly, an indictment identified the controlled substance that allegedly possessed, sold and delivered as “methylenedioxymethamphetamine a controlled substance which is included in Schedule I of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act” was defective because although 3, 4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine was listed in Schedule I, methylenedioxymethamphetamine was not. Notwithstanding this, at least one case has held that controlled substance indictments will not be found defective for minor errors in identifying the relevant controlled substance, such as challenged indictments were drafted to include the possibility that defendant possessed and transported exactly ten pounds of marijuana (which does not constitute trafficking in marijuana) does not invalidate the indictments; Epps, 95 N.C. App. at 175-76 (quashing conspiracy to traffic in cocaine indictment for failure to refer to amount of cocaine); State v. Keyes, 87 N.C. App. 349, 358-59 (1987) (although statute makes it a trafficking felony to possess “four grams or more, but less than 14 grams” of heroin, the indictment charged possession of “more than four but less than fourteen grams of heroin;” distinguishing Goforth, discussed below, and holding that variance was not fatal; the indictment excludes from criminal prosecution the possession of exactly four grams, whereas the statute includes the possession of exactly four grams; the indictment, while limiting the scope of defendant’s liability, is clearly within the confines of the statute); State v. Goforth, 65 N.C. App. 302, 305 (1983) (applying prior law that criminalized trafficking in marijuana at weights of in excess of 50 pounds and holding that indictment charging conspiracy to traffic “in at least 50 pounds” of marijuana was defective). But see Epps, 95 N.C. App. 176-77 (affirming trafficking by sale conviction even though relevant count in indictment did not allege a drug quantity; defendant was charged in a two-count indictment, count one charged trafficking by possession of a specified amount of cocaine and count two charged trafficking by sale but did not state an amount; the two counts, when read together, informed defendant that he was being charged with trafficking by sale).

209. See State v. Hyatt, 98 N.C. App. 214, 216 (1990) (“while the quantity of drugs seized is evidence of the intent to sell, ‘it is not an element of the offense’”); Peoples, 65 N.C. App. at 169 (same).
210. See, e.g., supra pp. 57, 59.
212. Ledwell, 171 N.C. App. at 331-33.
213. Ahmadi-Turshizi, 175 N.C. App. at 785-86.
as “cocoa” instead of cocaine,\textsuperscript{214} cocaine instead of a mixture containing cocaine,\textsuperscript{215} and the use of a trade name instead of a chemical name.\textsuperscript{216}

\textbf{T. Weapons Offenses and Firearm Enhancement}

Several cases addressing indictment issues with regard to weapons offenses and the firearm enhancement in G.S. 15A-1340.16A are annotated below.

\textbf{1. Shooting into Occupied Property}

\textit{State v. Pickens}, 346 N.C. 628, 645-46 (1997) (no fatal variance between indictment alleging that defendant fired into an occupied dwelling with a shotgun, and evidence establishing that the shot came from a handgun; the essential element of the offense is “to discharge ... [a] firearm;” indictment alleging that defendant discharged “a shotgun, a firearm” alleged that element and the averment to the shotgun was not necessary, making it mere surplusage in the indictment).

\textit{State v. Cockerham}, 155 N.C. App. 729, 735-36 (2003) (indictment charging shooting into occupied property was not defective for failing to allege that defendant fired into a “building, structure or enclosure;” indictment alleged defendant shot into an “apartment” and as such was sufficient; an indictment which avers facts constituting every element of the offense need not be couched in the language of the statute).

\textit{State v. Bland}, 34 N.C. App. 384, 385 (1977) (no fatal variance between indictment alleging that defendant shot into an occupied building and evidence showing that he shot into an occupied trailer; indictment specifically noted that the occupied building was located at 5313 Park Avenue, the address of the trailer).

\textit{State v. Walker}, 34 N.C. App. 271, 272-74 (1977) (indictment not defective for failing to allege that the defendant knew or should have known that the trailer was occupied by one or more persons).


\textsuperscript{215} \textit{State v. Tyndall}, 55 N.C. App. 57, 61-62 (1981) (although the indictment alleged that defendant sold cocaine rather than a mixture containing cocaine, this was not a fatal variance).

\textsuperscript{216} \textit{State v. Newton}, 21 N.C. App. 384, 385-86 (1974) (no fatal variance between indictment charging that defendant possessed Desoxyn and evidence that showed defendant possessed methamphetamine; Desoxyn is a trade name for methamphetamine hydrochloride).
2. Possession of Firearm by Felon

G.S. 14-415.1 makes it a crime for a felon to possess a firearm or weapon of mass destruction. G.S. 14-415.1(c) provides that an indictment charging a defendant with this crime “shall be separate from any indictment charging him with other offenses related to or giving rise to a charge under this section.” It further provides that the indictment must set forth the date that the prior offense was committed, the type of offense and the penalty therefore, and the date that the defendant was convicted or plead guilty to such offense, the identity of the court in which the conviction or plea of guilty took place and the verdict and judgment rendered therein.

The court of appeals has held that the statutory requirement that the indictment state the conviction date for the prior offense is directory and not mandatory.217 Thus, it concluded that failure to allege the date of the prior conviction did not render an indictment defective.218 Also, State v. Boston,219 rejected a defendant’s claim that an indictment for this offense was fatally defective because it failed to state the statutory penalty for the prior felony conviction. The court held that “the provision . . . that requires the indictment to state the penalty for the prior offense is not material and does not affect a substantial right,” that the defendant was apprised of the relevant conduct, and “[t]o hold otherwise would permit form to prevail over substance.” Other relevant cases are summarized below.

Cases Finding a Fatal Defect or Variance/Error With Respect to an Amendment

State v. Langley, 173 N.C. App. 194, 196-99 (2005) (in conviction under a prior version of G.S. 14-415.1, the court held that there was a fatal variance where the indictment charged that the defendant was in possession of a handgun and the State’s evidence at

218. Id. at 571.
trial tended to show that defendant possessed a firearm with barrel length less than 18 inches and overall length less than 26 inches, a sawed-off shotgun). 220

Finding No Fatal Defect or Variance/No Error With Respect to an Amendment

State v. Coltrane, __ N.C. App. __, 656 S.E.2d 322 (2008) (the trial court did not err by allowing the State to amend the allegation that the defendant’s underlying felony conviction occurred in Montgomery County Superior Court to state that it occurred in Guilford County Superior Court; the indictment correctly identified all of the other allegations required by G.S. 14-415.1(c).

State v. Bishop, 119 N.C. App. 695, 698-99 (1995) (indictment was not invalid for failing to allege (1) that possession of the firearm was away from defendant’s home or business; (2) that defendant’s prior Florida felony was “substantially similar” to a particular North Carolina crime; and (3) to which North Carolina statute the Florida conviction was similar; omission of the situs of the offense was not an error because situs is an exception to the offense, not an essential element; omission of a statement that the Florida felony was “substantially similar” to a particular North Carolina crime was not an error because the indictment gave sufficient notice of the offense charged; the indictment clearly described the felony committed in Florida, satisfying the requirements of G.S. 14-415.1(b)(3) and properly charging defendant with possession of firearms by a felon).

State v. Riggs, 79 N.C. App. 398, 402 (1986) (indictment charging that defendant possessed “a Charter Arms .38 caliber pistol, which is a handgun” was not invalid for failing to allege the length of the pistol).

3. Possession of Weapon of Mass Destruction

State v. Blackwell, 163 N.C. App. 12 (2004) (no fatal variance between indictment charging possession of weapon of mass destruction that alleged possession of “a Stevens 12 gauge single-shot shotgun” and evidence at trial that shotgun was manufactured by Jay Stevens Arms; even if there was no evidence that the shotgun was a “Stevens” shotgun, there would be no fatal variance because “any person of common understanding would have understood that he was charged with possessing the sawed-off shotgun that he used to shoot the victim).

4. Firearm Enhancement

G.S. 15A-1340.16A provides for an enhanced sentence if the defendant is convicted of a felony falling within one of the specified classes and the defendant used, displayed, or threatened

220. At the time, the prior version of the statute made it a crime for a felon to possess “any handgun or other firearm with a barrel length of less than 18 inches or an overall length of less than 26 inches, or any weapon of mass destruction as defined by G.S. 14-288.8(c).” G.S. 14-415.1(a) (2003).
to use or display a firearm during commission of the felony. The statute provides that an indictment is sufficient if it alleges that “the defendant committed the felony by using, displaying, or threatening the use or display of a firearm and the defendant actually possessed the firearm about the defendant’s person.”

U. Motor Vehicle Offenses

1. Impaired Driving

G.S. 20-138.1(c) and 20-138.2(c) allow short form pleadings for impaired driving and impaired driving in a commercial vehicle respectively. For a discussion of the implications of Blakely v. Washington, on these offenses, see supra p. 21. A case dealing with an allegation regarding the location of an impaired driving offense is summarized below.

_State v. Snyder_, 343 N.C. 61, 65-68 (1996) (indictment alleged that offense occurred on a street or highway; trial judge properly permitted the State to amend the indictment to read “on a highway or public vehicular area;” although the _situs_ of the impaired driving offense is an essential element, the indictment simply needs to contain an allegation of _a situs_ covered by the statute and no greater specificity is required; change in this case merely a refinement in the description of the type of _situs_ on which the defendant was driving rather than a change in an essential element of the offense).

2. Habitual Impaired Driving

Under the current version of the habitual impaired driving statute, this offense is committed when a person drives while impaired and has three or more convictions involving impaired driving within the last ten years. Under an earlier version of the statute, the “look-back period” for prior convictions was only seven years. At least one case has held, in connection with a prosecution under the prior version of the statute, that it was error to allow the State to amend a

221. G.S. 15A-1340.16A(d).
223. G.S. 20-138.5.
habitual impaired driving indictment to correct the date of a prior conviction and thereby bringing it within the seven-year look-back period.\textsuperscript{224} Indictments charging habitual impaired driving must conform to G.S. 15A-928. Cases on point are summarized below.


\textit{State v. Lobohe,} 143 N.C. App. 555, 557-59 (2001) (indictment which alleged in one count the elements of impaired driving and in a second count the previous convictions elevating the offense to habitual impaired driving properly alleged habitual impaired driving) (citing G.S. 15A-928(b)).

\textit{State v. Baldwin,} 117 N.C. App. 713, 715-16 (1995) (indictment alleged the essential elements of habitual impaired driving; contrary to defendant’s claim, it alleged that defendant had been previously convicted of three impaired driving offenses).

\textbf{3. Speeding to Elude Arrest}

G.S. 20-141.5 makes it a misdemeanor to operate a motor vehicle while fleeing or attempted to elude a law enforcement officer who is in lawful performance of his or her duties. The crime is elevated to a felony if two or more specified aggravating factors are present, or if he violation is the proximate cause of death.

An indictment for this crime need not allege the lawful duties the officer was performing.\textsuperscript{225} When the charge is felony speeding to elude arrest based on the presence of aggravating factors, the indictment is sufficient if it charges those aggravating factors by tracking the statutory language.\textsuperscript{226} Thus, when the aggravating factor is “reckless driving proscribed by

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{224} State v. Winslow, 360 N.C. 161 (2005).
  \item \textsuperscript{225} State v. Teel, 180 N.C. App. 446, 448-49 (2006).
  \item \textsuperscript{226} State v. Stokes, 174 N.C. App. 447, 451-52 (2005) (indictment properly charged this crime when it alleged that the defendant unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did operate a motor vehicle on a highway, Interstate 40, while attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, T.D. Dell of the Greensboro Police Department, in the lawful performance of the officer’s duties, stopping the defendant’s vehicle for various motor vehicle offenses, and that at the time of the violation: (1) the defendant was speeding in excess of 15 miles per hour over the legal speed limit; (2) the defendant was driving recklessly in violation of G.S. 20-140; and (3) there was gross impairment of the
\end{itemize}
G.S. 20-140,‖ the indictment need not allege all of the elements of reckless driving. However, when the aggravating factor felony version of this offense is charged, the aggravating factors are essential elements of the crime and it is error to allow the State to amend the indictment to add an aggravating factor.

4. Driving While License Revoked

In State v. Scott, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that an indictment for driving while license revoked was defective because it failed to list the element of notice of suspension. Acknowledging that proof of actual or constructive notice is required for a conviction, the court held that “it is not necessary to charge on knowledge of revocation when unchallenged evidence shows that the State has complied with the provisions for giving notice of revocation.

V. General Crimes

1. Attempt

An indictment charging a completed offense is sufficient to support a conviction for an attempt to commit the offense. This is true even though the completed crime and the attempt are not in the same statute. G.S. 15-144, the statute authorizing use of short-form indictment
for homicide, authorizes the use of the short-form indictment to charge attempted first-degree murder.234

2. Solicitation

In solicitation indictments, “it is not necessary to allege with technical precision the nature of the solicitation.”235

3. Conspiracy

For the law regarding conspiracy to sell or deliver controlled substances indictments, see supra p. 58. For cases pertaining to allegations regarding the date of a conspiracy offense, see supra p. 10.

Conspiracy indictments “need not describe the subject crime with legal and technical accuracy because the charge is the crime of conspiracy and not a charge of committing the subject crime.”236 Thus, the court of appeals has upheld a conspiracy indictment that alleged an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act and contained allegations regarding their purpose, in that case to “feloniously forge, falsely make and counterfeit a check.”237 The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the indictment should have been quashed for failure to specifically allege the forgery of an identified instrument.238


235. State v. Furr, 292 N.C. 711, 722 (1977) (holding “indictment alleging defendant solicited another to murder is sufficient to take the case to the jury upon proof of solicitation to find someone else to commit murder, at least where there is nothing to indicate defendant insisted that someone other than the solicitee commit the substantive crime which is his object”).

236. State v. Nicholson, 78 N.C. App. 398, 401 (1985) (rejecting defendant’s argument that conspiracy to commit forgery indictment was fatally defective because it “failed to allege specifically the forgery of an identified instrument”).

237. Id.

238. See id.
4. Accessory After the Fact to Felony

Accessory after the fact to a felony is not a lesser included offense of the principal felony. This suggests that an indictment charging only the principal felony will be insufficient to convict for accessory after the fact.

W. Participants in Crime

An indictment charging a substantive offense need not allege the theory of acting in concert, aiding or abetting, or accessory before the fact. Thus, the short-form murder indictment is sufficient to convict under a theory of aiding and abetting. Because allegations regarding these theories are treated as “irrelevant and surplusage,” the fact that an indictment alleges one such theory does not preclude the trial judge from instructing the jury that it may convict on another such theory not alleged, or as a principal.

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240. Compare infra n. x & accompanying text (discussing accessory before the fact). For a case allowing amendment of an accessory after the fact indictment, see State v. Carrington, 35 N.C. App. 53, 56-58 (1978) (indictments charged defendant with being an accessory after the fact to Arthur Parrish and an unknown black male in the murder and armed robbery of a named victim; trial court did not err by allowing amendment of the indictments to remove mention of Parrish, who had earlier been acquitted).
242. See State v. Ainsworth, 109 N.C. App. 136, 143 (1993) (rejecting defendant’s argument that first degree rape indictment was insufficient because it failed to charge her explicitly with aiding and abetting); State v. Ferree, 54 N.C. App. 183, 184 (1981) (“[A] person who aids or abets another in the commission of armed robbery is guilty … and it is not necessary that the indictment charge the defendant with aiding and abetting.”); State v. Lancaster, 37 N.C. App. 528, 532-33 (1978).
243. See G.S. 14-5.2 (“All distinctions between accessories before the fact and principals … are abolished.”); Westbrook, 345 N.C. at 58 (1996) (indictment charging murder need not allege accessory before the fact); State v. Gallagher, 313 N.C. 132, 141 (1985) (indictment charging the principal felony will support trial and conviction as an accessory before the fact).
246. Estes, ___ N.C. App. ___, 651 S.E.2d 598 (trial judge could charge the jury on the theory of aiding and abetting even though indictment charged acting in concert).
247. State v. Fuller, 179 N.C. App. 61, 66-67 (2006) (where superseding indictment charged the defendant only with aiding and abetting indecent liberties, the trial judge did not err in charging the jury that it could convict if the defendant was an aider or abettor or a principal).