One Trial Judge Overruling Another

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This bulletin was previously posted as a paper on the School of Government’s Judicial Authority and Administration microsite in April 2014. For archival purposes, the paper has been converted to an article in the Administration of Justice Bulletin series.

I. General rule
The general rule is that one trial judge may not modify or overrule an order entered by another trial judge on a matter of law. If the order is about a matter of discretion rather than a matter of law, the second judge may modify it, but only if there has been a substantial change in circumstances.

There are exceptions to the general rule. In a few circumstances a statute or rule specifically authorizes modification of an earlier order. Also, some matters of trial procedure are left to the discretion of the trial judge regardless of any earlier rulings by other judges. Those exceptions are discussed below.

II. Typical statements of the rule
A. “‘The power of one judge of the superior court is equal to and coordinate with another.’ Michigan Nat’l Bank v. Hanner, 268 N.C. 668, 670, 151 S.E.2d 579, 580 (1966). Accordingly, it is well established in our jurisprudence that no appeal lies from one Superior Court judge to another; that one Superior Court judge may not correct another’s errors of law; and that ordinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another Superior Court judge previously made in the same action. Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 501, 189 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1972).” State v. Woolridge, 357 N.C. 544, 549 (2003).

B. “One superior court judge may only modify, overrule or change the order of another superior court judge where the original order was (1) interlocutory, (2) discretionary, and (3) there has been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the prior order. Stone v. Martin, 69 N.C. App. 650, 652, 318 S.E.2d 108, 110 (1984). A substantial

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change in circumstances exists if since the entry of the prior order, there has been an ‘intervention of new facts which bear upon the propriety’ of the previous order. See Calloway v. Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 505, 189 S.E.2d 484, 490 (1972),” First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Coverage Inc., 154 N.C. App. 504, 507 (2002).

III. The rule is relevant only to interlocutory orders
A. Because final orders are subject to appeal and the trial judge loses jurisdiction once the matter is appealed, the rule about one trial judge overruling another generally is relevant only when the order is interlocutory and still subject to trial court jurisdiction.
B. An interlocutory order is an order that does not finally resolve all issues in controversy. There are still matters to be decided by the trial court.
C. Generally, appeal is the means to correct or overrule a final order, and once a final order is appealed the trial court loses jurisdiction to act further in the case. Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co., 292 N.C. 633 (1977).
D. If an interlocutory order affects a substantial right, it may be appealed immediately. G.S. 1-277, 7A-27(d); Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 133 N.C. App. 408 (1999), rev’d on other grounds, 351 N.C. 458 (2000). Upon appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction to act further, just as with a final order.
E. There are instances in which a trial court may modify a final order.
   1. In a civil case, the court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for the reasons stated in Rule 60(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion under Rule 60(b) may be heard by a different judge than the one who entered the judgment or order. Duplin Cnty. DSS ex rel. Pulley v. Frazier, ___ N.C. App. ___, 751 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2013).
   2. In a civil case tried without a jury a judgment may be later modified by the trial court through a motion under Rule 59(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for a new trial. However, a motion under Rule 59 must be heard by the same judge who entered the original judgment. Sisk v. Sisk, 221 N.C. App. 631, 633 (2012); Gemini Drilling & Found., LLC v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 192 N.C. App. 376 (2008).
   3. In a criminal case, G.S. 15A-1420 provides for a motion for appropriate relief.

IV. The rule is applicable to district court and the Court of Appeals as well as superior court
V. If the legal issue is the same, it does not matter that the motion heard by
the second judge is different than the one decided by the first judge

A. The second judge’s decision on summary judgment was void because it was based on
the same legal issue as the first judge’s decision denying a motion to dismiss. Adkins v.
differed, the linchpin legal issue for each was whether the dismissed public employee
had been speaking on a matter of public concern so as to raise First Amendment
protections.

B. A second judge’s order of summary judgment in a medical malpractice case was void
because, even though the judge said he was not overruling the first judge, the legal
issue being determined—whether negligence might be established by *res ipsa loquitur*
and thus avoid the need to have the pleadings reviewed by an expert—was the same as
decided by the first judge in denying a motion to dismiss. Robinson v. Duke Univ. Health

VI. Examples of matters of law on which a second trial judge could
not overrule or modify an order of a previous judge

A. Motion to suppress evidence (although the prosecutor presented a different legal theory
for admission of the evidence in the second hearing the legal issue was the same). State

B. Decision on whether a statute authorizes an award of attorney’s fees. Able Outdoor, Inc.

(1986).

D. Dismissal of case for failure to complete service. Bumgardner v. Bumgardner, 113 N.C.

E. Whether caregivers were entitled to payments from trust after beneficiary’s death. Shelf

VII. Examples of matters of law in which the legal issue presented
to the second judge was different than the issue decided by the
first judge, and thus the second judge was free to act

A. A motion for permissive intervention was proper following the first judge’s decision to
dismiss the parties from the lawsuit for lack of standing. Bruggeman v. Meditrust Co.,

B. A motion for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages in a medical mal-
practice case was proper following the first judge’s denial of summary judgment on
negligence, because the damages issues had not been presented in the first motion. Fox
VIII. Examples of matters of discretion for which a second trial judge could overrule or modify the order of a previous judge upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances

A. Motion for special jury venire. State v. Duvall, 304 N.C. 557 (1981) (but the prosecutor failed to show a substantial change in circumstances from the time of the earlier ruling).

B. Motion to amend answer. Madry v. Madry, 106 N.C. App. 34 (1992) (summary judgment should not have been allowed when the motion was based on the same facts as the previously denied motion to amend and there was no change in circumstances shown).


D. Sealing of documents in a domestic case. France v. France, 224 N.C. App. 570, 580 (2012) (the change in circumstance justifying the second judge's unsealing of documents was the appellate ruling that the courtroom had to be opened for proceedings in case).

E. Motion to compel discovery (but second judge made no finding of change in circumstance). Crook v. KRC Mgmt. Corp., 206 N.C. App 179 (2010).

IX. Second motions for summary judgment

A. A decision on summary judgment is a decision on a matter of law and may not be overruled by a second trial judge on the same legal issue. Taylorsville Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Keen, 110 N.C. App. 784 (1993).

1. A second motion for summary judgment on punitive damages could not be considered because the same legal issue was presented in the first motion. Carr v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 49 N.C. App. 631 (1980).

2. A motion for summary judgment under G.S. 99B-3, the statute exempting manufacturers from liability when the product was improperly modified or used, could not be considered by a second judge after the first judge had denied the manufacturer summary judgment based on contributory negligence. The manufacturer had asserted that the child victim was contributorily negligent for engaging in “horse-play” in use of the gate and fence. The contributory negligence legal argument thus was essentially the same as the legal argument in the second motion. Hastings ex rel. Pratt v. Seegars Fence Co., 128 N.C. App. 166 (1997).


C. The rule is the same even if the second motion for summary judgment is made by a different party. If the legal issue in the second motion for summary judgment is essentially the same as in the first motion, the second judge may not consider the motion, regardless of who made each motion. Cail v. Cerwin, 185 N.C. App. 176 (2007).
D. A second motion for summary judgment, however, may involve a different legal issue and if it does, it may be considered by a second judge.

1. Denial of summary judgment on the issue of absence of negligence in a medical malpractice case could not be reconsidered in a second motion for summary judgment, but the issue of punitive damages could be considered because it was not presented in the first motion. Fox v. Green, 161 N.C. App. 460 (2003).

X. Examples of statutes and rules authorizing a second judge to modify a previous order or action


B. As mentioned above, Rule 60(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a grant of relief from a judgment for the reasons stated in the rule.


D. As mentioned above, G.S. 15A-1420 provides for motions for appropriate relief in criminal cases.

XI. Jurisdiction may be raised at any time

A. Because standing is an aspect of subject matter jurisdiction, it may be raised at any time; thus a second trial judge could consider a motion for summary judgment based on lack of standing even though the first judge denied a motion to dismiss based on the same issue. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline v. Calco Enterprises, 132 N.C. App. 237, 241 (1999).

XII. Some procedural decisions are within the discretion of the trial judge regardless of previous orders by another judge

A. The judge presiding at trial could decide to deny individual voir dire of prospective jurors in a capital case even though another judge had earlier stated in a pretrial order that individual voir dire would be allowed. The rule of one judge overruling another does not apply to interlocutory orders which affect the procedure and conduct of trial; those remain subject to the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Stokes, 308 N.C. 634 (1983).

B. It is within the discretion of the judge presiding at trial whether to consolidate for trial actions that involve common questions of law and fact. Oxendine v. Catawba Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 303 N.C. 699 (1981).
XIII. Evidentiary rulings before mistrial not ending in later trial
   A. An evidentiary ruling by the first judge in the first trial are not binding on the new judge in the second trial when a mistrial is declared in the first trial. State v. Harris, 198 N.C. App. 371 (2009).

XIV. A second judge is not bound by an earlier judge's order that is void
   A. If the first judge's order is void ab initio because the first judge did not have jurisdiction to enter the order, then the order is a nullity and may be ignored by a second judge. State v. Sams, 317 N.C. 230 (1986).
   B. If the first judge had jurisdiction to enter an order, even though it is incorrect as a matter of law, the order is merely voidable and remains in effect and must be honored by the second judge until voided by direct challenge to its validity. Able Outdoor, Inc. v. Harrelson, 341 N.C. 167 (1995); State v. Sams, 317 N.C. 230 (1986).