This post summarizes the published opinions in criminal cases issued by the North Carolina Court of Appeals on May 6, 2026.
The trial court properly revoked the defendant’s probation for absconding despite erroneously checking box 4 on the probation revocation judgment.
State v. Mayfield, No. COA25-1023 (N.C. Ct. App. May 6, 2026) (Iredell County). The defendant was on probation for a felony hit and run. His probation officer alleged multiple violations of probation: two counts of absconding, failure to complete special probation, failure to report to his probation officer, and a positive drug screen. After a probation violation hearing, the trial court orally stated that the defendant violated probation and revoked the defendant’s probation, “specifically [for] both counts of absconding.” However, the court’s written findings indicated that the court found all four alleged violations and the court checked box 4 on the form indicating that “each violation [was], in and of itself, a sufficient basis upon which [to] revoke probation.” On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that written finding 4 was erroneous to the extent that it indicated that the non-absconding violations were, in and of themselves, a sufficient basis to revoke probation. However, because the court was able to ascertain from the record that the trial court properly weighed the violations and revoked probation based on absconding, it affirmed the trial court’s judgment revoking probation. The court noted that checking box 4 when there are violations other than a new criminal offense or absconding has become a repetitive error, and admonished the trial courts to be mindful of the limited grounds on which a defendant’s probation may be revoked.
(1) G.S. 14-318.5 is not unconstitutionally vague; (2) G.S. 14-318.5 does not impermissibly compel self-incrimination; (3) there was sufficient evidence that the defendant had knowledge that the child was missing; (4) the defendant failed to show any prejudice stemming from the exclusion of a text message on hearsay and relevancy grounds.
State v. Palmiter, No. COA25-338 (N.C. Ct. App. May 6, 2026) (Mecklenburg County). The defendant was charged with failure to report the disappearance of a child under G.S. 14-318.5. The child—missing since November 2022—was the young daughter of the defendant’s partner Diana, who moved to the United States from Moldova after meeting the defendant on an online dating website. When school counselors noticed the child absent from school in late 2022, they initiated a truancy investigation that eventually led to criminal charges for both the defendant and Diana. Diana—whose behavior was erratic in the time period before the child’s disappearance, and who shared limited and seemingly misleading information with the defendant about the child’s whereabouts—pled guilty. The defendant went to trial.
At trial, the defendant testified that he did not report the child as missing because he had no reason to think she was; Diana, who was the child’s biological mother and primary caregiver, spoke of the child as though she were in the house and texted the defendant as if she were with the child. When the defendant received messages from the school in late 2022 indicating the child’s absence, Diana told him the child was sick in her room. In early December 2022, Diana told the defendant she was taking the child hiking in the mountains. Nevertheless, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to probation.
The defendant made four arguments on appeal. First, he argued that G.S. 14-318.5 is unconstitutional in that it is vague. In support that argument, the defendant raised a series of hypotheticals involving temporary caregivers and babysitters to demonstrate how a literal interpretation of the statute could lead to absurd results. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, concluding in light of Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), and related cases that a defendant whose conduct is clearly proscribed by a statute cannot succeed on a facial vagueness challenge by reference to hypotheticals that would fall on the margins of the law’s coverage. Though not the child’s biological parent, he clearly fell under the definition of “other person providing care to or supervision of a child,” as he was listed on her school forms and provided for insurance, food, and other necessities. Therefore, the law was not vague as applied to him.
Second, the defendant argued that G.S. 14-318.5 is unconstitutional in that it impermissibly compels self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals again disagreed. Though the statute compels testimonial disclosures that could aid in a criminal prosecution, the court concluded that it is not targeted at inherently criminal activity, and that the concern about self-incrimination is outweighed by the strong policy in favor of protecting minors.
Third, the defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that he violated G.S. 14-318.5 in that he did not knowingly fail to disclose the disappearance of a child. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, concluding that even in light of the defendant’s travel and work schedule and Diana’s erratic behavior and representations about the child’s whereabouts, a reasonable person might accept that the defendant had sufficient information to know that the child was missing and failed to report it.
Finally, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by excluding on hearsay and relevancy grounds evidence of a text message between Diana and her cousin indicating that the child was with Diana during a time where the child was alleged to be missing. The Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the argument, concluding that the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice in light of other admitted evidence.
Finding no error, the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction.
(1) The sentence rendered in open court impermissibly differed from the written judgment entered outside of the defendant’s presence; (2) there was insufficient evidence for one of the defendant’s eight convictions.
State v. Horne, No. COA25-655 (N.C. Ct. App. May 6, 2026) (Guilford County). The defendant was convicted at a jury trial of eight counts of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle in operation inflicting serious bodily injury. The convictions arose from an incident where the defendant and another man fired multiple shots at an SUV, whose occupant testified to being shot “maybe seven” times. At sentencing, the trial court orally pronounced, “We are going to consolidate the charges into the first three counts. Those are all Class C felonies. . . . Each sentence is going to be for the same. They are all going to be consecutive sentences. I sentence the defendant to 58 months minimum, 82 months maximum.” The same day, the court signed six written judgments, each imposing a consecutive active term of 58 to 82 months.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by entering written judgments that did not reflect the sentence orally pronounced in open court. In light of the large disparity between the judgment seemingly rendered in open court and the written judgment entered outside of the presence of the defendant, the Court of Appeals agreed, vacating the sentence and remanding the matter for entry of a new sentencing judgment.
The defendant also argued that there was insufficient evidence for two of the eight convictions for discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle in operation inflicting serious injury. Though there were eight bullet holes in the victim’s car, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial testimony supported only seven instances of violations resulting in serious bodily injury. The court remedied the error by “arrest[ing] judgment” on one of the defendant’s eight convictions.
(1) The defendant was not prejudiced by an alleged error in the exclusion of an investigatory report; (2) a DSS report stemming from an allegation by an unknown person lacked sufficient trustworthiness to be admissible under the public records hearsay exception of Rule 803(8).
State v. Alcantar-Conrado, No. COA25-515 (N.C. Ct. App. May 6, 2026) (New Hanover County). The defendant was convicted at a jury trial of statutory rape of a child by an adult, statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult, incest, and indecent liberties with a child based on sexual assaults of a five-year-old victim. Investigation of the case began when the victim was diagnosed with a sexually transmitted infection at a doctor’s appointment. Based on that diagnosis, DSS workers interviewed the victim and her 10-year-old stepsister. At trial, the defendant attempted to introduce statements from the victim’s stepsister alleging that the victim’s mother had been “coaching” the victim, arguing that the statements were admissible under Rule 803(4). But the trial court excluded the report. The clinical therapist also testified at trial that there was no indication the victim had been coached. The trial court also excluded as inadmissible hearsay evidence of another allegation of sexual abuse involving the victim from an unknown person.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by excluding the victim’s sister’s statements regarding coaching, as they fell within the medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay exception. The Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant failed to show how the exclusion of any details of the purported coaching in that report would differ from other testimony about coaching offered at trial—which, if anything, indicated that the victim’s mother was trying to coach the victim out of implicating the defendant, not coaching her into implicating him. Because the defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the alleged error, the court dismissed the argument without ruling on the report’s admissibility.
The defendant also argued the later DSS report by an unknown person was admissible at trial under Rule 803(8), the public records hearsay exception. However, the court concluded that Rule 803(8) did not apply to a report from an unknown person that lacked any guarantees of trustworthiness, and the trial court therefore did not err by excluding it.
In the absence of any error, the defendant’s convictions were affirmed.
Assault on a female is a general intent crime, and the State need not prove that the defendant specifically intended to assault a female victim.
State v. Horton, No. COA25-888 (N.C. Ct. App. May 6, 2026) (Guilford County). The defendant contacted a locksmith to create a key for his vehicle. When he met the locksmith to get the key, he sprayed pepper spray and took the key without paying. The pepper spray hit the locksmith and the locksmith’s young daughter, who was in his truck. The defendant was convicted at a jury trial of common law robbery and assault on a female. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the assault on a female charge because he did not know anyone other than the locksmith was in the truck. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that assault on a female is a general intent crime, and the State need not prove that the defendant acted with the specific intent to assault a female victim, only that he intended to spray someone. The defendant’s conviction was therefore affirmed.
(1) Admission of a nurse’s testimony and unredacted medical examination report did not amount to plain error; (2) the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. Huff, No. COA25-912 (N.C. Ct. App. May 6, 2026) (Yancey County). The 20-year-old defendant invited a 13-year-old girl to his house and had sex with her. He was convicted at a jury trial of statutory rape and contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence certain testimony of a nurse and an unredacted version of the nurse’s child medical examination (CME). Because the defendant did not object to either the testimony or the report at trial, the Court of Appeals reviewed for plain error.
As to the nurse’s trial testimony, she never expressly stated that the victim had, in fact, been abused. Rather, she said that the child’s medical history and presentment were “consistent with sexual abuse.” Because the nurse’s testimony was based on both the child’s story and changes in her behavior, the court concluded that the trial court did not err in allowing it. And in any event, applying the three-element test for plain error from State v. Reber, 386 N.C. 153 (2024), any purported error did not rise to plain error when the defendant failed to demonstrate how it would have had a probable impact on the jury’s verdict.
As to the CME report, the defendant argued on appeal that portions expressing the nurse’s belief that the victim had suffered sexual abuse should have been redacted. The Court of Appeals again concluded that the defendant failed to demonstrate plain error under Reber. The 34-page report contained only one statement from the nurse that she believed the victim was sexually abused. Given the overall length of the report and the fact that the jury returned a verdict in under an hour, the defendant did not show that the error was “fundamental,” or that it had a probable impact on the jury’s verdict.
Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the unredacted CME report. The court reasoned that the lawyer’s decision not to object may have been a matter of trial strategy, and that in any event the defendant failed to show a reasonable probability under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), that the outcome would have been different had his lawyer objected.
(1) There was a sufficiently distinct interruption between the defendant’s attacks to support three assaults; (2) the trial court did not err by sentencing multiple assaults; (3) there was sufficient evidence of serious injury and sufficient evidence that the defendant’s hands and feet could be considered deadly weapons.
State v. Smith, No. COA25-791 (N.C. Ct. App. May 6, 2026) (Mecklenburg County). The defendant was convicted at a jury trial of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, assault by strangulation, and assault on a female, stemming from an incident with a woman he was dating. The defendant punched the victim in the face while she was in the bathroom, causing her to hit her head on the bathtub. The defendant then grabbed the victim by the throat and continued hitting her head against the tub, causing her to lose consciousness. He hit her with the metal shower rod, kicked her with his bare feet, and strangled her with both hands around her neck, making her feel numb and unable to breathe. The defendant then dragged the victim by her hair to another room where he lashed her with a belt, using the buckle to strike her, which pierced her skin and drew blood. Finally, the defendant bit the victim’s cheek. A medical evaluation showed the victim had compression fractures of her thoracic spine, a head injury, bite marks on her cheek, and other injuries.
The defendant made three arguments on appeal. First, he argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss all but one of the assault charges. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding under State v. Dew, 379 N.C. 64 (2021), that there was a sufficiently “distinct interruption” between the attacks to support three separate assault charges. The first interruption occurred when the defendant stopped the momentum of the attack to pull the metal shower rod down to use it as a weapon. The second interruption occurred when the defendant dragged the victim from the bathroom into another room—pausing, changing the location, and altering the method of attack by using his belt. Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the defendant’s second argument, that the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant on three assault convictions.
Finally, the defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that the victim suffered serious injury and that the defendant’s hands and feet were deadly weapons. The Court of Appeals again disagreed. As to serious injury, the court said the evidence of the victim’s hospitalization, spinal fractures, and other injuries was sufficient to submit the issue to the jury. As to the defendant’s hands and feet as deadly weapons, the State proffered evidence that the defendant was a couple of inches taller than the victim and at least “a little bit bigger.” The defendant surprised the victim while she was in the bathroom when she was nude and vulnerable and banged her head against the tub, causing her to lose consciousness. Based on that manner of use and the relative size and condition of the parties, the appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
(1) In the absence of other record evidence, the trial court did not err in allowing a substitute expert to testify to independent conclusions based on photographs; (2) the trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify about the victim’s credibility after the defendant opened the door.
State v. Phillips, No. COA25-864 (N.C. Ct. App. May 6, 2026) (Buncombe County). The defendant was convicted at a jury trial of first-degree kidnapping, assault by strangulation, and other crimes based on his attack on his wife, Pearl, in their home. He beat her with a cane until the cane broke, tried to stab her with the broken pieces of it, strangled her, and threatened to kill her. When first responders arrived at the house, Pearl initially told them she had fallen down the stairs, because she was afraid of what was going to happen to her infant son with the defendant still inside the house. However, once she learned that her son was safe in DSS custody, she told first responders about the defendant’s attack on her. At the hospital, Pearl underwent an examination by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE), Tanailly Smith. Nurse Smith took over 140 photographs and wrote a report stating that Pearl’s responses and visual signs of injury were consistent with manual strangulation.
Over a year later, when the case came to trial, Nurse Smith was unavailable because she moved to Florida. The State called her supervisor, Nurse Maillet, to testify regarding Pearl’s injuries. Nurse Maillet, who was qualified as an expert in forensic nurse examination and strangulation assessment, testified that she had independently reviewed Nurse Smith’s report, including charting, photographs, and other documentation, and reached her own conclusions about the incident. The defendant objected, asserting that Nurse Maillet’s conclusions were based on the observations of another person who was not present in court. The trial court overruled the objections and allowed Nurse Maillet to testify and allowed admission of Nurse Smith’s examination report. Nurse Maillet testified that based on her independent review of the report, including the photographs, charts, and statements from Nurse Smith, there was evidence of manual strangulation and that Pearl’s injuries were consistent with her description of the attack.
The State also called Detective Burns, whose testimony indicated some inconsistencies in Pearl’s prior statements as to whether she had ever used methamphetamine. Based on those inconsistencies, defense counsel asked Detective Burns on cross examination whether he had any concerns about her truthfulness. Detective Burns replied that he did not. On redirect, the State asked Detective Burns if, based on his interview of Pearl, he believed that she had been assaulted by the defendant and believed what she was saying at trial. He replied that he “100 percent did.” The defendant did not object. The defendant was convicted on all charges and sentenced to two consecutive terms of imprisonment.
On appeal, the defendant argued (1) that the trial court erred or plainly erred under the Confrontation Clause by allowing a substitute expert witness to testify regarding Pearl’s hospital examination, and (2) plainly erred by allowing Detective Burns to vouch for Pearl’s credibility.
As to the confrontation issue, the Court of Appeals determined that the defendant’s trial objections preserved the issue for de novo appellate review. The court explained that, under Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), the Confrontation Clause is implicated when a surrogate expert’s testimony is based on testimonial hearsay statements contained in lab reports or notes prepared by a different analyst, but not violated when the testifying expert’s opinion is the product of their own independent observation and analysis of objective data that does not itself depend on the absent analyst’s credibility or skill. The court had previously applied that understanding of the law in State v. Ball, 282 N.C. App. 151 (2024), concluding that a substitute expert may testify as to testing completed by another expert if the information is reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, and the substitute expert presents an independent opinion based on his or her own analysis of that information.
Applying the law as understood after Smith v. Arizona and State v. Ball to the facts here, the court concluded that the trial court did not err in allowing Nurse Maillet’s testimony about her independent opinion formed after review of the many photographs taken by Nurse Smith. The court noted that Nurse Smith’s actual report and Nurse Maillet’s written opinion based on that report were not in the record on appeal, and the court was therefore unable to discern whether any of Nurse Smith’s statements were being offered for their truth through Nurse Maillet in violation of the Confrontation Clause. In the absence of any record indicating that they were, the court held that the trial court did not err in allowing Nurse Maillet’s testimony. The court added that even if some portion of Nurse Maillet’s testimony was admitted in error, that any such error was harmless in light of other competent and overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
The court emphasized that its holding is limited to cases in which the underlying data relied upon by the out-of-court expert—like the photographs here—can be independently examined by the testifying expert, who is subject to cross examination. The court distinguished cases where the testifying expert relies on the truth of the absent expert’s statements. The court specifically noted that in the context of drug analysis or DNA testing, where the accuracy of the results depends on whether the absent expert properly applied his or her specialized skill and training, the “truth” of those results cannot be verified without cross examination of the person who performed the tests.
As to the improper vouching issue, in the absence of a trial objection, the court reviewed for plain error. The court concluded that the trial court did not err, much less plainly err, in allowing Detective Burns to testify as to whether he believed Pearl’s story, because the defendant opened the door for the detective to comment on her credibility. Defense counsel was the first to question Detective Burns on the believability of Pearl’s story by illustrating inconsistencies about her prior statements to law enforcement regarding drug use and the extent of her injuries. The court concluded the State was thereafter permitted to offer rebuttal testimony.
