Restitution for Rewards

Suppose a crime victim offers a reward related to a crime—money for information leading to the return of stolen property, or perhaps information leading to the apprehension of an assailant. If the reward works and leads to a person’s conviction, may the court order the defendant to pay the victim restitution for the reward? Today’s post considers that question, and the related question of whether it is proper to order restitution to third parties that offer rewards, like crime stoppers. No North Carolina statute answers these questions directly. In general, a judge may order restitution to a crime victim, defined as a person “directly and proximately harmed as a result of the defendant’s commission of the criminal offense.” G.S. 15A-1340.34(a). Restitution is limited to “injuries or damages arising directly and proximately out of the offense committed by the defendant.” G.S. 15A-1340.34(b). The question, then, is whether the victim’s decision to offer a reward flows directly and proximately from the defendant’s offense. On the one hand, the victim obviously would not have offered the reward but for the defendant’s crime. People v. Dillingham, 881 P.2d 440, 442 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). On the other hand, the offer of a reward is a voluntary act “subsequent to infliction of the damage by the victim,” and not a direct result of the defendant’s actions. Id. at 443 (Jones, J., dissenting). Dillingham—itself a divided opinion—is one of the only cases to consider the question nationally. A reward is not among the things listed in G.S. 15A-1340.35, [...]