When is Double Jeopardy a Rule of Evidence?

The defendant in State v. Greenfield, No. COA23-597 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025), argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence and allowing argument about an attempted armed robbery charge for which he had previously been acquitted. The Court of Appeals posited that evidence is inadmissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause only when it falls within the scope of the collateral estoppel doctrine, which precludes relitigation of an issue of fact previously determined by a final judgment. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err by failing to intervene in the closing argument here, but its formulation of the rule begs the question: under what circumstances will double jeopardy require the exclusion of evidence? This post attempts to answer that question. Double Jeopardy The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. Amend V. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held the Double Jeopardy Clause is incorporated in the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment and hence is applicable to the states. The North Carolina Constitution contains no double jeopardy provision. State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173, 175 n.1 (1995). Even before incorporation, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court found comparable protections in the common law and in the “law of the land” clause of the state constitution. See State v. Crocker, [...]