Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Land-Use Management Decisions
It is clear that a city council member should not vote on rezoning his own property. But what about rezoning the property next door? Should a county commissioner vote on a proposed subdivision that would adjoin her own neighborhood, affecting traffic, services, and perhaps her own property's value? What about a city council member voting on a special-use permit for a project when his employer has a contract to furnish the building materials if it is approved? While a zoning board of adjustment member should not vote on her own variance request, what if the request is being made by her son? What if her son is the petitioner's realtor? What about voting on a project against which the board member signed a petition prior to being appointed to the board of adjustment? Is there a different rule for planning commission members who are making a recommendation rather than a final decision?
Those who make governmental land-use decisions must often wrestle with these ethical questions. The legislature has organized North Carolina's land-use review process to put many of these decisions directly in the hands of the state's citizens. Citizen boards, not professional staff members or judges, adopt ordinances and regulations, issue special-use permits, and grant variances.
Because these decisions so vitally affect the future quality of life for the entire community, public interest in securing knowledgeable citizens to serve on the many boards involved in the land-use processes is strong. Yet these same knowledgeable citizens are also likely to be personally involved in land development and in neighborhood and environmental groups. They may make their livings as builders, realtors, surveyors, and bankers. They may have organized neighborhood associations or led groups favoring or opposing controversial development projects. In sum, their knowledge and wisdom often come from experience--their active personal participation in land-use issues.
And therein lies an inherent conflict. Although government needs the participation of knowledgeable citizens, it also is obligated to provide fair and unbiased decisions. Citizens have the right to expect that governmental decisions will be based on consideration of what is in the best public interest, not what will most benefit the personal finances or concerns of an individual citizen board member. This right is based on constitutional guarantees of due process, on common law principles, and on statutes, ordinances, and codes of conduct mandating ethics in government. This article addresses how that inherent conflict is and can be balanced in North Carolina land-use decisions.
Types of Bias and Conflicts of Interest
There are several types of objectionable bias possible in land-use decision making by government. They include financial conflicts of interest, personal bias, association with those affected by a decision, and procedural irregularities.
The most obvious, and clearly illegal, is the straightforward bribe. Fortunately, North Carolina largely has been spared the scandal involved in outright sale of land-use approvals. However, given the very large sums of money at stake in some decisions, the temptations are such that blatantly criminal acts will be committed occasionally.
Financial conflict of interest arises more frequently. This occurs when a citizen board member is in a position to benefit financially from the outcome of a particular decision. It is important to remember that this includes direct and indirect financial benefits. For example, conflicts of interest arise not only when the board member's own property is directly affected but also when a business owned by the board member stands to benefit from increased sales if someone else's new project is built or, conversely, stands to lose sales if a competing business receives a permit.
Personal interest on other than financial grounds also can be a type of objectionable bias. The board member may have had personal dealings with a petitioner that so color the board member's judgment that he or she is unable to separate that prior unrelated encounter from the land-use issue at hand. Or, in a more typical occurrence, a board member may have taken a strong public position on a proposed development, which later is presented to the board for an objective decision based on the record developed at an adjudicatory hearing. In these situations, questions arise as to the impartiality of the decision maker. Further, the potential personal interest may not even involve the particular board member. At times it is the board member's association with an interested party that raises a potential problem. A close relative or business partner's involvement in a matter coming before the board is not uncommon, especially in small towns.
Another type of bias involves the fairness of the process itself. With some land-use decisions, such as special- or conditional-use permits, variances, and permit appeals, all of the requirements of a fair hearing must be met. If a board of adjustment member discusses a matter coming before the board informally with one of the parties, there is the possibility that the board member will then reach a decision based in part on information that was not presented at the hearing and was therefore not subject to cross-examination or rebuttal. Although this outside communication may be difficult for board members to avoid, it does taint the fairness of the hearing process and is improper. Finally, it should be remembered that the concern is not only with actual conflicts but with the appearance of impropriety as well. In most cases, members of the public do not know government officials personally and have no way of independently verifying their integrity. As a practical matter, no one--not a close associate, judge, or jury--can know for certain what motivated a board member to vote in a certain way. Therefore the avoidance of even the appearance of a conflict of interest is required by some ethical codes.
In all of these diverse types of cases--bribery, financial conflicts, personal bias, associations with interested parties, an unfair hearing process, and the appearance of conflicts--the common thread is protecting the public interest in the fairness and integrity of land-use decisions. Public confidence in government depends on the integrity of its decisions, and the avoidance of bias and conflicts of interest in these various forms is no doubt a factor in establishing that confidence.
Types of Land-Use Decisions
Whether an improper bias or conflict of interest exists and what response is appropriate may depend in part on the character of the land-use decision involved. Decisions by citizen boards may be one of three types--advisory, legislative, or quasi-judicial.
Advisory decisions are involved when a body has no formal decision-making power but is reviewing and commenting on a matter. Some reviews are mandatory. For instance, in North Carolina a planning board reviews all initial zoning ordinances, which may not be adopted or even sent to public hearing by the governing board until recommended by the planning board. Counties are required to send zoning ordinance amendments to a planning agency for a recommendation prior to adoption. Other reviews are optional. For instance, the planning board may receive special-use permit applications and subdivision plats for comment before the city council acts on them. In each of these instances, the advisory board takes a position that may significantly affect the outcome of the land-use decision, but it does not actually make the decision. Therefore a less-demanding conflict-of-interest policy is sometimes applied to these decisions.
The second major category of citizen land-use decision is legislative. These decisions involve policy choices that affect the entire community. The most typical case is adoption of an ordinance by a local governing board or an administrative rule by a state citizen commission. In North Carolina the courts have ruled that a zoning ordinance amendment is a legislative matter within the discretion of the city council.[1] The courts traditionally have deferred to the governing board's judgment and to the political process with legislative decisions. Therefore, resolution of bias and conflict-of-interest issues in these matters often is guided more by legislatively adopted ethical guidelines than by strict legal rules set forth by the courts.
The third type of decision by citizen boards is quasi-judicial. These decisions involve the application of adopted policies to individual situations. They must not involve new policy decisions but apply previously made legislative decisions to the facts before the board. The most common quasi-judicial decision is a variance or appeal decision made by a board of adjustment. In North Carolina law a decision on whether to issue a special- or conditional-use permit also has been ruled to be a quasi-judicial decision, whether issued by a board of adjustment or by the elected board. Consideration of permit appeals by state commissions also falls into this category. For any of these quasi-judicial decisions, the courts require that all of the essential elements of a fair trial be observed, including developing a record to support the decision and giving parties directly affected by the decision the right to offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and have sworn testimony. This strict requirement means special attention must be given to avoiding bias and conflicts of interest whenever a citizen board is making a quasi-judicial decision.
Ways to Avoid Conflicts of Interest and Bias
There are a number of measures that can be employed to avoid conflicts of interest, ranging from disclosure of information to nonparticipation in the decision involved. The most commonly used means of addressing financial conflicts of interest regarding legislative land-use decisions is disclosure to the public of a government official's economic interests. This usually takes the form of a financial disclosure statement that sets forth an official's substantial financial interests. Another example of disclosing information would be setting forth on the record any prior knowledge or contacts with the parties to a quasi-judicial hearing. A variation of this approach is disclosure of the possible conflict and then only continuing to participate if all of the affected parties agree.[2]
The rationale for such disclosure requirements is that public confidence in the integrity of governmental decisions will be enhanced by putting any potential conflicts on the public record. The disclosure provides the voters with information sufficient to allow them to exercise their electoral judgment should they determine improper conflicts exist.
Conflicts of interest can be avoided by using a variety of other measures. One simple measure is to remove the source of the conflict, for example, divestiture of the conflicting financial interest or placing assets in a blind trust. Another is for the board member to abstain from voting on a particular matter or even refrain from any participation at all in an individual matter. The legal term for this is recusation. A board member is recused when he or she is disqualified from hearing a case because of a potential conflict of interest or personal bias. Finally, the board member can always remove the conflict by resigning from the governmental body or office making the decision. Resignation is an extreme measure, but sometimes the conflicts of interest presented may be so frequent that the board member must consider stepping down to make way for a replacement who will be able to participate fully and actively.
Requirements of the Law
Statutes, ordinances, regulations
Unlike a number of states, North Carolina has no specific state statute addressing the issue of bias and conflict of interest in land-use decisions. There are, however, general statutory provisions that are applicable to certain aspects of the issue.
The state's Administrative Procedures Act, which the courts have said provides a similar standard for review of local land-use decisions, has several provisions requiring fair and unbiased hearings. Administrative law judges may be disqualified for personal bias, and ex parte communication is prohibited in contested cases. Bribery and many direct financial contracts between a local government and a citizen board member are illegal.[3] Section 14-230 of the General Statutes also provides that any state or local official who willfully fails to discharge any legally required duty is guilty of a misdemeanor. This statute does not impose criminal liability for an error in judgment. However, in the conflict-of-interest area this criminal statute could apply to situations where an official purposefully deleted relevant information from a required financial disclosure statement and may even cover a situation where an official willfully continued to participate in a decision after being advised to withdraw because of a conflict of interest.
State statutes specifically address the question of when local elected officials can be excused from voting. Section 160A-75 of the General Statutes provides that, for city councils, "No member shall be excused from voting except upon matters involving the consideration of his own financial interest or official conduct." In such cases the board member can only be excused by a majority vote of the council. If not excused, the board member automatically is recorded as voting in the affirmative if present but not actually casting a vote. Section 153A-44 contains a similar provision for county boards of commissioners. These statutes only apply to local elected officials and do not affect voting by members of planning boards, boards of adjustment, and state citizen commissions.
These statutes on voting ensure that a quorum can be maintained and that the public's business will not be delayed by board members seeking to avoid controversial votes. Excusing board members with conflicts of interest can in rare instances leave a body without a quorum or the necessary majority required for some land-use approvals. For boards of adjustment, this can be addressed by having alternate board members, but for governing boards the lack of a quorum would result either in an automatic denial or a proceeding under a common law "rule of necessity." The latter course seems to have dubious propriety in this setting. The statutes provide that vacant seats are not considered in determining a quorum. It would be reasonable to treat disqualifications on account of conflict of interest the same way, although it is not certain that current law allows this.
These voting statutes, by specifically allowing governing board members to be excused in matters involving their own financial interest, emphasize the prohibition against financial self-dealing and financial conflicts of interest. However, they pose a dilemma for elected officials in those local governments that have chosen to retain quasi-judicial decision-making authority at the council and commission level. When voting on a special-use permit after an adjudicatory hearing, the board member may need to be excused from participation because of a nonfinancial conflict (for instance, because he or she is related to one of the parties). But the statute on its face allows board members to be excused only for financial conflicts.The voting statute apparently was intended to address the concern of voting on contracts and other legislative matters, not such more recent innovations as quasi-judicial conditional-use permits that must be approved by a city council.
Thus the voting statutes create a conflict between requiring board members to vote and protecting due process rights in a quasi-judicial hearing. The city of Charlotte resolved one aspect of this conflict through local legislation. Its code on voting excuses a board member from voting not only for financial conflicts but also when the board member failed to attend the entire hearing for a special-use permit. This ensures that only those board members who heard all the evidence will vote on a quasi-judicial matter. But even this does not address the problem facing an elected board member who has a nonfinancial conflict of interest. Until the voting statutes are amended to authorize recusal for bias and nonfinancial conflicts of interest, this is an uncertain area of the law. Although constitutional guarantees of due process should prevail over statutory voting requirements, the issue will remain unsettled until the legislature or courts resolve the question.
One possible standard that can be used to resolve these conflicting duties is found in existing conflict-of-interest standards for judges. There is a specific standard that judges use to determine whether they should hear a matter when there may be a conflict of interest, and this standard may serve as a useful guide when citizen bodies are acting in a quasi-judicial fashion. Canon 3(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges should disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to situations where they have a personal bias or prejudice, they have personal knowledge of disputed facts, they or an immediate family member has a financial interest in the matter that could be substantially affected by the outcome, they are closely related to an interested party, or they have previously served (or had a law partner who served) as a lawyer or witness in the matter.
Financial disclosure requirements and a conflict-of-interest prohibition for state policy-making employees and citizen members of state boards, commissions, and councils have been in effect since 1977. The executive order establishing these requirements notes that "public office in North Carolina must always be regarded as a public trust" and that the people "have a fundamental right to the assurance that officers of their government will not use their public position for personal gain." The order prohibits those subject to it from engaging in "any activity which interferes or is in conflict with the proper and effective discharge of such person's official duties." The order also requires the annual submission of a detailed statement of economic interest that includes a list of all assets and liabilities over $5,000, a list of sources of income over $5,000, and a list of gifts valued at more than $100 (over $50 if the donor has any business with or is regulated by the state). The statement is reviewed by the state Board of Ethics for conflicts of interest, and the board may recommend remedial action if actual or potential conflicts are identified. The board also investigates complaints regarding conflicts of interest and provides for public inspection of the statements of economic interest.
Several local governments also have codes of ethics regarding conflicts of interest. The most common are financial disclosure requirements, required, for example, by Guilford and Orange counties, Greensboro, and Charlotte. Charlotte council members are required to disclose (for both themselves and their spouses) all real property holdings within the county and the identity of businesses they own and their employer. In addition to disclosure, the Guilford County code specifically requires a county commissioner to disqualify himself or herself from voting on any matter involving such a disclosed interest. The Greensboro code states that "No member of any board or commission may discuss, advocate or vote on any matter in which he has a separate, private or monetary interest, either direct or indirect."
Case law
Although there have been no reported cases directly on this subject, North Carolina does have a substantial body of case law addressing governmental and judicial decision making that can be applied to land-use situations. In an early case involving the propriety of a clerk of court ruling on the acceptability for recordation of his own mortgage, the court in 1890 adopted the English common law prohibiting a person from acting as a judge in his own case:
- This maxim applies in all cases where judicial functions are to be exercised, and excludes all who are interested, however remotely, from taking part in their exercise.
It is not left to the discretion of a Judge, or to his sense of decency, to decide whether he shall act or not; all his powers are subject to this absolute limitation; and when his own rights are in question, he has no authority to determine the cause. . . . [T]he maxim "no man is to be a judge in his own cause," should be held sacred. And that is not to be confined to a cause in which he is a party, but applies to a cause in which he has an interest.
[Those involved should] take care not only that in their decrees they are not influenced by their personal interest, but to avoid the appearance of laboring under such an influence.[4]
The North Carolina courts have long ruled that governmental decision makers should not participate in deciding matters in which they have a pecuniary interest. In a 1919 case involving the authority of the Greensboro city council members to vote themselves a raise, the court ruled that the public policy of the state prohibits anyone from acting on a matter affecting the public when he or she has a direct pecuniary interest.[5] In a case involving legislators voting on their own travel expenses, the court in 1947 ruled, "It has long been a rule of general observance that self-interest disqualifies one from acting in a public capacity where unbiased judgment is required."[6]
When quasi-judicial land-use decisions are involved, the law requires an impartial decision maker. Therefore if a citizen board member has prejudged the merits of a matter, that is a disqualifying bias. The test set by the courts is that the decision maker should be excused if a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances would have doubts about the individual's ability to rule in an impartial manner.
A recent court of appeals case on an employment matter presents an interesting parallel to land-use cases.[7] In reviewing a dismissed teacher's claim that the school board was biased against him and that this prejudgment violated his constitutional rights, the court recognized the inherent conflict in the need to secure knowledgeable citizens to serve on boards and committees and in the necessity of having impartial decision makers for quasi-judicial decisions. The court ruled that a dismissal hearing must comply with all the essential elements of due process, including having an impartial decision maker. The court noted that the state has a "strong interest in ensuring that capable citizens of civic spirit will look to serve" on these boards, that such involved citizens cannot be expected to decide cases in a "vacuum of ignorance," and that the law therefore "affords a presumption of honesty and integrity to policymakers who possess decision-making powers." The court went on to hold, though, that if a board member had a predetermined opinion that was fixed and not susceptible to change (as opposed to a preliminary opinion about the matter or mere familiarity with the facts), that was impermissible bias. The court further ruled that even if only one of the six board members participated despite a disqualifying bias, the board's ruling would have to be set aside.
The supreme court also has ruled that a person should not participate in a quasi-judicial decision if he or she has too close an association with the parties involved. In 1951 the court ruled that a judge who had campaigned for a sheriff should not hear legal actions challenging the sheriff's election, ruling that the judge should recuse himself in proceedings "where they involve personal feelings which do not make for an impartial and calm judicial consideration and conclusion in the matter."[8] In this ruling the court noted the importance of avoiding even the appearance of bias in order to preserve public confidence in the judicial system: "It is not enough for a judge to be just in his judgments; he should strive to make the parties and the community feel that he is just; he owes this to himself, to the law and to the position he holds."[9]
Conclusions
Governmental land-use decisions have a profound effect on communities and individuals. It is through these decisions that the quality and character of our state's future development will in large part be determined. These decisions also can significantly affect individual landowner's rights. It therefore is imperative that these decisions be made in a fair and impartial manner. Because many of these decisions are made by citizen officials selected in part because of their knowledge and active experience in land-use matters, maintaining impartiality and avoiding conflicts of interest can be difficult.
State law requires that those entrusted with governmental land-use decision-making authority avoid financial conflicts of interest. This applies to elected and appointed officials at both the state and local level. It applies to any participation that is likely to affect the outcome of the decision, not just voting.
Determining how substantial a financial interest must be for it to constitute a conflict of interest is a difficult question. When legislative land-use decisions are involved, if the financial interest is very small or if the impact of the decision is remote and speculative, there is not likely to be a conflict of interest. An example is a city council member voting on a comprehensive rezoning that affects his or her property in the same way that it affects the property of all other city residents. However, if a particular land-use decision will affect a citizen board member's financial condition in a specific, substantial, and readily identifiable way, the board member would be well advised to refrain from any participation in that decision. This includes voting or even participating in the debate on a rezoning, an ordinance or rule amendment, a variance, a subdivision approval, or a special-use permit. With quasi-judicial decisions, even small or indirect financial conflicts should be avoided because these decisions do not involve the making of general public policy, where the broadest possible participation is desirable, but are the application of those policies to an individual situation, where complete impartiality is necessary. Although the law may not absolutely mandate nonparticipation in advisory decisions, full disclosure on the record in these situations is warranted, and nonparticipation is advisable.
When quasi-judicial decisions are involved, such as a permit appeal or variance, additional protections against bias and conflicts of interest on other than financial grounds also must be observed. A personal bias, a predisposition on the merits of the matter, or a close personal association with any of the parties disqualifies that board member from any involvement with the decision. In such situations, the board member should refrain not only from voting but from any participation in the matter.
If a citizen board member fails to follow these requirements, the courts may well invalidate the action taken and send the matter back to the board for a properly conducted reconsideration. This is costly and time consuming for the government, the applicant, and the person challenging the action, and it can be avoided by careful consideration of conflict-of-interest standards at the outset. Also, in some circumstances the board member who participates in spite of having a conflict of interest may be subject to individual sanctions, such as censure, removal from office, or even criminal prosecution.[10]
Given the complexity of this question and the possibilities for misunderstandings, citizen boards charged with land-use decision making should give serious consideration to adopting a written policy on conflicts of interest. Such a policy should set forth any desired financial disclosure requirements and should outline the circumstances under which the board expects its members to disqualify themselves.[11] Adoption of such a policy in advance of a conflict-of-interest controversy has several advantages. It allows a board to give rational and considered attention to this complex matter rather than having to react to what frequently are emotionally charged, individual controversies that allow little time for thoughtful deliberation. It also serves an educational purpose in that it lets decision makers, landowners, interest groups, and citizens explore the issue and set clear ground rules and expectations before conflicts arise.
A written conflict-of-interest policy also allows a clear procedure to be established for deciding who determines whether a conflict exists. Most codes leave the decision to withdraw to the individual board member, although a few provide for a vote by the full board. In either instance, it is very helpful if the code provides a means for securing an independent evaluation of the conflict and for providing board members with competent and timely legal advice. Such an independent evaluation relieves the person with the potential conflict of a decision that is not likely to instill much public confidence. In this respect, the Charlotte code provides that a city official can seek an advisory opinion from the city attorney regarding a potential conflict. State citizen board members may obtain opinions from the state Board of Ethics. Legislators may seek advisory opinions from a Legislative Ethics Committee. Including a provision in local ethics codes allowing (or even requiring) board members to refer close calls on participation to an outside party such as the city or county attorney should be considered carefully.
North Carolina is fortunate in having thousands of dedicated citizens volunteering to serve their state and local governments in land-use matters. Maintaining broad public confidence in the fairness of the process and the integrity of those involved warrants careful and continuing attention to the avoidance of even the appearance of bias or conflict of interest in land-use decision making.
Notes
1. In re Markham, 259 N.C. 566, 131 S.E.2d 329, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1964). Courts in other states have ruled that individual rezonings are quasi-judicial decisions. Given the site-specific nature of such decisions and the findings the governing board must make with small area rezonings, it is possible that North Carolina courts may eventually reach a similar conclusion. This is especially the situation with the creation of conditional-use zoning districts and spot zoning. See Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 (1988). In many ways such decisions are far more similar to quasi-judicial special-use permit decisions than the broad legislative policy choices involved with typical ordinance adoptions. In this particular instance, the "legislative" designation may be more semantical than real.
2. The method used to allow this in a judicial setting may offer some guidance for quasi-judicial boards. Canon 3(D) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct allows a judge who otherwise would be disqualified because of his or her potential financial interest or relationship to a party to disclose that fact. If all parties then agree in writing that the financial interest is insubstantial or the relationship is immaterial, the judge may continue to hear the matter. This waiver may not be applied if the disqualification is based on personal bias or prejudice or on the judge's prior service as an attorney for one of the parties.
3. Section 14-217 of the General Statutes (hereinafter cited as G.S.) makes it a felony for an office holder to receive "directly or indirectly, anything of value or personal advantage, or the promise thereof, for performing or omitting to perform any official act. . . ." Section 14-218 makes the offering of such a bribe a felony. North Carolina also has statutes prohibiting gifts and favors to those involved in contracting and inspection or supervision of construction [G.S. 133-32]. Section 160A-415 provides that building inspectors may not have a financial interest in the furnishing of labor or material for the construction, alteration, or maintenance of any building they do not own within their jurisdiction and that an inspector may not "engage in any work that is inconsistent with his duties or with the interest of the city." Other specialized statutes apply to school and transportation officials [G.S. 14-236, 136-13, and 136-14]. Also, administrative law judges may be disqualified for "personal bias" [G.S. 150B-32(b)].
The state also has several conflict-of-interest statutes applicable to individual boards and commissions. Most of these statutes address membership on the boards rather than voting on individual matters. For example, nine of the thirteen members of the Environment Management Commission must be individuals "who do not derive any significant portion of their income from persons subject to permits or enforcement orders" issued by the commission [G.S. 143B-283(c)], and a majority of the Coastal Resources Commission must "not derive any significant portion of their income from land development, construction, real estate sales, or lobbying and do not otherwise serve as agents for development-related business activities" [G.S. 113A-104(c)]. Section 18B-201 similarly restricts membership on the state and local Alcoholic Beverage Control boards.
4. White v. Connelly, 105 N.C. 65, 70, 11 S.E. 177, 179 (1890). Also see Trenwith v. Smallwood, 111 N.C. 132, 15 S.E. 1030 (1892). This rule is now codified at G.S. 7A-104.
5. Kendall v. Stafford, 178 N.C. 461, 101 S.E. 15 (1919). Subsequent statutory amendments now allow city councils to set their salaries [G.S. 160A-64].
6. In re Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of HB 276, 227 N.C. 705, 707, 41 S.E.2d 749, 750 (1947). A more recent statement of this general principle is found in a 1984 condemnation case, where the court ruled, "it is axiomatic, of course, that it is the lawful right of every litigant to expect utter impartiality and neutrality in the judge who tries his case. . . . This right can neither be denied nor abridged" [Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Weaver, 310 N.C. 93, 103, 310 S.E.2d 338, 344 (1984)].
7. Crump v. Board of Educ., 93 N.C. App. 168, 378 S.E.2d 32, rev. denied, 324 N.C. 543, 380 S.E.2d 770 (1989).
8. Ponder v. Davis, 233 N.C. 699, 704, 65 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1951).
10. Greensboro's code provides that a board member may be removed from office if the board's financial conflict-of-interest policy is violated [Greensboro Code § 2-142], as does Guilford County's [Guilford Co. Code § 1-56]. Similarly, the General Assembly's Legislative Ethics Act provides that either the House or the Senate can censure, suspend, or expel any member it finds guilty of unethical conduct [G.S. 120-103(d)(3)].
11. With city councils and boards of county commissioners, this would contain guidelines on when the board member would request the board to vote to excuse him or her from participation, as these elected officials cannot excuse themselves from voting. The General Assembly in 1975 established financial disclosure requirements for both candidates and members of the legislature [G.S. 120-85 through 120-106]. The Legislative Ethics Act also requires a legislator to disqualify himself or herself if a conflict of interest would "impair his independence of judgment" [G.S. 120-88].
