I. Introduction
A. Government Regulation of Sexually Oriented Businesses
In the past thirty years the number of topless bars, adult bookstores, X-rated theaters, massage parlors—even exotic car washes—has mushroomed. These uses generate intense community concern about the morality of such businesses, their exploitation of women, and their impact on surrounding neighborhoods. Downtown business owners call city council members with concerns that prospective customers will stay away if a massage parlor sets up shop next door. Landowners in a rural area who previously opposed any zoning as an undue restriction on private property rights suddenly turn out in great numbers to demand zoning “protection” when they learn a topless bar is proposed to be located nearby. Conservative religious groups and liberal advocates of women’s rights join forces to protest the moral climate set by a proliferation of sexually oriented businesses.
The upshot of this outpouring of concern has been a strong trend among local governments around the country and in North Carolina to regulate sexually oriented businesses, most often by significantly restricting their location.[1] These regulations typically restrict such uses to a few zoning districts and establish minimum separations between sexually oriented businesses and a variety of other uses, most commonly other sexually oriented businesses, places of worship, schools, parks, and residential districts. Special use permits and special licensing requirements are also often used to impose restrictions on sexually oriented businesses that do not apply to other businesses.
This Special Series publication examines the legal issues associated with government regulation of sexually oriented businesses. The balance of this initial section establishes a framework for analysis—what is meant by or included within “sexually oriented businesses” and what are the basic constitutional issues that must be addressed. The second section addresses the question of what type of sexually oriented activity can be banned entirely. The publication then devotes considerable attention in a third section to the type of restrictions most frequently used by local governments—zoning restrictions on the location of sexually oriented businesses. This third section examines how far the First Amendment allows local governments to go in restricting these businesses and what a local government must do to establish a proper legal foundation for its regulations. The fourth section briefly reviews operational restrictions that can be imposed on sexually oriented businesses.
B. Defining Sexually Oriented Businesses
The first question a local government must address in developing regulations for sexually oriented businesses is to determine which business operations should be covered. Most regulations address adult bookstores, adult theaters, and facilities that feature nude or topless dancing. Other ordinances regulate a broader range of activities where the business is restricted to an adult clientele and there is an emphasis on sexuality, including massage parlors, adult motels, escort services, and nude modeling studios. A few ordinances are drafted to apply to all establishments that limit patrons to those over the age of
eighteen.
[2]The difficult question in this area is defining a threshold—how much adult material must be present to make an establishment a “sexually oriented business” (or for it to be considered a place intended for “adult uses” as they are termed by some ordinances). Is a bookstore that sells a single “adult” magazine title covered? Does it have to sell “hard core” material or are more mainstream publications such as Playboy covered? Does the definition apply only to theaters that regularly screen X-rated movies, or does it also include screening movies that have any nudity presented? What about a brief nude scene in a “legitimate” play? Does the definition cover the bar with occasional topless dancers as well as bars featuring them as their regular entertainment?
To avoid being unconstitutionally vague, an ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses must be drawn with sufficient precision that a person of normal intelligence has fair notice of what is prohibited. It must also give reasonably clear guidelines concerning the scope of the regulation for enforcement officers and the courts to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.[3]
This requirement of avoiding unduly vague definitions has not been a significant difficulty with most ordinances regulating the location of adult bookstores, theaters, and bars. The Supreme Court’s initial case upholding a restriction on the location of sexually oriented businesses held Detroit’s ordinance was sufficiently precise when it regulated exhibitions “characterized by an emphasis on” specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas.[4] Many local ordinances simply repeat Detroit’s same definitions verbatim. Other formulations that have been approved by the courts as being sufficiently precise include regulating establishments that have “a substantial or significant portion,”[5] a “preponderance,”[6] or a set percentage[7] of their merchandise or exhibitions devoted to sexually explicit material; regulating businesses that have dancing that “emphasizes and seeks, through one or more dancers, to arouse or excite the patrons’ sexual desires” and prohibiting dancers from “caressing” or “fondling” the patrons;[8] and regulating theaters that “on a regular basis” show films minors are prohibited from viewing.[9]
On the other hand, an ordinance that applied to “adult theaters” without defining the term was held to be impermissibly vague.[10] Also, an ordinance that is drafted to cover any and all sexually explicit material, including a single magazine, performance, or film showing, faces significant legal problems if challenged.[11]
Even definitions found adequately precise by the courts can still, however, be subject to contentious battles over interpretation. For example, one Charlotte establishment attempted to circumvent a definition based on having a “preponderance” of sexually explicit material by adding a large volume of used paperback books in their book section and screenings of prize fights in their video booths, then contending that at least 51 percent of their stock was “non-adult” material. After a lengthy hearing, the board of adjustment rejected this subterfuge, ruling preponderance related more to the weight, force, and impact of the material, and not to a mathematical counting of numbers of items available.[12]
A final aspect of definitions that requires careful consideration is the question of exemptions. Many local governments draft their regulations regarding sexually oriented businesses to exempt mainstream businesses, such as legitimate theatrical productions or providers of therapeutic massage. Some ordinances exempt all regulation of protected speech, thus avoiding First Amendment review altogether.[13] A few local governments have unsuccessfully attempted to avoid problems with unduly infringing on First Amendment rights by exempting businesses with only a small percentage of their business devoted to sexually explicit material.[14]
C. Overview of Constitutional Issues
Regulation of sexually oriented businesses raises several important constitutional issues, particularly First Amendment questions regarding restrictions on adult bookstores, theaters, and performances. Before undertaking a detailed review of these constitutional issues, it is useful to briefly review the underlying constitutional doctrines involved.
1. First Amendment
The First Amendment protects rights of free speech. A critical threshold question is what is included within protected “speech.” Protected speech includes not only the spoken word, but also books, films, theatrical productions, and dance.
First Amendment cases that address political expression are familiar to many. For example, in recent years the Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment to protect citizens’ rights to post protest signs in their yards and windows,[15] to burn a flag in symbolic protest,[16] and to wear armbands to protest government policies.[17] First Amendment protections apply not only to political speech, but to commercial speech as well. The general standard for regulation of commercial speech is set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.[18] This 1987 case established a four-part test for restrictions on commercial speech:
- To be protected, the speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading;
- the asserted governmental interest in the restriction must be substantial;
- the regulation must directly advance the governmental interest; and
- the regulation must be no more extensive than necessary.
Commercial speech can be subject to greater regulation than noncommercial speech, but total bans on a particular form or method of speech are viewed
suspiciously.
[19]Even though adult books, films, and performances have some First Amendment protection, there are two important types of “speech” that do not receive First Amendment protection. Both have important implications for regulation of sexually oriented businesses.
The first type of speech with no First Amendment protection is obscenity. When books, movies, or dance cross the line from “sexually explicit” to “obscene,” they become illegal and may be banned entirely. For example, in North Carolina if a female dancer exposes her breasts, this is “sexually explicit” dancing that can be subject to local restrictions (but not prohibition). If she exposes her genitals, this is “obscene” and is a prohibited criminal act that has no First Amendment protection. This distinction is discussed in more detail below in the sections on obscenity and indecent exposure.
The second type of “speech” with no First Amendment protection is conduct. The boundary between conduct that is “symbolic speech” and is protected and “conduct” that can be prohibited is sometimes difficult to discern. If a protester burns the American flag, is this action a political statement protected as speech, or is it illegal conduct? What about burning a draft card? The Court held flag burning to be protected speech[20] but draft card burning to be conduct. In the latter case, United States v. O’Brien,[21] the Court established a four-part test to determine whether First Amendment free speech rights are impermissibly burdened by a particular governmental regulation of “symbolic” conduct:
- Is the regulation within the constitutional power of the government?
- Does it further an important or substantial governmental interest?
- Is the governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression? and
- Is the restriction no greater than is essential?
O’Brien is a very important test that has been discussed in most of the cases reviewing restrictions on sexually oriented businesses. Its application is discussed in some detail in Part III of this publication.
In the context of sexually oriented business, the question arises whether dancing completely or nearly nude is speech or conduct. Justice Scalia has proposed that nudity in and of itself be declared conduct that could always be prohibited.[22] No other justices currently share this view, however, and “erotic dancing” is considered symbolic speech. While the Supreme Court has debated just how much First Amendment protection is to be provided to commercial sexually explicit speech,[23] even nude or semi-nude dancing receives some degree of constitutional protection.[24]
Another concept in First Amendment law that is crucial in regulation of sexually oriented businesses is “content neutrality.” This is critically important because if a restriction on protected speech is based on the content of the speech, strict scrutiny is applied by the courts. Such a regulation must be narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest in order to be sustained,[25] a very difficult burden that is met only in extraordinary situations.[26] On the other hand, an ordinance that is content neutral can regulate the “time, place, and manner” of speech.[27]
A regulation is content neutral if it is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”[28] This test is sometimes phrased by the courts as a requirement that the regulation be “substantially unrelated to suppression of speech.”[29] A regulation of sexually oriented businesses is deemed by the courts to be “content neutral” if the predominant concern leading to its enactment is with the secondary impacts of the speech rather than the content of the speech itself. The Court has held that “secondary effects” do not include the reactions of those hearing the speech.[30] Secondary effects do include impacts on the viability of surrounding neighborhoods but not the potential psychological damage to the viewers of sexually explicit material.[31]
2. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause requires that similarly situated persons and businesses be treated alike. Operators of sexually oriented businesses often make two equal protection challenges to government restrictions on their business.
First is the challenge that it is unfair to restrict adult bookstores, bars, or theaters without placing similar restrictions on all bookstores, bars, or theaters. The argument here is that, for example, a topless bar has the same impacts on traffic, noise, and the neighborhood as a regular bar; and therefore the topless bar and the regular bar should be regulated alike. Courts have, however, held there is a rational basis for different treatment of adult businesses and their “non-adult” counterparts because of the different secondary impacts of the two.[32]
Second, an equal protection challenge is also raised where the ordinance regulates some but not all sexually oriented businesses. The argument here is that it is unfair, for example, to regulate an adult theater without also regulating an adult bookstore. The courts have uniformly rejected such an argument.[33] Governments may choose to regulate some aspect of a problem without being compelled to address every aspect of that problem. However, categories for regulation should be chosen carefully. Glaring over- or under-inclusiveness can be used to establish that an ordinance is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause.[34]
3. Twenty-first Amendment
At one time it appeared that the authority granted to states by the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate alcohol sales might well provide a rationale to justify greater restriction on First Amendment rights than might otherwise be the case. In California v. LaRue,[35] the Supreme Court in 1972 upheld a prohibition of acts of “gross sexuality” in facilities with ABC licenses. The Court noted the state’s broad authority under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the sale of liquor may justify restrictions on protected speech in establishments serving alcohol that would not be justified if applied to other types of businesses. Subsequent cases used this rationale to justify a ban on topless dancing in facilities with liquor licenses.[36]
However, the Supreme Court recently ruled that while the Twenty-first Amendment grants states authority to regulate commerce, it in no way reduces the protections afforded by the First Amendment.[37] In a case striking down restrictions on advertising retail prices of alcoholic beverages, the Court held that “the States’ inherent police powers provide ample authority to restrict the kind of ‘bacchanalian revelries’ described in the LaRue opinion regardless of whether alcoholic beverages are involved. . . . Without questioning the holding in LaRue, we now disavow its reasoning insofar as it relied on the Twenty-first Amendment.”[38] Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion adds, “The Twenty-first Amendment does not trump First Amendment rights or add a presumption of validity to a regulation that cannot otherwise satisfy First Amendment requirements.”[39]
II. Banning Sexually Oriented Businesses
When a local government considers regulation of sexually oriented businesses, there is invariably a call from some citizens to simply ban these uses altogether, a view that finds considerable sympathy among many elected officials. This section first examines what activities can be banned; it then examines restrictions a local government can place on sexually oriented businesses.
Obscenity and indecent exposure are banned by state law. There are also state laws in North Carolina that ban location of more than one adult-use establishment in a single building, that ban lewd activities in establishments with alcohol licenses, and that prohibit the maintenance of a public nuisance.
The exact scope of these state statutes is critically important because it limits the range of regulatory options available to local governments. Local governments may not adopt regulations on sexually oriented businesses that duplicate or are contrary to state laws.[40] The statute on preemption, however, provides that the fact that a state or federal law, standing alone, makes a given act, omission, or condition unlawful does not preclude city ordinances requiring a higher standard of conduct. In State v. Tenore,[41] the court held that the state obscenity statutes had not entirely preempted this field and that more restrictive local regulations might be legally possible. However, the court went on to rule that an Onslow County ordinance prohibiting topless dancing was invalid because it purported to regulate the same conduct addressed by state statutes.
A. Obscenity
Obscenity is not protected by the First
Amendment.
[42] Production and dissemination (but not mere possession in the privacy of one’s
home)
[43] of obscene materials are criminal offenses and are banned entirely by the state.
The North Carolina statutory definition of obscenity, which has been updated several times to conform to judicial definitions of the scope of First Amendment protections, defines material (including writings, pictures, records, films, tapes, plays, dance, and performance) as obscene if
- the material depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct specifically defined by the statute; and
- the average person applying contemporary community standards relating to the depiction or description of sexual matters would find that the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; and
- the material lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value; and
- the material as used is not protected or privileged under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of North Carolina.[44]
The statute makes it a felony to create, buy, or sell obscene materials and declares such to be contraband.
Several aspects of this definition are noteworthy. First, the statute specifically defines the depictions of “sexual conduct” covered. The statute defines specified “sexual conduct” as
- vaginal, anal, or oral intercourse, whether actual or simulated, normal or perverted; or
- masturbation, excretory functions, or lewd exhibition of uncovered genitals; or
- an act or condition that depicts torture, physical restraint by being fettered or bound, or flagellation of or by a nude person or a person clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume.[45]
Second, since “community standards” are involved, the question becomes what is the “community.” There is no requirement that a national or even statewide standard be
applied.
[46] In North Carolina it has been held appropriate to permit a jury to apply the standards of the community in which the indictment was returned and from which the jurors
came.
[47] However, jurors do not have unbridled discretion in determining what is patently offensive. Even though material might violate a particular community’s standard as to what appeals to prurient interests, the Supreme Court has ruled that only “hard-core” material can be found
obscene.
[48] Also, the question of the material’s literary, artistic, political, or scientific value is determined by a national
standard.
[49] These factors effectively preclude a small community from adopting a highly restrictive definition of obscenity. Third, in assessing whether the material has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, the jury must be instructed to consider the work as a whole—not just an isolated excerpt—and apply a “reasonable person” standard even though those qualifications are not explicitly in the
statute.
[50]
B. Indecent Exposure
Public nakedness has always been an offense at common law in North
Carolina.
[51] Public nudity in and of itself—outside of the context of a play, dance, or performance—is not protected speech under the First
Amendment.
[52] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-190.9 (hereinafter G.S.) codifies the common law rule and makes indecent exposure a misdemeanor. “Indecent exposure” is defined by this statute as occurring when an individual willfully exposes “the private parts of his or her person in any public place and in the presence of any other person or persons, of the opposite sex, or aids or abets in any such act,” or when an individual “procures another to perform such act.”
The first critical question in the application of this statute to adult entertainment is just what are “private parts”? In State v. Jones,[53] a topless dancer at The Keg in Raleigh was charged with violation of this statute. The court of appeals held that “private parts” are male and female genitalia and do not include female breasts.[54] Thus the indecent exposure statute prohibits “bottomless” but not “topless” dancing.[55] The supreme court subsequently invalidated an Onslow County ordinance that included “the breasts of a physically developed female” within the definition of “private parts,” ruling that the state indecent exposure statute precludes a city or county ordinance that purports to prohibit topless dancing because it regulates the same behavior covered by the state statute.[56]
A second critical question is what is a “public place” for the purposes of this statute? In upholding a conviction for indecent exposure in a nightclub, the court held there is “nothing whatsoever in the present or former indecent exposure statutes that in any way requires the viewers of the exposure of one’s private parts to be unwilling observers.”[57] Thus exposure in a private club to “willing” viewers is covered, as is exposure in parking lots and streets.[58]
Could the state legislature change the law by specifically amending the indecent exposure statute to prohibit exposure of female breasts by dancers in topless bars and clubs since the legislature can generally change the common law by enacting a statute? In this instance, however, the First Amendment may well limit the General Assembly’s ability to expand the coverage of this statute. The Supreme Court has twice addressed the constitutionality of laws attempting to ban topless dancing. The Court in 1981 in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim[59] held that a total ban on all commercial live entertainment by a Philadelphia suburban community, a measure adopted to close a “peep show” in an adult bookstore, was unconstitutional. The Court held the borough had not established any justification for a total ban and had failed to provide adequate alternative channels for the presentation of speech protected by the First Amendment, including non-obscene nude dancing. But the Court in 1991 upheld an Indiana statute prohibiting “totally nude” dancing in Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc.[60] The issue in Barnes was that of regulation rather than a total ban on erotic dancing. As has been the situation in a number of First Amendment cases, Barnes produced a fractured court—in this instance there were four separate opinions—that supported regulation rather than a total ban on dancing. Chief Justice Renquist’s plurality opinion, joined by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, held that nude dancing was on the periphery of protected speech and that the requirement of this statute that dancers wear very minimal costumes was a narrowly tailored response to the important governmental interest of protection of public morals. Justice Scalia would have held the regulation valid as a general law applying to conduct—nudity in this instance—rather than speech and therefore not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all. Justice Souter’s narrowly drawn concurring opinion applying the O’Brien tests in the context of regulating secondary impacts provided the necessary fifth vote to sustain the regulation.[61] As the only portion of the Barnes decision supported by a majority of the Court, Justice Souter’s opinion has been influential in subsequent decisions.[62] Thus, for North Carolina to amend its indecent exposure statute and ban topless dancing altogether in a manner consistent with the Barnes decision, it would be necessary to establish negative secondary impacts from topless bars, as opposed to simply prohibiting topless dancing per se.
C. Other Statutes
In 1977 the General Assembly adopted several specific restrictions on “adult establishments,” which include adult bookstores, motion picture theaters, motion picture mini-theaters, live entertainment, and massage
businesses.
[63] The basic rule established by G.S. 14-102.11 is that not more than one adult establishment can be located within a single
building.
[64] So the establishment of “sexually explicit supermarkets” has been banned in North Carolina. For example, a topless bar cannot also sell adult books, nor can a massage parlor also screen adult movies.
One federal court has held that this statute preempts any more restrictive local requirement that separates sexually oriented businesses.[65] The contested ordinance was a general county ordinance, not adopted as part of a general zoning ordinance, that required sexually oriented businesses to be located at least 1,000 feet from dwellings, places of worship, schools, parks, and other sexually oriented businesses. The ordinance required existing businesses that were not in compliance to close or relocate within two years. The court held this restriction on location of the businesses regulated the same subject as G.S. 14-202.11 and was thus preempted. It should be noted though that the state statute applies to the number of adult businesses located within a single structure and is completely silent as to where that building may be located relative to surrounding land uses. Thus it is unlikely (though possible) that state courts will extend this rationale to hold that the statute preempts the many zoning restrictions on location of sexually oriented businesses.
The North Carolina statutes governing alcohol sales also include specific restrictions on adult entertainment. These statutes reemphasize the state’s indecent exposure and obscenity laws.[66] Among other things, under G.S. 18B-1005(a) the following conduct is prohibited on the premises of any facility with an ABC permit:
- any conduct or entertainment by any person whose private parts are exposed or who is
- wearing transparent clothing that reveals the private parts;
- any entertainment that includes or simulates sexual intercourse or any other sexual act; or
- any other lewd or obscene entertainment or conduct, as defined by the rules of the Commission.[67]
The court has upheld the revocation of a permit to sell beer where there was testimony that a topless waitress on more than one occasion exposed her pubic area to patrons when collecting change from
customers.
[68]G.S. 14-190.13 to 14-190.19 make it criminal offenses for the participation of minors in a variety of sexual activities, including participating in or viewing topless dancing or viewing non-obscene but sexually explicit materials. The courts have long upheld restrictions designed to prevent minors from being exposed to sexually explicit material.[69] Thus any adult establishment must limit its patronage to those over the age of eighteen.
Finally, state law on nuisance abatement[70] provides an additional enforcement tool should an adult entertainment business provide obscene materials as a principal or substantial[71] part of its business. G.S. 19-1 makes the use of a building for the purposes of illegal possession or sale of obscene films or photographs[72] a public nuisance. This statute also defines us of the property for prostitution, assignation, or sale of illegal drugs or alcohol a nuisance. For the purposes of this nuisance statute, “prostitution” has been held to include any physical contact with a person’s genitals, buttocks, or breasts for a fee.[73] A private citizen, as well as the state or a local government, can institute a court action to secure an injunction to prohibit use of a building for such purposes.[74] The statute not only allows all obscene material to be seized as contraband, it allows all of the gross proceeds from unlawful activity to be forfeited to the general fund of the local government in which the nuisance was maintained[75] and allows the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney fees.[76]
III. Regulating the Location of Sexually Oriented Businesses
There is a wide variety of sexually oriented businesses that cannot be entirely banned from a city or county. These include stores selling non-obscene but sexually explicit books, magazines, and paraphernalia; stores that rent or screen non-obscene X-rated movies; and clubs and bars that feature topless or minimally clad dancers. In all of these instances, substantial regulation of the business is allowed if the proper foundation is established. This section reviews the key United States Supreme Court cases establishing the ground rules for local regulation of these businesses and then reviews the application of these principles over the past twenty years by federal appellate courts.
A. Overview of Key Supreme Court Cases
A cautious United States Supreme Court in 1976 first addressed a local ordinance regulating the location of sexually oriented businesses in Young v. American Mini-Theatres,
Inc.
[77] This 5-4 decision upheld a 1972 amendment to the “anti-skid row” provisions in Detroit’s zoning ordinance. The ordinance required adult theaters to be located at least 1,000 feet from any two other regulated uses and 500 feet from residential zoning districts. The city based this dispersal requirement upon a finding that a concentration of adult-use establishments “tends to attract an undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and business to move
elsewhere.”
[78] The court held that the city’s interest in preventing the deterioration of urban neighborhoods justified the restriction on location of adult uses. Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, which supplied the necessary fifth vote for upholding the ordinance, employed the four-part test of United States v.
O’Brien
[79] and emphasized balancing the important and substantial governmental interest in stable neighborhoods against the incidental (and in this instance minimal) impact of the ordinance on protected
speech.
[80]There are several important aspects of the Young decision. First, the ordinance in question was based on protection of neighborhoods from deterioration, not a community objection to the content of adult entertainment.[81] The ordinance required dispersal of a number of “regulated businesses” that could cause a “skid row” effect if unduly concentrated.[82] In addition to adult theaters and bookstores, the ordinance prohibited a concentration (more than two uses within 1,000 feet of each other) of cabarets, bars, pawnshops, pool halls, hotels, lodging houses, secondhand stores, and even shoeshine parlors. Second, the ordinance was based on an established local problem. There was evidence that in the five years leading up to adoption of the ordinance, the number of adult theaters in Detroit had risen from two to twenty-five, with a comparable increase in the number of other adult establishments. Third, the ordinance did not purport to substantially restrict the availability of constitutionally protected speech (which includes non-obscene adult films and books). The court distinguished this modest separation requirement for multiple adult establishments from a total ban on protected speech, noting the ordinance did not limit the total number of adult establishments in the city nor deny ready access as establishments for adult uses could still be located in any commercial district as long as there were not already two other such uses nearby.[83]
Ten years later a somewhat more sympathetic court[84] revisited this question and upheld a more restrictive location ordinance in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.[85] Renton, a city of 32,000 located just south of Seattle, adopted an ordinance requiring adult theaters to be located at least 1,000 feet from any residential zone, residence, church, park, or school. The effect of this was to leave only 520 acres, about 5 percent of the city’s land area, available for use by adult theaters.
Justice Renquist, writing for a six-member majority of the Court, held that Renton’s ordinance should be reviewed as a content neutral time, place, and manner restriction on free speech. The ordinance was deemed to be “content neutral” even though there was differential treatment of theaters based on the type of films being shown. The court reasoned that the content of the films was not the basis of the ordinance because the city council’s “predominate concern” in adopting it was the secondary effects of adult theaters on the surrounding neighborhood.[86] The court held that the critical inquiry in determining the validity of a restriction on the location of premises for adult uses is whether the ordinance “is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.”[87]
There are several particularly notable aspects of the Renton decision. First, the Court did not impose particularly stringent requirements on the degree of effort a local government must undertake to demonstrate the need for regulation of adult businesses. In Renton, the governing board’s findings relative to secondary impacts, which formed the basis for establishing the city’s requisite substantial interest, were added to the ordinance after litigation was commenced. Also, the city was allowed to rely on studies prepared by neighboring Seattle, rather than having to document any negative secondary impacts of adult theaters in Renton itself. The court held studies from other locations could be the basis of the restriction “so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem the city addresses.”[88] Second, the court allowed the regulations to be imposed as a preventive rather than a corrective measure. There were no adult establishments at all present in Renton when the ordinance was adopted. Third, the court allowed a substantial restriction, but not total exclusion, on the availability of permissible sites for adult entertainment. The court held that leaving 5 percent of the city’s land area potentially open to adult uses allowed “reasonable alternative avenues” for protected speech. The court noted that while the city could not effectively deny the opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the entire city, the adult entertainment operators would have to fend for themselves in the real estate market. The city has no obligation to assure that sites are readily available at bargain prices.[89]
In sum, the Young and Renton decisions established the following tests for determining the validity of local regulations on sexually oriented businesses with First Amendment protection. To be upheld, the restrictions must
- Be content neutral. If the predominate purpose of the regulation is to address the secondary impacts of adult uses, it is deemed content neutral;
- Serve a substantial governmental interest. If there is an adequate foundation of study and deliberation that the governing body reasonably believes to be relevant to addressing secondary impacts in their jurisdiction, the regulation is deemed to serve a substantial governmental interest;
- Allow for reasonable alternative avenues of communication. If the regulation provides reasonable opportunities to operate adult-use businesses within the jurisdiction, even if the sites are not economically attractive, adequate alternative avenues have been provided; and,
- Be narrowly tailored to meet the substantial governmental interest. If the scope of the regulation covers no more than is necessary to prevent harmful secondary impacts, it is narrowly tailored and is not overly broad.
Each of these tests is discussed in detail below.
B. Establishing a Legitimate Purpose for Regulation: Motive and Content Neutrality
A regulation that imposes special restrictions on sexually oriented businesses that have First Amendment protection must be based on the secondary impacts of those businesses. The regulation cannot be based on an attempt to suppress or eliminate the content of the material available in these businesses. The courts term this a requirement that the restriction be “content
neutral.”
[90] The difficulty this requirement presents is that there are usually mixed motives and purposes at work as local governments develop recommendations for regulating sexually oriented businesses.
To be considered “content neutral” the predominant purpose of the regulation of adult business location and operation must be to prevent harmful secondary impacts—neighborhood blight, increases in crime, decreases in property values, and the like. It is not unusual for the public record surrounding the adoption of local restrictions on adult uses to contain a number of statements from members of the public, the city or county staff, and governing board members regarding other purposes of the regulatory action. It is commonplace that many, sometimes most, of these comments focus on the content of the speech. What if there is a memo from the city planner or county attorney in the file noting that their purpose in drafting the regulation was to “run adult businesses out of town”? What if a majority of the board members adopting the ordinance explicitly state in the minutes of the meeting that they have acted in order to rid the community of immoral books, material that is degrading to women, or sleazy performances they feel are inherently evil and are detrimental to the character of their community?
As a general rule, the actual motives of the governing board in adopting the regulation are irrelevant. Noting it is best to eschew altogether the guesswork inherent in determining legislative motive, the Supreme Court has held, “It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”[91] Courts examine the regulation itself rather than the motive of the adopting body to determine if the regulation serves a legitimate purpose. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in reviewing a Houston, Texas, ordinance restricting the location of topless bars, “We do not ask whether the regulator subjectively believed or was motivated by other concerns, but rather whether an objective lawmaker could have so concluded, supported by an actual basis for the conclusion.”[92] The statement of purpose in the regulation and the specific terms of the restrictions are the key factors to be examined, not the personal statements of motive from citizens, staff, or elected officials.
Though advisable, it is not absolutely necessary that a regulation of sexually oriented businesses have a statement of purposes regarding secondary impacts. In the Barnes case, Justice Souter was willing to infer an intent to regulate to address secondary impacts based on the terms of the regulation.[93] However, a section of the ordinance on “Findings” or “Statement of Purpose” is prudently used to explicitly set out concern about secondary impacts of adult businesses as a foundation for regulatory action. These provisions can be important in establishing the validity of the regulation. For example, when the Little Rock, Arkansas, governing board was considering adult business regulations, there was a memo in the files from the city attorney to his staff asking for legal analysis of steps the city could take to regulate adult businesses, with the notation, “Please get together and draft a legal opinion on this—I want to shut these places down! Somehow.” The subsequently adopted ordinance had a number of “whereas” clauses, all related to detrimental secondary impacts. When the ordinance was challenged, the reviewing court held the stated purpose of the ordinance was important; the personal motivation of the city attorney and any “hidden motive” of the council were not.[94]
Still, a local government places itself at some risk of having its regulations invalidated if it treats the requirement of having a predominate purpose of addressing secondary impacts as a legal fiction to be given lip service but otherwise ignored.[95] This is particularly the case if the record indicates the restrictions have been hurriedly adopted to stop a single business. It is not unusual for zoning amendments to be proposed to deal with particular emerging issues. However, since these particular types of restrictions must have a predominate purpose of addressing secondary impacts, many courts are particularly sensitive to First Amendment infringements when the record of local consideration contains only expressions of moral outrage about the content of adult entertainment.
The judicial fate of a Pensacola, Florida, ordinance illustrates this point.[96] There had been topless bars in town for a number of years. Then, the Rawhide Topless Go-Go & Lounge, complete with large pictures of go-go girls painted on the side of the building, opened next door to the Brownsville Baptist Church. Church members and other concerned citizens immediately bombarded the city council with complaints contending that topless bars were an affront to all standards of decency, public sensibility, and propriety. The council instructed the city attorney to prepare the strongest possible ordinance to ban nude dancing in the city. The city then quickly adopted a regulation banning topless dancing in facilities selling alcohol, even though the police chief and city attorney had advised the council that the city’s existing topless bars presented no greater crime problems or neighborhood impacts than other bars. When challenged in court, the ban was invalidated, the court holding that mimicking another city’s ordinance or putting language on secondary impacts in the preamble was insufficient to establish a predominate purpose of addressing secondary impacts where there was no evidence of any concern other than with the moral content of the performances. The court concluded, “The general reluctance to plumb the legislative psyche does not mandate, however, that we turn a deaf ear to a record that establishes with unmistakable clarity the actual motives of the legislators in this case.”[97]
C. Establishing a Foundation for Regulation: Relevant Studies of Secondary Impacts
Once a local government establishes that its predominate concern in developing regulations for sexually oriented businesses is preventing harmful secondary impacts, it must establish a factual basis that those harmful impacts are real and that the restrictions will address them.
The courts have widely held that there are substantial and legitimate governmental interests in protecting adjoining neighborhoods from blight, preventing traffic and litter problems, preventing crime, promoting consistency with adopted land use plans, and maintaining property values.[98] The key question here is the extent of analysis each individual local government must conduct in order to determine if the specific regulation of sexually oriented businesses proposed for that community will in fact address these legitimate concerns. Can a small town or rural county rely on studies from a major urban center halfway across the country? Can a city rely on the observations of its officials and citizens, or is a professional study required? Can a study on the impacts of a massage parlor be used to justify restrictions on a video rental store? These are critical questions because very few local governments conduct their own local planning studies to document adverse secondary impacts.[99]
Local governments have an affirmative burden to establish a relationship between the restriction on protected First Amendment rights and the harms to be prevented. As with the motive question, however, the courts have been fairly lenient about this requirement. The courts have not been as demanding on establishing a substantial link (or nexus) between the means and ends of the regulation as has been the case in the property rights area.[100] For example, Justice Renquist noted in the Renton decision that each individual local government is not required “to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”[101] In that case the city relied on extensive studies from an adjoining city.[102]
A wide variety of studies have been found by the courts to meet this standard of “reasonably believed to be relevant.” For the most part courts have deferred to local elected officials’ legislative judgment in determining what studies are relevant. Some local governments have successfully used professional staff to make a study of the issue and assist in designing an ordinance that is specifically tailored to local needs.[103] A local government can also solicit analysis from local law enforcement personnel[104] and the legal staff.[105] In a number of instances, extensive public hearings and planning board discussions have been important in tailoring an ordinance to a particular community’s needs.[106] This local information, analysis, and debate is the best and legally safest approach for developing regulations on sexually oriented businesses.
It is also permissible to anticipate problems[107] by reviewing experiences elsewhere[108] and conducting a legal review of other ordinances and court decisions.[109] Courts have cautioned that there is a need to examine the studies underlying the other ordinances, not just their judicial validation.[110] In one of the decisions most sympathetic to local governments, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in upholding a regulation on the location of adult bookstores simply concluded that local governments could take notice of or assume matters of “common knowledge and experience,” which the court held includes the “notorious and self-evident” harmful secondary impacts of adult businesses.[111] The court tempered this with the admonition that local governments should limit their consideration to what has been generally experienced in “similarly situated” or “generally comparable” communities.[112]
Despite this judicial deference to local legislative judgment on the relevance of studies and experiences in other locales, courts will invalidate ordinances where there is no evidence at all in the record to justify a concern about secondary impacts.[113] This is particularly the case if there are existing adult businesses in the jurisdiction that have had no problems.
Local governments should also be careful to assure that the studies used are in fact related to the type of sexually oriented business being regulated. Several ordinances have been invalidated due to unsupportable inferences about the scope of potential adverse secondary impacts, especially when the regulation is aimed at businesses of a different character from those studied. For example, studies of the deleterious secondary impacts of a full-time adult theater should not be used to justify restrictions of a single showing of an adult film. In invalidating a location restriction that applied to any theater “temporarily or permanently used” to show adult films, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held “there must be a logical relationship between the evil feared and the method selected to combat it.”[115] The court went on to conclude, “Nor do we see how the County could make such a showing, since it is difficult to imagine that only a single showing ever, or only one in a year, would have any meaningful secondary effects.”[116] Similarly, some courts have been reluctant to sanction use of a study of the impacts of one type of adult business—such as a theater with live peep shows—to a totally different type of business—such as one with rental videos only.[117] These considerations also raise questions about expansive definitions of “sexually oriented business” to include businesses for which no studies of secondary impacts have been conducted, such as including cabarets with female impersonators within the scope of a regulation based on studies of adult bookstores.
Also, care should be taken to prepare the necessary information in the course of consideration of adoption of restrictions, not afterwards in response to litigation. Courts generally will allow use of studies conducted after the adoption of the regulation, but only if they supplement some information available prior to adoption.[118] While it is not necessary that the elected officials actually personally review all of the studies, they should be aware of the existence of the studies and have the opportunity to review them prior to adoption of restrictions if desired.[119]
D. Establishing the Bounds of Restriction: Reasonable Alternative Avenues
The Supreme Court’s initial case on regulating the location of adult businesses assumed the Detroit ordinance would not have “the effect of suppressing production of or, to any significant degree, restricting access to” protected
speech.
[120] However, in 1986 Renton opened the door to considerable limitation on the amount and location of sites permitted to be used for adult businesses, holding that the obligation was only to provide “reasonable alternative avenues for
communication.”
[121] There the court upheld a restriction that limited potential adult uses to 5 percent of the city’s land area and noted these did not all have to be commercially viable
sites
[122] so long as the city had not effectively denied the businesses a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult business.
Not surprisingly, defining the boundary between permissible reasonable limitations and de facto exclusion is a subject that has been frequently litigated as many local governments have attempted to come as close to that line as possible without passing it. A number of courts have upheld restrictions that generally fall close to the Renton facts—limiting adult uses to about 5 percent of the jurisdiction’s area.[123] On the other hand, courts have invalidated restrictions that effectively leave no alternative sites available.[124] Cases on the borderline, such as only allowing 1 percent of the city’s area for this type of use, have gone both ways.[125]
The test increasingly applied by the courts requires a case-by-case analysis of the detailed facts of each situation, with the critical inquiry being whether the application of the regulation leaves realistic sites available within the jurisdiction’s commercial real estate market that could be used for protected adult speech.[126] There is not a need to show that adult establishments could be profitably operated at such alternative sites; but if the costs of improvements necessary to make a site suitable for any commercial use are so high as to be prohibitive, the site cannot be realistically considered part of the commercial real estate market. Similarly, if the land is permanently dedicated to other uses (such as a municipal airport or landfill), the fact that it is technically “available” under the ordinance is irrelevant as that land is not part of the commercial real estate market.[127] In Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals proposed the following guides to determining whether property should be considered part of the relevant commercial real estate market (and thus available as a potential reasonable alternative avenue for conveying protected speech):[128]
- Is it reasonable to believe the property would ever become available for any commercial use?
- Is the property reasonably accessible to the general public, particularly if the sites are in manufacturing or industrial areas?
- Do the sites in manufacturing zones have proper infrastructure for commercial uses, such as sidewalks, roads, and lighting?
- Do the sites suit some generic commercial venture?
An interesting question is presented by jurisdictions with relatively small geographic areas. It is one thing to hold that a major metropolitan area or large county must make some space available for constitutionally protected speech, but is the same true for a small resort town or an exclusively residential suburban community? Such small communities routinely completely exclude certain high-intensity uses, such as heavy industry or high density multi-family housing. Can they also totally exclude topless bars and adult bookstores? The Supreme Court has hinted that this might be permissible, but only if there is evidence in the record to show adult entertainment is in fact allowed by the zoning of reasonably nearby
areas.
[129]
E. Establishing a Required Focus: Narrowly Tailored Regulations
A regulation that restricts non-obscene sexually oriented businesses must be narrowly tailored to meet the legitimate objective of preventing adverse secondary impacts. This requirement is usually stated as part of the O’Brien test—is the restriction on protected speech no greater than is
essential?
[130] Some courts refer to this as a requirement that the regulation not be “overly
broad.”
[131]A challenge based on lack of narrow tailoring most frequently arises when a restriction is drafted so tightly as to preclude even a single showing or rental of an adult film or performance or to include sale of even a single publication that includes adult materials. Examples of ordinances invalidated on this basis include: an ordinance that banned any female topless appearance in any public place;[132] an ordinance that applied to any theater even temporarily used for presentation of adult films;[133] an ordinance that applied to “any” depiction of specified sexual activity, no matter how brief;[134] an ordinance that purportedly addressed traffic problems but only applied to one topless bar and not twenty other nearby bars without adult entertainment;[135] and an ordinance that prohibited any exhibition of nudity.[136] Ordinances have also been invalidated that based a separation requirement on the presence of any residence (e.g., requiring the adult-use establishment to be 500 feet from any residence as opposed to 500 feet from a residential zoning district), the court reasoning that such a restriction is not narrowly tailored because the residence may be an isolated dwelling with no surrounding neighborhood to protect or may well not contain any children.[137]
The invalidation of two Onslow County, North Carolina, ordinances attempting to regulate “movie mates” and “escort services” illustrate the difficulty of narrowly tailoring an ordinance to regulate adult business other than bookstores, theaters, and topless bars. The first[138] involved a 1985 ordinance designed to address establishments known as “movie mates”—where female employees joined male customers in a booth to watch adult movies—and thought to be fronts for prostitution and other crimes. These businesses had arisen after the county severely restricted massage parlors in 1978, an action the court characterized as causing “the chameleon of adult entertainment to appear in novel hues.”[139] In an attempt to foil such ingenuity, the county adopted an ordinance licensing “companionship businesses.” The court, however, held the regulation overbroad and thus not rationally related to a substantial governmental purpose.[140] The court ruled regulation of “companions” is “broad enough to encompass both the salubrious and the salacious,”[141] as it captures both companions for the elderly in nursing homes as well as movie mates in adult mini-theater viewing booths. The county’s second attempt to regulate these businesses was a 1988 ordinance regulating “escort bureaus”; and it, too, was invalidated.[142] The ordinance required escort bureaus and each “escort” to be licensed, required a record of each client to be available for inspection by the sheriff, and prohibited transactions with juveniles. The court held the term escort was too vague and the ordinance as a whole was overly broad, as the court noted that dance instructors, golf and tennis pros, social secretaries, and chauffeurs could be considered escorts.[143]
F. Dealing with Preexisting Sexually Oriented Businesses: Amortization
Some local regulations on the location of adult businesses exempt existing businesses. Others require existing businesses to come into compliance within a set time period, even if that requires closing or relocation of the business. This latter practice is termed an “amortization” provision and is increasingly common. As a general rule, an amortization requirement is lawful if the time period allowed is
reasonable.
[144] The reasonableness of a particular provision requires a balancing of the benefits compliance provides for the community against the cost of compliance for the owner (considering the amount of the investment and the opportunity to recoup that
investment).
[145]In the context of adult business regulations, amortization periods upheld by the courts include: ninety days,[146] one hundred twenty days,[147] six months,[148] one year,[149] two years,[150] three years,[151] and five years.[152] Care should be taken to make an analysis of the reasonableness of each specific amortization proposal rather than simply adopting a time period that has been approved in a different jurisdiction. If the application of an amortization provision does not allow adult businesses forced to close or relocate an adequate opportunity to recoup their investment, the amortization provision may be invalidated.[153]
IV. Regulating the Operation of Sexually Oriented Businesses
In addition to specifying where these businesses can be located, many local governments impose additional requirements related to the operation of sexually oriented businesses.
In order to reduce exposure to minors and protect surrounding businesses, ordinances may require the windows of sexually oriented establishments to be opaque and limit exterior advertising.[154] However, a total ban on all outside advertising has been invalidated as too broad.[155] In order to reduce disease and illegal activity, many ordinances require individual viewing booths to be open and constantly visible to the business operator.[156] Other specific restrictions upheld by the courts include requiring dancers to be physically separate from the patrons,[157] limiting the hours of operation of adult businesses,[158] requiring adult materials to be in sealed wrappers with any sexually explicit covers being opaquely covered,[159] and requiring employees of massage parlors to remain fully clothed at all times.[160]
Another management technique frequently used by local governments is a licensing requirement for owners and employees of adult establishments. These requirements address the very important issues of how the adult business is operated and managed as opposed to where it is located. They differ from zoning requirements, which apply to the physical property involved irrespective of the owners or operators, in that they focus management attention on the operators. However, as with zoning requirements, there are constitutional restrictions on licensing of sexually oriented businesses. Any such license requirement that can effectively serve as a prior restraint on protected First Amendment speech must have clear and definite standards for decisions and must have adequate procedural safeguards to ensure a prompt decision on license applications.[161]
Licensing standards that have been invalidated as too broad include a requirement that the operator be “of good moral character,”[162] that operators be local residents,[163] that the business be operated “in a peaceful and law-abiding manner,”[164] and that the use not be detrimental to the neighborhood.[165] Examples of standards that have been upheld include that the adult use not unreasonably increase pedestrian traffic, noise, or disruptive conduct.[166] It is permissible to require disclosure of the names of the owners, operators, and employees of adult establishments in order to check criminal records and the like.[167] However, requirements for disclosure of past aliases have been invalidated, as have requirements to disclose shareholders that have no responsibility for operation of the business.[168] It is not permissible to require a log be kept of the names of customers as this would unduly impinge on rights of association.[169] Also, any regulatory fees charged must be reasonably related to the costs of administering and enforcing this particular ordinance. For example, a Seattle licensing fee that generated $86,715 revenue in a year where the cost of administering the licensing program was $2,040 was invalidated as unreasonable.[170]
As for the timeliness of decisions, the regulatory scheme must provide for a brief review of permit applications and must make provision for prompt judicial review[171] of any denials. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently invalidated an ordinance that allowed up to 150 days to make an initial decision on an application for an adult business license, with a period of at least 103 days for a subsequent judicial review, ruling that this was not a “brief period” for decisions on applications nor did it provide the requisite “prompt judicial review.[172] Other courts have allowed review periods for adult business licenses ranging from sixty to ninety days.[173] These provisions likely do not impose any special time constraints on routine times for review of content neutral land use applications.[174] For example, it is permissible to process a special use permit review for an adult bookstore in the same time period required to process a special use permit for a similar commercial use.
V. Conclusions
Sexually oriented businesses are particularly controversial. Many citizens object to these businesses, contending they are indecent, immoral, and cause the decline of the community in which they are located. Yet non-obscene, sexually explicit businesses are legal. The books, magazines, videos, films, and performances they provide have a degree of constitutional protection.
A local government concerned about the impacts of sexually oriented businesses can do several things. Exhibition of obscenity and indecent exposure—as well as other criminal sexual activity such as prostitution—are crimes and have been totally banned by the state. Zoning restrictions on sexually oriented businesses can be adopted to minimize the adverse effects these uses may have on surrounding neighborhoods. These businesses can be limited to certain zoning districts and be kept a reasonable distance away from residential areas, places of assembly, and other sensitive land uses. Local governments can require premises for adult uses to be separated from one another so as to prevent an unwholesome concentration of adult businesses. Reasonable regulations can also be adopted to govern the operation of adult businesses to reduce the potential for criminal activity and assure responsible operation.
To successfully defend potential challenges to regulations restricting the location of sexually oriented businesses, a local government must establish a proper foundation for its regulations. The local government should document that the purpose of the regulation is to prevent secondary impacts. The regulating ordinance itself should include a specific statement of purpose regarding minimizing harmful secondary impacts of sexually oriented businesses. The local government should conduct a specific study of what these secondary impacts are and how the proposed restriction will reduce them. While studies and reports from other locations should certainly be considered, care should be taken to make sure the other studies are indeed relevant and helpful in determining just what local action is warranted. A small town in North Carolina enacting a regulation affecting a video store in a shopping mall where 5 percent of the store’s fare is in a back room devoted to adult films should not rely on a twenty-five-year-old study of the impacts on urban neighborhoods in Detroit or Seattle of a concentration of multiple adult bookstores and theaters. Such a tenuously related study not only provides little legal justification for the regulation, it likely provides scant practical guidance as to what is actually needed to help the community solve its problems. Finally, the local government should conduct an analysis that shows some practical (though not necessarily profitable) alternative space still exists in the community where legal adult businesses can be conducted.
If these steps are carefully followed, reasonable regulations can be adopted and enforced that balance the free speech rights of businesses and individual consumers with a community’s legitimate interest in protecting its neighborhoods.
See Appendix B for a summary of typical North Carolina local regulations restricting the location of sexually oriented businesses.
2.
Some of these, however, contain exceptions for limits based solely on alcohol sales or the motion picture industry rating system, thereby eliminating regular bars, clubs, and theaters that show R-rated movies from coverage.
3.
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). Also, a very broad and encompassing definition may add certainty in covering all sexually oriented businesses, but such an approach can raise serious constitutional problems of overbreadth. See the discussion of this danger on pages 19-20.
4.
Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 58-61 (1976). The Court noted that any uncertainty regarding borderline applications was readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts.
5.
See, e.g., ILQ Investments, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1418-19 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 578 (1994); 15192 Thirteen Mile Road, Inc. v. City of Warren, 626 F. Supp. 803, 819-20 (E.D. Mich. 1985). See also Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980) (upholding as adequately specific a definition of “sexually oriented commercial enterprises” as those “whose major business is the offering of a service which is intended to provide sexual stimulation or sexual gratification.”).
6.
Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 833-34 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980) (noting the definitions must be “reasonably specific and precise, bearing in mind that unavoidable imprecision is not fatal and celestial precision is not necessary.”).
7.
11126 Baltimore Boulevard v. Prince George’s County I, 886 F.2d 1415 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 496 U.S. 901 (1990) (upholding ordinance applicable to businesses with 5 percent of stock devoted to such material).
8.
KEV, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1986).
9.
Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1209-12 (5th Cir. 1982).
10.
Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).
11.
See, e.g., Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernadino County, 827 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987) (invalidating ordinance that applied to even tempoaarary use of theater for adult fare); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1219-22 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (invalidating Atlanta ordinance that applied to any depiction of sexual material). See the discussion of documenting secondary impacts and narrowly tailoring an ordinance at pages 14-17 and 19-20 for further details on this point.
12.
This board of adjustment determination is currently on appeal in superior court.
13.
See, e.g., Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980) (upholding Harris County, Tex. ordinance that regulated location of massage parlors, nude modelling studios, and the like but exempted bookstores, theaters, and businesses licensed to sell alcohol).
14.
Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988) (holding First Amendment protections apply even though ordinance exempted from its coverage bookstores with less than 20 percent of their material devoted to sexually explicit material).
15.
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). For a review of the case see A. Fleming Bell, II, Telling the Neighbors What You Think: City of Ladue v. Gilleo, Local Gov’t L. Bulletin no. 61 (Aug. 1994).
16.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
17.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
18.
447 U.S. 557 (1987) (invalidating total ban of promotional advertising by electric utility). See also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding ban of signs on public property) and Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (invalidating billboard regulation, with seven-member plurality holding a prohibition of commercial billboards could be permissible).
19.
See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S.Ct. 1585 (1995) (invalidating prohibition of all advertising of the alcohol content of beers); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993) (invalidating ban on commercial news racks). In order to maintain content neutrality, some sign regulations treat commercial and noncommercial speech alike.
20.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
21.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968).
22.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572-75 (1991) (concurring opinion).
23.
The Court has implied commercial sexually oriented speech is entitled to less protection than political speech, noting we would not march our sons and daughters off to war to protect it. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
24.
The Court has stated nude dancing is entitled to the “barest minimum” of protection, Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975), and that it is within the “outer perimeters” of the First Amendment, Barnes 501 U.S. 566.
25.
Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (invalidating regulation of “indecent” but non-obscene telephone communications); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
26.
See, e.g., Whitten v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.2d 1400 (8th Cir. 1995) (invalidating a city ordinance placing duration and lighting restrictions on political signs on the ground that this was a content-based restriction of protected speech that was not narrowly tailored to meet the city’s aesthetic and traffic concerns); Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994) (invalidating restrictions on signs within twenty-five feet of public right-of-way due to lack of content neutrality).
27.
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). This test is most frequently applied to regulations limiting expression in a public forum. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
28.
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
29.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
30.
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (invalidating an ordinance prohibiting display of signs critical of foreign governments within 500 feet of embassies).
31.
Id. at 321. In dissent, Justice Brennan renewed his objection to this line of analysis, noting the secondary impact motivation was an unworkable “fuzzy distinction.” Id. at 336.
32.
See, e.g., Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 831-32 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980). If a regulation is drafted to have a very low threshold for triggering special restrictions, such as showing a single adult film or having only a few adult books or videos, this distinction based on secondary impacts may be difficult to sustain.
33.
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1986) ; SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1279-80 (5th Cir. 1988); Specialty Malls of Tampa v. City of Tampa, 916 F. Supp. 1222, 1232 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
34.
See, e.g., Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1225-27 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
35.
See, e.g., New York Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (upholding New York state law banning nude dancing in establishments licensed to sell liquor); Grand Falloon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982) (upholding Coca Beach, Fla., ordinance prohibiting nude and topless dancing in establishments selling alcohol but allowing such elsewhere with minimum separations between such businesses); City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1985) (upholding ban on nudity in facilities serving alcohol). But see Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1985) (invalidating ordinance banning topless bars, noting state had not delegated to municipalities whatever authority Twenty-first Amendment provides).
37.
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 134 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1996).
38.
Id. at 4322. The fact that an establishment includes protected First Amendment speech does not exempt it from other legitimate police regulations. See, e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986), upholding a New York statute that allowed closure of premises found to be used as a place of prostitution as applied to an adult bookstore.
39.
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 134 L. Ed. 2d 711, 746 (1996).
40.
N.C.G.S. § 160A-174(b) (hereinafter G.S.) codifies the rule on state preemption of local ordinances. It provides that a city may not adopt ordinances if
(1) The ordinance infringes a liberty guaranteed to the people by the State or federal Constitution;
(2) The ordinance makes unlawful an act, omission or condition which is expressly made lawful by State or federal law;
(3) The ordinance makes lawful an act, omission, or condition which is expressly made unlawful by State or federal law;
(4) The ordinance purports to regulate a subject that cities are expressly forbidden to regulate by State or federal law;
(5) The ordinance purports to regulate a field for which a State or federal statute clearly shows a legislative intent to provide a complete and integrated regulatory scheme to the exclusion of local regulation;
(6) The elements of an offense defined by a city ordinance are identical to the elements of an offense defined by State or federal law.
41.
280 N.C. 238, 185 S.E.2d 644 (1972).
42.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1967). For similar state court rulings, see State v. Bryant and Floyd, 285 N.C. 27, 203 S.E.2d 27 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Cinema I Video, Inc. v. Thornburg, 83 N.C. App. 544, 351 S.E.2d 305 (1986), aff'd, 320 N.C. 485, 358 S.E.2d 383 (1987).
43.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
44.
G.S. 14-190.1(b). The court has ruled that this definition is neither vague nor overbroad because it specifically defines the types of sexual conduct deemed obscene. Cinema I Video, Inc. v. Thornburg, 83 N.C. App. 544, 351 S.E.2d 305 (1986), aff'd, 320 N.C. 485, 358 S.E.2d 383 (1987).
45.
G.S. 14-190.1(c). For a review of the state’s comprehensive update of its obscenity laws, see Samual T. Currin and H. Robert Showers, Regulation of Pornography—The North Carolina Approach, 21 Wake Forest L. Rev. 263 (1986) and Michael Kent Curtis, Justices’ (Not So) New Robes, 8 Campbell L. Rev. 387 (1986).
46.
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (invalidating conviction for showing film Carnal Knowledge).
47.
State v. Mayes, 323 N.C. 159, 371 S.E.2d 476 (1988); State v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 366 S.E.2d 459 (1988).
48.
While the Court has not precisely defined “hard core,” it has offered as examples representations of ultimate sex acts, masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. Nudity alone is insufficient. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25-27 (1973).
49.
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977) (affirming a conviction for mialing obscene magazine and films).
50.
State v. Watson, 88 N.C. App. 624, 364 S.E.2d 683 (1988).
51.
State v. Roper, 18 N.C. 208 (1835) (upholding a conviction for exposing one’s private parts while on a public highway). This case cited as authority an English case upholding a conviction for “skinny dipping” at a beach at Brighton. The beach involved had previously been widely used for nude bathing, but houses had recently been built nearby. Since this construction created the possibility of exposure to the public, nude bathing at that beach became criminal. The King v. Crunden, 170 Eng. Rep. 1091 (K.B. 1809).
52.
See, e.g., South Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 610 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding there is no constitutional right to sunbathe or associate in the nude); Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976) (upholding ban on nude sunbathing at national park).
53.
7 N.C. App. 166, 171 S.E.2d 468 (1970).
54.
It is likely that buttocks are also not included within “private parts,” though the court has not explicitly ruled on this point. North Carolina Crimes: A Handbook on the Elements of Crime 143 (Thomas H. Thornburg, ed., 4th ed. 1995). Even though female breasts are not “private parts,” the legislature in 1993 amended the G.S. 14-190.9 to exempt exposure during breast feeding from the prohibition.
55.
A conviction of the dancers and nightclub owner under this statute for “bottomless” dancing was upheld in State v. King, 285 N.C. 305, 204 S.E.2d 667 (1974).
56.
State v. Tenore, 280 N.C. 238, 185 S.E.2d 644 (1972). The defendant was the owner of The Tempo Lounge, a topless bar. The South Carolina court reached a similar conclusion, holding that a municipality could not prohibit all-nude and semi-nude dancing as state law did not prohibit nude dancing per se. Conner v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 442 S.E.2d 608, 609-10 (S.C. 1994).
57.
State v. King, 285 N.C. 305, 311, 204 S.E.2d 667 (1974).
58.
Exposure in a private car in the parking lot of a private business is covered. State v. King, 268 N.C. 711, 151 S.E.2d 566 (1966) (per curiam); State v. Streath, 73 N.C. App. 546, 327 S.E.2d 240, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 513, 329 S.E.2d 402 (1985). Similarly, exposure in a car on a public street is covered. State v. Lowery, 268 N.C. 162, 150 S.E.2d 23 (1966). In a case regarding public drunkenness, the court held that a “public place is one “which in point of fact is public as distinguished from private, but not necessarily a place devoted solely to the uses of the public, a place that is visited by many persons and to which the neighboring public may have resort, a place which is accessible to the public and visited by many persons.” State v. Fenner, 263 N.C. 694, 698, 140 S.E.2d 349 (1965). The court has not ruled on the applicability of this statute to a nudist camp, although in a zoning case the court of appeals noted, “there may be a serious question that use as a nudist camp is unlawful and in violation of G.S. 14-190.9.” Freewood Assocs. v. Davie County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 28 N.C. App. 717, 720, 222 S.E.2d 910 (1976).
59.
452 U.S. 61 (1981). See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (invalidating a Long Island town’s ordinance banning topless dancing, upholding a district court conclusion that an ordinance prohibiting any female from appearing in any public place with uncovered breasts was overly broad); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (invalidating an ordinance that prohibited the display of any nudity on an outdoor movie screen). Likewise, in Chase v. Davelaar, 645 F.2d 735, 737 (9th Cir. 1981) the court invalidated a ban on display of female breasts at any place serving food or beverages as overly broad and in Conner, 442 S.E.2d at 610, the South Carolina court held a total ban on nude and semi-nude dancing violated the First Amendment. The Georgia court also has addressed this question. In Pel Asso, Inc. v. Joseph, 427 S.E.2d 264 (Ga. 1993), the court invalidated an ordinance that prohibited “total nude dancing” and restricted “partial nude dancing” on the grounds it was overly broad and vague. The court subsequently upheld an ordinance that applied only to live entertainment featuring topless and/or bottomless dancing in facilities serving alcohol. S.J.T., Inc. v. Richmond County, 430 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011 (1993).
60.
501 U.S. 560 (1991) (upholding an Indiana statute requiring dancers to wear “pasties” and a “G-string” in order to prevent harmful secondary impacts). The Indiana statute was challenged by two South Bend establishments—a topless bar (the Kit Kat Lounge) and an adult bookstore with a live “peep show”—and dancers at both establishments. A local ordinance similar to this Indiana statute was upheld by the Pennsylvania court in PAP’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 674 A.2d 338 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
61.
The four dissenting justices—White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens—would have held the statute invalid as a prohibition of expressive conduct fully protected by the First Amendment and not narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.
62.
When a case is decided by a fragmented Court, the holding of the Court is viewed as that position taken by the justice concurring on the narrowest grounds. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
63.
G.S. 14-102.10. A bookstore is deemed to be covered if it “receives a majority of its gross income during any calendar month from the sale of publications (including books, magazines, and other periodicals) which are distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter depicting, describing, or relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas, as defined in this section; or . . . [has] a preponderance of its publications books, magazines, and other periodicals which are distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter depicting, describing, or relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas, as defined in this section.” G.S. 14-102.10(1).
64.
The statute was upheld as meeting the tests of Young and O’Brien in Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir., 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980). The court also rejected equal protection and vagueness challenges.
65.
K. Hope, Inc. v. Onslow County, 911 F. Supp. 948, 952-54 (E.D.N.C. 1995). The case is on appeal to the Fourth Circuit.
66.
In addition to zoning authority, both cities and counties in North Carolina have been given specific authority to regulate places of amusement, including nightclubs and similar establishments. This authorization specifically requires the local regulations to be consistent with state ABC permits and licenses. G.S. 160A-181, 153A-135.
67.
The Commission’s rule, 4 N.C. Admin. Code tit. 4, ch 2S § .0216, provides:
(a) No permittee or his employee shall allow any person to perform acts of or acts that simulate:
(1) sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation, or any sexual acts that are prohibited by law;
(2) the touching, caressing or fondling of the breasts, buttocks, anus, vulva or genitals;
(3) the display of the pubic hair, anus, vulva or genitals.
(b) No permittee or his employee shall allow any person to use artificial devices or inanimate objects to depict any of the prohibited activities described in Paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(c) No permittee or his employee shall allow any person who exposes to public view any portion of his pubic hair, vulva, genitals or anus to remain in or upon the licensed premises.
While this rule generally tracks the definition of obscenity, an argument can be made that subsection (a)(2) prohibits some nonobscene erotic dancing. However, the statutory reference to “lewd or obscene” dancing supports a narrowing construction.
68.
Fay v. State Board of Alcoholic Control, 30 N.C. App. 492, 227 S.E.2d 298, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 175, 229 S.E.2d 689 (1976). The case involved the Bowry Bar in Jacksonville. The court was not persuaded that one could avoid violation of the rule regarding display of pubic hair simply by shaving the affected area, as was done here. The court ruled these were not criminal statutes to be strictly construed but were civil regulations to be reasonably interpreted so as to accomplish their legitimate objectives. Id. at 496. The court further held the permittee is responsible for the actions of the employee unless the action was sudden or unexpected in a manner so as to make it unfair to do so. Id.
69.
The constitutionality of a local ordinance requiring non-obscene sexually explicit books and magazines be in sealed wrappers and explicit covers to have opaque wrappers to prevent exposure to minors was upheld in Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass’n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985). See also Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding conviction for sale of “girlie” magazine to person under 17 years of age).
70.
For an overview of the nuisance abatement statute enacted by the General Assembly in 1977, codified at G.S. 19-1 through 19-8.3 see L. Lynn Hogue, Regulating Obscenity Through The Power to Define and Abate Nuisances, 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (1978). For a critique of the portions of the statute authoring injunctions against future violations, see Carolin D. Bakewell, Comment, The Constitutionality of North Carolina’s Nuisance Abatement Statute: A Prior Restraint on Nonobscene Speech, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 685 (1983).
71.
State ex. rel. Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979), vacated, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), on remand, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981) (adopting opinion in 296 N.C. 251 by reference). The case is reviewed in Robert H. Miller II, Note, Constitutional Law: Control of Obscenity Through Enforcement of a Nuisance Suit, 4 Campbell L. Rev. 139 (1981).
72.
Written material is explicitly excluded f rom the definition of obscene material for the purpose of the nuisance abatement statute by G.S. 19-1.1(2). Thus it may be applied to adult theaters and stores with video booths or pictorial magazines, but not to a bookstore with only textual material. Fehlaber v. North Carolina, 675 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1982).
73.
State ex. rel. Gilchrist v. Hurley, 48 N.C. App. 433, 443, 269 S.E.2d 646, 653, cert. denied, 301 N.C> 720, 274 S.E.2d 233 (1981) (applying statute to Par-A-Dice Health Clinic, a Mecklenburg County massage parlor found to be operating as a front for prostitution). This is a considerably broader definition than is applicable in criminal cases. In State v. Richardson, 307 N.C. 692, 300 S.E.2d 379 (1983), the court dismissed a criminal charge of prostitution as applied to an employee of Sultan’s Harem Movie Mates in Jacksonville who had performed masturbation for hire. They held that criminal prosecutions for “prostitution” under G.S. 14-204 are limited to sexual intercourse for hire.
74.
G.S. 19-6. If the nuisance includes at least two prior occurrences within five years of the possession or sale of narcotic drugs, a forfeiture of the real property involved may also be sought (G.S. 19-6.1).
76.
427 U.S. 50 (1976). The challenge to Detroit’s ordinance was brought by the operators of two adult motion picture theaters—the Nortown and the Pussy Cat (a corner gas station converted to an adult mini-theater ).
78.
391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding a conviction for burning a draft card).
80.
Young was the initial case to uphold a locational restriction based on the adult content of the films shown and it promoted a strong dissent from Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. The dissenters contended that sexually oriented speech was entitled to the same level of protection as any other form of free speech, thus the land-use impacts of adult theaters should be addressed in the same manner as the impacts of any other theater. The dissenters also contended the Detroit ordinance was impermissibly vague (it applied to theaters presenting films “with an emphasis on” specified sexual content).
82.
This raises the question of where the dispersed adult businesses move. Fears that such a regulation would encourage relocation to “nicer” neighborhoods, which to a degree happened in Detroit, prompted the defeat of a similar dispersal regulation in New York City. Norman Marcus, Adult Use Zoning Revisited, 8 Metro Planner (newsletter of the Metropolitan Chapter of the American Planning Ass’n), New York, N.Y. Oct. 1995, at 3. New York City did subsequently adopt zoning restrictions on adult businesses. The provisions, to take effect in October 1996, limit businesses with over 40 percent of their inventory devoted to adult material to locations in limited manufacturing and commercial zoning districts and require a 500-foot separation from residences, schools, churches, and other adult uses. The restrictions would require the relocation of an estimated 150 of the 180 adult businesses in the city. Vivian S. Toy, New York’s Limits on Sex Shops Are Upheld, New York Times, Oct. 24, 1996, at B12. Enforcement of the requirements has been delayed pending resolution of judicial appeals regarding the adequacy of alternative sites and whether an adequate foundation has been established regarding secondary impacts. Vivian S. Toy, Judge Delays Enforcement of Sex-Shop Restrictions, New York Times, Oct. 25, 1996, at A16.
83.
“Viewed as an entity, the market for this commodity is essentially unrestrained.” 427 U.S. 50, 62. See also Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (invalidating ban on live entertainment).
84.
By 1986, two of the four dissenters in Young, Justices Stewart and Blackmun, had left the court and Justice O’Connor, whose views are less protective of the First Amendment protection available to adult entertainment, had joined the Court.
85.
475 U.S. 41 (1986). The Renton ordinance was challenged by the purchaser of two existing theaters who proposed to convert them to adult theaters.
86.
475 U.S. 41, 47-49. The fact that some members of the council may have been motivated by a desire to restrict access to adult films was deemed irrelevant as long as the predominate intent was prevention of crime, protection of retail trade, maintenance of property values, and preservation of the quality of urban life. Id.
87.
Advocates on both the right and the left have argued that content-based restrictions on pornography should be permitted. Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin contend pornography plays in important role in perpetuating a subordinate status of women and have urged adoption of local restrictions on sexually oriented businesses. For a detailed review of local consideration in Minneapolis and Indianapolis of this basis for regulation of sexually oriented businesses, see Donald A. Downs, The New Politics of Pornography (1989). The Indianapolis pornography ordinance was invalidated in American Booksellers Association v. Hundnut, 771 F.2d 323, aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). For further explanation of MacKinnon’s position, see Catherine MacKinnon, Pornography Left and Right, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 143 (1995); Catherine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
91.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). As Judge Phillips observed in the conclusion of the Fourth Circuit decision upholding North Carolina’s statute on adult establishments:
- In practical terms this statute may well be revealed as yet another essential failure in the ancient, essentially unequal struggle to contain various social side-effects of the commercial exploitation of human sexuality. An omniscience that could plumb the depths of the many strands of motivation behind this particular effort would undoubtedly reveal much of questionable social and philosophical insight as to both ends and means. Our concern is not, however, with questions of the practical ineptitude of legislation or even with the possibility of its sheer silliness or asininity in a social or philosophic sense, but with whether it violates specific rights secured by the Constitution.
Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 834-35 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980).
92.
SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1274 (5th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989).
93.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (concurring opinion). Justice Souter noted the key inquiry was “the existence or not of a current governmental interest in the service of which the challenged application of the statute may be constitutional.” Id. Under this rationale, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held an Akron, Ohio ordinance on nude dancing need not explicitly state an secondary impacts rationale as the court could infer such (though the ordinance in question was invalidated on other grounds). Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 134 (6th Cir. 1994).
94.
Ambassador Books & Video, Inc. v. City of Little Rock, 20 F.3d 858, 863-64 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 186 (1994).
95.
See, e.g., Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981) (invalidating ordinance whose sole purpose was to regulate the showing of sexually explicit movies).
96.
Another similar example is provided by Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F. 2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981), where the court invalidated zoning restrictions hurriedly adopted by North Little Rock, Ark., after learning of the imminent opening of city's first adult movie theater, with no empirical basis at all in the record relative to deleterious effects on surrounding neighborhoods. Similar situations, with subsequent judicial invalidations, resulted in 754 Orange Ave., Inc. v. West Haven, 761 F.2d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 1985) and in People Tags, Inc. v. Jackson County Legislature, 636 F. Supp. 1345, 1354 (W.D. Mo. 1986). See also Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981), where the court invalidated a restriction on location of adult theaters only after the town’s single existing theater announced its intentions to convert to adult fare. The fact that this 300-acre municipality had twenty bars that were left unregulated, and the record contained no objective information at all on the blight that might be caused by adult uses, led to the court to conclude there was not sufficient justification provided for infringement on protected First Amendment rights. But see D. G. Restaurant Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 953 F.2d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 1992) (fact that it took an application for a permit for a topless bar to spur council to action does not impute illicit motives).
97.
Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851, 856 (11th Cir. 1985). A latter case from the same circuit distinguished Krueger, a general police power ordinance, from zoning ordinances, noting that evidence of an actual problem may be required in the former but not the latter. International Food & Beverage Systems v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 794 F.2d 1520, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986) (remanding restriction on location of topless bars for further consideration in light of Renton).
98.
See, e.g., Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1158-59 (Wash. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979) (noting “the City’s great interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its neighborhoods through effective land use planning” and zoning).
99.
At a recent meeting of over seventy-five zoning officials from across North Carolina, while almost all of the attendees reporting having special zoning restrictions on sexually oriented businesses, none reported having conducted a local study of secondary impacts. Most relied on testimony of citizens and neighbors at hearings on the regulations and judicial validation of ordinances in other jurisdictions.
100.
Compare, for example, Chief Justice Renquist’s opinion in Renton with his opinion in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994). In Dolan the Court held the city’s studies and finding that a development could, as opposed to would, have an impact on traffic was insufficient to establish the requisite essential nexus between given legitimate ends and the greenway exaction that was imposed. Id. at 323. In many respects this difference reflects the current Court’s suspicion of (some woudl contend hostility toward) regulation of private property rights contrasted with their sympathy to regulation of sexually explicit speech.
101.
Even though the cities are only fifteen miles apart and are part of the same urban metropolitan area, the sites of the proposed adult uses and the likely secondary impacts in Renton were not particularly similar to those of Seattle. Seattle is a major international seaport with a population of over 500,000 (and the center of a metropolitan area of almost 3 million). It has a large number of adult-use businesses, bars, hotels, shelters, facilities for transients, and the like concentrated in a high-density area of the central city opposite the Pike Street Market. Renton is a city of 32,000 population with a low density downtown with few attractions for nonresidents.
103.
See ILQ Investments, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 578 (1994) (year-long study of secondary impacts by planning department, followed by extensive planning board discussion and public hearings, held adequate study); Holmberg v. City of Ramsey, 12 F.3d 140 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 59 (1994) (hiring professional planner to investigate secondary impacts and examine other studies held adequate); Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993) (studies by city attorney’s office and planning department, along with public hearings, held adequate even though studies not formally presented to the governing board); U.S. Partners Financial Corp. v. Kansas City, 707 F. Supp. 1090, 1094-95 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (testimony on secondary impacts to governing board committee considering regulation by two staff planners and two outside experts held adequate to support substantial basis for regulation that is unrelated to content suppression); Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1154-55 (Wash. 1978) (holding staff study of zoning plan requirements and surrounding land uses, followed by extensive public comment at hearings, was adequate).
104.
East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220, 222 (6th Cir. 1995) (report or arrest records around sexually oriented businesses and report by city vice squad held adequate); Grand Faloon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1982) (testimony of police on extensive criminal activity at one of two topless bars in town held adequate).
105.
Bonnell, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Oklahoma City, 792 P.2d 107, 112 (Ok. Ct. App. 1989) (holding detailed research and analysis by city’s legal department adequate).
106.
See, e.g., Envy, Ltd. v. City of Louisville, 734 F. Supp. 785, 786 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (series of five public hearings with testimony from law enforcement officials, medical personnel, neighbors, real estate professionals, city regulators, and adult business representatives held adequate).
107.
“A city need not await deterioration in order to act.” Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1211 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding zoning restrictions on location of adult businesses). See also, Postscript Enterprises v. City of Bridgeton, 905 F.2d 223, 227 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding a small town need not conduct independent health studies to justify ordinance requiring open booths in adult establishments).
108.
Studies cited as being reviewed by others include those from Austin, Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Oklahoma City, Phoenix, New York, and Seattle. Several of these studies are summarized in a 1989 Minnesota report, Report of the Attorney General’s Working Group on the Regulation of Sexually Oriented Businesses, June 6, 1989, reprinted in Jules Gerand, Local Regulation of Adult Businesses 393-403 (1995). These studies generally focus on crime rates and property value impacts within a block of adult businesses in large metropolitan areas.
109.
See Ambassador Books & Video, Inc. v. City of Little Rock, 20 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 186 (1994) (study of other ordinances by city attorney’s staff, followed by consultation with planning staff, held adequate); International Eateries of America, Inc. v. Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157, 1162-63 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 920 (1992) (reliance on Detroit ordinance upheld in Young sufficient). For an early collection of ordinance provisions from around the country, see F. Strom, Zoning Control of Sex Businesses 48-126 (1977).
110.
See, e.g., SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1274 (1988). Some courts have been skeptical of the value and need for independent verification of secondary impacts: “Any local government can hire a group of experts to say that “adult” entertainment produces undesirable consequences” or “to opine that they will cause crime and reduce property value.” International Food & Beverage Systems v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 614 F. Supp. 1517, 1521 (S.D. Fla. 1985), vacated and remanded, 794 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1986).
111.
11126 Baltimore Boulevard v. Prince George's County I, 886 F.2d 1415, 1423 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 496 U.S. 901 (1990). In a similar vein, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held the personal observations of local elected officials have substantial weight in establishing that there are negative secondary impacts of adult businesses. Thames Enterprises, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 851 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1988).
112.
11126 Baltimore Boulevard v. Prince George's County I, 886 F.2d 1415, 1423 (4th Cir. 1989).
113.
See 754 Orange Ave., Inc. v. West Haven, 761 F.2d 105, 112 (2nd Cir. 1985) (invalidating ordinance on adult bookstores where there was “no evidence whatsoever” relating potential impacts to legitimate public interests); CLR Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1983) (invalidating ordinance restricting location of adult bookstores where there was a complete failure to assert a factual justification, compelling or otherwise, for restriction); North Street Book Shoppe, Inc. v. Village of Endicott, 582 F. Supp. 1428, 1435 (N.D. N.Y. 1984) (invalidating ordinance absent “some showing of some factual basis for the purported governmental interest”); E & B Enterprises v. City of University Park, 449 F. Supp. 695, 697 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (invalidating restriction on adult theater where there was no evidence of secondary impacts, noting that if “the neighborhood preservation justification is a mere mask to cover an attempt to run out of town a theater whose fare some citizens do not approve,” the restriction must fall); Chambers v. Peach County, 467 S.E. 2d 519, 523 (Ga. 1996) (invalidating restrictions on nude dancing where there was no evidence of adverse secondary impacts before the governing board at the time of adoption of the restriction.)
114.
See Ebel v. City of Corona, 767 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1985) (application of restriction on adult bookstore location invalid when applied to existing bookstore and city failed to link the business to any of the cited secondary impacts); Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1985) (where there is no evidence of crime problems at existing topless bars, mere speculation as to potential problems is inadequate to establish a legitimate purpose for ban on topless bars). See also Janra Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Reno, 818 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (D. Nev. 1993) (invalidating restriction on adult business location where there was no evidence presented to support assumption that regulation would prevent secondary harms).
115.
Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernadino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1987).
116.
Id. at 1333. See also Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988) (“some relevant evidence” required to establish a link to secondary impacts); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F. 2d 659, 661-62 (8th Cir. 1981) (no substantial government interest in regulation absent some empirical evidence that a single theater would cause secondary impacts).
117.
Wolff v. City of Monticello, 803 F. Supp. 1568, 1572-73 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding an ordinance based on studies of adult uses as principal use is not narrowly drawn if applied to uses where adult aspects were an accessory use); World Wide Video v. City of Tukwila, 816 P.2d 18, 21 (Wash. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 986 (1992) (city can not rely on studies of impact of peep show businesses to justify regulation location of adult video store with “take out” only fare). But see T-Marc, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 804 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (holding Renton does not mandate comparisons between different types of adult uses if the same secondary effects are being addressed).
118.
11126 Baltimore Boulevard v. Prince George’s County I, 886 F.2d 1415, 1425 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 496 U.S. 901 (1990) (trial testimony and supplemental evidence cannot sustain regulation if there is no evidence in the preenactment legislative record, but can be used to explain stated interests); 15192 Thirteen Mile Road, Inc. v. City of Warren, 626 F. Supp. 803, 825 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (post hoc justifications should be considered suspect in order to assure the proffered justification is not pretextual, but may be considered to supplement the record); Chambers v. Peach County, 467 S.E. 2d 519, 523 (Ga. 1996) (affidavit on other studies prepared for litigation held inadequate if there is no evidence the studies were considered prior to adoption).
119.
Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993) (city council can rely on staff and planning board review of studies).
120.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976).
121.
475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986).
122.
Some pre-Renton decisions had invalidated ordinances that only provided “commercially undesirable” alternative locations. See, e.g., North Street Book Shoppe, Inc. v. Village of Endicott, 582 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. N.Y. 1984).
123.
See, e.g., Woodall v. City of El Paso III, 49 F.3d 1120, 1124-27 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that at least 50 alternative sites for twenty-two existing adult businesses is adequate); Grand Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, 27 F.3d 1068, 1069-70 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding restriction that left sixty-three potential sites for relocation of amortized adult uses, even though most sites did not have water and sewer or available buildings for lease); Ambassador Books & Video, Inc. v. City of Little Rock, 20 F. 3d 858, 864-65 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 186 (1994) (upholding limiting adult businesses to 6.75 percent of city land area, ninety-seven potential sites for relocation of amortized existing uses); Holmberg v. City of Ramsey, 12 F.3d 140, 144 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 59 (1994) (upholding restriction that allowed relocation of amortized uses to 35 percent of city’s commercial zones, noting high relocation costs irrelevant); International Eateries of America, Inc. v. Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157, 1165 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 920 (1992) (upholding restriction that left at least twenty-six alternative sites for location of adult establishments); Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 928 F.2d 278, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding restriction that left 6.6 percent of city’s commercial area available, noting some owners had successfully relocated); SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding restriction where a study found at least 40 percent potential sites existed in the 20 percent of the city area studied ); Specialty Malls of Tampa v. City of Tampa, 916 F. Supp. 1222, 1230-31 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (upholding restriction to 7.5 percent of city area); O’Malley v. City of Syracuse, 813 F. Supp. 133, 146-47 (N.D. N.Y. 1993) (upholding requirement limiting strip clubs to 4 percent of city area); T-Marc, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 804 F. Supp. 1500, 1504-05 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (upholding restriction that left at least 123 alternative sites available); Southern Entertainment Co. of Fla., Inc. v. City of Boynton Beach, 736 F. Supp. 1094, 1101 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (upholding restriction limiting location of adult business to eleven potential sites in a city of 45,000 population); Function Junction, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 705 F. Supp. 544, 552 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding twelve alternate locations as reasonable alternatives); S & G News, Inc. v. City of Southgate, 638 F. Supp. 1060,1066 (E.D. Mich. 1986), aff'd, 819 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1987) (upholding restriction limiting adult uses to a commercial zone comprising 2.3 percent of city jurisdiction); Centaur, Inc. v. Richland County, 392 S.E.2d 165, 168-69 (S.C. 1990) (holding sixteen alternative sites adequate).
124.
See, e.g., Woodall v. City of El Paso II, 959 F.2d 1305, 1306 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 (1992) (an ordinance that only makes land available that is physically or legally unsuitable for adult businesses has effectively suppressed protected speech); Ebel v. City of Corona, 767 F.2d 635, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1985) (ordinance invalid if there are no practically effective alternative locations for amortized adult businesses); CLR Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d 637, (6th Cir. 1983) (two to four potential sites for adult uses in a city of 60,000 population inadequate); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1214 (5th Cir. 1982) (ordinance invalid that banned adult uses from 90 percent of city and severely restricted location in remainder, rendering it all but impossible to locate an adult theater in the city); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94, 98-99 (6th Cir. 1981) (total ban of adult uses in very small jurisdiction not per se invalid, but need and reasonable nearby alternatives must be established); Janra Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Reno, 818 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (D. Nev. 1993) (three potential sites for adult business in a city of fifty-five square miles held inadequate alternative avenues); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1224 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Atlanta ordinance invalid as it leaves “very few feasible sites” available); Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 702 (M.D. Fla 1978) (Jacksonville ordinance invalid as application of separation requirements results in a total ban for all practical purposes of adult bookstores and theaters).
125.
Compare Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d 1255, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993) (upholding ordinance limiting adult businesses to 1.2 percent of city land area as adequate for relocation of five to six adult-use businesses required by amortization provision to move) and D.G. Restaurant Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 953 F.2d 140, 147 (4th Cir. 11992) (upholding ordinance limiting topless dancing to “a few poorly lit sites in industrial areas”) with Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989) (invalidating ordinance leaving 1.4 percent of city’s land available for adult uses as the paucity of alternatives would make a mockery of First Amendment protections). See also Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988) (remanding ordinance restricting stores with over 20 percent of business devoted to adult material to a 0.23 percent area of city to determine adequacy of alternatives); International Food & Beverage Systems v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 794 F.2d 1520, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1986) (remanding ordinance limiting topless bars to twenty-two potential sites for review of adequacy in light of Renton).
126.
Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1537 (1994) (invaliding ordinance due to lack of suitable alternative sites for relocation of amortized adult businesses). A federal district court in North Carolina has also applied this “commercial real estate market” test, ruling, “If the land remaining for adult establishments post-zoning would not normally be considered a potential site for any business, it is not available under Renton.” K. Hope, Inc. v. Onslow County, 911 F. Supp. 948, 959 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (emphasis in original).
127.
It may not be necessary, however, that the alternative sites actually be on the market. Southern Entertainment Co. of Florida, Inc. v. City of Boynton Beach, 736 F. Supp. 1094, 1101 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (alternative sites may be considered even where the owner has indicated an unwillingness to lease to adult businesses).
128.
Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981). The fact that surrounding rural areas were unzoned was not deemed sufficient to show that alternative sites are available. Further, it is likely that this opinion, if it exists at all, would only be available to very small jurisdictions.
130.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968). This issue is also sometimes raised as a potential equal protection violation.
131.
The courts allow a broader standing when ordinances limiting protected speech are challenged on grounds of overbreadth, reasoning that those who are actually affected are less likely to sue. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
132.
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 933-34 (1975).
133.
Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernadino County, 827 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987).
134.
Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 1981).
135.
Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1981) (noting less intrusive measures were available, such as ticketing parking violators).
136.
Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1219-22 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The Atlanta ordinance invalidated in this case defined adult bookstores to include any building which contained a magazine characterized by an emphasis on matters depicting specified anatomical areas leading the court to observe, “The many Atlanta subscribers to Playboy and similar magazines would be amazed to find that their homes are considered to be adult book stores and subject to the zoning restrictions under this ordinance.” Id. at 1220. See also Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 134-35 (6th Cir. 1994) (invalidating total ban on all nudity, including nudity in theatrical performances as well as in adult establishments, as overly broad); contra, O’Malley v. City of Syracuse, 813 F. Supp. 133, 141-43 (N.D. N.Y. 1993) (upholding total ban on nudity).
137.
Amico v. New Castle County, 571 F. Supp. 160, 169-70 (D. Del. 1983). The district court in the Young case reached the same conclusion, a result that was not challenged in the Supreme Court. Nortown Theater, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 369-70 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev’d on other grounds, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), rev’d sub nom. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
138.
Treants Enterprises, Inc. v. Onslow County, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987). Note that G.S. 14-202.11 was amended in 1985 to add a specific prohibition against a viewing booth in an adult mini motion picture theater being occupied by more than one person at any time, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 731, § 2.
139.
Id. at 778-79. This is the standard for review under both the state constitutional requirement restricting government regulation of business and trades and the state constitutional’s “law of the land” clause. N.C. Const., art I, §§ 1, 19.
141.
Treants Enterprises, Inc. v. Onslow County, 94 N.C. App. 453, 380 S.E.2d 602 (1989).
143.
Id. at 461. A third Onslow County attempt to address the issue, an ordinance banning nudity, was held to be “substantially overbroad,” but the federal court did not invalidate the ordinance in its entirety, holding it was subject to a narrowing construction by state courts. K. Hope, Inc. v. Onslow County, 911 F. Supp. 948, 952-54 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
144.
State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E.2d 320, appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975) (upholding three-year amortization requirement for junkyard). See generally David Owens, Amortization: An Old Land-Use Controversy Heats Up, Popular Gov’t 20 (Fall 1991). Of course, the local government must have the basic authority to impose an amortization provision on nonconforming businesses. East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995) (invalidating one-year amortization provision for nonconforming sexually oriented businesses due to lack of authority for amortization generally.)
145.
Holmberg v. City of Ramsey, 12 F.3d 140, 142 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 59 (1994).
146.
Northend Cinema Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153 (Wash. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979) (upholding ninety-day amortization requirement that included provision for balancing public benefits and costs, noting costs for improvements had either been fully recovered or could be used by future site lessons).
147.
City of Whittier v. Walnut Properties, Inc., 197 Cal. Rptr. 127, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
148.
Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 830 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980) (upholding requirement that only one adult business could be located within a single structure, with six-month grace period for existing businesses to come into compliance).
149.
T-Marc, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 804 F. Supp. 1500, 1504 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
150.
Centaur, Inc. v. Richland County, 392 S.E.2d 165, 169 (S.C. 1990).
151.
Ambassador Books & Video, Inc. v. City of Little Rock, 20 F.3d 858, 865 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 186 (1994) (business has no absolute right to continue to operate at same location and three-year amortization period is adequate).
152.
Bonnell, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Oklahoma City, 791 P.2d 107, 112 (Ok. Ct. App. 1989). See also Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215, 224 (N.Y. 1989) (upholding amortization periods ranging from 1.25 years to 5.25 years, depending on the amount of capital investment in the adult business).
153.
Ebel v. City of Corona, 767 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1985) (ninety-day amortization inadequate where adult business had five-year lease and substantial investment and ordinance allowed few if any alternative locations). Of course, if general state law restricts application of amortization requirements generally, those restrictions would also apply to non-conforming adult businesses. People Tags, Inc. v. Jackson County Legislature, 636 F. Supp. 1345, 1357-58 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (invalidating 120-day amortization requirement for adult business); PA Northwestern Distributors v. Zoning Hearing Board, 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa. 1991) (invalidating ninety-day amortization as an unconstitutional taking).
154.
Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1218-20 (holding provocative posters can be banned, but prohibition of sign with legend “Adult Theater” is too broad). State v. Holmberg, 545 N.W. 2d 65, 70-71 (Ct. App. Minn. 1996) (upholding Minneapolis ordinance limiting signs in windows and requiring that no merchandise or entertainment be visible from the exterior of the building).
155.
Wolff v. City of Monticello, 803 F. Supp. 1568, 1575 (D. Minn. 1992) (total ban on interior and exterior advertising is not narrowly tailored). See also MD II Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 28 F.3d 492, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1994) (invalidating restriction of any term in advertising that is calculated to attract patrons with nudity, semi-nudity, or simulated nudity).
156.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Comm’n on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 10 F.3d 123, 139-44 (3rd Cir. 1993) (upholding open-booth requirement); Doe v. City of Minneapolis, 898 F.2d 612, 615-20 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding open-booth ordinance); Berg v. Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County, 865 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding open-booth ordinance); Wall Distributors, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 782 F.2d 1165, 1168-70 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding open-booth requirement); Ellwest Stereo Theaters, Inc. v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding open-booth ordinance, noting right of privacy does not extend to public places such as theaters).
157.
KEV, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding requirements that exotic dancing be conducted at least ten feet away from patrons and on a stage raised at least two feet above the floor as reasonable to prevent negotiations for narcotic transfer or sexual favors); T-Marc, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 804 F. Supp. 1500, 1506-07 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (upholding requirement of minimum three-foot separation between exhibitors and patrons).
158.
Mitchell v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 10 F.3d 123, 132-39 (3rd Cir. 1993) upholding requirement limiting hours of operation to 10:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday); Star Satellite, Inc. v. City of Biloxi, 779 F.2d 1074, 1079-80 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding requirement limiting hours of operation to 10:00 a.m. to midnight, Monday through Saturday); Envy, Ltd. v. City of Louisville, 734 F. Supp. 785, 790 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (upholding a limit on operation between midnight and 6:00 a.m. as reasonable to prevent noise and crime problems). Note that in North Carolina state regulations set maximum hours of operation for establishments with ABC licenses and this may pre-empt stricter local regulation. In re Melkonian, 85 N.C. App. 351, rev. denied, 320 N.C. 631 (1987).
159.
Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass’n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985).
160.
Mini Spas, Inc. v. South Salt Lake City, 810 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1987).
161.
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (invalidating ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses due to failure to provide a time limitation within which a decision must be made); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (licensing schemes that are a prior restraint on protected speech must contain adequate procedural safeguards).
162.
Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1217 (7th Cir. 1980); Broadway Books, Inc. v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486, 494-95 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (holding that a license requirement that the applicant have good moral character is “an amorphous standard requiring the licensing authority to exercise unguided subjective judgment.”); Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 706-07 (M.D. Fla 1978).
163.
Broadway Books, Inc. v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486, 494 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (invalidating thirty-day local residency requirement as violation of equal protection); Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 699 (M.D. Fla 1978).
164.
East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995).
165.
Amico v. New Castle County, 571 F. Supp. 160, 172-73 (D. Del. 1983). In a zoning context, a regulation that allowed special use permits for adult theaters to be based on twelve specified factors “among other things” was invalidated as vesting virtually unlimited discretion with the board charged with decisionmaking. Barbuleau v. City of Newburgh, 640 N.Y.S.2d 935, 945-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
166.
Fantasy Book Shop v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115, 1122-23 (1st Cir. 1981) (upholding use of cited standards, but disallowing as too subjective a standard that the use not harm “legitimate protectable interests of affected citizens.”). The court further noted that any denial of a license must be supported by evidence, not just an assertion that the standard would be violated.
167.
TK’s Video, Inc. v. Denton County, 24 F.3d 705, 709 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding requirement to disclose names of owners, directors, partners, employees, and clerks); T-Marc, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 804 F. Supp. 1500, 1505-06 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (upholding requirement that adult-use establishments disclose the names, aliases, and dates of birth of employees, but prohibiting requirements for more extensive information); Envy, Ltd. v. City of Louisville, 734 F. Supp. 785, 790 (W.D. Ky. 1990); Broadway Books, Inc. v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486, 492-93 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (substantial record of criminal violations justifies disclosure requirement). See also American Library Ass’n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2610 (1996) (upholding some but not all record-keeping and disclosure requirements of the federal Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act).
168.
East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995) (invalidating requirement that all shareholders be disclosed, noting the disclosure requirement must be limited to those with a controlling interest and those with operational responsibilities); Acorn Investments, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 887 F.2d 219, 224-26 (9th Cir. 1989); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1217 (7th Cir. 1980).
169.
See, e.g., Treants Enterprises, Inc. v. Onslow County, 94 N.C. App. 453, 380 S.E.2d 602 (1989). The court held a client record-keeping requirement patently interferes with social relationships and was thus subject to strict scrutiny. The court found less obtrusive means of preventing prostitution, such as surveillance, informants, and undercover agents, were available. Id. at 458-61.
170.
Acorn Investments, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 887 F.2d 219, 224-26 (9th Cir. 1989) (invalidating licensing fee for operators of adult peep shows of $650 per year plus $25 per month per machine, finding asserted additional policing costs of $65,068 were unrelated to activities of these businesses). See also East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995) (application fee of $5,000 invalidated by district court, city reduced fee to $500, which was not challenged on appeal); TK’s Video, Inc. v. Denton County, 24 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding a $500 fee for businesses and $50 fee for individuals to be reasonable); Movie & Video World, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County, 723 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (upholding annual licensing fee of $800 plus $40 per booth for adult video booths); Broadway Books, Inc. v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486, 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (upholding a refundable $500 application fee); Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 704-06 (M.D. Fla 1978) (holding a $500 licensing fee unreasonable); City of Great Falls v. M.K. Enterprises, Inc., 732 P.2d 413 (Mont. 1987) (upholding a $300 per video booth fee as reasonably related to the costs of regulation where estimated first-year costs were $13,000 and the fee would generate $17,700). For a review of an analogous First Amendment and fees question, see William S. McConnell, The Constitutionality of Assessing Parade-Permit Fees, Local Gov’t Law Bulletin No. 62 (Oct. 1994).
171.
East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220, 224-25 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995) (holding a potential delay of five months for judicial review inadequate).
172.
11126 Baltimore Boulevard v. Prince George’s County III, 58 F.3d 988, 996, 1101 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 567 (1995). See also Chesapeake B & M, Inc. v. Harford County, 58 F.3d 1005 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 567 (1995).
173.
TK’s Video, Inc. v. Denton County, 24 F.3d 705, 708 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding sixty-day period); Wolff v. City of Monticello, 803 F. Supp. 1568, 1574 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding ninety-day period not invalid per se, but status quo must be maintained during period).
174.
Marty’s Adult World of Enfield, Inc. v. Town of Enfield, 20 F.3d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that special use permit review required for all business was valid as applied to adult bookstore and not subject to the strict scrutiny and procedural safeguards required by Freedman).
Appendix B: Sample North Carolina Local Regulations on Sexually Oriented Business Location
Appendix C: Zoning Text Provisions on Sexually Oriented Businesses From Selected N.C. Ordinances