Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (May 21, 2025)
This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on May 21, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.
Indirect criminal contempt proceeding is similar to a criminal trial, but is not a misdemeanor subject to statute of limitations.
State Board of Examiners of Plumbing, Heating and Fire Sprinkler Contractors v. Hudson, COA24-136, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Burke County case, defendant appealed the order holding him in indirect criminal contempt, arguing error in denying his motion to dismiss, lack of jurisdiction, and that the statute of limitations barred the contempt proceeding. The Court of Appeals found no error and affirmed the order.
In 2001, the State Board of Examiners of Plumbing, Heating, and Fire Sprinkler Contractors (State Board) obtained an injunction against defendant barring him from engaging in any plumbing, heating, or fire sprinkler business without a license from the State Board. Over the years, the State Board investigated complaints against defendant, most recently in 2021 where investigators turned up evidence defendant performed work on an HVAC unit. After a show cause hearing in 2023, the trial court entered an order holding defendant in indirect criminal contempt for violating the injunction. The trial court initially issued an oral ruling and filed a form document titled “Order in Indirect Criminal Contempt Proceeding” in July 2023. This was followed in August 2023 by the “Order of Contempt and Order of Arrest” with findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Court of Appeals first established the applicable standard for review on the motion to dismiss, noting that indirect criminal contempt proceedings are similar to normal criminal trials and “a show-cause order in a criminal contempt proceeding, while not ‘equivalent’ to a criminal indictment is ‘akin’ to one.” Slip Op. at 8 (cleaned up). The court determined the substantial evidence standard was appropriate and reviewed the trial court’s order de novo, finding substantial evidence to support denying defendant’s motion.
The court next considered defendant’s argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Defendant initially filed an appeal after the July 2023 oral ruling and form document order, which he argued deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the later August 2023 order. The court disagreed, explaining the July ruling and form did not represent a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order. Instead, the order from August “was the trial court’s final judgment,” as it was file-stamped and “included the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to [G.S.] 5A-15(f).” Id. at 16-17.
Finally, defendant argued that indirect criminal contempt was barred by the two-year statute of limitations on misdemeanors in G.S. 15-1. The court disagreed that the misdemeanor statute of limitations applied, explaining “criminal contempt is not tantamount to a traditional ‘crime.’” Id. at 23. To support this reasoning, the court explained the nature of criminal contempt, and pointed to State v. Burrow, 248 N.C. App. 663, 670 (2016), where the court had previously held “a criminal contempt adjudication is not a misdemeanor in North Carolina.” Slip Op. at 24. The court also noted that the contempt provisions are in G.S. Chapter 5A, not in G.S. Chapter 14 with the majority of other penal statutes, and Chapter 5A contains no statute of limitations.
Trial court erred when holding defendant in direct criminal contempt for testing positive for a controlled substance before entering a plea.
State v. Aspiote, COA24-298, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Carteret County case, defendant appealed the order holding him in direct criminal contempt, arguing error by the trial court. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversing and remanding for further proceedings.
In July 2023, defendant appeared in Superior Court to plead guilty to charges from a 2022 crime. Defendant answered “yes” to the question asking if he was using or consuming alcohol or drugs, telling the trial court he consumed some that morning before the hearing, but that his mind was clear. Defendant never told the trial court the type of substance he consumed. The trial court ordered defendant to take a urine test, and the test returned a positive for methamphetamine. At that point, the trial court declared it would not accept defendant’s plea and held defendant in direct criminal contempt for delaying the proceedings.
The Court of Appeals noted that while the trial court’s order was predicated on defendant’s delay of the proceedings because he tested positive, “nowhere in the record does it show that Defendant ever represented to the trial judge he would not test positive for a controlling substance.” Slip Op. at 5. Additionally, “the record does not show the type of substance Defendant ingested on the morning of the hearing.” Id. at 6. Since there was no evidence of delay in the trial court’s presence, defendant’s actions could not form the basis of direct criminal contempt. The court also specifically noted that delay waiting for defendant to take the urine sample could not support direct contempt “as Defendant’s act in providing the sample took place outside the presence of the court.” Id.
(1) Expressing alignment with the sheriff was unusual but not error; (2) admitting bloody clothing was not error; (3) forensic download of phone was admitted with proper foundation; (4) State’s closing arguments were proper.
State v. Joyner, COA24-438, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Hertford County case, defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing error in (1) the trial court’s remarks to the jury expressing alignment with the sheriff’s office, (2) admitting the victim’s bloody clothing as evidence, (3) admitting a forensic download of defendant’s phone, and (4) failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State’s closing. The Court of Appeals found no error.
In February of 2021, defendant confronted his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend at the boyfriend’s house. After an argument and physical confrontation, defendant and the new boyfriend started fighting. Eventually defendant pulled out his gun and shot the boyfriend eight times, killing him. During jury selection for the trial, the trial court introduced the sheriff of Hertford County to the potential jurors, and “[t]hroughout the rest of the five-day trial, the trial court thanked the jurors for their service ‘on behalf of the Sheriff’ approximately sixteen times.” Slip Op. at 7. During trial, the State offered the bloody shirt, shorts, and pants of the victim as an exhibit to demonstrate where the victim was shot. The State also offered a forensic download of defendant’s phone to show the calls and texts between defendant and his ex-girlfriend.
Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals explained that while the trial court’s choice to introduce and repeatedly reference the sheriff “was more than usual in this case, we cannot say that the trial court made an improper ‘expression of judicial leaning.’” Id. at 7. Even if the remarks represented error, overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt meant he could not show prejudicial error.
Moving to (2), the court noted that the bloody clothing was not excessively displayed or discussed in a way that would create unfair prejudice. As a result, under Rule of Evidence 403 “the probative value of [the victim’s] bloody clothing was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. at 10.
In (3), the court dispensed with defendant’s argument that the State did not lay a proper foundation under Rule of Evidence 901, pointing to the testimony of a sergeant that he “examined Defendant’s phone and performed the forensic extraction of the phone.” Id. at 11. Although defendant contended the testimony lacked information on when the extraction was performed and what method was used, the court explained that “[a]ll that is required under Rule 901 is that a witness with knowledge about the evidence in question testifies that ‘the matter in question is what its proponent claims.’” Id. at12.
Finally, in (4), the court explained that defendant did not object to a statement he subsequently asserted was erroneously-admitted hearsay, and failed to assert that it was plain error to admit the hearsay on appeal. As a result, the State’s closing argument was based on a properly admitted statement and defendant’s argument failed.
Trial court erred by not informing defendant he could withdraw his plea when the court imposed a sentence greater than the plea agreement.
State v. Latta, COA24-407, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Durham County case, defendant appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea agreement to robbery and kidnapping charges. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
In 2002, defendant entered a plea agreement conditioned on his testimony against a co-defendant, receiving an active sentence of 61 to 83 months as a prior record level I. However, defendant failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, and disappeared from North Carolina for 20 years, picking up several criminal convictions in other states during the interim. Defendant was subsequently arrested in Vance County in 2022 for possession of a controlled substance, and transferred back to Durham County, where his previous charges were reinstated. At trial, defendant filed a motion to set aside his plea agreement, which the trial court denied, and defendant was sentenced as a prior record level IV in the mitigated range of 71 to 95 months.
The Court of Appeals considered whether it was error to deny defendant’s motion before the trial court pronounced a sentence, and whether defendant should have had an opportunity to withdraw his plea after the trial court imposed a sentence greater than defendant had agreed to in the original plea. The court concluded that there was no error beforehand, as “there is no evidence to indicate that Defendant ever asserted legal innocence, nor was there evidence of incompetent counsel or misunderstanding of what a guilty plea entails.” Slip Op. at 4. However, afterwards there was error, as G.S. 15A-1024 allows a defendant to withdraw a plea as a matter of right when a trial court imposes a sentence greater than agreed to by the defendant. The court explained that “[a]lthough the sentencing occurred during the same hearing that Defendant separately moved to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial judge did not inform Defendant that he may withdraw his plea because the sentencing would be different than that which he agreed to.” Id. at 6. On remand, the court directed that the defendant either be sentenced to a term within his original plea agreement, or be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea if the trial court determined a greater sentence was warranted.
(1) Testimony from defendant’s ex-wife was properly admitted under Rule 404(b); (2) prosecutor’s statements asking jury to place themselves in the victim’s shoes were improper but not prejudicial; (3) trial court’s delay signing appellate documents was not prejudicial.
State v. Maney, COA24-894, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Jackson County case, defendant appealed his convictions for numerous sexual offenses against a child, arguing error in (1) admitting improper evidence under Rule of Evidence 404(b), (2) allowing the State to make improper prejudicial statements, and (3) failing to sign documents requisite to defendant’s appeal. The Court of Appeals found no error.
The charges against defendant arose from years of sexual abuse directed at his daughter and was corroborated by testimony from his ex-wife, who was also subject to sexual abuse by defendant. Before trial in 2020, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude portions of his ex-wife’s testimony, but did not object to the portions of testimony at trial that subsequently formed the basis of his appeal. During closing arguments, the prosecutor asked the jury to place themselves in the shoes of the minor victim several times; defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s comments. After trial, the trial court delayed for 19 months in signing the required appellate entries, as the trial court judge retired without signing the documents.
Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals walked through the various testimony from defendant’s ex-wife that he found objectionable, based around defendant’s threats to harm her, urging her to have an abortion, holding a knife and gun to her head, and other threatening acts towards her and her baby. Here the court found justification for admission under Rule 404(b), as the testimony “was probative of numerous aspects of the State’s case because it added context and illustrated Defendant’s state of mind when victimizing members of his family.” Slip Op. at 8. The court walked through the probative nature of the behavior, also noting that “a rational jury could have questioned why [the ex-wife] failed to report the abuse, thereby undermining her testimony about the rape, but the State utilized the challenged testimony to illustrate Defendant’s erratic, violent, and threatening behavior to explain [the ex-wife’s] failure to report the abuse.” Id. at 9. As the acts were substantially similar to the crimes charged, and admitting the testimony did not unfairly prejudice defendant, the court found no error in allowing the testimony.
Moving to (2), the court noted that under State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208 (1993), the prosecutor’s statements were improper, as a prosecutor cannot ask the jury to place themselves in the place of the victim. However, due to the overwhelming evidence against defendant, “they did not prejudice Defendant to the level necessary to warrant a new trial.” Slip Op. at 18.
For (3), the court looked to the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S 514 (1972), to determine if the delay in defendant’s appeal amounted to a prejudicial violation. As a delay of more than one year is presumptively prejudicial, the court continued to the analysis in the other three factors. The court noted that it was not clear that the delay was intentional due to the trial judge’s retirement. Defendant did not urge his appeal after the initial filing, weighing against him in the analysis. Additionally, the court saw no harm to defendant’s appellate arguments or preparation. As a result, the court concluded defendant was not prejudiced by the delay and found no merit in his appeal.
Judge Arrowood concurred only in the result.
Driving into a construction zone and striking an officer represented sufficient evidence of reckless driving; jury’s request for clarification did not show jury instructions were confusing.
State v. Montgomery, COA24-291, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Forsyth County case, defendant appealed his conviction for felonious operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest, arguing error in (1) denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence and (2) providing a confusing jury instruction. The Court of Appeals found no error.
In August of 2020, defendant drove his truck into a closed lane where construction workers were paving a highway. An officer was present doing lane control, and he attempted to stop defendant; at first, defendant slowed to a stop, but then began driving away as the officer ran to keep up with him. Defendant eventually ran over the officer’s foot and hit the officer with the front fender of his truck as he reversed out of the area. Construction workers took a picture of defendant’s license plate, allowing law enforcement to locate and charge him with eluding arrest. At trial, defendant stipulated that his license was revoked, meaning the State only had to prove one aggravating factor, that defendant was driving recklessly, to elevate the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony.
Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals disagreed with defendant that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he was driving recklessly to support the charge. The court pointed to the series of events after defendant drove into the construction area, as he “drove into a lane closed to regular traffic where multiple construction workers were working on foot and another worker was actively operating a paving machine” and then “drove his truck in reverse in the construction zone, going the wrong direction, increasing his speed as he drove.” Slip Op. at 6. Ultimately defendant struck the officer while backing out of the construction area, showing willful disregard for the safety of everyone present.
Reaching (2), the court explained that the trial court laid out the stipulation and the necessary issue the State had to prove in a statement to the jury, then provided the pattern jury instruction for the charge. After this, the jury asked for clarification between felony and misdemeanor, but the court noted “its inquiry does not render the trial court’s instructions erroneous.” Id. at10. Ultimately the court concluded “[t]aken as a whole, the trial court’s instruction to the jury on felonious operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest is correct.” Id. at 11.
(1) No error in providing a self-defense instruction that referenced disqualifying felonies; (2) no error in allowing detective to testify regarding trajectory of bullets using wooden dowels; (3) detective’s lay opinion testimony did not require notification under G.S. 15A-903(a)(2).
State v. Townsend, COA24-431, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2025). In this Guilford County case, defendant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing error in (1) instructing the jury on self-defense, (2) admitting testimony from a detective, and (3) failure to consider the detective’s testimony subject to disclosure under G.S. 15A-903(a)(2). The Court of Appeals found no error.
In October of 2017, defendant went to the apartment of the victim to buy marijuana, and shot the victim while he was preparing to sell to defendant. The detective at issue on appeal investigated the scene, examining the bullet holes in the wall to determine the trajectory of the shots. During the trial, the detective testified regarding photographs from the scene showing dowel rods in the bullet holes, and he used the dowel rods to demonstrate the trajectory of the bullets. However, the detective also acknowledged he was not an expert in ballistics or bullet trajectory. Defense counsel objected to this testimony, but was overruled. When instructing the jury, the trial court included a self-defense instruction including a statement that self-defense is not available to a defendant attempting to commit or committing a felony, and that “the State must prove ‘an immediate causal nexus between the Defendant’s use of force and felony conduct used to disqualify the Defendant from use of defensive force.’” Slip Op. at 4. When providing this instruction, the trial court told the jury that “attempting to possess two ounces of marijuana and attempting to possess any amount of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver are felonies.” Id.
In (1), defendant argued that possessing marijuana could not be a disqualifying felony for self-defense. The Court of Appeals disagreed, looking to State v. McLymore, 380 N.C. 185 (2022), and explaining the causal nexus requirement is a jury question. Here, the jury instructions “closely follow[ed] the guidance set forth in McLymore regarding the causal nexus requirement, including expressly articulating the State’s burden to prove but-for causation between Defendant’s felonious conduct and the confrontation resulting in [the victim’s] death.” Slip Op. at 9.
For (2), defendant argued admitting the detective’s testimony regarding the trajectory of the bullets was error as he was not qualified under Rule of Evidence 702. The court explained that neither party had provided cases on whether lay testimony under Rule 701 may cover bullet trajectories, requiring the court to consider precedent from other states. After surveying relevant caselaw, the court explained that the detective’s testimony was based on observations and techniques appropriate for lay testimony, and the fact that he was law enforcement did not convert it to expert testimony.
Reaching (3), the court explained that “because we conclude [the detective’s] testimony was lay opinion testimony, Section 15A-903(a)(2) does not apply.” Id. at 14. The court disagreed with defendant’s assertion that the detective’s testimony could be expert opinions under State v. Davis, 368 N.C. 794 (2016), noting the witness in this case was not offered as an expert at trial and “his testimony regarding the trajectory of the bullets was lay opinion testimony.” Id. at 15.
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