Confrontation Rights Apply at Sentencing in Noncapital Cases

In 2002, David Hurt pled guilty to second-degree murder. Over the next several years his case bounced back and forth between the trial and appellate courts based on problems with his aggravated-range sentence. In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Hurt’s case was eventually remanded for a Blakely-compliant sentencing hearing in 2008. With the State still seeking an aggravated sentence (this time on the basis that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel), the court empanelled a jury to consider the aggravating factor—exactly what a court should do for a case of this vintage where a defendant pleads guilty to a felony but denies the existence of any aggravating factors. See State v. Blackwell, 361 N.C. 41 (2006) (approving use of a special verdict for cases sentenced after Blakely but not covered by North Carolina’s 2005 Blakely-fix legislation). At the hearing, the State presented lab evidence and an autopsy report prepared by non-testifying witnesses. Based on that evidence—which identified the defendant and described a grisly and painful attack on the victim—the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and the court sentenced the defendant in the aggravated range. On appeal, the defendant argued that admission of that evidence violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The court of appeals agreed, holding as a matter of first impression that Crawford-style confrontation rights apply to “all sentencing proceedings [...]