The scope of a suspect’s consent to search is determined objectively, by “what . . . the typical reasonable person [would] have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). There is a split of authority regarding whether a reasonable person would understand consent to search a residence as including consent to search associated outbuildings. Compare, e.g., State v. Billups, 575 P.2d 323 (Ariz. 1978) (consent to search house did not include search of shed behind house), with, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eckert, 368 A.2d 794 (Pa. 1976) (consent to search residence did include search of storage shed). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c) (4th ed. 2004) (discussing split and expressing “serious question” about the result in Eckert). Until this week, no North Carolina appellate court had ruled on this issue. That changed in State v. Hagin. In Hagin, officers suspected the defendant of manufacturing methamphetamine, so they went to his house and asked for consent to search. The defendant signed a form consenting to a search of “the personal or real property” at the defendant’s address, described as a “[s]ingle wide mobile home, brown in color with a covered wooden porch.” The officers searched the mobile home, apparently finding nothing. Then, accompanied by the defendant, they searched “a small outbuilding located approximately 15-20 feet from the back porch of the mobile home,” finding materials used in manufacturing methamphetamine. The defendant was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine. He moved [...]
Faculty Coordinators
