Delegated Authority in Probation Cases

I was at a meeting at the Department of Correction yesterday talking about some of the changes made by the Justice Reinvestment Act (JRA, summarized here). One of the big changes is an expansion of the conditions a probation officer may add through delegated authority under G.S. 15A-1343.2(e) and (f). In talking about those changes, though, it became clear that there are some questions about how delegated authority works under existing law. In some places around the state it is used a lot, in other places not much at all. This post summarizes existing law and then looks at how things change under the JRA. Delegated authority has been a part of our law since Structured Sentencing first became effective in 1994. The law allows a probation officer to impose certain additional requirements on an offender without first clearing those new conditions with the court. As the law was initially enacted, authority to add those conditions was not granted to the probation officer unless the court expressly delegated it. Under changes made to the law in 1997 (S.L. 1997-57), however, the default position was reversed such that delegated authority applies unless the judge specifically finds that the delegation is not appropriate. The delegated authority law applies only to cases sentenced under Structured Sentencing, not in DWI cases or anything sentenced under older law. Under existing law, which conditions an officer may impose through delegated authority depends on whether the probationer was sentenced to community punishment or intermediate punishment. In all cases, [...]