Editor's note: Tom Tynan is an alumnus of Duke University Law School, a recent federal judicial clerk, and a soon-to-be associate at a large law firm. He spent several months at the School of Government recently, helping me prepare to update the Capital Case Law Handbook. We'll miss him. by School of Government law fellow Tom Tynan While helping Jeff prepare a new edition of the Capital Case Law Handbook, I've researched some pretty interesting topics, to say the least. Just recently, I came across a report called Mental Illness and the Death Penalty in North Carolina: A Diagnostic Approach. The Charlotte School of Law compiled it after a 2006 symposium on Mental Illness and the Death Penalty: Seeking a 'Reasoned Moral Response' to an Unavoidable Condition. Among the many important issues raised in the report, one that especially caught my eye pertains to whether it is permissible for the state to execute a mentally ill prisoner who regains competence as a result of an involuntary antipsychotic medication regime. As far as I can tell, no court in North Carolina has had reason to chime in here, but the opportunity could certainly arise. Consider this scenario: On the eve of execution, a death-row inmate files a motion in North Carolina state court claiming to be incompetent and therefore ineligible to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). The court agrees that the inmate is incompetent. Later, either by court order or by the order of medical personnel, antipsychotic [...]
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