Relief from (Un?)Fair Sentencing

One of our loyal readers asked for our take on the provision in the motion for appropriate relief (MAR) statute that allows a defendant to seek relief at any time when “[t]here has been a significant change in law, either substantive or procedural, applied in the proceedings leading to the defendant’s conviction or sentence, and retroactive application of the changed legal standard is required.” G.S. 15A-1415(b)(7). In particular, the reader asked us to consider whether that provision allows relief for an inmate who received a much longer sentence under Fair Sentencing than he would have received for the same crime under Structured Sentencing. A discussion of an illustrative case can be found here. When an appellate court decision creates a new rule of law, the question of whether that rule applies retroactively can be a complicated one. Fortunately for all of us, my colleague Jessica Smith wrote a really helpful paper on how to apply Teague v. Lane or State v. Rivens to determine whether a judge-made rule applies retroactively. When a new rule is created by statute, the retroactivity analysis is at least a little easier—it is essentially a question of statutory interpretation. With respect to Structured Sentencing, G.S. 15A-1340.10 says the law applies to offenses that occur on or after October 1, 1994, and the session law enacting Structured Sentencing, S.L. 1993-538, expressly said that “[p]rosecutions for, or sentences based on, offenses occurring before the effective date of this act are not abated or affected by the repeal or [...]