State v. Daniel Tees Up An Analysis of Prejudice

North Carolina’s implied-consent laws were substantially amended in 2006 to, in the words of the Governor’s task force recommending the change, “prevent dismissals under Knoll.” In State v. Knoll, 422 N.C. 535 (1988), the court ordered that charges of impaired driving against defendants in three separate cases be dismissed because the magistrate in each case violated statutory provisions governing pretrial release, and, as a result, defendants were prejudiced in their ability to gain access to witnesses. Knoll and its progeny are discussed at length in this bulletin. There are no reported appellate decisions post-Knoll determining that dismissal of implied consent charges is warranted for a statutory violation of provisions governing pretrial release. Indeed, cases in Knoll’s wake demonstrate that prejudice will not be readily inferred from a statutory violation, even if it results in the defendant’s unlawful detention. The implied consent procedures enacted for offenses committed December 1, 2006 or later and providing for access to witnesses during a defendant’s detention are designed to ensure that a defendant is afforded the evidence necessary to her defense, or, to take a more cynical view, to defeat any argument that a defendant was prejudiced by her detention. One might legitimately question whether a defendant permitted access to witnesses in jail can ever show prejudice from an unlawful detention. The dissenting opinion in State v. Daniel, decided this week by the court of appeals, provides the state supreme court (which has not weighed in on the issue since Knoll) with an opportunity to address [...]