Terrorists, Miranda, and the Public Safety Exception, Part II

Yesterday, I noted that the public safety exception to Miranda has been invoked in two recent terrorism cases to justify delaying the administration of Miranda warnings. A commenter correctly identified the seminal case in this area: New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). In Quarles, a woman approached two police officers, told them that she had just been raped, described her assailant, reported that he had a gun, and said that he had just entered a nearby supermarket. An officer entered the supermarket and saw the defendant, who matched the woman's description. The defendant turned and ran. The officer pursued him at gunpoint, and after rounding a corner, the defendant stopped. The officer frisked him and found an empty shoulder holster. The officer then asked where the gun was, and the defendant nodded towards some empty boxes and said "over there." At the defendant's trial on weapons charges, the trial judge suppressed the defendant's statement and the gun because the officer did not Mirandize the defendant before asking about the gun. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "there is a 'public safety' exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence." It isn't clear from the Court's opinion how important the immediacy of the safety concern was to the holding. Sometimes the Court emphasizes that the situation was "kaleidoscopic," requiring "spontaneity," an "instinctive" response, and the "immediate necessity" of recovering the gun. At other times, the Court focuses more on the [...]