In re K.E.P., _ N.C. App. _ (April 16, 2025)

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Held:

Affirmed

Facts: Mother sought and was awarded civil custody of the child at issue in 2019. Thereafter, Cumberland DSS received five reports, and Sampson DSS received three reports, of Father’s maltreatment of the child. The first report was not investigated and the others were unsubstantiated. Both counties performed child medical examinations (CME) which raised concern for the frequency that the child was presented to the emergency department with requests of evaluations for concerns of sexual abuse. Sampson DSS sought a child and family forensic evaluation (CFE) that determined it was highly improbable that the child had been sexually abused as alleged and instead concluded that it was highly likely the child sustained some emotional abuse by Mother and her family. Sampson DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging the child abused and neglected, obtained nonsecure custody, and placed the child with Father. At the adjudicatory hearing the court received testimony from DSS staff of both counties and the medical professionals who performed the CME and CFE. The trial court admitted into evidence the CME and the five child welfare reports received by Cumberland DSS. The child was adjudicated abused and neglected. Mother appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting several findings of fact.
Appellate courts review adjudication orders to determine “whether the trial court’s conclusions of law are supported by adequate findings and whether those findings, in turn, are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” Sl. Op. at 5 (citation omitted).
The Rules of Evidence apply at adjudication. When an evidentiary objection is properly preserved, “a party may argue on appeal that any findings supported solely by inadmissible evidence are infirm and cannot support the trial court’s conclusions of law.” Sl. Op. at 5 (citation omitted). Mother’s challenges to the findings are broadside and lack reference to her evidentiary objections at trial, acknowledgement of testimonial evidence which support the findings, and lack citation to legal authority. Assuming, arguendo, that Mother’s challenges to the trial court’s findings were properly before the court, the challenges are overruled as follows.
Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Rule 802 provides that hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by the Rules of Evidence or by statute. Rule 803(6) provides that business records of regularly conducted activity are not excluded by the hearsay rule if properly authenticated. The foundation “must be laid by a person familiar with the records and the system under which they are made” in order “to satisfy the court that the methods, the sources of information, and the time of preparation render such evidence trustworthy.” Sl. Op. at 9 (citations omitted). The person who made the records is not required to authenticate the records. So long as the records are admissible under the business records exception, a DSS worker can “properly testify about the [juvenile records kept by DSS] and their significance.”
The five child welfare reports received by Cumberland DSS were properly admitted into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Mother does not argue that the reports were not properly authenticated or were improperly admitted under the business records exception, and therefore those arguments are abandoned. Mother’s only argument is that the findings based on the child welfare reports were admitted only “for explaining the background of [Sampson DSS’s] investigation” and should be treated as “non-substantive evidentiary findings”. Sl. Op. at 7, 10. The court of appeals determined this argument lacks merit. Sampson DSS consistently maintained that the reports were offered into evidence pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The record shows the trial court admitted the reports under this exception, and Mother’s counsel acknowledged that the child welfare reports were being offered as substantive evidence during the proceeding by objecting and renewing that objection to the trial court’s admission of the reports on the grounds of “authentication, hearsay, and no business record exception.” Sl. Op. at 10. Mother erroneously cites cases concerning admissible nonhearsay, rather than hearsay properly admitted, to support her argument. Challenged findings are supported by the properly admitted child welfare reports.
Rule 803(4) provides that out-of-court statements “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history” are not excluded by the hearsay rule. The CME was offered and admitted into evidence in this case on the grounds that it contained information that formed the basis of the expert witness’s opinions and that the out-of-court statements contained in the CME were admissible hearsay as statements made for the purpose of a medical evaluation or treatment. Mother argues that evidence that forms the basis for an expert’s opinion is not admissible for the truth of the matter asserted. Though the CFE and other hospital and medical records upon which the CME was partially based were not admitted into evidence, the trial court explained that “any statements [in the CME] made by other individuals were done as the basis of preparing [the expert], conducting her examination and . . . the foundation of her conclusions.” Sl. Op. at 12. As such the CME was admitted for a dual purpose as both a basis for expert testimony and as statements made for purposes of medical treatment. Mother’s counsel acknowledged this when counsel objected to the admission of the CME for “lack of foundation, hearsay, and various other violations of [Mother’s] constitutional state and federal rights.” Sl. Op. at 12. Mother does not challenge the admission of the CME into evidence or any statements contained in the CME and therefore those arguments are abandoned. The trial court properly considered the CME, including its descriptions of the child’s medical history, as admissible hearsay when making its findings of fact and those challenged findings are supported by the evidence.
Other challenged findings are supported by the evidence, including social worker testimony, or disregarded. Challenged findings that are unnecessary to support the conclusions of law are disregarded. The trial court did not err in reciting witness testimony in its findings where the findings of fact indicate the trial court evaluated witness credibility and resolved factual disputes. Appellate courts will not reweigh the evidence. Findings that are conclusions of law are treated as conclusion of law on appeal.