Charging R/D/O: Alleging the Duty the Officer Was Discharging

I was teaching a class about charging documents recently when the conversation turned to the rule that a charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer in violation of G.S. 14-223 must describe the particular duty that the officer was discharging at the time of the resistance. A member of the class asked whether it would suffice to describe the duty as “protecting and serving.” I gave my best guess about the answer but I thought I would see how others react to the question. So take the poll below, then read the rest of the post for a little history about the rule, a summary of a recent case, and a discussion of authority about the sufficiency of a general description like “protecting and serving.” [poll id="19"] The rule has a long history. The earliest case that I could find that states the rule clearly is State v. Eason, 242 N.C. 9 (1955), where the court ruled that an indictment purporting to charge a violation of G.S. 14-223 was fatally defective because it did not “indicate the official duty [the officer] was discharging or attempting to discharge.” Many other cases decided around the same time reflect the same holding, suggesting that the charging practices of the day often varied from the rule. See, e.g., State v. Stonestreet, 243 N.C. 28 (1955) (ruling that an indictment was “fatally defective [because] it fails to charge the official duty the designated officer was discharging or attempting to discharge.”). The rule has been [...]