In re L.C., _ N.C. _ (May 23, 2025)

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Held:

Reversed

Facts and procedural history: The supreme court granted the petition for discretionary review filed by DSS and the GAL in this case following the decision of the court of appeals vacating and remanding the trial court’s neglect adjudication order. The child’s circumstances involved the juvenile and subsequently born twin siblings testing positive for substances at birth, Mother and her live-in partner’s substance use, the juvenile finding Mother’s needle, Mother’s and her live-in partner’s violation of the juvenile’s safety plan, and mother’s erratic and hostile behavior toward DSS. Note, Mother relinquished her rights to the twins; this action solely involves the older sibling. At the adjudication hearing, the DSS social worker testified that Mother refused drug screening for herself and the juvenile but admitted to using substances and having a history of addiction; appeared agitated and was uncooperative with DSS’s involvement; and discussed concerns regarding rats in the home. The juvenile was adjudicated neglected and Mother appealed. The court of appeals held the trial court’s findings of fact were insufficient to support its conclusion that the juvenile was neglected because there are no evidentiary findings showing the juvenile suffered any physical, mental, or emotional impairment, or that there was a substantial risk of impairment. The sole issue before the supreme court is whether the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that the child is a neglected juvenile.
Adjudication orders are reviewed “to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent[,] and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” Sl. Op. at 7 (citation omitted). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
A neglected juvenile is one whose parent or legal guardian “[d]oes not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline” or “[c]reates or allows to be created a living environment that is injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” G.S. 7B-101(15). Appellate precedent also requires “that there be some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence of the failure to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline.” Sl. Op. at 7-8 (citation omitted). The trial court is only required to “make written findings of fact sufficient to support its conclusion of law of neglect[,]” and is not required to make “a specific written finding of a substantial risk of impairment.” Sl. Op. at 8, quoting In re G.C., 384 N.C. 62, 69 (2023). The supreme court has directed that “[t]he ultimate findings of fact that [the child] does not receive proper care, supervision, and discipline from her parents is supported by the trial court’s evidentiary findings of fact and reached by natural reasoning from the evidentiary findings of fact.” Sl. Op. at 8, quoting In re G.C., 384 N.C. at 67 (emphasis in original). This standard means that “[i]f the objective reasonable person, examining the totality of the circumstances, would understand how the trial court’s written findings lead to its conclusion of neglect, those findings are sufficient.” Sl. Op. at 9.
The trial court’s findings of fact are sufficient to support its conclusion of neglect, including that the child tested positive for substances at birth; Mother admitted to using substances at the time of the twin siblings’ birth; Mother was concerned there was a rat infestation in the home; the child had access to unsecured needles; Mother admitted to her history of substance use and continued use of a combination of illegal substances; Mother was uncooperative with DSS with regards to drug testing of herself and the juvenile as well as entering into a safety plan; and Mother violated the safety plan two days after signing the plan. The totality of these findings demonstrate that the juvenile lacked proper care, supervision, or discipline and lived in an injurious environment.
The court of appeals ruled that the finding addressing Mother’s belief there existed a rat infestation in the home was insufficient since the finding did not specify whether the rats actually existed or were hallucinations of Mother, nor whether the child’s resulting impairment was physical, mental, or emotional. The supreme court held that “a trial court does not need to specify whether the impairment in question is physical, mental, or emotional.” Sl. Op. at 9, n.9. The trial court “merely needs to conclude the existence of impairment (or a substantial risk thereof) based on a reasonable interpretation of the evidentiary findings.” Sl. Op. at 9, n.9.
Dissent: The court of appeals did not err in vacating the trial court’s adjudication order. The trial court must assess that there is some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the child or a substantial risk of such impairment resulting from the failure to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline. When “the trial court does not make a specific written finding of impairment, then it must make findings of fact sufficient to demonstrate impairment.” Dissent at 14. If on review findings of fact can support multiple conclusions, the trial court has not made sufficient evidentiary findings from which a conclusion of law can be naturally reasoned. Here, the trial court’s findings lacked determinations regarding credibility of the evidence or the impact of the findings on the child. A reasonable interpretation of the findings do not demonstrate the child was impaired or was at substantial risk of impairment. Appellate courts cannot reweigh the evidence or make the findings required of the trial court. The statutory requirements are “more than mere formalism”; they safeguard the interest of protecting children from abuse and neglect and the constitutional rights of parents and children. Dissent at 19.