Letting the Jury Know about “Collateral” Consequences of a Conviction

Under North Carolina law a criminal defendant has the right to inform the jury of the punishment for the crime being tried. In State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286 (1976), the North Carolina Supreme Court traced this right back to the mid-19th century. Back then, the legislature took umbrage at a judge’s refusal to allow a lawyer to argue both the law and facts to the jury and enacted what is now G.S. 7A-97. That statute states that “the whole case as well of law as of fact may be argued to the jury.” The Supreme Court in McMorris held that this provision gave the defendant the right to inform the jury of the statutory punishment in the case. The Court observed: “In a real sense the sanction prescribed for criminal behavior is part of the law of the case.” 290 N.C. at 287. This basic right obviously has deep roots. How does it apply to the many and varied sanctions that have sprouted up in the law, including collateral sanctions for crimes? In State v. Prestwood, 211 N.C. App. 198 (2011) (unpublished), the Court of Appeals addressed one such sanction—sex offender registration—and held that the defendant has the right to inform the jury of that consequence in the trial of an offense triggering registration. I learned of the decision in readying the latest edition of the North Carolina Defender Manual (more on that below). Although the decision is a few years old, it strikes me as an important addition to [...]