“No” Will Mean “No” in North Carolina

Two years ago I wrote a blog post about North Carolina’s unusual stance on rape and consent. In its 1979 decision in State v. Way, 297 N.C. 293 (1979), the North Carolina Supreme Court appeared to take the position that if a woman consents to sexual intercourse and in the middle of the act changes her mind, the defendant is not guilty of rape for continuing to engage in intercourse with her. In my lengthy blog, I suggested ways to distinguish or limit the antiquated approach in Way. This post need not be nearly as long. Last week, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 199, which revised the elements of rape and other sexual offenses to recognize the right to revoke consent, whether or not sexual intercourse or another sexual act has begun. If signed by the Governor (the Governor has signed the bill), the law will apply to offenses committed on or after December 1, 2019. The bill accomplishes this result by amending the definitions section for rape and other sex offenses in Article 7B of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes. New subsection (1a) of G.S. 14-27.20 creates a definition of “against the will of the other person,” a required element of proof for forcible rape as well as forcible sexual offense and sexual battery (except when the other person is mentally incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically helpless and effectively incapable of consenting). It defines the element as either: Without consent of the other person. After consent is revoked [...]