Abortion and North Carolina Criminal Law after Dobbs

I was born the year before the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Abortion has been a constitutionally protected right very nearly my whole life, so I’ve never needed to examine the issue through the lens of criminal law. That has changed as a result of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. __ (2022), which overruled Roe. This post identifies some of the issues that may arise under North Carolina criminal law in a post-Roe world. Disclaimers. The legal analysis that follows is necessarily tentative given how new Dobbs is. It is intended to be neutral, in keeping with the School of Government’s non-partisan and non-advocacy stance. And it is limited by my modest knowledge of the medical aspects of abortion and related matters. I consulted with physicians and colleagues in preparing this post; I am grateful for their input, which improved the post. Still, the views below, including any errors, are mine alone. The statutory regime. North Carolina has three main criminal statutes pertaining to abortion. Two old and facially similar statutes generally prohibit abortion: Under S. 14-44, which dates to 1881, it is a Class H felony to give a woman who is “pregnant or quick with child” any “drug or other substance whatever,” or to “use or employ any instrument,” with the intent “to destroy such child.” Under S. 14-45, also dating to 1881, it is a Class I felony to administer a drug or medicine to, or to use any instrument [...]