Be careful what you wish for . . . Kostick further muddles Knoll analysis

The decades-old state supreme court decision in State v. Knoll, 322 N.C. 535 (1988), dismissing charges against three impaired driving defendants, is confusing.  For starters, the Knoll court’s decision hinged in part on its determination that the defendants were unlawfully detained.  Yet the court never even mentioned G.S. 15A-534.2—the statute authorizing the detention of impaired drivers or explained why its provisions did not apply. Second, the court held that a defendant charged with a per se violation of the impaired driving laws had to establish prejudice to be entitled to relief, but the court then failed to apply a higher standard than it had applied under an earlier presumptive prejudice test. This lack of clarity is problematic. Because Knoll granted such drastic relief—dismissal—for defendants charged with a very common crime—driving while impaired—many motions are filed seeking relief pursuant to its holding. Several years ago, the legislature reacted to defendants’ success in procuring such relief by enacting additional procedures that apply in initial appearances for DWIs. See G.S. 20-38.4. Now a magistrate who finds by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant’s impairment presents a danger to persons or property if he is released must record those findings on AOC-CR-270.  Magistrates also must inform defendants who are jailed for implied consent offenses of the procedures by which they may have others appear at the jail to observe them or to administer an additional chemical analysis.  G.S. 20-38.4(a)(4)b. Finally, magistrates must require people detained for implied consent offenses to list the names and [...]