Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (Oct. 21, 2026)
This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on October 21, 2026.
The trial court did not plainly err in admitting two statements referring to the defendant’s prior bad acts where the statements also contained relevant information establishing defendant’s control of the premises; jury instruction on constructive possession supported by evidence that defendant had control of the premises.
State v. Harmon, COA26-145 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2026) (Avery County) (Gore). The defendant was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine after a jury trial. The evidence showed that detectives developed probable cause to search her home after receiving information from informants. During the search of a cabinet located next to the defendant, detectives found defendant’s wallet, a case with her name on it, mail addressed to her, more than an ounce of methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia, including scales, pipes, and baggies.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of two statements as plain error under Rule 404(b). The first statement referred to a previous “undercover operation in which Ms. Harmon was the target, and she was in the residence.” The second statement referred to the defendant’s getting out of prison and beginning to live at the residence. The defendant asserted that these statements prejudiced her by alluding to prior bad acts in front of the jury without a proper purpose. However, the Court of Appeals determined that both statements were relevant to establish that the defendant resided in the home and had control over the drugs. The court also concluded that extensive evidence of guilt was presented and the statements did not have a probable impact on the verdict.
The defendant also challenged the trial court’s jury instruction on constructive possession. She asserted that the instruction was unsupported where the evidence showed that her sister’s name was on the lease and that she was merely a part-time guest. However, the court rejected this argument, pointing to ample evidence of defendant’s control of the premises.
The court remanded only for the correction of a clerical error in listing one of the crimes of conviction as “deliver methamphetamine” instead of “possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine.”
Warrantless blood draw justified by exigent circumstances where delays arising from troopers’ shift change and investigation of fatal car crash were reasonable and obtaining a search warrant at magistrate’s office would have required half-hour drive.
State v. Miner, COA25-216 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2026) (Johnston County) (Stading). The sole issue on appeal was the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw. The defendant had reserved his right to challenge the ruling as part of a guilty plea to several charges arising from a fatal car collision.
The central question was whether sufficient exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw. The defendant asserted that the state had created the exigency by delaying the investigation to wait for a trooper to arrive as part of a shift change. The defense further questioned the lead investigator’s decision to wait to drive the defendant to the magistrate’s office until the trooper had completed several other tasks, rather than delegating the task to another trooper.
However, the Court of Appeals analyzed the facts under the McNeely totality-of-the-circumstances test and concluded that the warrantless search was reasonable. The court relied on other cases in which officers acting under similar circumstances were deemed to have acted reasonably. The court did not find unreasonable the delay of approximately one hour to wait for the trooper who was at the start of his shift. The court also stressed the chaotic and complex nature of fatality investigations, with troopers needing to attend to many investigative tasks in addition to tasks to ensure the safety of the scene. Finally, the court agreed with the trial court’s analysis in giving significant weight to the 21.2-mile distance between the scene and the magistrate’s office, a drive of approximately 30 minutes.
The court also rejected the defendant’s contention that the trial court considered the defendant’s refusal to submit to the blood draw as a factor justifying the warrantless search. The court concluded that the trial court only referred to the refusal to establish a timeline rather than as a factor creating the exigency. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
The defendant failed to meet his burden of showing manifest injustice to support his post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court rejected the defendant’s contention that he asserted his innocence by entering an Alford plea and also rejected the defendant’s argument that the state’s contemporaneous motion to revoke his bond rendered the plea coercive.
State v. Plummer, COA25-1026 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2026) (Cabarrus County) (Zachary). On appeal, the defendant challenged the denial of his post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea. The procedural history of the case began with the defendant being charged for assault on a female based on his girlfriend’s allegations. While being served with an arrest warrant for this charge, the defendant was charged with resist, delay, or obstruct as well as assault on a law enforcement officer. The defendant was convicted of the latter charges in district court though the state dismissed the original assault on a female charge. The defendant appealed these convictions to superior court. Despite a no-contact order in place, the defendant was subsequently charged with felonies arising from two separate incidents involving the same victim. In response, the state sought revocation of his bond through a motion to modify the conditions of his pretrial release. At the same time, the state made a probationary plea offer to the defendant. Two days later, the defendant pled guilty pursuant to Alford to assault on a female, felonious restraint, and interfering with emergency communications. During the colloquy, the trial court inquired as to whether anyone had promised him anything or threatened him in any way to cause him to enter the plea against his wishes. The defendant responded, “Revoke my bond.” The court inquired further and suggested that the defendant confer with his attorney. The defendant ultimately stated that he was entering the plea of his own free will with full comprehension. The trial court accepted the plea and imposed a suspended sentence in accordance with the plea agreement.
The next day, the defendant moved to withdraw his Alford plea. The motion was denied.
On appeal of the denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court applied the analysis set forth in State v. Handy, under which pre-sentencing motions to withdraw require only a “fair and just reason,” but post-sentencing motions require the defendant show “manifest injustice.” The court analyzed several factors and found that the defendant had not met his burden. First, the court noted that the period of time between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw was only one day, but the motion came after sentencing and thus the factor did not weigh in the defendant’s favor. The court further found that defendant’s plea under Alford did not amount to an assertion of innocence. Third, the court did not find the defendant’s assertion that the state’s case was “weak” convincing; even if the state’s case depended heavily on the testimony of the victim, the factual basis was sufficient. Fourth, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that he was coerced by the state to enter the plea after the state sought revocation of his bond. The court pointed to the thorough plea colloquy and the fact that the decision to modify the defendant’s pretrial release conditions was ultimately within the trial court’s discretion. Finally, the court noted that the defendant never challenged the competency or effectiveness of trial counsel. In sum, the court found that the defendant had failed to show manifest injustice and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Where evidence of contemporaneous sexual offenses strongly corroborated defendant’s confession to another sexual offense, the corpus delicti rule did not require vacating conviction; though state asked improper questions and witnesses gave improper testimony, the conduct was not so serious as to require the court to order a mistrial ex mero motu.
State v. Tyson, COA25-889 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2026) (Anson County) (Stroud). The defendant was convicted of four sexual crimes against a minor after a jury trial. On appeal, he first argued that the offense based on digital penetration should have been dismissed by the trial court because the case was based solely on the defendant’s confession. The Court of Appeals recounted the history of the corpus delicti rule in North Carolina and how it initially stood for the proposition that a conviction could not be sustained upon a “naked extrajudicial confession.” Some independent proof was required. However, in 1985, the rule was “loosened,” and the question today is whether the defendant’s confession is reliable rather than whether independent evidence of the corpus delicti (meaning “body of the crime”) exists. In the case at bar, the defendant confessed to a series of sex acts involving vaginal penetration, digital penetration, and fellatio, but the victim only testified to vaginal penetration and fellatio. The question was whether the sexual offense based on digital penetration could stand. The Court of Appeals relied on other cases involving multiple crimes and determined that the evidence supporting the other sexual offenses, one of which occurred immediately before and one of which occurred immediately after, “strongly corroborated” the defendant’s confession to digitally penetrating the victim.
As a second issue, the defendant contended that the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu after the prosecutor asked numerous improper questions and elicited inadmissible testimony. The appellate court agreed that the state asked several improper questions, such as stakeout questions during voir dire asking whether the jurors would “require the presentation of DNA or fingerprints,” as well as overly broad questions to witnesses, such as “Why are we here?” The appellate court also noted that an officer gave testimony that improperly commented on the credibility of the victim. However, the trial court sustained many objections and issued curative instructions. The appellate court concluded that the defendant did not show error serious enough to “make it impossible to attain a fair and impartial verdict.” The Court of Appeals thus affirmed the convictions.
