Case Summaries: N.C. Court of Appeals (Sept. 2, 2026)
This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on September 2, 2026.
Where there is insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether the Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated, the Court cannot evaluate the Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance.
State v. Goins, No. COA25-715 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2026) (Zachary). The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and possession of a firearm by a felon arising from offenses committed in 2016. Following approximately eight and a half years between arrest and trial, including at least forty-eight continuances, a jury found the defendant guilty, and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the murder conviction and arrested judgment on the remaining convictions. The defendant appealed, arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to demand a speedy trial and failing to move to dismiss based on a violation of his constitutional speedy-trial rights.
Although the approximately eight-and-one-half-year delay was sufficient to trigger a speedy trial analysis under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Court concluded that the appellate record lacked the information necessary to perform that review. The record did not indicate which party requested the continuances, whether the defendant consented to the delays, or how responsibility for the delay should be allocated. The Court also noted that a significant portion of the delay occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the record contained no information regarding court closures, scheduling restrictions, or the specific impact of pandemic-related circumstances on the defendant’s case. Because the record was insufficient to determine whether the defendant’s speedy-trial rights were violated, the Court could not determine whether counsel performed deficiently or whether the defendant suffered prejudice. The Court dismissed the ineffective assistance claim without prejudice to the defendant’s right to reassert it in a motion for appropriate relief in the trial court.
(1) Trial counsel’s decision to introduce evidence of pending charges in another county constituted a reasonable trial strategy; (2) the record demonstrated that the defendant knowingly agreed to counsel’s strategy and counsel did not concede guilt; (3) overwhelming evidence of guilt defeated the prejudice requirement of the ineffective assistance claim.
State v. Benson, No. COA25-852 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2026) (Collins). The defendant appealed convictions for two counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense and two counts of indecent liberties with a child for alleged conduct in Pender County. The evidence showed that the child victim disclosed during therapy that the defendant had repeatedly placed his fingers inside her vagina at both the defendant’s home in Brunswick County and the victim’s home in Pender County (the defendant was charged in both counties). The victim later repeated those allegations during a forensic interview, and the defendant admitted during a recorded law-enforcement interview that he had touched the victim’s genital area on multiple occasions in both counties. A jury found the defendant guilty of all charges.
On appeal, the defendant argued that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by eliciting testimony regarding his Brunswick County charges, requesting a limiting instruction concerning that evidence, and emphasizing during closing argument that any misconduct occurred in Brunswick County rather than Pender County. The Court of Appeals rejected those arguments. The Court noted that the victim testified to conduct occurring in both counties and that the defendant’s recorded statements likewise referenced incidents in both locations. The Court concluded that counsel’s decisions to introduce the existence of the Brunswick County charges, seek a limiting instruction, and frame closing argument around that distinction were components of a unified and rational trial strategy. Before closing arguments, the trial court also conducted a colloquy with the defendant regarding counsel’s proposed strategy. The defendant confirmed that he had discussed the matter with counsel, was maintaining his innocence to all charges, and agreed with counsel’s approach. The Court held that counsel did not concede guilt to the charged offenses but instead argued that statements made by the defendant were more closely related to allegations pending in another county.
Finally, the Court concluded that even if counsel’s performance was deficient, the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. Given all the evidence, the Court found no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent the challenged strategic decisions. The Court found no error and rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(1) Even assuming the initial aggressor instruction was unsupported by the evidence, the defendant was not entitled to relief where the jury could have rejected self-defense on other grounds; (2) an investigating officer’s opinion that the defendant’s use of deadly force was unjustified was inadmissible lay opinion testimony, but not prejudicial.
State v. Stevenson, No. COA25-1035 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2026) (Arrowood). The defendant appealed his conviction arising from the stabbing of a neighbor during an ongoing dispute over loud music. The defendant testified that he went to speak with the neighbor about the noise, that the neighbor struck him in the chin when answering the door, and that he responded by stabbing the neighbor once in self-defense. The neighbor testified that he never touched the defendant and was stabbed almost immediately after opening the door. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, including the aggressor doctrine, and the jury convicted the defendant of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury on the aggressor doctrine because there was no evidence that he was the aggressor. Relying on State v. Juarez, 369 N.C. 351 (2016), the Court began by determining whether the jury could have rejected his self-defense claim for reasons unrelated to the aggressor doctrine. The State presented evidence that the defendant acted out of anger stemming from the parties’ long-running dispute, including testimony that the confrontation was “long overdue.” The Court also noted that the jury could have concluded that the defendant used excessive force against an unarmed neighbor. As a result, the Court found the jury could have rejected the self-defense claim for reasons unrelated to the aggressor doctrine and did not need to decide whether the instruction was unsupported by the evidence. The defendant also challenged testimony from the lead investigator who testified that he felt the defendant’s use of deadly force was not justified. The Court noted that the officer did not personally observe the altercation and that the officer’s opinion was based entirely on the same facts that were presented to the jury. The Court therefore held that the testimony invaded the province of the jury and constituted inadmissible lay opinion testimony. In light of the substantial evidence of guilt properly admitted, the Court found that the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of a difference result absent the challenged testimony. As a result, the Court concluded that the error was not prejudicial.
The presence of thirteen jurors in the jury room during deliberations constituted structural error and reversible error per se under Article I, Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution and G.S. 15A‑1215(a).
State v. Humphrey, No. COA25-1051 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2026) (Wood). The defendant was convicted of death by distribution of a controlled substance arising from the sale of fentanyl and cocaine. Following the close of evidence and jury instructions, the trial court inadvertently sent all twelve jurors and one alternate juror to the jury room. The thirteen jurors remained together for approximately nineteen minutes, selected a foreperson, and began deliberations before the error was discovered. The trial court then removed the alternate juror, instructed the remaining jurors to restart their deliberations, and the jury later returned a guilty verdict. The defendant appealed.
The Court concluded that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting thirteen jurors to participate in deliberations. The Court explained that both the North Carolina Constitution and G.S. 15A‑1215(a) require that no more than twelve jurors participate in jury deliberations. The Court distinguished the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Chambers, 387 N.C. 521 (2025), which upheld substitution procedures in part because the statute expressly provides that “in no event shall more than twelve jurors participate in the jury’s deliberations.” Here, by contrast, thirteen jurors actually deliberated together before the error was discovered. The Court further noted that the thirteen-member jury deliberated for nineteen minutes before the alternate was removed and that the jury reached its verdict after only seventeen additional minutes of deliberation. The Court also concluded that the trial court’s instruction was not an unequivocal directive to restart deliberations because jurors were told to await further instructions that might require them either to “continue” or “begin” deliberations. Under these circumstances, the Court held the constitutional and statutory violation was not cured. The Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. Having ordered a new trial, the Court declined to address the defendant’s additional challenge to the calculation of prior record level points.
(1) The court was not required to instruct on second-degree murder based on voluntary intoxication absent evidence that the defendant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of deliberation and premeditation; (2) a lying in wait instruction is proper where the evidence showed the defendant positioned himself to make a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim; (3) a flight instruction is supported by evidence that the defendant took steps to avoid apprehension after the crime.
State v. Spencer, No. COA25-1063 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2026) (Collins). The defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder. The evidence showed that after his girlfriend was terminated from her employment at Big Lots, the defendant left her apartment shortly before closing time, approached employees in the parking lot while wearing a mask and hoodie, and fatally shot one employee. Multiple witnesses placed the defendant near the scene, and two fellow inmates testified that the defendant admitted committing the shooting, disposing of the weapon, changing clothes after the crime, and initially intending to “kill everybody” at the store. A jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder based on both premeditation and deliberation and lying in wait.
On appeal, the defendant first argued that the trial court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury on second-degree murder based on evidence that he consumed alcohol and marijuana before the killing. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, emphasizing that voluntary intoxication negates premeditation and deliberation only when the evidence shows the defendant was so completely intoxicated that he was incapable of forming a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill. The Court concluded that the evidence of intoxication was minimal and that the State’s evidence instead demonstrated planning and forethought. As a result, the trial court was not required to instruct on second-degree murder. The defendant next challenged the instruction on first-degree murder by lying in wait. The Court held that the instruction was supported by the evidence. The Court emphasized that lying in wait does not require literal concealment and may be established by evidence that a defendant positioned himself to make a private attack when the victim was unaware of his murderous purpose. Here, the evidence showed that the defendant was familiar with the store, knew when employees would be leaving for the night, waited until the parking lot was largely empty, and approached the victims after they exited the building. Finally, the Court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the flight instruction. Although the defendant openly returned to the apartment complex and later encountered law enforcement at a nearby store, the Court emphasized that flight includes not only leaving the scene but also taking steps to avoid apprehension. The evidence showed that the defendant misled his girlfriend about his whereabouts, changed clothing after the shooting, and disposed of the firearm. The Court found no error in the trial court’s jury instructions and upheld the defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder.
