Petitions to Terminate Sex Offender Registration: Moir Tiers

Last month the supreme court decided State v. Moir. It is a case about how a state sex crime—namely, indecent liberties with a child—fits within the offense tiering system set out in the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).  It has been a while since I last blogged about this topic, so let’s start with some background. Sex offenders who aren’t required to register for life can petition for removal from the registry 10 years from the date of initial county registration. G.S. 14-208.12A. The superior court judge hearing that petition may grant relief only if, among other things, doing so would “compl[y] with the provisions of the federal Jacob Wetterling Act, as amended, and any other federal standards applicable to the termination of a registration requirement or required to be met as a condition for the receipt of federal funds by the State.” G.S. 14-208.12A(a1)(2). As noted on this blog since 2009, that finding, which I’ll call the Wetterling finding, effectively incorporates an important bit of federal law into our state sex offender registration regime. As a matter of state statute, a judge can’t let someone off the registry if doing so would violate relevant federal laws and regulations—even though North Carolina hasn’t enacted other state laws incorporating those federal standards explicitly. (Even now, only 17 states are substantially compliant with SORNA, and North Carolina isn’t one of them.) Easily the most important federal law that a judge must consider when hearing a petition to terminate registration is [...]