In a per curiam decision, the Court held that the Virginia Supreme Court’s ruling, holding that Virginia’s “geriatric release” provision satisfies Graham v. Florida was not an objectively unreasonable application of Graham. In 1999, the defendant, who was 16 years old at the time, raped a 62-year-old woman. In 2003, a state court sentenced him to life in prison. At the time, Virginia had abolished traditional parole. However it had a geriatric release parole program which allowed older inmates to receive conditional release under some circumstances. Specifically, the statute provided: “Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a conviction for a felony offense . . . (i) who has reached the age of sixty-five or older and who has served at least five years of the sentence imposed or (ii) who has reached the age of sixty or older and who has served at least ten years of the sentence imposed may petition the Parole Board for conditional release.” Seven years after the defendant was sentenced, the Court decided Graham, holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits juvenile offenders convicted of non-homicide offenses from being sentenced to life without parole. Graham held that while a “State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime,” it must give defendants “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” The Graham Court left it to the States, “in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance” with the Graham rule. The defendant then sought to vacate his sentence in light of Graham. The Virginia courts rejected this motion, holding that Virginia’s geriatric release statute satisfied Graham’s requirement of parole for juvenile offenders. The defendant then brought a federal habeas action. The federal district court held that “there is no possibility that fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts wit[h] the dictates of Graham.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, noting in part:

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred by failing to accord the state court’s decision the deference owed under AEDPA. Graham did not decide that a geriatric release program like Virginia’s failed to satisfy the Eighth Amendment because that question was not presented. And it was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that, because the geriatric release program employed normal parole factors, it satisfied Graham’s requirement that juveniles convicted of a nonhomicide crime have a meaningful opportunity to receive parole.

The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide crime. For a more detailed discussion of this case, click here. 

In this Columbus County case, the juvenile defendant pled guilty to the first-degree murder and first-degree rape of his aunt, offenses he committed and was arrested for when he was 15 years old.­­ The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing under the statutory procedures enacted to conform to the United States Supreme Court’s determination in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), that the Eighth Amendment bars the automatic, mandatory imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile defendant. Based on its finding of numerous mitigating factors, the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 25 years for first-degree murder. The trial court further sentenced the defendant to 240-348 months of imprisonment for the first degree rape, and ordered that the two sentences run consecutively. As a result, the defendant was to become eligible for parole after being incarcerated for 45 years, at which point he would be 60 years old.

The defendant appealed, raising, in addition to other arguments, the claim that the consecutive sentences were the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without parole and thus were unconstitutional when imposed on a juvenile who was not determined to be incorrigible or irredeemable. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals rejected this argument. The defendant appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.

On this issue of first impression, the Supreme Court reasoned that at some point multiple terms of active consecutive sentences imposed upon a juvenile offender, even if they expressly provide for parole, become tantamount to a life sentence without parole. This occurs when the offender has been incarcerated for such a protracted period of time that the possibility of parole is no longer “plausible, practical, or available.” Slip op. at 47. A juvenile offender entitled to parole based on the trial court’s determination that he is neither incorrigible nor irredeemable must be afforded an opportunity for parole that is “realistic, meaningful, and achievable.” Id. A sentence that fails to afford that opportunity violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments as well as the more protective provisions in Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution barring cruel or unusual punishments.

In determining the maximum amount of time that a redeemable juvenile offender may serve before becoming parole eligible, the Court found it necessary to balance guidance from the United States Supreme Court that parole eligibility should be sufficiently far in the future to provide a juvenile offender time to mature and rehabilitate but sufficiently early to allow the offer to experience worthwhile undertakings outside of prison in the event parole is granted. The Court said it also had to give due weight to the trial court’s discretion to determine whether multiple sentences will run concurrently or consecutively pursuant to G.S. 15A-1354. Drawing from the United States Sentencing Commission’s guidance regarding determination of a de facto life sentence, the Court established forty years of incarceration as the point in time at which a juvenile offender who has not been deemed incorrigible or irredeemable by a trial court, and who is serving a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, is eligible to seek parole. The Court thus reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on this issue and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court.

Justice Berger, joined by Chief Justice Newby and Justice Barringer, dissented, reasoning that the defendant’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment or corollary provisions of the North Carolina Constitution because the State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. The dissent criticized the majority for transforming the opportunity to obtain release required by the Constitution to an opportunity to seek parole early enough to experience meaningful life outside of prison based on policy preferences.

On discretionary review of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 786 S.E.2d 73 (2016), in this murder case where the defendant, who was a juvenile at the time of the offense, was resentenced to life in prison without parole under the state’s Miller-compliant sentencing scheme (G.S. 15A-1340.19A to -1340.19D), the court modified and affirmed the opinion below and remanded for further proceedings. In the Court of Appeals, the defendant argued that the trial court had, by resentencing him pursuant the new statutes, violated the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws, that the statutory provisions subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and deprived him of his rights to a trial by jury and to not be deprived of liberty without due process of law, and that the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact to support its decision to impose a sentence of life without parole. In a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the statutes while reversing the trial court’s resentencing order and remanding for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals remanded for the trial court to correct what it characterized as inadequate findings as to the presence or absence of mitigating factors to support its determination. Before the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the statute creates a presumption in favor of life without parole and by rejecting his constitutional challenges to the statutory scheme.

The Supreme Court began its analysis by addressing whether or not G.S. 15A-1340.19C gives rise to a mandatory presumption that a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder on the basis of a theory other than felony murder should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The court concluded, in part: “the relevant statutory language, when read in context, treats the sentencing decision required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.19C(a) as a choice between two equally appropriate sentencing alternatives and, at an absolute minimum, does not clearly and unambiguously create a presumption in favor of sentencing juvenile defendants convicted of first-degree murder on the basis of a theory other than the felony murder rule to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” Thus, the Court of Appeals erred by construing the statutory language as incorporating such a presumption. The court offered this instruction for trial judges:

On the contrary, trial judges sentencing juveniles convicted of first-degree murder on the basis of a theory other than the felony murder rule should refrain from presuming the appropriateness of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and select between the available sentencing alternatives based solely upon a consideration of “the circumstances of the offense,” “the particular circumstances of the defendant,” and “any mitigating factors,” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.19C(a), as they currently do in selecting a specific sentence from the presumptive range in a structured sentencing proceeding, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s statements in Miller and its progeny to the effect that sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole should be reserved for those juvenile defendants whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption rather than transient immaturity.

The court then rejected the defendant’s argument that the statutory scheme was unconstitutionally vague, concluding that the statutes “provide sufficient guidance to allow a sentencing judge to make a proper, non-arbitrary determination of the sentence that should be imposed upon a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder on a basis other than the felony murder rule to satisfy due process requirements.” The court also rejected the defendant’s arbitrariness argument. Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s ex post facto argument, holding that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the statutory scheme does not allow for imposition of a different or greater punishment than was permitted when the crime was committed. In this respect, it held: because the statutes “make a reduced sentence available to defendant and specify procedures that a sentencing judge is required to use in making the sentencing decision, we believe that defendant’s challenge to the validity of the relevant statutory provisions as an impermissible ex post facto law is without merit.” Justices Beasley and Hudson dissented. 

In a per curiam opinion, and for the reasons stated in Young (summarized immediately above), the court affirmed the trial court and remanded for resentencing.

In this Watauga County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder for killing his parents one month before he turned eighteen years old, arguing error in sentencing him to two consecutive life sentences without parole. The Court of Appeals majority found no error.

On one day in April of 2019, defendant attacked and killed both of his parents in separate attacks, using a large knife to stab both of them to death. He then spent several hours cleaning the crime scene and attempting to conceal his crimes. Then defendant picked up his younger brother from his grandmother’s house, dropped him off in the home, and stayed with a friend that night. The next day defendant attempted to flee but was caught after crossing into Tennessee. Defendant was found guilty of both counts of first-degree murder by a jury, and the judge sentenced him to consecutive life sentences without parole. 

The Court of Appeals explained that defendant’s argument rested upon G.S. 15A-1340.19B, the statute providing appropriate procedure for sentencing a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole, and that his sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment of the federal constitution and Article 1, Section 27 of the state constitution. The court first looked at the Eighth Amendment issue and applicable U.S. Supreme Court precedent, concluding “[t]he procedure employed by the sentencing judge met the requirements of the Eighth Amendment as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in [Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021)] and was at least as robust as the procedure employed by the Mississippi judge in Jones.” Slip Op. at 7. 

Moving to the North Carolina statute and constitutional concerns, the court noted that G.S. 15A-134019B provides the defendant with the opportunity to offer evidence towards eight specific, non-exclusive mitigating factors. Here the court reviewed six factors provided by defendant in his brief and concluded “the sentencing judge considered the evidence presented concerning mitigating factors, including those enumerated in the sentencing statute” and complied with G.S. 15A-1340.19B. Id. at 13. Finally, looking at the North Carolina constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and applicable caselaw, applying State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558, (2022), for the concept that the North Carolina constitution offers broader protection of juvenile offenders than the federal constitution. Id.at 14. Despite this broader protection, defendant was not entitled to reversal, as “the trial court expressly found that ‘it did not believe that there is a likelihood of rehabilitation in confinement’ and that Defendant’s crimes ‘demonstrate a condition of irreparable corruption and permanent incorrigibility.’” Id. 

Judge Arrowood provided a lengthy dissent discussing the applicable constitutional requirements and caselaw precedent, and would have vacated and remanded for resentencing because the trial court violated G.S. 15A-1340.19B, the Eighth Amendment, and Article 1, Section 27. 

In 2004, the defendant was convicted of criminal offenses related to two convenience store robberies and a separate kidnapping and murder. All three incidents occurred in 2002, when the defendant was 16 years old. The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of armed robbery, and was subsequently convicted at trial of first-degree murder under the felony murder rule, first degree kidnapping, and attempted robbery for the third incident. Sentencing for all the offenses occurred at a single hearing and the defendant was sentenced to a total of five consecutive active terms, including a term of life without parole for the murder. The defendant appealed his convictions, asserting errors related to the use of aggravating factors and double jeopardy. The appellate courts’ resolution of those claims in State v. Oglesby, 174 N.C. App. 658, (2005), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 361 N.C. 550 (2007) and State v. Oglesby, 186 N.C. App. 681 (2007) (unpublished), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 478 (2008), ultimately resulted in a remand to the trial court to arrest judgment on the attempted robbery conviction, but otherwise left the sentences undisturbed. 

Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the defendant filed an MAR challenging his sentence of life without parole. The state initially requested a stay, arguing that it had not yet been decided whether Miller applied retroactively. Once that issue was resolved by Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the state agreed that the defendant was entitled to a resentencing hearing. The trial court granted the defendant’s MAR and ordered a new sentencing hearing for the purpose of resentencing the defendant on the murder and arresting judgment on either the kidnapping or attempted robbery conviction in accordance with the prior appellate decisions.

Since the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction was based on felony murder, there was no dispute that the defendant should be resentenced to life with the possibility of parole for that offense, pursuant to G.S. 15A-1340.19B(a). The contested issue at the hearing was whether that life sentence should also be ordered to run concurrently with the kidnapping sentence. After hearing arguments from the state and defense, the trial court ordered that the sentences remain consecutive. The defendant’s consecutive sentences for the two armed robbery convictions were not altered by the order.

The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences on the murder and kidnapping convictions, and also by failing to consider the two robbery convictions at the resentencing. The appellate court rejected both arguments. After reviewing the Miller decision and the responsive statutory changes, the court explained that the sentencing judge retains the discretion to order either consecutive or concurrent sentences pursuant G.S. 15A-1354, and the record in this case demonstrated that the judge “duly exercised that discretion by considering all facts presented at the resentencing hearing in reaching its decision.” Additionally, the appellate court held that the defendant failed to preserve the issue of whether the armed robbery sentences should have been included in the resentencing, based on defense counsel’s statements at the resentencing hearing conceding that they were not, as well as the defendant’s failure to include that issue in the notice of appeal. However, even if the issue had been preserved, the court held that the robbery sentences were properly excluded from the resentencing because they arose from a separate transaction. When a juvenile offender is awarded a resentencing under Miller, “the juvenile is only entitled to be resentenced on his murder conviction (i.e., the conviction for which he received mandatory LWOP), and is not entitled to be resentenced for unrelated convictions which arose out of a different transaction.”

The defendant next argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, based on his attorney’s acknowledgement at the hearing that the two armed robbery convictions were unrelated and not before the court for resentencing. The appellate court held that the defendant’s claim failed under both prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, defense counsel’s performance was not deficient because the argument that he purportedly should have raised (that the robbery convictions could also be included in the resentencing) “was, at best, resting on unsettled law, and at worst, meritless” as demonstrated by the appellate court’s rejection of the argument above. Second, the defendant likewise failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this alleged failure. Given that the trial court declined to consolidate the two sentences that were before it, there was only a “highly remote possibility” that the court would have consolidated the other sentences, even if that option had been presented.

Finally, the defendant argued that his multiple consecutive sentences constituted a de facto sentence of life without parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Noting that there have been conflicting decisions on that issue at the Court of Appeals, and that the North Carolina Supreme Court recently issued a stay in State v. Kelliher, 854 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 2021) pending discretionary review, the appellate court declined to rule on that argument at this time; instead, the court dismissed the claim without prejudice, allowing it to be raised on a subsequent MAR after Kelliher is decided, if warranted.

Judge Arrowood concurred with the majority in part, but dissented as to ineffective assistance of counsel and would have held that the trial court did have the authority to resentence on the robberies because the sentences were all imposed at the same time, and therefore trial counsel was deficient in failing to advance that argument at the hearing and there was a reasonable probability that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result.

The defendant was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of life without parole for two murders he committed when he was 17 years old. The defendant filed an MAR requesting resentencing on the grounds that sentencing a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional, pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and G.S. 15A-1340.19A, et seq. The MAR was granted and the defendant was resentenced to two consecutive life sentences with parole.

On appeal, the defendant argued that his new sentence was unconstitutional since it amounted to a de facto sentence of life without parole. The majority opinion acknowledged that an identical sentence was held unconstitutional in State v. Kelliher, __ N.C. App. __, 849 S.E.2d 333 (2020), temp. stay allowed, __ N.C. __, 848 S.E.2d 493 (2020), but found that it was not binding precedent because the state Supreme Court stayed the decision and granted discretionary review. Turning to the case at hand, the appellate court held that “the sentences imposed by the trial court, though significant, are not unconstitutional.” Assuming that a de facto life sentence without parole would be unconstitutional, that argument did not apply to this defendant since he will be eligible for parole in 50 years. However, the appellate court did find that the trial court erred at the resentencing hearing by failing to consider whether concurrent sentences might be appropriate, due to a mistaken belief that concurrent sentences were not permissible under the statutes. The two sentences of life with parole were therefore affirmed, but the portion of the judgment ordering that the terms be consecutive was vacated and remanded for a new hearing to determine whether the sentences should be consecutive or concurrent.

Chief Judge McGee concurred in part and dissented in part. Judge McGee agreed that the statutes themselves do not prohibit consecutive sentences and also agreed that the defendant must be resentenced, but would have held that two consecutive sentences of life with parole do constitute a de facto sentence of life without parole, and are therefore unconstitutional as held in Kelliher.

The defendant, 17 years old at the time of his crime, was charged with first-degree murder based on his role in a murder committed by one of his acquaintances during a robbery. Trial testimony indicated that the defendant orchestrated the killing. He was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. At sentencing, the trial judge reviewed mitigating circumstances as required by G.S. 15A-1340.19B(c) to decide whether to impose a sentence of life without parole or life with the possibility of parole after 25 years. Among other findings, the trial court found no evidence of particular immaturity, no evidence of mental illness, and “no evidence . . . that the defendant would benefit from rehabilitation and confinement other than that of other . . . persons who may be incarcerated for . . . first degree murder.” The trial court concluded that any mitigating factors were “outweighed by other evidence in this case of the offense and the manner in which it was committed” and sentenced the defendant to life without parole. The court of appeals vacated the sentence, concluding that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard by focusing on the nature of the offense and not whether the defendant was, within the meaning of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), “the rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible and life without parole is justified.” The trial court also erred by comparing the young defendant to the broader class of all persons who may be incarcerated for first-degree murder, including adults. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with its opinion, emphasizing that the mitigation evidence put on by the defendant (including his youth, his violent home environment, his potential for rehabilitation) “seemingly implicated every factor Miller identified as counseling against sentencing a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole.” Slip op. at 24 (emphasis in original). A dissenting judge would have affirmed the sentence of life without parole.

In this child sexual assault case, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court’s consecutive sentences, totaling a minimum of 138 years, violated his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The court began by finding that because the defendant failed to object to the sentencing on constitutional grounds in the trial court, he failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. The court went on however to reject the defendant’s argument on the merits. It noted that a punishment may be cruel or unusual if it is not proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Here, the trial court exercised its discretion and consolidated the 70 verdicts into six identical judgments, each of which were sentenced in the presumptive range, and the trial court ordered that these 276-month sentences be served consecutively.

The defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after a term of 25 years does not violate the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). As a 15-year-old, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. He was found guilty under the felony murder rule and under then-applicable law, was sentenced to a mandatory term of life without the possibility of parole. While the defendant’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller, holding that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment. The General Assembly then amended the statute to provide that the sentence for a defendant found guilty of first-degree murder solely under the felony murder rule shall be life in prison with the possibility of parole; a defendant sentenced under this provision must serve a minimum of 25 years before becoming eligible for parole. The defendant’s sentence was vacated on appeal and remanded to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to the new statute. The trial court held a resentencing hearing and imposed a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 25 years. The court declined the defendant’s invitation to extend Miller to sentences that include the possibility of parole. It added, however:

Nevertheless, we note there may indeed be a case in which a mandatory sentence of life with parole for a juvenile is disproportionate in light of a particular defendant’s age and immaturity. That case is not now before us. Defendant chooses only to assert that [the statute] fails to provide a trial judge with discretion to consider the mitigating factors of youth and immaturity. He does not show the existence of circumstances indicating the sentence is particularly cruel or unusual as-applied to him.

The court affirmed the sentence, noting that the defendant had failed to meet the burden of the facial constitutional challenge and did not bring an as-applied challenge.

The trial court erred by concluding that the defendant’s 300-month minimum, 420-month maximum sentence for statutory rape and statutory sex offense violated the Eighth Amendment. The court concluded: “A 300-month sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the two crimes to which Defendant pled guilty. Furthermore, Defendant’s 300-month sentence … is less than or equal to the sentences of many other offenders of the same crime in this jurisdiction.”

In this case, arising from the defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder of UNC student Eve Carson, the court upheld the constitutionality of the State’s “Miller fix” statute and determined that the trial court’s findings supported a sentence to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The defendant—who was 17 years old at the time of the murder—was originally sentenced to life in prison without parole. In his first appeal the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under G.S. 15A-1340.19A et. seq., the new sentencing statute enacted by the N.C. General Assembly in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, ___, 183 L.Ed. 2d 407, 421-24 (2012). On remand, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing and resentenced the defendant under the new sentencing statute to life imprisonment without parole after making extensive findings of fact as to any potential mitigating factors revealed by the evidence. Among other things, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Miller fix statute was constitutionally infirm because it “vests the sentencing judge with unbridled discretion providing no standards.” It also rejected the defendant’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s findings of fact in connection with the resentencing and that without findings of irretrievable corruption and no possibility of rehabilitation the trial court should not have imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. It concluded:

As noted by Miller, the “harshest penalty will be uncommon[,]” but this case is uncommon. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 183 L.E. 2d at 424. The trial court’s findings support its conclusion. The trial court considered the circumstances of the crime and defendant’s active planning and participation in a particularly senseless murder. Despite having a stable, middleclass home, defendant chose to take the life of another for a small amount of money. Defendant was 17 years old, of a typical maturity level for his age, and had no psychiatric disorders or intellectual disabilities that would prevent him from understanding risks and consequences as others his age would. Despite these advantages, defendant also had an extensive juvenile record, and thus had already had the advantage of any rehabilitative programs offered by the juvenile court, to no avail, as his criminal activity had continued to escalate. Defendant was neither abused nor neglected, but rather the evidence indicates for most of his life he had two parents who cared deeply for his well-being in all regards. 

he trial court erred by concluding that a 50-year sentence with the possibility of parole on a defendant who was a juvenile at the time the crimes were committed subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendant was convicted of second degree burglary (1 count), felonious breaking or entering (3 counts), felonious larceny (four counts), and possession of stolen property (2 counts). Assessing the number of felony convictions, the fact that one was particularly serious, and the fact that the defendant’s conduct involved great financial harm and led to criminal activity on the part of a younger individual, the court concluded that the sentence was not “grossly disproportionate.” 

The court rejected the defendant’s argument that a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for first-degree felony-murder (child abuse as the underlying felony) violated the 8^th Amendment.

In an appeal from a conviction obtained in the Eve Carson murder case, the court held that the defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing in accordance with G.S. 15A-1476 (recodified as G.S. 15A-1340.19A), the statute enacted by the North Carolina General Assembly to bring the State’s sentencing law into compliance with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentencing scheme that requires life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders). The State conceded that the statute applied to the defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the murder and whose case was pending on direct appeal when the Act became law.