In this Beaufort County case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the State’s appeal of a district court order suppressing evidence gathered during a DWI traffic stop. The Supreme Court found that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest defendant and reversed the suppression order, remanding for further proceedings. 

In April of 2020, a State Highway Patrol officer stopped defendant after observing him weaving across the centerline. The officer noticed defendant smelled of alcohol and had glassy eyes, and defendant admitted to having a couple of beers earlier in the day. Afte administering a preliminary breath test (PBT) and horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, the officer arrested defendant for DWI. When the matter came to district court, defendant moved to suppress the results of the stop. The trial court found that the officer did not have probable cause to suspect defendant of DWI before his arrest, and also that the officer failed to ensure defendant had nothing in his mouth before the PBT, excluding the results. After the trial court’s preliminary ruling, the State challenged the determination in superior court under G.S. 20-38.7(a), but that court affirmed the trial court’s determination and directed it to enter a final order. The Court of Appeals denied the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 

Taking up the State’s petition, the Supreme Court first established its jurisdiction and the lack of other appeal routes, explaining that the final suppression order from district court was interlocutory, and the statute governing appeals from district court, G.S. 15A-1432, provided no other route for the State to appeal because there was no dismissal or motion for new trial. Since there was no vehicle for appeal and the State “would otherwise be marooned in an ‘interlocutory no-man’s land,’” Rule of Appellate Procedure 21 allowed the State to petition the Court for certiorari. Slip Op. at 8. This also meant that the Court was considering the district court’s final order, as there was no Court of Appeals opinion on the matter. 

Moving to the suppression order, the Court explained the applicable standard for probable cause in DWI arrests, and noted the extensive facts in the record supporting the officer’s suspicion of defendant, including “erratic weaving; the smell of alcohol on his breath and in his truck; his red, glassy eyes; his admission to drinking; and his performance on the HGN test.” Id. at 23.  Based on the totality of the evidence, the Court concluded that “a reasonable officer would find a ‘substantial basis’ to arrest in this case,” and defendant’s arrest did not offend the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 22. 

In this Edgecombe County case, defendant appealed his convictions for second-degree murder and aggravated serious injury by vehicle, arguing error in the denial of his motion to suppress a warrantless blood draw and motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals found no error and affirmed. 

In June of 2015, defendant crossed the centerline of a highway and hit another vehicle head on, causing the death of one passenger. Officers responding to the scene interviewed defendant, and noted his responses seemed impaired and the presence of beer cans in his vehicle. A blood draw was performed at the hospital, although the officer ordering the draw did not read defendant his Chapter 20 implied consent rights or obtain a search warrant before the draw. The results of defendant’s blood draw showed a benzodiazepine, a cocaine metabolite, two anti-depressants, an aerosol propellant, and a blood-alcohol level of 0.02.  

Reviewing defendant’s argument that no exigent circumstances supported the warrantless draw of his blood, the Court of Appeals first noted that defense counsel failed to object to the admission of the drug analysis performed on defendant’s blood, meaning his arguments regarding that exhibit were overruled. The court then turned to the exigent circumstances exception to justify the warrantless search, noting that the investigation of the scene took significant time and defendant was not taken to the hospital until an hour and forty-five minutes afterwards. Acknowledging Supreme Court precedent “that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream cannot, standing alone, create an exigency in a case of alleged impaired driving sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant,” the court looked for additional justification in the current case. Slip Op. at 11. Here the court found such justification in the shift change occurring that would prevent the officer from having assistance, and the delay in going to obtain a warrant from the magistrate’s office that would add an additional hour to the process. These circumstances supported the trial court’s finding of exigent circumstances. 

The court then turned to defendant’s argument that insufficient evidence was admitted to establish he was impaired at the time of the accident. The record contained evidence that defendant had beer cans in his truck along with an aerosol can of Ultra Duster, and several witnesses testified as to defendant’s demeanor and speech after the accident. The record also contained a blood analysis showing defendant had five separate impairing substances in his system at the time of the accident, “alcohol, benzyl ethylene (a cocaine metabolite), Diazepam (a benzodiazepine such as Valium), Citalopram (an anti-depressant) and Sertraline (another anti-depressant called “Zoloft”).” Id. at 16. The court found that based on this evidence there was sufficient support for denying defendant’s motion.

In three consolidated cases the Court held that while a warrantless breath test of a motorist lawfully arrested for drunk driving is permissible as a search incident to arrest, a warrantless blood draw is not. It concluded: “Because breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, we conclude that a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving. As in all cases involving reasonable searches incident to arrest, a warrant is not needed in this situation.” Having found that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not justify the warrantless taking of a blood sample, the Court turned to the argument that blood tests are justified based on the driver’s legally implied consent to submit to them. In this respect it concluded: “motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense.”

The petitioner appealed from his impaired driving conviction on the basis that the State violated the Fourth Amendment by withdrawing his blood while he was unconscious without a warrant following his arrest for impaired driving. A Wisconsin state statute permits such blood draws. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions, though no single opinion from that court commanded a majority, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.”  

Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer and Justice Kavanaugh announced the judgment of the court and wrote the plurality opinion. The plurality noted at the outset that the Court’s opinions approving the general concept of implied consent laws did not rest on the idea that such laws create actual consent to the searches they authorize, but instead approved defining elements of such statutory schemes after evaluating constitutional claims in light of laws developed over the years to combat drunk driving. The plurality noted that the Court had previously determined that an officer may withdraw blood from an impaired driving suspect without a warrant if the facts of a particular case establish exigent circumstances. Missouri v.McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 765 (1966). While the natural dissipation of alcohol is insufficient by itself to create per se exigency in impaired driving cases, exigent circumstances may exist when that natural metabolic process is combined with other pressing police duties (such as the need to address issues resulting from a car accident) such that the further delay necessitated by a warrant application risks the destruction of evidence. The plurality reasoned that in impaired driving cases involving unconscious drivers, the need for a blood test is compelling and the officer’s duty to attend to more pressing needs involving health or safety (such as the need to transport an unconscious suspect to a hospital for treatment) may leave the officer no time to obtain a warrant. Thus, the plurality determined that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed an impaired driving offense and the person’s unconsciousness or stupor requires him to be taken to the hospital before a breath test may be performed, the State may almost always order a warrantless blood test to measure the driver’s blood alcohol concentration without offending the Fourth Amendment. The plurality did not rule out that in an unusual case, a defendant could show that his or her blood would not have been withdrawn had the State not sought blood alcohol concentration information and that a warrant application would not have interfered with other pressing needs or duties. The plurality remanded the case because the petitioner had no opportunity to make such a showing.

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment only, writing separately to advocate for overruling Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), in favor of a rule that the dissipation of alcohol creates an exigency in every impaired driving case that excuses the need for a warrant. 

Justice Sotomayer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, dissented, reasoning that the Court already had established that there is no categorical exigency exception for blood draws in impaired driving cases, although exigent circumstances might justify a warrantless blood draw on the facts of a particular case. The dissent noted that in light of that precedent, Wisconsin’s primary argument was always that the petitioner consented to the blood draw through the State’s implied-consent law. Certiorari review was granted on the issue of whether this law provided an exception to the warrant requirement. The dissent criticized the plurality for resting its analysis on the issue of exigency, an issue it said Wisconsin had affirmatively waived.

Justice Gorsuch dissented by separate opinion, arguing that the Court had declined to answer the question presented, instead upholding Wisconsin’s implied consent law on an entirely different ground, namely the exigent circumstances doctrine. 

The superior court erred by denying the State a de novo hearing from the district court’s preliminary determination that the defendant’s motion to suppress should be granted. At issue was whether G.S. 20-38.7(a) “requires more than a general objection by the State to the district court judge’s findings of fact or an assertion of new facts or evidence in order to demonstrate a ‘dispute about the findings of fact.’” The court held: “Neither the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-38.7(a) nor § 15A-1432(b) requires the State to set forth the specific findings of fact to which it objects in its notice of appeal to superior court.”

On remand from the Supreme Court, __ N.C. __, 814 S.E.2d 39 (June 8, 2018), of this DWI case, the Court of Appeals declined to exercise its discretion to grant the defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review her claim that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss. The defendant’s motion to dismiss asserted that the State violated G.S. 20-38.4, G.S. 15A-534, and State v. Knoll, 322 N.C. 535 (1988), when the magistrate failed to provide her a written copy of form AOC-CR-271, advising of her right to have witnesses observe her demeanor in jail; and failed to enter sufficient findings of fact to show that the defendant was a danger to herself and others to justify imposing a secured bond pursuant to G.S. 15A-534. Dismissal of charges for violations of statutory rights is a drastic remedy which should be granted sparingly. Before a motion to dismiss should be granted it must appear that the statutory violation caused irreparable prejudice to the preparation of the defendant’s case.

     On the first issue, the State conceded that the magistrate did not comply with G.S. 20-38.4 in that the magistrate did not inform the defendant in writing of the established procedure to have others appear at the jail to observe her condition and failed to require her to list all persons she wanted to contact and telephone numbers on the relevant form. However, the State argued that the defendant could not demonstrate irreparable prejudice to the preparation of her case because the magistrate orally informed the defendant of her right to have witnesses present to observe her condition. In denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the magistrate told the defendant of her right to have individuals come to the detention center to observe her condition and that once she was placed in the detention center, the defendant was allowed to make phone calls to several identified people. These findings are supported by competent evidence.

     With respect to the defendant’s argument that the magistrate violated G.S. 15A-534, the magistrate testified that he considered the defendant’s condition in deciding whether to impose a secured bond and initially entered his reasons on his computer for imposing a secured bond into the “FINDINGS” section of form AOC-CR-270. However, he accidently deleted his reasons listed on form AOC-CR-270 and they were replaced with the text and finding of “BLOOD TEST.” Competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the magistrate considered the factors in G.S. 15A-534 in setting the defendant’s bond, and found by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the defendant’s physical or mental faculties were impaired and that she was a danger to herself, others or property if released.

     The defendant failed to show that she was denied access to witnesses, her right to have witnesses observe her condition, or her right to collect evidence and did not demonstrate irreparable prejudice to the preparation of her case by the magistrate’s statutory violations and failures to provide her with a copy of form AOC-CR-271 or to make additional factual findings to justify imposing a secured bond under G.S. 15A-534. The court noted that the defendant was informed of her right to have witnesses observe her and had the means and was provided the opportunity to contact potential witnesses. Additionally, the magistrate’s detention order required the defendant to remain in custody for a twelve-hour period or until released into the custody of a sober, responsible adult. In fact, the defendant was released into the custody of a sober acquaintance after spending only two hours and fifty-three minutes in jail.

     The court went on to reject the defendant’s argument that she was per se prejudiced by the magistrate’s statutory violations, pursuant to State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547 (1971). Distinguishing Hill the court noted that no evidence in the record suggests the State took affirmative steps to deprive the defendant of any access to potential witnesses or an attorney, such as by preventing them from talking to the defendant or entering the jail to observe her. It continued: “Unlike the defendant in Hill, Defendant was told of her right to have observers present, was not limited to one phone call following her arrest, was allowed and did make numerous calls to multiple individuals and was released to a sober adult within less than three hours. Additionally, the Supreme Court later acknowledged in Knoll that the per se prejudice rule stated in Hill is no longer applicable.”

     Ultimately the court found that the defendant’s arguments failed to demonstrate “irreparable prejudice to the preparation of defendant’s case” and that that she did not raise any “good and sufficient cause” to support the court’s exercise of its discretion to grant her petition and issue the writ of certiorari.

For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion below, the court reversed State v. McKenzie, 225 N.C. App. 208 (Jan. 15, 2013), which had held, over a dissent, that prosecuting the defendant for DWI violated double jeopardy where the defendant previously was subjected to a one-year disqualification of his commercial driver’s license under G.S. 20-17.4.

The trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress in this DWI case. The defendant had argued that the arresting officer failed to comply with the requirements of G.S. 20-16.2. Specifically, the defendant asserted that he was not adequately informed of his rights under the statute due to the fact that English is not his first language and that the officer’s failure to ensure that these rights were communicated to him in his native language of Burmese resulted in violation of the statute. The court held that State v. Martinez, __ N.C. App. __, 781 S.E.2d 346 (2016) (holding that the admissibility of the results of a chemical analysis test are not conditioned on a defendant’s subjective understanding of the information disclosed to him pursuant to the requirements of G.S. 20-16.2(a)), was controlling. It held: “as long as the rights delineated under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(a) are disclosed to a defendant — which occurred in the present case — the requirements of the statute are satisfied and it is immaterial whether the defendant comprehends them.”

The superior court erred in reversing a DMV civil revocation of a driver’s license in a case where the appellee refused to consent to a chemical analysis after being charged with DWI.  An officer responded to a call that a driver had fallen asleep in the drive-through lane of a fast food restaurant and discovered the appellee asleep in the driver’s seat of her vehicle, which was not running and was parked in the parking lot.  After an investigation where the appellee admitted to falling asleep while in the drive-through lane and failed a field sobriety test, she was charged with DWI.  The appellee refused to consent to a blood sample for a chemical analysis, causing the DMV to revoke her license pursuant to G.S. 20-16.2 and sustain the revocation following an administrative hearing.  The superior court reversed the revocation on two grounds, finding that there was a lack of evidence that the appellee was operating a motor vehicle and also finding that the procedures of G.S. 20-16.2 deprived the appellee of due process.  Leaving open the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the appellee of DWI, the Court of Appeals found that the officer had probable cause to believe that the appellee was operating the vehicle, as required by the statute.  As for the due process issue, the Court of Appeals found that the procedures prescribed by G.S. 20-16.2 do not violate due process merely because DMV hearing officers are DMV employees and there is no attorney at revocation hearings putting on the State’s case.