Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Table of Contents
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
About
This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
Instructions
Navigate using the table of contents to the left or by using the search box below. Use quotations for an exact phrase search. A search for multiple terms without quotations functions as an “or” search. Not sure where to start? The 5 minute video tutorial offers a guided tour of main features – Launch Tutorial (opens in new tab).
In this capital case, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that information he provided his lawyers regarding the location of the victim’s body was inadmissible by virtue of the attorney-client privilege. Here, the trial court correctly determined that the information was not protected by the privilege. Specifically, testimony of defense counsel at a hearing before the trial court plainly established that the defendant communicated the information to counsel with the purpose that it be relayed to law enforcement to assist in the search for the victim. Because the communication was made for the purpose of being conveyed by counsel to others, it was not privileged.
In this Gaston County first-degree murder case, the trial court (1) did not err in instructing the jury that there was sufficient evidence to infer that the defendant intentionally injured the victim; (2) erred by allowing the State to examine the defendant about privileged communications he had with defense counsel; (3) and did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to compel the State to disclose the theory on which it sought to convict him of first-degree murder.
(1) The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court’s instruction to the jury that “[w]hen an adult has exclusive custody of a child for a period of time during which that child suffers injuries that are neither self-inflicted nor accidental, there is sufficient evidence to create an inference that the adult intentionally inflicted those injuries” impermissibly “created a ‘mandatory presumption’” that the defendant intentionally injured the victim. Viewing the challenged language “in light of the entire charge” and in the greater context of the law regarding intent and direct and circumstantial evidence, the Court of Appeals found no error in the instruction, explaining in part that the phrase “sufficient to create an inference” cannot reasonably be interpreted as meaning that the basic facts, if proven, “necessarily create an inference” of intent.
(2) The trial court erred by permitting the State to question the defendant on cross-examination about the substance of communications between him and defense counsel as those communications were subject to attorney-client privilege. Over an objection and in an effort to impeach the defendant’s credibility, the State was permitted to question the defendant about whether he discussed his law enforcement interrogation with his attorney. The Court of Appeals determined that the error was not prejudicial in light of the fact that the defendant’s credibility was already at issue at the time of the objectionable cross-examination and the defendant already had testified to being untruthful with police in the past.
(3) Given the well-stablished principle that “when first-degree murder is charged, the State is not required to elect between theories of prosecution prior to trial,” the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to compel the State to disclose the theory upon which it sought his conviction.
Conversation between the defendant and his lawyer was not privileged because the defendant told his lawyer the information with the intention that it be conveyed to the prosecutor. At a hearing on the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the defendant’s former attorney, who had represented the defendant during plea negotiations, testified over the defendant’s objection. Former counsel testified about a meeting in which the defendant provided former counsel with information to be relayed to the prosecutor to show what testimony the defendant could offer against his co-defendants.