In this Cumberland County case, the Supreme Court majority affirmed an unpublished Court of Appeals decision denying defendant’s constitutional challenge to his sentences of life without parole for murders committed while he was a juvenile.

In August of 1998, defendant was seventeen years old, and a member of the Crips gang, when he participated in the abduction and robbery of three women; defendant and the gang killed two of the women, but one woman survived. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, but the sentence was reduced to two consecutive life sentences without parole after the holding in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that sentencing juvenile offenders to death was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court subsequently held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), that a mandated life without parole sentence for a juvenile was unconstitutional, but permitted sentencing where the trial court had discretion to impose a lesser sentence. Defendant was resentenced in accordance with the Miller-fix statute adopted by the General Assembly, resulting in the imposition of two consecutive terms of life without parole in March 2020. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentences in the unpublished decision State v. Tirado, COA20-213 (June 15, 2021), leading to the current opinion.

On appeal, defendant argued that Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution was more protective than the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and his sentences were cruel or unusual punishments and unconstitutional under North Carolina law. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that the Cruel or Unusual Punishment clause in the North Carolina Constitution prohibited imposing sentences beyond those authorized by law. The Court reached this conclusion by conducting a historical analysis of the clause along with Article XI, which provides a list of acceptable punishments and has no analogue in the U.S. Constitution. Summarizing the function of these two provisions, the Court noted:

Because a constitution cannot violate itself, we must construe Article I, Section 27’s proscription of cruel or unusual punishments and Article XI’s enumeration of acceptable punishments harmoniously. Logically, therefore, the punishments the people sanctioned in Article XI, Sections 1 and 2 are inherently not “cruel or unusual” in a constitutional sense. Accordingly, an act of the General Assembly cannot violate the Cruel or Unusual Punishments Clause by prescribing a punishment allowable under Article XI, Sections 1 and 2, and similarly, judges cannot violate Article I, Section 27, by handing down a sentence in obedience to such an act.

Slip Op. at 32 (cleaned up). Although defendant argued the North Carolina Constitution was more protective, the Court explained that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause provided more protection in modern jurisprudence and concluded the Court of Appeals properly evaluated and decided defendant’s appeal in light of the protections afforded by both.

The Court also determined that the trial court’s sentence complied with State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558 (2022), as that opinion was released after defendant’s appeal. First the Court noted defendant’s case did not meet the criteria of that opinion because “Kelliher applies only to juvenile homicide offenders whom the trial court (1) expressly finds to be neither incorrigible nor irredeemable and (2) sentences to multiple, consecutive terms of life with parole.” Slip Op. at 43. Then the Court clarified that a portion of the Kelliher opinion was obiter dictum, as “the statement requiring the trial court to make an express finding of incorrigibility before sentencing a defendant to life without parole was unnecessary in determining the outcome of the case.” Id. at 44.

Justice Berger, joined by Justices Barringer and Allen, concurred but wrote separately to express concerns with the Kelliher opinion and the precedential weight to which it is entitled. Id. at 46.

Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only and argued that the majority’s assertions regarding Article I, Section 27 were unnecessary and should be interpreted as dicta. Id. at 50.

In this Cleveland County case, defendant appealed the result of his resentencing hearing for life without parole and the denial of his constitutional challenges to his sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s orders. 

In 1999, defendant received a sentence of life without parole for a murder committed when he was 16 years old. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), holding that mandatory life without parole sentences for defendants under age 18 were unconstitutional, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), holding that Miller v. Alabama was retroactive. The General Assembly adopted G.S. 15A-1340.19A, referred to by the court as “the Miller statute,” to require a resentencing hearing for every defendant convicted of first-degree murder committed while under 18 and with a sentence of life without parole. Slip Op. at 2. Defendant’s Miller resentencing hearing in 2020 gave rise to the current case. 

The Court of Appeals considered three arguments from defendant. First, defendant argued that the resentencing judge erred when he “impermissibly assessed the credibility of witnesses who testified during the 1999 trial, where he was not the presiding judge at that trial.” Id. at 3. The court disagreed, pointing to the language of the Miller statute as well as general practice allowing substitution of new judges during criminal trials. The court concluded “the judge thoroughly reviewed the record and could appropriately assess the credibility of the two co-defendants who testified against Defendant at the 1999 trial.” Id. at 6. 

Defendant next argued that the trial court improperly weighed several mitigating factors: “(1) age, (2) immaturity, (3) reduced ability to appreciate risks and consequences, (4) family and peer pressure exerted upon the defendant, and (5) the defendant’s likelihood to benefit from rehabilitation.” Id. at 7. The court walked through the analysis for each factor, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when considering the mitigating factors. 

Finally, the court reached defendant’s constitutional arguments that (1) the Miller statute was unconstitutional as it contained a presumption in favor of life without parole and lacks guidance for resentencing, and (2) that life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and North Carolina constitution. The court rejected both arguments, noting for (1) that State v. James, 371 N.C. 77 (2018), upheld the constitutionality of the Miller statute, and for (2) that State v. Conner, 381 N.C. 643 (2022), and State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558 (2022), upheld the constitutionality of life without parole sentences. Slip Op. at 10. 

In this Cumberland County case, defendant appealed the superior court order sentencing him to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOPP) for two counts of first-degree murder committed while he was a juvenile. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order. 

In 1998, defendant was convicted of murdering two law enforcement officers and was sentenced to death. Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the murders. Defendant’s convictions were upheld on direct appeal in State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364 (2000). After defendant was convicted, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), holding death sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), holding that a mandatory sentence of LWOPP was unconstitutional for a juvenile; and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), holding that Miller’sprohibition on mandatory LWOPP must be applied retroactively to those already sentenced to mandatory LWOPP. Defendant was initially resentenced to mandatory LWOPP in December of 2005, after filing a motion for appropriate relief (MAR) under Roper. In the current case, defendant filed a MAR in July of 2018, alleging his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller and Montgomery. A sentencing hearing was held in 2022, where the MAR court reviewed the nine mitigating factors from G.S. 15A-1340.19B and sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of LWOPP. 

The Court of Appeals first explained the scope of its review was abuse of discretion, and that the relevant considerations were the mitigating factors from G.S. 15A-1340.19B(c), along with the additional factor from State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558 (2022), that the sentencing court must make an express finding of “a juvenile’s permanent incorrigibility” before imposing LWOPP. Slip Op. at 12. The court then grouped defendant’s arguments in two categories, (1) that defendant’s sentence of LWOPP should be reversed based on Kelliherbecause he was capable of reform, and (2) the MAR court incorrectly weighed the mitigating factors of G.S. 15A-1340.19B. Taking up (1), the court quickly dispensed with defendant’s arguments, as defendant did not challenge the findings of fact as unsupported by the evidence and they were binding on his appeal.

Because defendant did not challenge the findings of fact, the court moved to (2), and specifically the weight the MAR court gave to each of the nine mitigating factors and the express finding of incorrigibility under Kelliher. A significant portion of the opinion (pages 15 to 30) were spent examining the factors and the weight given by the MAR court to each. The court ultimately concluded that “the Sentencing Order properly addressed each factor as required by [G.S.] 15A-1340.19A and Kelliher.” Id. at 31. After noting the possible differing views on the mitigating impact of the factors, the court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the order. 

In a case where the trial court found that the juvenile’s likelihood of rehabilitation was uncertain and sentenced him to life in prison without parole, the court vacated and remanded for the defendant to be resentenced to life with the possibility of parole. The defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. He was 17 years old at the time of the crimes. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Following the United States Supreme Court’s Miller decision, the defendant sought and obtained a new sentencing hearing. After considering the evidence and arguments by counsel at the new hearing, the trial court entered an order that concluded, in part: “There is no certain prognosis of Defendant[’]s possibility of rehabilitation. The speculation of Defendant’s ability to be rehabilitated can only be given minimal weight as a mitigating factor.” The trial court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive sentences of life without parole and the defendant appealed.

            Citing state Supreme Court precedent, the court quickly rejected the defendant’s argument that G.S. 15A-1340.19B (the post-Miller sentencing scheme for juveniles) is unconstitutional on its face.

However, the court agreed with the defendant that the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation was speculative rendered him ineligible for life without parole. The court noted that the case required it to address a question of first impression: whether the Supreme Court’s holdings require trial courts to determine, as a threshold matter, whether a juvenile defendant is eligible for such punishment independent of other relevant factors, or whether it merely identifies additional factors that the trial court must consider as it weighs the totality of circumstances in making its sentencing decision. Considering the case law, the court stated:

[W]e hold that whether a defendant qualifies as an individual within the class of offenders who are irreparably corrupt is a threshold determination that is necessary before a life sentence without parole may be imposed by the trial court. This holding is not inconsistent with the North Carolina Supreme Court’s rejection of a specific factfinding requirement. Rather, we hold that, when a trial court does make a finding about a juvenile offender’s possibility of rehabilitation that is inconsistent with the limited class of offenders defined by the United States Supreme Court, a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional as applied to that offender.

Turning to the case at hand, the court concluded that “the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole after making a finding contrary to the defined class of irreparably corrupt offenders described in our precedent.” The trial court made an explicit finding that “there is no certain prognosis” for the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. This finding directly conflicts with the limitation of life in prison without parole to juveniles who are “irreparably corrupt” and “permanently incorrigible.” It concluded: “Because the trial court made an explicit finding contrary to a determination that Defendant is one of those rarest of juvenile offenders for whom rehabilitation is impossible and a worthless endeavor, we hold the trial court erred by imposing a life sentence without the possibility of parole.”

(1) Because the trial court failed to make statutorily required findings of fact addressing statutory mitigating factors prior to sentencing the juvenile defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, a new sentencing hearing was required. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the murder charge. Immediately after judgment was entered, the defendant gave oral notice of appeal. Almost one month later, the trial court entered an order making findings of fact based on G.S. 15A-1340.19B to support its determination that the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, as opposed to a lesser sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The court agreed with the defendant that the trial court erred by sentencing him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, where it failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the sentence. (2) Because the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter findings of fact after the defendant gave notice of appeal, the court vacated the order entered upon these findings. Once the defendant gave notice of appeal, the trial court’s jurisdiction was divested. Note: one judge concurred, but wrote separately to note concern about how the trial courts are addressing discretionary determinations of whether juvenile should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.