In this human trafficking case involving multiple victims, (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the defendant to represent himself; (2) the indictments were sufficient to convey subject matter jurisdiction; (3) the trial court did not err by entering judgments for multiple counts of human trafficking for each victim; and (4) the trial court did not err in determining the defendant’s prior record level.

(1)  The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court’s statements concluding that he had an “absolute right” to represent himself coupled with the trial court’s failure to consider whether he fell into the “gray area” of being competent to stand trial but incapable of representing himself was a mistake of law requiring a new trial.  While the defendant suffered from an unspecified personality disorder and drug use disorders, the record showed that the trial court “undertook a thorough and realistic account of Defendant’s mental capacities and competence before concluding Defendant was competent to waive counsel and proceed pro se.”  The Court of Appeals noted that after interacting with him, considering his medical conditions, and receiving testimony concerning his forensic psychiatric evaluation, two judges had ruled that Defendant was competent to proceed and represent himself.  The Court of Appeals said that even if the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to represent himself, he invited the error by disagreeing with the manner of representation of appointed counsel and any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

(2) The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s arguments concerning the sufficiency of the seventeen indictments charging him with human trafficking of six different victims.  The Court noted that the indictments alleged every element of the offense within a specific time frame for each victim and tracked the language of the relevant statute word for word.

(3) The Court then turned to and rejected the defendant’s argument that human trafficking is a continuous offense and may only be charged as one crime for each victim.  The Court explained that the defendant’s interpretation of G.S. 14-43.11, which explicitly provides that each violation of the statute “constitutes a separate offense,” would “result in perpetrators exploiting victims for multiple acts, in multiple times and places, regardless of the length of the timeframe over which the crimes occurred as long as the Defendant’s illegal actions and control over the victim were ‘continuous.’”  The Court characterized human trafficking as “statutorily defined as a separate offense for each instance.” 

(4) Finally, the Court determined that the defendant failed to show any error in the trial court’s calculation of his prior record level for sentencing purposes.  With regard to a prior federal felon in possession of a firearm charge, the defendant conceded its classification as a Class G felony on the basis of substantial similarity by not objecting at trial when given the opportunity.  Likewise with regard to a misdemeanor drug paraphernalia charge, the defendant conceded its classification as a Class 1 misdemeanor by not objecting when given the opportunity.

Judge Arrowood concurred in part and dissented in part by separate opinion, expressing his view that it was improper to convict the defendant of multiple counts per victim of human trafficking.  Judge Arrowood explained that North Carolina precedent, specifically involving issues of first impression addressing statutory construction, “clearly instructs that, where a criminal statute does not define a unit of prosecution, a violation thereof should be treated as a continuing offense.”  Judge Arrowood then proceeded with a lengthy and detailed analysis of the appropriate unit of prosecution for human trafficking in North Carolina.