In a case where the defendant was convicted of second-degree rape, breaking or entering, and two counts of attempted second-degree sexual offense, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss one count of attempted second-degree sexual offense. The defendant asserted that the evidence did not show an intent to commit the act by force and against the victim’s will. The court disagreed:

[W]here the request for fellatio is immediately preceded by defendant tricking the victim into letting him into her apartment, raping her, pulling her hair, choking her, flipping her upside down, jabbing at her with a screwdriver, refusing to allow her to leave, pulling her out of her car, taking her car keys, dragging her to his apartment, slapping her so hard that her braces cut the inside of her mouth, screaming at her, and immediately after her denial of his request, raping her again, we hold that this request is accompanied by a threat and a show of force and thus amounts to an attempt. Had [the victim] complied with defendant’s request, thus completing the sexual act, we cannot imagine that the jury would have found that she had consented to perform fellatio. Given the violent, threatening context, defendant’s request and presentation of his penis to [the victim] amounted to an attempt to engage [the victim] in a sexual act by force and against her will.