Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Table of Contents
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
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In this Caswell County case, the Supreme Court majority affirmed the Court of Appeals decision that defendant’s convictions were valid even though he never received the competency evaluation ordered by the trial court under G.S. 15A-1002. The Court concluded that defendant waived his statutory right to the competency hearing.
Defendant was arrested in 2018 for a scheme that involved cutting open footballs and filling them with drugs, then throwing the footballs over the wall to a prison yard. While defendant was in the Caswell County Jail awaiting trial, he was involved in assaulting a detention officer and was charged with assaulting a government employee and communicating threats. Defense counsel filed a motion questioning defendant’s competency for trial, and the trial court granted the request to have a competency evaluation. However, after the order was entered, defendant posted bond and was released. Throughout the trial proceedings, the competency evaluation was not raised again. After defendant was convicted, he raised the competency evaluation issue at the Court of Appeals, where the majority held that under State v. Young, 291 N.C. 562 (1977), defendant waived his statutory right to the hearing. Defendant appealed based on the dissent, which looked to State v. Sides, 376 N.C. 449 (2020), concluding the lack of a hearing violated defendant’s constitutional rights and justified a new trial.
Taking up the competency issue, the Supreme Court explained that the source of defendant’s right was statutory under G.S. 15A-1002, as he had “disclaimed a constitutional challenge at the Court of Appeals . . . and did so again before this Court.” Slip Op. at 7, n.2. This was significant as the right to a competency hearing under the United States Constitution is distinct from the statutory right under G.S. 15A-1002, and “the constitutional right to a competency hearing cannot be waived.” Id. at 11.
The Court explained that defendant “had several chances—over several years, with several attorneys, and in several procedural contexts—to assert the [statutory] right, but never did so.” Id. at 8. Even while out on bond, defendant could have pursued the competency evaluation, but the Court noted he did not do so. During the proceedings, defendant “squarely indicated that he was competent and ready to move forward with trial.” Id. at 10. Considering defendant’s argument that Sides overruled Young and required the trial court to enforce the competency evaluation order, the Court disagreed, explaining Sides did not concern the statutory aspect in question here, as “Sides—a case decided on purely constitutional grounds—did not overrule Young, which addressed both the constitutional and statutory standards.” Id. at 12. Here, Young controlled, and the Court held that defendant waived his statutory right by failing to pursue the competency evaluation or raise the competency issue at trial.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, dissented and would have held that defendant’s right to a competency evaluation was preserved and the trial court was obligated to enforce compliance with the order.
In this Gaston County case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision finding no error when the trial court declined to conduct further inquiry into defendant’s capacity after determining that he voluntarily absented himself by jumping from a balcony on the sixth day of trial.
In May of 2018, defendant forced his way into the home of his ex-girlfriend and held her at gunpoint for several hours, raping her twice. Police eventually forced their way into the home and successfully rescued the ex-girlfriend from defendant. Defendant came for trial on charges of rape, burglary, kidnapping, sexual offense, possession of a firearm by a felon, and violation of a protective order beginning on December 9, 2019. After defendant decided not to testify or present evidence on his own behalf, the trial court conducted two colloquies with defendant to determine if he was making the choices freely and intelligently. The court conducted these colloquies on Friday, December 13, and again on Monday, December 16, 2019. After the second colloquy, the jury was brought back and heard closing arguments from both sides, and trial proceedings concluded for the day. On the morning of December 17, 2019, defendant leaped off a mezzanine in the jail, breaking his leg and ribs. Defense counsel then moved under G.S. 15A-1002 to challenge defendant’s competency. After hearing from defense counsel and the state, the trial court determined that defendant voluntarily absented himself from the trial, and the trial moved forward, ultimately resulting in defendant’s convictions. A unanimous panel at the Court of Appeals found no error by the trial court, distinguishing the circumstances from State v. Sides, 376 N.C. 449 (2020).
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an inquiry into his capacity to proceed, basing his arguments on G.S. §§ 15A-1001 & -1002, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court reviewed these interrelated arguments de novo, first looking at the statutory claim. Here, defense counsel’s initial motion was sufficient to trigger G.S. 15A-1002’s hearing procedures, but the court explained the section only provides “sparse guidance regarding the procedural and substantive requirements of the competency hearing.” Slip Op. at 29. The court concluded that the inquiry here, where the trial court heard from both parties and accepted testimony on the events, was “statutorily sufficient because defendant was provided an opportunity to present any and all evidence relating to his competency that he was prepared to present.” Id. at 30. Even though the trial court did not consider whether defendant had attempted suicide by his jump, this did not show a failure to consider defendant’s capacity, as “[s]uicidality does not automatically render one incompetent,” and defendant could be suicidal without being incompetent, or vice versa. Id. at 31.
The court next moved to the Due Process Clause argument, explaining that the requirements for a constitutional competency hearing are more involved, but are only triggered when the trial court is presented with substantive evidence of defendant’s incompetence. Here, “the determinative issue [was] whether the trial court in the instant case had substantial evidence that defendant may have lacked capacity at the time of his apparent suicide attempt.” Id. at 36. The court first noted that, as explained in the statutory inquiry, defendant’s suicide attempt on its own did not represent substantial evidence of incompetence. Defendant pointed to three categories of evidence showing incompetence: (1) his actions before the arrest, including erratic behavior, the use of a racial slur, and the nature of his crimes, (2) his suicide attempt, and (3) testimony that defendant was heavily medicated and had trouble communicating in the hospital after his attempt at suicide. The court rejected number (3) immediately as it related to after the attempt, and again noted that number (2) by itself did not support incompetence. That left the evidence of number (1), which the court found was inadequate to show substantial evidence of incompetence. Additionally, the trial court was able to observe and interact with defendant over the course of the trial, and received evidence provided by defense counsel at the hearing, none of which indicated a history of mental illness or inability to participate or understand the legal proceedings prior to his suicide attempt. The court concluded that no substantial evidence existed to justify further inquiry.
Justice Earls dissented, and would have held that the trial court held an insufficient hearing under G.S. 15A-1002 and had sufficient evidence to require a competency hearing under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 45.
In this Caswell County case, Defendant appealed his conviction for drug possession charges, arguing error by the trial court for the lack of a competency evaluation and admission of testimony regarding his silence at a traffic stop. The Court of Appeals found no error.
Defendant was in the front seat of an SUV stopped in 2018 under suspicion of throwing contraband into a prison yard. A search of the vehicle found two footballs cut open and filled with drugs; defendant was silent during the stop and search of the vehicle. While awaiting trial, defense counsel moved for a competency hearing; the trial court entered an order finding defendant’s competency in question, and ordering an evaluation of defendant. However the defendant was never evaluated and no finding was ever entered as to his competency, as he was instead released on bail. By the time defendant reached trial in 2021, he had new counsel, who did not assert the right to a competency evaluation, and defendant was convicted of drug possession.
Reviewing defendant’s appeal, the court noted that defendant never objected to the lack of a hearing or evaluation on his competency at trial, and this represented waiver of the statutory right to a competency evaluation and hearing. Defendant failed to assert a due process clause claim for the competency hearing, preventing consideration of the constitutional issue. The court explained that the statutory right to a competency hearing comes from G.S. 15A-1002, and under State v. Young, 291 N.C. 562 (1977), “our Supreme Court repeatedly has held that ‘the statutory right to a competency hearing is waived by the failure to assert that right at trial.’” Slip Op. at 4, quoting State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234 (2007). Reviewing defendant’s objection to the admission of testimony about his silence, the court found no plain error, and noted it was unclear if the issue was even reviewable on appeal. Id. at 9-10.
Judge Inman dissented by separate opinion, and would have granted defendant’s right to competency hearing. Id. at 11.
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that his due process rights were violated when the trial judge failed to provide him with a hearing before ordering an examination of his capacity to proceed. G.S. 15A-1002 does not require the trial judge to conduct a hearing before such an examination. A defendant may request a hearing after the examination but failure to do so—as happened here—constitutes a waiver.