The defendant was accused of killing his aunt in Lenoir County. Following his arrest, the defendant initially requested an attorney and was not interrogated, but later contacted detectives and signed a Miranda waiver. The defendant offered to make a full statement if he could see his family face-to-face again (visits at the jail were conducted by computer and phone only). Officers initially declined the offer but eventually agreed to a face-to-face family visit, and the defendant confessed. The trial court refused to suppress the statement and the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder at trial. He appealed, arguing that his confession was the product of improper inducement by police and therefore not voluntary.

Due process prohibits the admission of an involuntary confession by a person in custody. “[A] confession obtained by the improper ‘influence of hope or fear implanted in the defendant’s mind’ by law enforcement can render the confession involuntary.” Slip. op. at 5. However, for an inducement to be improper, it “must promise relief from the criminal charge to which the confession relates, not to any merely collateral advantage.” Id. at 6 (citations omitted). Here, the defendant initiated the contact with law enforcement and offered to confess in exchange for the family visit; the plan did not originate with law enforcement. The defendant also testified at suppression that he was motivated in part to confess after talking with his father, who encouraged the defendant to make a truthful statement. The totality of circumstances showed that the confession was knowing and voluntary. Further, the purported inducement here related only to a collateral advantage and did not promise relief from the crime. The denial of the motion to suppress was therefore unanimously affirmed.

(1) In this case involving a gang-related home invasion and murder, the court remanded to the trial court on the issue of whether the defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was voluntary. Officers interrogated the 15-year-old defendant four times over an eight hour period. Although he initially denied being involved in either a shooting or a killing, he later admitted to being present for the shooting. He denied involvement in the killing, but gave a detailed description of the murders and provided a sketch of the home based on information he claimed to have received from another person. All four interviews were videotaped. At trial, the State sought to admit the videotaped interrogation and the defendant’s sketch of the home into evidence. The defendant moved to suppress on grounds that the evidence was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant was convicted. He appealed arguing that the trial court’s suppression order lacks key findings concerning law enforcement’s communications with him after he invoked his right to counsel. The video recording of the interrogation shows that the defendant initially waived his right to counsel and spoke to officers. But, after lengthy questioning, he re-invoked his right to counsel and the officers ceased their interrogation and left the room. During that initial questioning, law enforcement told the defendant that they were arresting him on drug charges. The officers also told the defendant they suspected he was involved in the killings, but they did not tell him they were charging him with those crimes, apparently leaving him under the impression that he was charged only with drug possession. Before being re-advised of his rights and signing a second waiver form, the defendant engaged in an exchange with the police chief, who was standing outside of the interrogation room. During the exchange, the defendant asked about being able to make a phone call; the police chief responded that would occur later because he was being arrested and needed to be booked for the shooting. The defendant insisted that he had nothing to do with that and had told the police everything he knew. The chief responded: “Son, you f***** up.” Later, when officers re-entered the interrogation room, the defendant told them that he wanted to waive his right to counsel and make a statement. The trial court’s order however did not address the exchange with the chief. Because of this, the court concluded that it could not examine the relevant legal factors applicable to this exchange, such as the intent of the police; whether the practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused; and any knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion. The court thus remanded for the trial court to address this issue.

(2) The court went on however to reject the defendant’s argument that separate and apart from the chief’s communication with him, his waiver of his right to counsel was involuntary given his age, the officers’ interrogation tactics, and his lack of sleep, food, and medication. The court concluded that the trial court’s order addressed these factors and, based on facts supported by competent evidence in the record, concluded that the defendant’s actions and statements showed awareness and cognitive reasoning during the entire interview and that he was not coerced into making any statements, but rather made his statements voluntarily. Because the trial court’s fact findings on these issues are supported by competent evidence, and those findings in turn support the court’s conclusions, the court rejected this voluntariness challenge.

The trial court did not err by finding that the defendant’s statements were given freely and voluntarily. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that they were coerced by fear and hope. The court held that an officer’s promise that the defendant would “walk out” of the interview regardless of what she said did not render her confession involuntary. Without more, the officer’s statement could not have led the defendant to believe that she would be treated more favorably if she confessed to her involvement in her child’s disappearance and death. Next, the court rejected—as a factual matter—the defendant’s argument that officers lied about information provided to them by a third party. Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that her mental state rendered her confession involuntary and coerced, where the evidence indicated that the defendant understood what was happening, was coherent and did not appear to be impaired.

The defendant’s confession was involuntary. The defendant’s first confession was made before Miranda warnings were given. The officer then gave the defendant Miranda warnings and had the defendant repeat his confession. The trial court suppressed the defendant’s pre-Miranda confession but deemed the post-Miranda confession admissible. The court disagreed, concluding that the circumstances and tactics used by the officer to induce the first confession must be imputed to the post-Miranda confession. The court found the first confession involuntary, noting that the defendant was in custody, the officer made misrepresentations and/or deceptive statements, the officer made promises to induce the confession, and the defendant may have had an impaired mental condition.

The court rejected the juvenile’s argument that his statement was involuntary. The juvenile had argued that because G.S. 20-166(c) required him to provide his name and other information to the nearest officer, his admission to driving the vehicle was involuntary. The court rejected this argument, citing California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (a hit and run statute requiring the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident to stop at the scene and give his name and address did not violate the Fifth Amendment).

In this child sexual abuse case, the defendant’s confession was not involuntary. After briefly speaking to the defendant at his home about the complaint, an officer asked the defendant to come to the police station to answer questions. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that his confession was involuntary because he was given a false hope of leniency if he was to confess and that additional charges would stem from continued investigation of other children. The officers’ offers to “help” the defendant “deal with” his “problem” did not constitute a direct promise that the defendant would receive a lesser or no charge should he confess. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the confession was involuntary because one of the officers relied on his friendship with the defendant and their shared racial background, and that another asked questions about whether the defendant went to church or believed in God. Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that his confession was involuntarily obtained through deception.

The trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress three statements made while he was in the hospital. The defendant had argued that medication he received rendered the statements involuntary. Based on testimony of the detective who did the interview, hospital records, and the recorded statements, the trial court made extensive findings that the defendant was alert and oriented. Those findings supported the trial court's conclusion that the statements were voluntary.