Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
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In this Wake County case, defendant appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder and the sentence of death, arguing a list of errors related to admission of evidence, denial of his motions to dismiss, and imposition of the death penalty. In a substantial and detailed opinion, the Supreme Court majority found no prejudicial error, affirming the death sentence.
In December of 2016, defendant set up a meeting with a woman, the eventual female victim, for sexual services at a Raleigh hotel. Defendant and an accomplice arrived at the hotel and the woman provided her room number. The two men went to the room, passing the man serving as a protector for the woman in the hallway. After a few minutes the protector, who was the eventual male victim, began banging on the door of the room. Defendant’s accomplice left the room and after an exchange in the hallway shot the protector several times. Hearing the shots, defendant ran out of the room, turned, and fired several shots back into the room, hitting the woman. By the time police arrived, both victims were dead from gunshot wounds; an autopsy determined the female victim was twelve weeks pregnant. Defendant and his accomplice fled the hotel but were subsequently arrested. During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the State called two women, Bessie and Rachel, who had been hired for sexual services by defendant, and they offered testimony about his violent interactions with them, as he raped and robbed them in budget hotels. The State also called a woman, Kara, who had first been hired for sexual services by defendant, and who was then forced into prostitution by defendant and assaulted at gunpoint by him. Additional witnesses testified to defendant’s conduct during the sentencing phase of the trial. Defendant was convicted, sentenced to death, and appealed directly to the Supreme Court under G.S. 7A-27(a).
The Supreme Court took up defendant’s arguments regarding errors in both the guilt-innocence phase and the sentencing phase of trial (the numbering/lettering below corresponds to the majority opinion’s organization).
(A) Rule 404(b) Evidence (Bessie and Rachel) – Defendant argued it was error to admit evidence related to his interactions with Bessie and Rachel in the months before the murders. In separate incidents, defendant and an accomplice contacted each woman for sexual services, then met each woman at a budget Raleigh hotel, tied them up, raped them, and robbed them. (1) Defendant argued the evidence of the prior acts with the two women did not fall within the proper bounds of Rule 404(b) evidence. The Court disagreed, walking through defendant’s objections to the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, noting the similarities between the crime at issue and the two incidents and concluding “[t]hese facts are sufficient in both temporal proximity and similarity to demonstrate a common plan or scheme to rape and rob [the female victim] on the night she was murdered.” Slip Op. at 18. (2) The Court then looked to whether the evidence was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, determining “this evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, nor did it substantially outweigh the highly probative value, because it was introduced to establish defendant’s common scheme or plan.” Id. at 19-20. (3) Finally, the Court considered the limiting instruction given by the trial court and found no error, noting that defendant actually requested the instructions in question, meaning even if there was error, it would be invited error on defendant’s part.
(B) Evidence of a Prior Assault with a Firearm (Kara) – Defendant next argued that admitting evidence of his assault on Kara was plain error under Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, as defendant failed to object at trial. Defendant met Kara after he hired her for sexual services, but defendant then forced her to engage in prostitution to raise money for him. After defendant continued to force Kara to raise money, she protested, and defendant threatened her by placing his gun in her mouth. (1) After defendant’s motion in limine, the trial court allowed the State “to elicit testimony from Kara [] to identify defendant and/or the weapon he used on the night she was assaulted.” Id. at 22. Kara was not permitted to testify about human trafficking or prostitution offenses. (2) The Court applied plain error review, noting review was not available under Rule 403 as review was not available for issues “within the realm of the trial court’s discretion.” Id. at 26 (quoting State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227 (2000)). However, the Rule 401 relevancy issue could be considered, and the Court concluded that “testimony about defendant’s possession of, preference for, and prior assault with a firearm was relevant as it made the fact that defendant possessed and used the weapon to kill [the female victim] more probable.” Id. at 27-28. The Court also noted that even if the evidence was not relevant, defendant could not show the jury probably would have reached a different result if not for the evidence.
(C) Evidence of the Abusive Backgrounds of Prior Women Victimized by Defendant – The Court considered defendant’s arguments against testimony in both phases of the trial. (1) In the guilt-innocence phase, defendant challenged testimony from the female victim’s sister about her childhood, arguing it was improper testimony about the victim’s character. The court disagreed, explaining “the evidence revealed the factual circumstances of [the female victim’s] life relevant to explaining why she was engaging in prostitution on the night she was murdered by defendant at the hotel.” Id. at 31-32. Defendant also challenged certain testimony from the witness Rachel about her abusive childhood and experience in prostitution. Here the Court noted that defendant did not object to this portion of Rachel’s testimony at trial, and this “may have been part of defendant’s trial strategy” as defense counsel questioned Rachel regarding her experiences as a prostitute during cross-examination. Id. at 33. This represented invited error, and to the extent other portions of the testimony were objectionable, the Court found they were introductory evidence that provided context for the jury about how she crossed paths with defendant. (2) In the sentencing phase, two additional women, Keyona and Keyana, offered testimony about defendant’s violence towards them, and defendant again objected to testimony about their backgrounds. For sentencing, the rules of evidence did not apply, and the Rule 403 balancing test was not relevant. The Court found no error admitting the testimony as it introduced the women to the jury and “it showed a course of conduct by defendant of engaging in violent acts against vulnerable women and prostitutes.” Id. at 37. Defendant also argued that the trial court erred by instructing the jury they could consider evidence from the guilt-innocence phase of trial during their sentencing deliberations, but the Court dispensed with the argument as it was not error.
(D) Admission of Photographic Evidence from the Crime Scene – Defendant argued that the admission of nine photographs in State’s Exhibit 3 were unnecessarily repetitive and cumulative “because other evidence presented at trial showed that [the female victim] was found naked by the door of the hotel room, that her cause of death was a bullet wound to the chest, and that shell casings were found near her body.” Id. at 41. The Court walked through each of the photographs, determining they were independently useful by providing perspective and information related to the scene. Ultimately the Court determined “these photographs provided sufficiently distinct information of independent value to the State’s case, making them neither unnecessarily duplicative nor excessive.” Id. at 42-43.
(E) Failing to Dismiss Charges for First-Degree Murder of Female Victim – Defendant argued error in denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence the first-degree murder charge on both theories of felony murder and premeditation and deliberation. (1) For felony murder, defendant argued the State’s evidence failed to establish the murder occurred during the commission of an attempted rape or robbery. The Court first established that “[Rule] 404(b) evidence may be considered when determining whether the State has presented sufficient evidence of a defendant’s intent to commit an underlying crime.” Id. at 46. The Rule 404(b) testimony here “demonstrated that defendant had a common scheme or plan to rape and rob prostitutes.” Id. The Court then found an “overt act” towards the felonies when defendant entered the female victim’s hotel room. Id. at 48. (2) Dispensing with the premeditated murder argument, the Court explained that there was no time requirement to constitute premeditation. Here, defendant arrived at the hotel with a loaded weapon, suggesting he was prepared to engage in violence. The female victim did not provoke defendant and she was unarmed, and defendant fired two shots at her face and chest, showing he had a deliberate intent to kill.
(F) Failing to Dismiss Charges for First-Degree Murder of Male Victim – Defendant also argued error in denying his motion to dismiss the murder charge for the victim shot by his accomplice in the hallway. The Court considered whether evidence supported the acting-in-concert doctrine for defendant’s conviction. (1) For felony murder, the Court found sufficient evidence to support defendant and his accomplice acted “in a common plan or scheme to commit rape and robbery with a dangerous weapon” and the male victim “was killed in pursuit thereof” even though he was not the intended victim. Id. at 52. (2) The Court also found sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation, as “[the accomplice’s] violence against [the male victim] was unprovoked, [the male victim] was unarmed, and nine separate rounds were fired by [the accomplice], with multiple gunshot wounds to [the male victim’s] body.” Id. at 53. The Court also noted that it was “foreseeable that a prostitute would have another individual monitoring business-related activity for safety and protection” justifying the charge. Id.
(G) Finding of the Aggravating Circumstance that the Murders were Committed During the Commission of an Attempted Rape and Attempted Robbery – Defendant argued that insufficient evidence supported the aggravating circumstance, as with the felony murder argument above. The Court explained that although defendant failed to object at trial, his objection was preserved as the trial court should have known he was contesting this factor. However, “the evidence of the attempted rape and armed robbery of [the female victim] was sufficient for its submission to the jury as an aggravating factor.” Id. at 55.
(H) Trial Court’s Failure to Submit the Enmund/Tison Issue to the Jury for the Murder of the Male Victim – Defendant argued error under that Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), as he did not shoot the male victim, although defendant did not raise this objection at trial. The Court first explained Enmund’s holding where “[t]he Supreme Court determined that imposition of the death penalty on those who had not manifested an intent to kill violates the Eighth Amendment.” Slip Op. at 56. The holding in Tison “essentially concluded that major participation in felonious conduct in which there is a significant risk of death is no different for Eighth Amendment purposes than the intent to kill issue that Enmund confronted.” Id. at 57-58. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held in State v. Robinson, 342 N.C. 74 (1995), that an Enmund/Tison instruction is not required if a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation. The Court explained that the fact pattern here resembled Tison, as defendant was armed and actively involved in the planning and execution of the violent crimes, and in footnote 7 pointed out that the trial court provided an instruction on malice similar to the Enmund/Tison instruction in question. This led the Court to conclude that even if failing to provide an explicit Enmund/Tison instruction was error, it did not represent plain error.
(I) Jury Instructions Regarding the Use of the Same Evidence to Support More Than One Aggravating Circumstance – Defendant argued error in failing to instruct the jury that it could not use the same evidence to support more than one aggravating circumstance; here the circumstances were G.S. 15A-2000(e)(5) (during attempt or flight after robbery or rape) and (e)(11) (part of a course of conduct including other crimes of violence). The Court first noted that under State v. Moseley, 338 N.C. 1 (1994), the circumstances would only be redundant if there is a “complete overlap” of the evidence supporting each circumstance. Slip Op. at 60. Here testimony from two witnesses supported both (e)(5) and (e)(11), but “substantial separate evidence from additional victims that were subjected to the ongoing course of conduct” supported the (e)(11) circumstance, meaning no error. Id. at 61.
(J) Trial Court’s Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress a Witness’s In-Court Identification – During sentencing, a witness testified about an encounter she had with defendant in 2016 while working as a prostitute in a Raleigh hotel. Before the witness testified, the trial court allowed voir dire about her identification of defendant; after being contacted by a Raleigh police officer, the witness conducted research on her own and determined defendant was the same person she encountered in 2016. Defendant objected to the witness’s identification, arguing it was tainted by government action, but the objection was overruled. Looking at the limited contact between the Raleigh police officer and the witness, the Court concluded her identification “was not a result of State action and does not violate defendant’s due process rights.” Id. at 66.
(K) Trial Court’s Final Mandate for First-Degree Murder Under the Theory of Felony Murder – Defendant argued error by failing to repeat the elements for the underlying felonies of attempted rape and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, but failed to object to the instruction at trial. Here, the trial court informed the parties that it planned to give N.C.P.I.-Crim. 206.14, and defendant did not object or propose new instructions, meaning the review was for plain error. The Court explained that the trial court instructed on first-degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation, then for felony murder, and then a final mandate. Although the final mandate did not contain the elements of the underlying felonies, the Court reviewed the instructions as a whole and concluded “the trial court thoroughly and correctly instructed the jury as to the elements of the underlying felonies.” Id. at 73.
(L) Cumulative Error in Denying Defendant a Fair Trial and Sentencing Hearing – Defendant argued the cumulative effect of the various errors he identified justified a new trial or sentencing. The Court disagreed, explaining “there can be no cumulative error because the trial court did not err.” Id. at 74.
(M) Excusing Jurors for Cause Based on Their Views on the Death Penalty – Defendant argued abuse of discretion in excusing three jurors for cause when they expressed hesitation in imposing the death sentence. The Court first explored the caselaw in this area, noting a prospective juror cannot be excused for general objections to the death penalty, but can be excused for holding views that prevent impartially performing the required duties. The Court then examined the transcript, concluding the answers of each prospective juror represented personal views that were at odds with the duties imposed on jurors, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when allowing the three to be excused for cause.
(N) Peremptory Instructions on Three Mitigating Circumstances – Defendant argued error in failing to give peremptory instructions on three non-statutory mitigating circumstances related to defendant’s childhood, home environment, and mental health. Initially the State stipulated to the three disputed circumstances, but after further evidence was admitted, the State withdrew the stipulations. The Court first noted that peremptory instructions for mitigating circumstances were not appropriate when “the evidence is controverted or the evidence supporting the circumstance is not manifestly credible.” Id. at 84 (quoting State v. McLaughlin, 341 N.C. 426, 449 (1995)). Here, after looking at the testimony and evidence admitted during sentencing, the Court found controverted evidence or credibility issues with all three circumstances, meaning the trial court did not err.
(O) Defendant’s Motion to Strike the Death Penalty – Defendant argued that the District Attorney’s “discretion in seeking the death penalty and engaging in plea bargaining” created a system where the death penalty was effectively mandated similar to the now-repealed G.S. 15-162.1. Id. at 88. The Court rejected this interpretation of the discretion granted to the State and found no constitutional violation with the existing system.
(P) Lethal Injection as Cruel and Unusual – Defendant argued that North Carolina’s execution method was unconstitutional under the United States and North Carolina constitutions. The Court rejected defendant’s argument because he merely identified hypothetical risks and failed to “articulate how North Carolina’s lethal injection procedure creates a ‘substantial risk of serious harm.’” Id. at 91.
(Q) Preservation Issues – Defendant argued that the Court should invalidate the death penalty under international norms and prevailing standards of decency, and the indictment was insufficient because it did not include any elements elevating the crime of murder from second-degree to first-degree or allege aggravating circumstances. The Court noted these arguments have been rejected in the past, and pointed to several cases such as State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297 (2006), and State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364 (2000). The Court also rejected defendant’s argument that the State was barred from “death qualifying” the jury, pointing to State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666 (1986). Slip Op. at 93. Defendant additionally argued that the death penalty itself was unconstitutional in light of evolving standards of decency, which the Court again rejected.
(R) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – In defendant’s final issue, he requested the Court dismiss his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel without prejudice so he could assert them in a MAR proceeding. The Court granted this request and dismissed the claims without prejudice.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the Court’s judgement that the first-degree murder convictions were proper, but provided a lengthy dissent finding errors with defendant’s sentencing. Id. at 98.
In this Mecklenburg County case, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals majority opinion that held defendant was not entitled to an instruction on second-degree murder as a lesser included offense while on trial for first-degree murder based on the felony-murder rule.
On Father’s Day in 2017, defendant and an associate arranged to sell a cellphone to a man through the LetGo app. However, during the meeting to sell the phone, the deal went wrong and defendant’s associate shot the buyer. Defendant came to trial for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, first-degree murder under the felony murder theory, and conspiracy to commit robbery with his associate. The trial court denied defendant’s request for an instruction on second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense. Defendant was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder and attempted robbery, but not the conspiracy charge. The Court of Appeals majority found no error, applying “the second part of the test” from State v. Gwynn, 362 N.C. 334 (2008), to conclude “defendant was not entitled to a second-degree murder instruction because ‘there [was] no evidence in the record from which a rational juror could find [d]efendant guilty of second-degree murder and not guilty of felony murder.’” Slip Op. at 6.
Taking up the appeal, the Supreme Court explained that defendant was only entitled to an instruction on lesser-included offenses if “(1) the evidence supporting the underlying felony is ‘in conflict,’ and (2) the evidence would support a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder.” Id. at 9. The Court examined the elements of attempted robbery and found supporting evidence, while rejecting the three issues raised by defendant that attempted to show the evidence was “in conflict.” Id. at 15. Applying the first part of the test from Gwynn, the Court determined that there was no conflict in the evidence supporting the underlying attempted robbery felony. Modifying the Court of Appeals majority’s analysis, the Court explained that “[b]ecause there was not a conflict in the evidence, we need not proceed to the next step of the Gwynnanalysis to consider whether the evidence would support a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder.” Id. at 17.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, dissented and would have found the evidence was “in conflict,” justifying an instruction on second-degree murder under the Gwynn analysis. Id. at 18.
The defendant appealed from his conviction for the first-degree murder of his grandfather based on the felony murder rule using the attempted murder of his mother with a deadly weapon as the predicate felony. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder if it found that he killed his grandfather as part of a continuous transaction during which he also attempted to murder his mother using either his hands or arms or a garden hoe as a deadly weapon. The defendant appealed, arguing that his hands and arms were not properly considered a deadly weapon for purposes of the felony murder rule and that the trial court’s erroneous instruction that the jury could find that he attempted to murder his mother using a garden hoe was prejudicial error.
The defendant was at the home of his mother and grandfather on November 5, 2013. He owed money to both and they had recently told him that they would lend him no more. As his mother went outside the defendant followed behind her, saying he was leaving to go to work. His mother walked into a storage shed behind the house, where she remained for five or 10 minutes. She did not hear the defendant get into his car or hear the vehicle leave. While she was in the shed, she thought she heard raised voices. She came out to check on her father. As she walked toward the house, she felt someone put an arm around her neck. Her attacker put a hand over her nose and mouth and she lost consciousness. The next thing she remembered was someone opening her eyelid as she lay on the ground. She saw defendant’s face and thought he was there to help her.
The defendant worked from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., returning home the following morning. When he got home he saw that his mother had been attacked and called for emergency assistance. The defendant’s grandfather was dead when the paramedics arrived. He was face down near the back door, covered in blood, with a large pool of blood around his head. A garden hoe covered in blood was next to his body. The grandfather’s wallet was near his body and did not contain the money usually kept there.
The defendant denied his involvement in the assault and murder. He gave different explanations for the presence of scratches on his arm. DNA evidence from the scene did not connect him to the crime. The defendant’s mother (who experienced a traumatic brain injury) initially told investigators that the defendant left the home before she was attacked and said the person who attacked her was shorter than the defendant and was wearing a ski mask. She testified differently at trial, stating that it was the defendant who had choked her and that there had been no ski mask.
The trial court instructed the jury on multiple theories of first-degree murder, including the felony-murder rule using the attempted murder of the defendant’s mother as the predicate felony. As to the deadly weapon requirement, the court told the jury that the “State contends and the defendant denies that the defendant used his hands and/or arms, and or a garden hoe as a deadly weapon.” The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder based on this theory, and the defendant appealed.
The supreme court relied upon a “virtually uninterrupted line of appellate decisions from this Court and the Court of Appeals interpreting the reference to a ‘deadly weapon’ in N.C.G.S. § 14-17(a) to encompass the use of a defendant’s hands, arms, feet, or other appendages” and the “fact that the General Assembly has not taken any action tending to suggest that N.C.G.S. § 14-17(a) should be interpreted in a manner that differs from the interpretation deemed appropriate in this line of decisions” to establish that the General Assembly intended for the term “deadly weapon” to include a defendant’s hands, arms, feet or other appendages. The court rejected the defendant’s invitation to overrule or limit to child victims its holding in State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471 (1997) that the offense of felony child abuse could serve as the predicate felony for felony-murder when the defendant used his hands as a deadly weapon in the course of committing the abuse. The court also rejected the defendant’s invitation to rely on State v. Hinton, 361 N.C. 207 (2007) for the proposition that the term “deadly weapon” has different meanings in different contexts and should have a felony-murder specific definition. The Hinton court held that the reference to “any firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means” as used in N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a) (defining robbery with a dangerous weapon) did not encompass the use of a defendant’s hands because the statute was intended to provide a “more severe punishment when the robbery is committed with the ‘use or threatened use of firearms or other dangerous weapons’” than when the defendant committed common law robbery, which did not involve the use of such implements. The court reasoned that the logic in Hinton had no application to its interpretation of the felony-murder statute as nothing in the language or legislative history of G.S. 14-17 suggested that its reference to “deadly weapon” should be defined in a way that differed from the traditional definition, which included a person’s appendages.
Finally, the court rejected the notion that its interpretation meant that every killing perpetrated with the use of a defendant’s hands, arm, legs, or other appendages could constitute felony murder, thus undermining the General Assembly’s attempt to limit the scope of the rule when it revised the statute in 1977. The court noted that the extent to which hands, arms, legs, and other appendages can be deemed deadly weapons depends upon the nature and circumstances of their use, including the extent to which there is a size and strength disparity between the perpetrator and his or her victim. Moreover, something more than a killing with hands, arms, legs, or other bodily appendages must be shown (a felony) to satisfy the rule.
The court then considered whether the trial court’s instructions to the jury that it could find that the defendant attempted to murder his mother using a garden hoe was prejudicial error, concluding that it was as there was a reasonable possibility that the jury would not have convicted the defendant of first-degree murder without the erroneous instruction. The court explained that to conclude otherwise, “[w]e would be required to hold that the State’s evidence that defendant killed his grandfather as part of a continuous transaction in which he also attempted to murder his mother using his hands and arms as a deadly weapon was so sufficiently strong that no reasonable possibility exists under which the jury would have done anything other than convict defendant of first-degree murder on the basis of that legal theory.” The sharply disputed evidence over whether the defendant was the perpetrator, including the lack of physical evidence, the defendant’s trial testimony, and the conflicting nature of the statements made by the defendant’s mother, prevented the court from concluding that the error was harmless. Even more central to the court’s analysis was the dispute over the extent to which the defendant’s hands and arms were a deadly weapon. The court noted that although the size and strength differential between defendant and his mother was sufficient to permit a determination that defendant’s hands and arms constituted a deadly weapon, the differences were not so stark as to preclude a reasonable jury from concluding that defendant’s hands and arms were not a deadly weapon. If the jury had reasonably concluded that the defendant’s hands and arms were not used as a deadly weapon, it could not have convicted the defendant of the first-degree murder of his grandfather on the basis of the felony-murder rule, contrary to the suggestion in the jury instruction. As a result, the Court held that the trial court’s instruction concerning the use of the garden hoe as a deadly weapon during defendant’s alleged attempt to murder his mother was prejudicial error necessitating a new trial for the murder of his grandfather.
Justice Newby, joined by Justice Morgan, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the defendant’s hands and arms were deadly weapons, but disagreed that the instruction regarding the garden hoe resulted in prejudicial error.
Justice Earls concurred in the result only in part and dissented in part. She agreed with the majority that the instruction regarding the garden hoe was error warranting a new trial. She dissented from the majority’s conclusion that a jury could properly consider a person’s hands, arms, feet, or other body parts to be deadly weapons for purposes of the felony murder statute, reasoning that the legislative history and spirit of the statute demonstrate that the deadly weapon requirement refers to an external instrument.
In this Gaston County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and intentional child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury, arguing error in (1) denying his motion to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence, and plain error in (2) allowing testimony that was inherently incredible, and (3) allowing testimony from a witness who interrogated defendant as an agent of the state. The Court of Appeals found no error or plain error.
In May of 2020, defendant’s girlfriend gave birth to defendant’s twin sons. The twins were born prematurely and spent several weeks in the NICU. In June, defendant’s girlfriend brought the twins home to their shared apartment. Soon after, defendant’s girlfriend left the apartment to get groceries and diapers, leaving the twins with defendant for several hours. When she returned, defendant told her the twins were fine, but the next day one twin would not feed, and after calling her pediatrician, the girlfriend took the child to the ER for further evaluation. At the ER, it became clear the child had severe injuries, and he was airlifted to a Charlotte hospital where doctors found a skull fracture with brain bleeds and a left wrist fracture. The other twin was evaluated and similar head injuries were found. The first twin to be hospitalized died from his injuries, and an autopsy found injuries consistent with non-accidental blunt force trauma. While defendant was in jail before trial, he told a fellow inmate several stories about how the injuries occurred, ultimately admitting that he became frustrated and caused the injuries intentionally. This inmate later testified against defendant at trial. Defendant was subsequently convicted of first-degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury, and another count of child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury for the surviving twin.
Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals first explained that when an adult attacks a child with their hands, it can be inferred that the hands were used as deadly weapons, and “when an adult has exclusive custody of a child for a period of time during which the child suffers injuries that are neither self-inflicted nor accidental, there is sufficient evidence to create an inference that the adult intentionally inflicted those injuries.” Slip Op. at 12 (quoting State v. Liberato, 156 N.C. App. 182, 186 (2003)). The court then proceeded to examine the evidence of injuries sustained by the twins, concluding the expert testimony showed the injuries were indicative of child abuse. Defendant argued that the testimony did not establish intentional child abuse, but the court called that argument “demonstrably false,” as the testifying expert explicitly called the injuries “nonaccidental.” Id. at 14. Because the record contained sufficient evidence to support both convictions, the court held denying the motion to dismiss was not error.
Moving to (2), defendant argued the testimony of his jail cellmate was “inherently incredible” and although defendant did not object at trial, allowing the testimony was plain error. The court found the concept of “inherently incredible” from State v. Miller, 270 N.C. 726 (1967), inapplicable to the current case, as the issues with the witness’s testimony were simply discrepancies with other pieces of evidence at trial. To represent “inherently incredible” testimony, defendant would have to identify “evidence which is inherently impossible or in conflict with indisputable physical facts or laws of nature,” which defendant could not do in the current case. Slip Op. at 18 (quoting State v. Cox, 289 N.C. 414, 422-23 (1976)).
Reaching (3), the court explained that defendant failed to preserve this issue predicated on constitutional arguments. Because defendant did not object at trial, the issue was waived and not eligible for plain error review on appeal.
In this Durham County case, defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder based on the felony-murder rule, arguing insufficient evidence of the underlying felony because the State did not admit evidence establishing the value of the victim’s car. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversing defendant’s conviction and remanding for the trial court to enter judgment on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter.
In July of 2018, police found the victim dead in her apartment; the police noted the apartment looked as if there had been a party, as it was in disarray. Defendant was known to have spent time drinking with the victim, and his fingerprints were found on beer cans in the apartment. Later that day, police found defendant in Chapel Hill near defendant’s car, and defendant asked “is she dead?” when he was arrested. Police found the victim’s driver’s license and debit card in defendant’s wallet and determined defendant sold the victim’s smartphone in Burlington. Defendant was subsequently convicted based on the felony-murder rule as the determination was that the victim died while defendant was stealing her car.
The Court of Appeals first considered defendant’s argument that the jury instruction sheets were flawed as they did not have a selection for “not guilty.” The court noted defendant did not raise this objection during trial, and that the plain error standard applied. Because the jury selection sheet had a space for “no” for each charge, the court determined this did not represent plain error. The court noted this was not ideal, but when combined with the jury instructions from the trial court, the issue did not rise to the level of plain error.
Moving to the felony murder argument, the court explained that “in order to prove felony larceny, the State had the burden of proving that the victim’s car was worth over $1,000.00.” Slip Op. at 8. Here, “the State did not offer any opinion evidence regarding the vehicle’s value, evidence of what the victim paid for the vehicle, or any other evidence which included a dollar amount from which the jury could make a value determination.” Id. at 10. Although the State referenced various pieces of evidence in the record that could have supported the value was over $1,000, the court noted this was insufficient. Under State v. Holland, 318 N.C. 602 (1986), providing information about the vehicle’s make and year, a picture of the vehicle, and evidence the vehicle was operational did not represent sufficient evidence for a jury to establish a monetary value, and the court noted that here, the State presented even less evidence than in Holland.
The court also provided an explanation of the basis for entering judgment or retrying defendant for lesser-included offenses, explaining “[a] retrial for second-degree murder and/or voluntary manslaughter is one of ‘continuing jeopardy,’ as the original indictment in this case embraced second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of first-degree premeditated murder and also embraced misdemeanor manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of first-degree felony murder.” Slip Op. at 14.
Judge Stroud concurred as to the insufficiency of the evidence related to the car’s value, but dissented from the conclusions related to the jury selection sheet, and would have granted defendant a new trial.
In this Guilford County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder based on felony murder, armed robbery, and possession of a stolen vehicle, arguing error in (1) denying his motion to dismiss the armed robbery charge and (2) not instructing the jury that self-defense could justify felony murder based on armed robbery. The Court of Appeals found no error.
In August of 2018, defendant was staying at the apartment of a female friend when a series of phone calls from another man woke him up. Defendant went to the parking lot to confront the other man (the eventual murder victim), and defendant testified that the man threatened to kill him. At that point, defendant shot the victim four times, then after a few minutes, stole the victim’s car. The victim’s car was found abandoned in a field a day later. Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder based on felony murder, with the underlying felony being armed robbery. Defendant moved to dismiss the murder and robbery charges, arguing there was insufficient evidence the shooting and taking of the vehicle occurred in a continuous transaction. The trial court denied the motion.
Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals noted that temporal order of the felony and the killing does not matter for a felony murder charge, as long as they are a continuous transaction. Here, the time period between the shooting and defendant taking the victim’s car was short, only “a few minutes” after the shots. Slip Op. at 6. The court also noted that “our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected arguments a defendant must have intended to commit armed robbery at the time he killed the victim in order for the exchange to be a continuous transaction.” Id. at 7-8. Here, evidence supported the finding of a continuous transaction, and whether defendant initially intended to steal the car was immaterial.
Moving to (2), the court pointed to precedent that self-defense is not a defense for felony murder, but it can be a defense to the underlying felony. However, the court explained that “[b]ased on our precedents, self-defense is inapplicable to armed robbery[,]” and because armed robbery was the underlying felony in this case, defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense. Id. at 11.
In this Brunswick County case, defendant appealed denial of his motion to dismiss the murder charge against him, arguing that it represented double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review defendant’s interlocutory appeal, and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion.
In 1997, the fifteen-month-old child of defendant’s girlfriend was taken to the emergency room with severe injuries. A pediatrician who treated the child determined he had Battered Child Syndrome and life-altering brain injuries that would prevent the child from ever living or functioning on his own. One year later, defendant entered an Alford plea to four counts of felony child abuse; defendant completed his sentence in 2008. The child lived in long-term care facility until 2018 when he passed away, allegedly from complications related to his injuries. The State brought charges for first-degree murder against defendant after the 2018 death of the child.
Taking up the double jeopardy argument, the court explained that under the same-elements test from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), offenses for the same conduct are considered the same unless “each offense contains an element not contained in the other.” Slip Op. at 5, quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993). The court noted that the charges against defendant for felony child abuse and first-degree murder would normally fail the Blockburger test. However, the court applied the exception found in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912), where “a defendant subsequently may be prosecuted for a separate offense if a requisite element for that offense was not an element of the offense charged during the defendant’s prior prosecution.” Slip Op. at 8, citing Diaz. Because the necessary element of the child’s death did not occur until 2018, defendant could not have been prosecuted for the murder in 1998. The court rejected defendant’s arguments to expand the scope of North Carolina’s double jeopardy protection beyond applicable precedent and to apply substantive due process to overturn the denial of his motion.
The defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule. The underlying felony was statutory rape of a child under 13. And yet the jury acquitted the defendant of the charge of statutory rape of a child under 13. The defendant appealed, arguing that statutory rape of a child under 13 could not support a felony-murder conviction because it lacks the necessary intent to support such a charge. He also argued that because the jury acquitted him of the predicate felony, his first-degree murder conviction must be vacated. The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments.
(1) The Court of Appeals determined that while the offense of statutory rape does not require that the defendant intended to commit a sexual act with an underage person, it does require that the defendant intend to commit a sexual act with the victim. The Court held that this intent satisfies the intent required for a crime to serve as the basis for a felony-murder charge. The Court distinguished the sort of intent required to engage in vaginal intercourse with a victim from the culpable negligence required to commit the offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury based on driving a vehicle while impaired, which the court held in State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159 (2000), was insufficient to support a felony-murder charge. Statutory rape requires that the person be purposely resolved to participate in the conduct that comprises the criminal offense.
(2) The Court of Appeals determined that the jury verdicts finding the defendant (a) guilty of felony murder with statutory rape as the underlying felony but (b) not guilty of statutory rape were inconsistent but were not legally contradictory or, in other words, mutually exclusive. The Court of Appeals reasoned that a jury could rely on the act of committing statutory rape to support a felony murder conviction without also having a conviction of statutory rape. Indeed, the State could proceed to trial on such a felony murder theory without also charging statutory rape.
The Court noted that a defendant is not entitled to relief for a merely inconsistent verdict as it is not clear in such circumstances “‘whose ox has been gored.’” (Slip op. at ¶ 44 (quoting United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984)). The jury may have thought the defendant was not guilty. Equally possibly, it may have reached an inconsistent verdict through mistake, compromise, or lenity. The defendant receives the benefit of the acquittal, but must accept the burden of conviction.
Rejecting the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to his first-degree felony murder conviction, the court also rejected the proposition that a felony murder conviction cannot be predicated on a felony of shooting into occupied property where that felony also was the cause of the victim’s death. Reviewing the relevant case law, the court concluded:
[I]t is clear that neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever expressly recognized an exception to the felony murder rule for the offense of discharging a weapon into occupied property. At most, North Carolina courts have recognized a very limited “merger doctrine” that precludes use of the felony murder rule in situations where the defendant has committed one assault crime against one victim and the State seeks to use that assault as the predicate felony for a felony murder conviction.
In this case where the defendant was convicted of felony murder with the underlying felony being felony child abuse, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the merger doctrine prevents conviction of first-degree felony murder when there is only one victim and one assault. Although a defendant cannot be sentenced for both the underlying felony and first-degree felony murder, that did not occur here.
(1) The evidence was sufficient to submit felony murder to the jury on the basis of felony larceny with a deadly weapon being the underlying felony. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the State failed to show that a beer bottle found at the crime scene was used as a “deadly weapon” within the meaning of the homicide statute, G.S. 14-17. The State’s evidence showed, among other things that the murder victim’s injuries could have been caused by the bottle. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence that the broken beer bottle constituted a deadly weapon. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the State failed to prove that the defendant used the broken bottle during the commission of the felonious larceny, noting that the evidence showed that after incapacitating the victim with the broken bottle the defendant stole the victim’s vehicle. Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the State failed to prove that the killing was committed in the perpetration of the larceny, finding sufficient evidence of a continuous transaction. (2) Where the defendant was convicted of felony murder with the underlying felony being felony larceny, the trial court erred by failing to arrest judgment on the underlying felony.
Felony discharging of a firearm into an occupied vehicle can serve as an underlying felony supporting a charge of felony murder.
In this first-degree murder case, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that there was an insufficient relationship between the felony supporting felony-murder (discharging a firearm into occupied property) and the death. The law requires only that the death occur “in the perpetration or attempted perpetration” of a predicate felony; there need not be a causal “causal relationship”’ between the felony and the homicide. All that is required is that the events occur during a single transaction. Here, the defendant stopped shooting into the house after forcing his way through the front door; he then continued shooting inside. The defendant argued that once he was inside the victim attempted to take his gun and that this constituted a break in the chain of events that led to her death. Even if this version of the facts were true, the victim did not break the chain of events by defending herself inside her home after the defendant continued his assault indoors.
In this child homicide case, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss a charge of felony-murder based on an underlying felony child abuse. Prior to the incident in question the victim was a normal, healthy baby. After having been left alone with the defendant, the victim was found unconscious, unresponsive, and barely breathing. The child’s body had bruises and scratches, including unusual bruises on her buttocks that were not “typical” of the bruises that usually resulted from a fall and a recently inflicted blunt force injury to her ribs that did not appear to have resulted from the administration of CPR. An internal examination showed extensive bilateral retinal hemorrhages in multiple layers of the retinae, significant cerebral edema or swelling, and extensive bleeding or subdural hemorrhage in the brain indicating that her head had been subjected to a number of individual and separate blunt force injuries that were sufficiently significant to damage her brain and to cause a leakage of blood. Her injuries, which could have been caused by human hands, did not result from medical treatment or a mere fall from a couch onto a carpeted floor.
The evidence was sufficient to support a first-degree felony-murder conviction when the underlying felony was armed robbery and where the defendant used the stolen item—a .357 Glock handgun—to commit the murder and the two crimes occurred during a continuous transaction.
The trial court properly submitted felony-murder to the jury based on underlying felony of attempted sale of a controlled substance with the use of a deadly weapon. The defendant and an accomplice delivered cocaine to the victim. Approximately one week later, they went to the victim’s residence to collect the money owed for the cocaine and at this point, the victim was killed. At the time of the shooting, the defendant was engaged in an attempted sale of cocaine (although the cocaine had been delivered, the sale was not consummated because payment had not been made) and there was no break in the chain of events between the attempted sale and the murder.