Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Table of Contents
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
About
This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
Instructions
Navigate using the table of contents to the left or by using the search box below. Use quotations for an exact phrase search. A search for multiple terms without quotations functions as an “or” search. Not sure where to start? The 5 minute video tutorial offers a guided tour of main features – Launch Tutorial (opens in new tab).
The defendant failed to properly preserve the argument that there was a fatal variance between a drug trafficking indictment and the evidence at trial, where the issue was raised for the first time on appeal. The defendant never alleged a fatal variance when he moved to dismiss the charge. Rather, his motion was based on insufficiency of the evidence.
A defendant who fails to move to dismiss in the trial court on grounds of fatal variance waives the issue for purposes of appeal.
A defendant who fails to move to dismiss in the trial court on grounds of fatal variance waives the issue for purposes of appeal.
By failing to object at trial to a fatal variance between a second-degree trespass indictment and the evidence at trial, the defendant failed to preserve the issue. The court declined to invoke Rule 2 to address the issue on the merits.
A fatal variance issue that is not raised at trial is waived for purposes of appeal.
By failing to assert a claim of fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence with respect to a charge of injury to personal property, the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. Nevertheless, the court considered the issue and rejected the defendant’s claim. The indictment alleged that the defendant injured the personal property of the church, specifically a lock on a door. The defendant asserted that the evidence showed that the damaged device was owned not by the church but rather by the lessor of the property. The court concluded however that the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the church owned the lock and that it was damaged.
In a trafficking in methamphetamine case where the defendant did not object on grounds of fatal variance at trial, the issue was waived for purposes of appeal.
The issue of fatal variance is not preserved for purposes of appeal if not asserted at trial.
Where a defendant failed to make a motion to dismiss on the basis of fatal variance at trial, the issue was waived for purposes of appeal.
Where a defendant failed to make a motion to dismiss on the basis of fatal variance at trial, the issue was waived for purposes of appeal.
(1) By failing to assert fatal variance as a basis for his motion to dismiss, the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appellate review.
In a felony possession of cocaine case, the defendant waived the issue of fatal variance by failing to raise it at trial.
On appeal, the defendant argued that there was a fatal variance between the indictment charging him with possession of a firearm and the evidence introduced at trial. Specifically, the defendant argued there was a variance as to the type of weapon possessed. By failing at the trial level to raise fatal variance or argue generally about insufficiency of the evidence as to the weapon used, the defendant waived this issue for purposes of appeal.
Because it is a jurisdictional issue, a defendant’s argument that a criminal indictment is defective may be raised for the first time on appeal notwithstanding the defendant’s failure to contest the validity of the indictment at trial.
A defendant may challenge the sufficiency of an indictment even after pleading guilty to the charge at issue.
In this Durham County case, defendant appealed after pleading guilty to crimes against nature and sexual battery, arguing his waiver of indictment was invalid because he was not represented by counsel at the time. The Court of Appeals disagreed, affirming the judgment against defendant.
Defendant was indicted for statutory rape, kidnapping, and related charges in February of 2017. From his first appearance to the trial, defendant was provided five court-appointed attorneys, either as representation or standby counsel after defendant decided to represent himself. At the time defendant signed a waiver of indictment, he was not represented by counsel but had standby counsel available; the standby counsel did not sign the waiver.
Defendant’s argument relied on G.S. 15A-642, specifically the provisions in subsection (b) that prohibit waiver of indictment when “the defendant is not represented by counsel” and subsection (c) that reference signature by defendant and his attorney. The court reviewed the three cases cited by defendant to support his argument, holding “[defendant’s] case is distinguishable because he had previously waived multiple appointed counsels and had elected to proceed pro se.” Slip Op. at 6-7. Moving to the statute, the court first explained that defendant had used the appointed counsel system to delay his trial and had knowingly proceeded without counsel when waiving the indictment. The court also determined that any prejudicial error by the trial court was invited by defendant, explaining that defendant “created any purported error of proceeding unrepresented through his own demands when signing the Waiver of Indictment after he deliberately chose to proceed pro se.” Id. at 10.
The defendant pled guilty to controlled substance offenses pursuant to a bill of information and waiver of indictment. In an MAR, the defendant argued that the pleadings were defective and the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the waiver of indictment was not signed by his attorney. The trial court denied the MAR, finding that the pleadings substantially complied with the statute, but the appellate court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the MAR and vacate the judgment. The requirements listed in G.S. 15A-642 for a waiver of indictment, including the signature of the defendant’s attorney, are mandatory. Therefore, the waiver in this case was “invalid without Defendant’s attorney’s signature, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to accept Defendant’s guilty plea and enter judgment.”
The trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for appropriate relief alleging that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment where the defendant was charged with a bill of information that did not include or attach a waiver of indictment. G.S. 15A-642 allows for the waiver of indictment in non-capital cases where a defendant is represented by counsel. The statute further requires: “Waiver of Indictment must be in writing and signed by the defendant and his attorney. The waiver must be attached to or executed upon the bill of information.” G.S. 15A-642(c). The court rejected the State’s argument that the statute’s requirements about waiver of indictment were not jurisdictional.