Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

About

This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.

Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.

Instructions

Navigate using the table of contents to the left or by using the search box below. Use quotations for an exact phrase search. A search for multiple terms without quotations functions as an “or” search. Not sure where to start? The 5 minute video tutorial offers a guided tour of main features – Launch Tutorial (opens in new tab).

E.g., 09/22/2021
E.g., 09/22/2021
State v. Davis, 364 N.C. 297 (Aug. 27, 2010)

The trial court erred by imposing punishment for felony death by vehicle and felony serious injury by vehicle when the defendant also was sentenced for second-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury based on the same conduct. G.S. 20-141.4(a) prescribes the crimes of felony and misdemeanor death by vehicle, felony serious injury by vehicle, aggravated felony serious injury by vehicle, aggravated felony death by vehicle, and repeat felony death by vehicle. G.S. 20-141.4(b), which sets out the punishments for these offenses, begins with the language: “Unless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment, the following classifications apply to the offenses set forth in this section[.]” Second-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury provide greater punishment than felony death by vehicle and felony serious injury by vehicle. The statute thus prohibited the trial court from imposing punishment for felony death by vehicle and felony serious injury by vehicle in this case.

In this felony death by vehicle case involving the presence of narcotics in an unknown quantity in the defendant’s blood, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was impaired. The State’s expert testified that Oxycodone and Tramadol were present in the defendant’s blood; tests revealed the presence of these drugs in amounts equal to or greater than 25 nanograms per milliliter — the “detection limits” used by the SBI for the test; the half-lives of Oxycodone and Tramadol are approximately 3-6 and 4-7 hours, respectively; she was unable to determine the precise quantities of the drugs present in the defendant’s blood; and she was unable to accurately determine from the test results whether the defendant would have been impaired at the time of the accident. The defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied and the defendant was found guilty of felony death by motor vehicle based on a theory of impairment under G.S. 20-138.1(a)(1) (“While under the influence of an impairing substance”). On appeal the court rejected the defendant’s argument the State’s evidence merely showed negligence regarding operation of his vehicle as opposed to giving rise to a reasonable inference that he was impaired. The court noted that it was undisputed that the defendant ingested both drugs on the day of the accident and that they were present in his blood after the crash. It continued: “Taking these facts together with the evidence at trial regarding Defendant’s lack of awareness of the circumstances around him and his conduct before and after the collision, reasonable jurors could — and did — find that Defendant was appreciably impaired.” Specifically, the court noted: the labels on the medicine bottles warned that they may cause drowsiness or dizziness and that care should be taken when operating a vehicle after ingestion, and these substances are Schedule II and Schedule IV controlled substances, respectively; the defendant testified that he failed to see the victim on the side of the road despite the fact that it was daytime, visibility was clear, the road was straight, and three eyewitnesses saw the victim before the defendant hit her; the defendant admitted that he was unaware that his vehicle had hit a human being despite the fact that the impact of the crash was strong enough to cause the victim’s body to fly 59 feet through the air; and the defendant testified that his brakes had completely stopped functioning when he attempted to slow down immediately before the accident, he decided not to remain at the scene, instead driving his truck out of the ditch and to his home despite the fact that he had no operable brakes. Finding that this was sufficient evidence for the issue of impairment to go to the jury, the court noted that under Atkins v. Moye, 277 N.C. 179 (1970), impairment can be shown by a combination of evidence that a defendant has both (1) ingested an impairing substance; and (2) operated his vehicle in a manner showing he was so oblivious to a visible risk of harm as to raise an inference that his senses were appreciably impaired.

The trial court did not err in instructing the jury with respect to proximate cause as to the charge of felonious serious injury by vehicle. The defendant argued that the language of the statute “forecloses the possibility of the state proving proximate cause in conjunction with some other concurrent cause.” The court disagreed, citing prior case law rejecting this argument.

G.S. 20-141.4(c) does not bar simultaneous prosecutions for involuntary manslaughter and death by vehicle; it only bars punishment for both offenses when they arise out of the same death.

There was sufficient evidence of felonious serious injury by motor vehicle. The defendant had argued that his willful action in attempting to elude arrest was the proximate cause of the victim’s injuries, not his impaired driving. The court rejected this argument concluding that even if his willful attempt to elude arrest was a cause of the injuries, his driving under the influence could also be a proximate cause.

A defendant may not be sentenced for both felony death by vehicle and impaired driving arising out of the same incident. However, a defendant may be sentenced for both involuntary manslaughter and impaired driving.

Show Table of Contents