A man owned a trailer containing various catering equipment used for his business and stored the trailer on the business’s property adjacent to Sheetz. In the last week of August 2016, he drove past the property and saw that the trailer was gone. He contacted the police department, and a detective met him at the property. After reviewing footage recorded by Sheetz’s cameras, the detective sent a still image to a DMV agent who was able to identify the defendant as the person in the image. At trial, the man, the detective, the manager at Sheetz, and the DMV agent each identified the defendant as the person in the footage towing the trailer away. The defendant was found guilty of larceny of the trailer.

(1) On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court plainly erred by permitting the State’s witnesses to give lay opinion testimony identifying the defendant as the individual pictured in the Sheetz footage. The Court of Appeals held that because the DMV agent testified that he was familiar with and had previous dealings with the defendant, the agent was qualified to give lay opinion testimony identifying the person in the Sheetz footage as the defendant and that the admission of the agent’s testimony was not error. The Court also held that because the other witnesses each had no familiarity with the defendant prior to seeing him in the Sheetz footage, admission of their testimony was error. However, the Court concluded that those admissions did not amount to plain error because the admission of the DMV agent’s identification was not erroneous, the Sheetz footage illustrated the agent’s identification and permitted the jury to assess its accuracy, and the jury had the opportunity to draw its own conclusions based on still images admitted into evidence.

(2) The defendant next argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for felony larceny. The defendant argued that the evidence admitted at trial established only that the defendant was in the Sheetz store and that there was insufficient evidence to support an inference that the person depicted in the Sheetz surveillance video is the person who stole the trailer. In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals determined that crediting the in-court identifications and giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference, a rational juror could conclude that the defendant was the sole occupant and driver of the truck and, without consent, hitched the man’s trailer to the truck and drove away with the trailer in tow, intending to deprive the man of it permanently.

(3) The defendant argued that the trial court erred in ordering restitution because it failed to consider the defendant’s ability to pay. Prior to ordering restitution, the trial court was informed that the defendant was near the end of an active sentence and therefore unable to currently earn, the defendant has two children to support upon his release, and the defendant plans to go back to school and get a trade once he leaves from custody. The defendant also filed an affidavit of indigency reflecting that he was in custody and had zero assets and zero liabilities as of the date of the trial. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not fail to consider the defendant’s resources and thus did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution.

In this felon in possession of a firearm case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing an officer to identify a person depicted in a surveillance video as being the defendant. The officer testified that while he had never had any direct contact with the defendant he knew who the defendant was. On appeal the defendant argued that the officer was in no better position than the jury to identify the defendant in the surveillance footage. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that the officer had seen the defendant in the area frequently and knew who he was. In one instance, the officer saw the defendant coming out of a house that the officer was surveilling; the officer could identify the defendant because he recognized the defendant’s face and the defendant was wearing a leg brace and limping. These encounters would have sufficiently allowed the officer to acquire the requisite familiarity with the defendant’s appearance so as to qualify him to testify to the defendant’s identity. Additionally, the defendant had altered his appearance significantly between the date in question and the date of trial. The length and style of the defendant’s hair was distinctive during the period that the officer became familiar with the defendant and matched that of the individual shown on the surveillance footage. However, the defendant had a shaved head at trial. Thus, by the time of trial the jury was unable to perceive the distinguishing nature of the defendant’s hair at the time of the shooting. Thus the officer was better qualified than the jury to identify the defendant in the videotape. Because the officer was familiar with the defendant’s appearance and because the defendant had altered his appearance by the time of trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the officer to testify to his opinion that the defendant was the individual depicted shooting a weapon in the surveillance video.

The trial court did not commit plain error by admitting an officer’s lay opinion testimony identifying the defendant as the person depicted in a videotape. The defendant argued that the officer was in no better position than the jury to identify the defendant in the videotape. However, the officer had contact with the defendant prior to the incident in question; because he was familiar with the defendant, the officer was in a better position than the jury to identify defendant in the videotape.

In a sexual exploitation of a minor and indecent liberties case, the trial court did not err by allowing lay opinion testimony regarding photographs of a five-year-old child that formed the basis for the charges. None of the witnesses perceived the behavior depicted; instead they formed opinions based on their perceptions of the photographs. In one set of statements to which the defendant failed to object at trial, the witnesses stated that the photographs were “disturbing,” “graphic,” “of a sexual nature involving children,” “objectionable,” “concerning” to the witness, and that the defendant pulled away the minor’s pant leg to get a “shot into the vaginal area.” As to these statements, any error did not rise to the level of plain error. However the defendant did object to a statement in the Police Incident report stating that the photo “has the juvenile’s female private’s [sic] showing.” At to this statement, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this testimony as a shorthand statement of fact.