Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

Smith's Criminal Case Compendium


This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.

Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.


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E.g., 06/14/2024
E.g., 06/14/2024
State v. Graham [Duplicated], ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (Mar. 17, 2020) aff'd on other grounds, ___ N.C. ___, 2021-NCSC-125 (Oct 29 2021)

The defendant was charged with four counts of engaging in sexual acts against a child under 13 and taking indecent liberties with a child. The defendant was alleged to have touched a child, A.M.D., in sexual manner on several occasions over a period of one to two years. The state’s evidence at trial consisted primarily of testimony from the victim, A.M.D., and corroborating testimony from other witnesses to whom she had disclosed the abuse. 

After the allegations in this case came to light, the defendant left the area and could not be located. The lead detective sought assistance from the U.S. Marshals, and the defendant was eventually located in and extradited from Puerto Rico. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing the detective to testify about the extradition since he had no direct personal knowledge about what transpired, and argued that the court erred a second time by instructing the jury on flight. The defendant did not raise either objection at trial, so the issues were restricted to plain error review. The appellate court held that it was not plain error to allow testimony about extradition since the detective had personal knowledge based on his own attempts to locate the defendant, his act of soliciting help from the Marshals, and his oversight of the whole case as lead detective. Even if it was error, it was not prejudicial since the jury also heard testimony that the defendant escaped from jail pending trial and was recaptured hiding in a nearby home. The jury instruction on flight was likewise proper, since defendant altered his usual routine after the accusations by leaving and staying away until he was located and extradited, reasonably supporting the state’s position that he fled to avoid apprehension.

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder based on felony murder, attempted first-degree murder, felonious discharge of a firearm into an occupied vehicle in operation, and two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The defendant’s brother was the shooter and was convicted in a separate case. (1) On appeal the defendant argued that the trial judge committed plain error by admitting the following evidence. (A) A witness testified that the defendant knew that the defendant’s brother intended to shoot the victims. The Court found that the testimony was inadmissible because a witness may not testify to another person’s mind or purpose without personal knowledge of the person’s mind or purpose, a foundation not laid by the State. The Court concluded, however, that erroneous admission of the testimony did not have a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant counseled and knowingly aided the shooting by assisting in luring the victims to the place where the defendant’s brother shot them. (B) Two witnesses who were not called as experts, one of whom was a detective, testified that the defendant concealed evidence about the planned shooting by using a smartphone texting app. Applying Rule 701 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, which requires that opinion testimony by lay witnesses be rationally based on a witness’s perception and helpful to the jury, the Court found that the State failed to lay a foundation showing that the witnesses were familiar with how the use of such apps affects cell phone records. The Court concluded that the erroneous admission of the testimony was not plain error because other evidence showed that the defendant was communicating with her brother via cellphone, that her brother destroyed his cellphone, and there were no records of their communications, which the jury could have viewed in a manner disadvantageous to the defendant. (C) A witness testified to the good character of one of the victims— that he was kind, protective, and nonviolent, among other qualities. The Court held that this testimony was inadmissible under Rule 404(a)(2) because it was not offered to rebut any evidence by the defendant that the victim was the first aggressor in the altercation. The Court concluded that the erroneous admission of the testimony was not plain error given other evidence consistent with the defendant’s guilt. (2) The defendant argued, the State conceded, and the Court found that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to convict her of two counts of conspiracy because the evidence showed a single conspiracy to shoot two people. The Court therefore vacated one of the conspiracy convictions and remanded for resentencing. One judge concurred in the result only.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of seven sex crimes against a five-year-old victim, including statutory rape of a child by an adult, statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult, and indecent liberties with a child. At trial, the State presented a nurse practitioner who testified about the medical evaluation given to the victim. The nurse practitioner testified without objection that the victim gave “clear and concise statement[s] regarding child sexual abuse,” and that her own testimony was “based off a complete medical evaluation, not only [the victim’s] statements.” (1) On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error by impermissibly allowing the nurse practitioner to testify to the truth of the victim’s statements to the extent that she offered a conclusive diagnosis without physical evidence. The court rejected the argument, noting first that the witness never actually offered a conclusive diagnosis. To the contrary, she gave testimony relevant to helping the jury understand that a lack of physical evidence in a medical exam did not preclude sexual abuse. Moreover, any error related to the nurse practitioner’s detailed testimony about sexual abuse, including penetration, was deliberately elicited by the defendant on cross-examination. Regardless, the defendant did not demonstrate that the jury would have reached a different result in light of all the other unchallenged evidence. (2) The defendant also argued that the trial judge erred by excluding the testimony from two defense witnesses who allegedly asked the victim’s mother to stop talking about sex in front of children. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the proffered testimony—that the victim may have learned explicit language about sexual abuse from her mother and not from her personal experience with abuse—was too speculative and not within the witnesses’ personal knowledge. (3) Finally, the trial court did not err by failing to give a limiting instruction indicating that the nurse practitioner’s statistical testimony could be considered only for corroborative purposes. Reviewing the argument for plain error, the court concluded that the nurse practitioner’s testimony was proper, and that any error would not be prejudicial in any event in light of the collective evidence of guilt.

A hotel owner had personal knowledge and could testify to the responsibilities of the defendant, the hotel’s general manger, with respect to removing deposits from the hotel safe and other related matters.

In a murder and assault case involving a home invasion and two victims, the trial court did not err by admitting testimony from the surviving victim that touched on the deceased victim’s state of mind when he initially opened the door to the intruder. The surviving victim “merely gave his understanding and interpretation of what went on at the door based on his sitting in the next room and being able to hear the whole situation.” As such, the surviving victim properly testified regarding his own beliefs of the sequence of events that took place at the door.

In an armed robbery case, a store clerk’s testimony that he thought the defendant had a gun was not inadmissible speculation or conjecture. Based on his observations, the clerk believed that the defendant had a gun because the defendant was hiding his arm under his jacket. The clerk’s perception was rationally based on his firsthand observation of the defendant and was more than mere speculation or conjecture.

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