Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Table of Contents
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
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The defendant in this case was in possession of five guns and two knives on educational property. After threatening a school bus driver and attempting to shoot the first responding deputy, the defendant was taken into custody after a struggle with additional officers. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder, five counts of possessing a gun on educational property, and one count each of possessing a knife on educational property, cruelty to animals, and assault by pointing a gun. On appeal, the defendant argued that it was error to enter judgment on five separate counts of possessing a gun on educational property because the language in G.S. 14-269.2(b) which prohibits possessing “any gun” is ambiguous as to whether it authorizes multiple punishments for the simultaneous possession of more than one firearm. The Court of Appeals unanimously agreed that the language was ambiguous, and therefore under the rule of lenity the statute had to be construed as permitting only a single conviction even if the defendant possessed more than one firearm.
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for discretionary review and affirmed the ruling from the Court of Appeals. Citing State v. Garris, 191 N.C. App. 276 (2008), a case in which the Court of Appeals addressed similar statutory language prohibiting possession of “any firearm” by a convicted felon and held that only one conviction for the possession of multiple firearms was proper, the higher court agreed that the language was ambiguous in this case because it could be construed as referring to either a single or multiple firearms. Pursuant to State v. Smith, 323 N.C. 439 (1988), another case involving ambiguity as to the number of permissible convictions, when a statute fails to “clearly express the General Assembly’s intent as to the allowable unit of prosecution” the “ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity toward the defendant.” The court rejected the state’s arguments in favor of a contrary interpretation that would permit multiple convictions, holding that it “would be an act of pure judicial speculation in guessing which interpretation the legislature actually intended.”
Justice Morgan dissented, joined by Justice Newby. The dissent distinguished the cases cited in the majority opinion by arguing that the legislative intent to permit multiple convictions under this particular statute can be inferred from the unique dangers posed by guns on educational property “and the legislature’s clear intent to protect a vulnerable population from potential school shootings.”
In a per curiam decision and for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion below, the supreme court reversed State v. Huckelba, 240 N.C. App. 544 (2015). Deciding an issue of first impression, the court of appeals had held that to be guilty of possessing or carrying weapons on educational property under G.S. 14-269.2(b) the State must prove that the defendant “both knowingly possessed or carried a prohibited weapon and knowingly entered educational property with that weapon” and the trial court committed reversible error by failing to so instruct the jury. The dissenting judge concluded that “even accepting that a conviction … requires that a defendant is knowingly on educational property and knowingly in possession of a firearm” any error in the trial court’s instructions to the jury in this respect did not rise to the level of plain error, noting evidence indicating that the defendant knew she was on educational property.
In this Orange County case, defendant appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm on education property, arguing the application of G.S. 14-269.2 to his case was unconstitutional and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals majority agreed on both grounds, reversing the trial court and vacating defendant’s conviction.
In June of 2021, defendant drove his vehicle to UNC Hospital for treatment. Defendant was homeless at the time, and kept all his possessions, including his firearms, inside his vehicle. A UNC Hospital police officer received a report that defendant’s vehicle was suspicious, and while investigating, the officer discovered that the vehicle had no license plate or insurance coverage. The officer questioned defendant about the contents of the vehicle, and defendant admitted he had firearms inside, but that he was unaware he was on educational property. The officer cuffed defendant and searched the vehicle, finding several firearms along with ammunition. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of possession of a firearm on educational property.
The Court of Appeals first explained that defendant failed to raise the constitutional argument at trial, but that it would invoke Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 to consider his arguments. The court then moved to the substance of defendant’s argument, that applying G.S. 14-269.2(b) to defendant under the facts of his case violated his Second Amendment rights under the “historical tradition of firearm regulation” analysis required by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Slip Op. at 9. The court noted that the purpose of the open-air parking lot where defendant’s vehicle was located was “not educational in nature” as it was intended to serve the hospital and could not be considered an obvious sensitive place for purposes of Bruen. Id. at 10. The court also rejected that the hospital’s “affiliation” with UNC made it qualify as a sensitive place under Bruen. Id. at 12. Under these facts, the court held that applying G.S. 14-269.2(b) to defendant would be unconstitutional, regardless of the various signs and administrative links between the hospital and the educational campus.
The court then moved to defendant’s motion to dismiss, considering whether evidence supported that defendant was on educational property and whether he knew he was on educational property. Considering the first issue, the court held “Defendant’s car was located on the UNC Chapel Hill Campus.” Id. at 15. However, the majority opinion held that the State did not present sufficient evidence of defendant’s knowledge he was on educational property. To support this holding, the court looked to the arresting officer’s testimony, concluding “[t]he State failed to present any evidence, direct or circumstantial, as to which path Defendant took, what signs he saw, or any other indication of personal knowledge that he was on educational property.” Id. at 21.
Chief Judge Dillon concurred by separate opinion as to the Second Amendment holding, but did not agree with the majority’s holding regarding insufficient evidence that defendant knew he was on educational property.
The evidence was sufficient to support the court’s adjudication of a juvenile as delinquent for possession of a weapon on school grounds in violation of G.S. 14-269.2(d). The evidence showed that while on school grounds the juvenile possessed a 3/8-inch thick steel bar forming a C-shaped “link” about 3 inches long and 1½ inches wide. The link closed by tightening a ½-inch thick bolt and the object weighed at least 1 pound. The juvenile could slide several fingers through the link so that 3-4 inches of the 3/8-inch thick bar could be held securely across his knuckles and used as a weapon.