Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Table of Contents
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
About
This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
Instructions
Navigate using the table of contents to the left or by using the search box below. Use quotations for an exact phrase search. A search for multiple terms without quotations functions as an “or” search. Not sure where to start? The 5 minute video tutorial offers a guided tour of main features – Launch Tutorial (opens in new tab).
In this Martin County case, the Supreme Court reversed an unpublished Court of Appeals decision granting defendant a new trial for first-degree murder and finding that the robbery with a dangerous weapon charge should have been dismissed. The Court held that (1) the State admitted substantial evidence of every element of the robbery charge, (2) admitting Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence related to defendant’s gang affiliation and tattoos was not plain error, and (3) admitting a statement as an excited utterance under Rule of Evidence 803(2) was not error.
In 2015, defendant was released from prison and rekindled a relationship with the victim. Both men had a history of being in prison and had previously been in a relationship in the 1990s. In December of 2015, the two had an argument, which led to a physical altercation and threats of violence, including reference to defendant’s gang affiliation. In January of 2016, the victim was found dead in his home from stab wounds, and the victim’s cellphone and wallet with a large amount of cash were missing. Defendant was tried and convicted for robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree murder, but on appeal, the Court of Appeals issued a unanimous unpublished opinion holding the robbery conviction should be dismissed and granting a new trial for first-degree murder. The State appealed and the Supreme Court granted discretionary review.
Taking up (1), the Court explained that the Court of Appeals improperly “reviewed the evidence of robbery with a dangerous weapon ‘in isolation,’” instead of reviewing the evidence as a whole. Slip Op. at 9. The Court then laid out the three elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon under G.S. 14-87(a), and looked to the record for support. Here, defendant had made an extrajudicial confession to a cellmate after his arrest, and the money and cellphone from the victim were never found, meaning the corpus delicti doctrine applied. The corpus delicti doctrine required the State to admit corroborating evidence to support “the trustworthiness of the accused’s confession.” Id. at 12. The Court concluded that the confession, along with the independent testimony and evidence, represented substantial evidence that defendant committed the offense.
Moving to (2), the Court approached the issue of the Rule 404(b) evidence of defendant’s prior incarceration, gang affiliation, and tattoos by considering the second prong of the plain error standard, whether defendant could demonstrate prejudice by “showing that without the admission of the evidence in question, the jury probably would have reached a different result.” Id. at 19. The Court concluded defendant could not meet this standard, as additional evidence supported defendant as the perpetrator and connected him to the victim.
Finally in (3), the Court considered the admission of the victim’s statement “Dianne to the house” as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2). The victim made this statement on a quick phone call with his niece, and it was offered to prove defendant went to the victim’s house the night of the murder, with “Dianne” being a codeword for defendant. The Court outlined the applicable standard for an excited utterance, and determined that because “the statement [the victim] made followed a startling experience and was brief and quick, this statement qualifies as an excited utterance.” Id. at 21.
In this murder case, the Court of Appeals held, over a dissent, that the trial court did not err by admitting under Rule 404(b) portions of an audiotape and a corresponding transcript, which included a conversation between the defendant and an individual, Anderson, with whom the defendant was incarcerated. Anderson was a key witness for the State and his credibility was crucial. The 404(b) evidence was not admitted for propensity but rather to show: that the defendant trusted and confided in Anderson; the nature of their relationship, in that the defendant was willing to discuss commission of the crimes at issue with Anderson; and relevant factual information to the murder charge for which the defendant was on trial. These were proper purposes. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence under the Rule 403 balancing test.
In this Cleveland County case, defendant appealed his convictions for statutory sexual offense with a child and indecent liberties with a child, arguing error in (1) admitting testimony containing hearsay from a pediatrician, (2) admitting testimony containing hearsay to “corroborate” a minor victim’s account of abuse, and (3) failing to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor’s closing argument. The Court of Appeals found no error in (1), and no prejudicial error in (2)-(3).
Defendant came to trial on the charges in January of 2023, after an investigation by the Cleveland County Department of Social Services into allegations that defendant sexually abused his two daughters. During the trial, defendant’s two daughters both testified about defendant’s actions. Additionally, a pediatrician who examined the two girls testified about statements they made during medical examinations. Defendant’s half-brother also testified, and explained that his step-sister had told him about sexual contact between defendant and the half-brother’s daughter. The daughter also testified about those events at trial, and a signed statement from defendant that was given in 2009 was admitted into evidence. During closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to describe “404(b) evidence” to the jury, and included the following statement: “The best predictor of future behavior is past behavior.” Slip Op. at 6.
Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals first noted the basis of the objection, as the pediatrician testified that the patient, one of defendant’s daughters, told her that defendant had touched her sister in a no-no spot. The prosecution responded to defendant’s objection by arguing that the statement could be admitted under Rule of Evidence 803(4), as a statement offered for medical diagnosis or treatment. Even though the statement referenced the patient’s sister, the court held that it was still offered for medical diagnosis or treatment. Here the pediatrician was conducting an exam that included “a patient’s mental health,” and the patient’s statement “concerned an eyewitness account of her sister’s sexual abuse, which undoubtedly affected [the patient’s] mental health.” Id. at 12.
Moving to (2), the court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by admitting the hearsay statements, but held that defendant waived his objection. The testimony was framed as “corroborating” a witness’s former statement, but this witness did not testify at trial. Despite the error, the court held that defendant waived his objection because he did not object to other evidence that supported the out of court statements. Because the other evidence was “of a similar character,” including the written statement given by defendant himself, the court held that defendant waived his objection. Id. at 16.
Finally, the court considered (3), noting that the prosecutor’s statement was “the exact propensity purpose prohibited by [Rule of Evidence] 404(b).” Id. at 19. Although this statement was improper, the court did not see prejudice to the defendant, as there was ample evidence of guilt, and defendant did not rebut the presumption that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions.
The defendant in this Davidson County case was tried for common law robbery, habitual misdemeanor assault, and habitual felon. The charges stemmed from an incident between the defendant and his then-girlfriend at her residence, resulting in him assaulting her, damaging her car, and ultimately taking her car after she fled inside the home. The defendant had recently purchased the car for the woman and had been reimbursed by her family for its value, and this was apparently part of the argument. At trial, evidence was also presented that the defendant provided the victim heroin during their relationship. The defendant was convicted on all counts and appealed.
(1) The defendant argued there was insufficient evidence that he used force to take the car or that he took property from the victim’s presence. The court rejected the arguments, observing that “even when there is some attenuation between the use of force and the taking, the action can still amount to a continuous transaction.” Slip op. at 7. Here, the defendant’s acts of assaulting the victim and stealing her car occurred within a 20-minute time period in the victim’s front yard, and evidence showed that the argument and assault were related to the car. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the victim fled in response to the defendant’s assault, and the defendant took her car immediately afterwards. This was sufficient to show a continuous transaction linking the defendant’s use of force to the taking of property. The same facts showed that the taking occurred “in the presence of” the victim. In the words of the court:
If the force . . . for the purpose of taking personal property has been used and caused the victim in possession or control to flee the premises and this is followed by the taking of the property in one continuous course of conduct, the taking is from the “presence” of the victim.” Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
The trial court did not therefore err in denying the motion to dismiss the common law robbery charge for insufficient evidence.
(2) The defendant argued that the testimony about him giving the victim heroin during their relationship was unduly prejudicial and violated N.C. Evid. R. 404(b). Assuming without deciding that the admission of this testimony violated Rule 404(b), any error was harmless in light of “overwhelming evidence” of the defendant’s guilt.
(3) The trial court erred by failing to give the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard on attorney fees. The record contained no colloquy between the trial judge and the defendant on the issue and no other evidence showed that the defendant was given a chance to be heard. Thus, the civil judgement on attorney fees was vacated and the matter remanded for hearing on that issue only. The convictions were otherwise unanimously affirmed.
In this possession of a firearm by a felon case, the trial court did not err when it allowed an officer to testify that during an unrelated incident, the officer saw the defendant exiting a house that the officer was surveilling and to testify that the defendant had a reputation for causing problems in the area. This testimony was offered for a proper purpose: to establish the officer’s familiarity with the defendant’s appearance so that he could identify him as the person depicted in surveillance footage. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of this testimony outweighed its prejudicial impact under the Rule 403 balancing test. However, the court went on to hold that the officer’s testimony that the surveillance operation in question was in response to “a drug complaint” did not add to the reliability of the officer’s ability to identify the defendant. But because no objection was made to this testimony at trial plain error review applied, and any error that occurred with respect to this testimony did not meet that high threshold.
In a child sexual assault case, even if an officer’s testimony that the police department had a record of defendant’s date of birth “[f]rom prior arrests” could be considered 404(b) evidence, it was admissible to show a fact other than the defendant’s character: the defendant’s age, an element of the charged offense. Furthermore, there was no reasonable possibility that any error with respect to this testimony could have affected the verdict.