Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.

Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.

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E.g., 09/22/2021
E.g., 09/22/2021

(1) In this first-degree murder case, the trial court did not err by declining to give the defendant’s requested special jury instruction regarding potential bias of a State’s witness. Because the issue involves the trial court’s choice of language in jury instructions, the standard of review was abuse of discretion. With respect to witness Brown, the defendant requested a special jury instruction stating: “There is evidence which tends to show that a witness testified with the hope that their testimony would convince the prosecutor to recommend a charge reduction. If you find that the witness testified for this reason, in whole or in part, you should examine this testimony with great care and caution. If, after doing so, you believe the testimony, in whole or in part, you should treat what you believe the same as any other believable evidence.” The trial court denied the requested special instruction and gave the pattern jury instruction on interested witnesses and informants, N.C.P.I. 104.20; 104.30, and the general pattern jury instruction concerning witness credibility, N.C.P.I. 101.15. Considering the facts of the case, the court found that the trial court’s charge to the jury, taken as a whole, was sufficient to address the concerns motivating the defendant’s requested instruction. The entire jury charge was sufficient to apprise the jury that they could consider whether Brown was interested, biased, or not credible; was supported by the evidence; and was in “substantial conformity” with the instruction requested by the defendant. The court further noted that the defendant’s requested instruction—that Brown testified with the hope that his testimony would convince the prosecutor to recommend a charge reduction—was not supported by the law or the evidence; there was no possibility that Brown could receive any charge reduction because he had no pending charges at the time of his testimony. Even if the trial court erred with respect to the jury instruction, the defendant could not demonstrate prejudice.

(2) In this murder case, the trial court did not err by allowing a State’s witness to testify, over objection, about a jailhouse attack. Witness Brown testified that he was transferred to the county courthouse to testify for the State at a pretrial hearing. When he arrived, the defendant—who was present inside a holding cell--threatened Brown and made a motion with his hands “like he was going to cut me. He was telling me I was dead.” After Brown testified at the pretrial hearing, he was taken back to the jail and placed in a pod across from the defendant, separated by a glass window. The defendant stared at Brown through the window and appeared to be “talking trash.” A few minutes later “somebody came to him and threatened him” for testifying against the defendant. Soon after Brown returned to his cell, the same person who had threatened him moments earlier came into the cell and assaulted Brown, asking him if he was telling on the defendant. On appeal the defendant argued that evidence of the jailhouse attack was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.

            The evidence regarding the jailhouse attack was relevant. The defendant’s primary argument on appeal was that there was no evidence that the defendant knew about, suggested, or encouraged the attack. The court disagreed noting, among other things that the defendant stared at Brown through the window immediately before the assailant approached and threatened Brown, and that the assailant asked Brown if he was telling on the defendant. This testimony “clearly suggests” that the defendant “was, at minimum, aware of the attack upon Brown or may have encouraged it.” Evidence of attempts to influence a witness by threats or intimidation is relevant. Additionally, Brown testified that he did not want to be at trial because of safety concerns. A witness’s testimony about his fear of the defendant and the reasons for this fear is relevant to the witness’s credibility. Thus the challenged testimony is clearly relevant in that it was both probative of the defendant’s guilt and of Brown’s credibility.

            The court went on to find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the challenged testimony under Rule 403, finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate how the challenged testimony was unfairly prejudicial or how its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s request for a jury instruction on the testimony of an interested witness (N.C.P.I.-Crim. 104.20), where it gave a different instruction leaving “no doubt that it was the jury’s duty to determine whether the witness was interested or biased.”

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