In this Carteret County case, defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing (1) insufficient evidence, (2) error in admitting numerous gruesome photos of the body, and (3) error in allowing several statements by the prosecutor during closing argument. The Court of Appeals found no prejudicial error. 

At trial, defendant admitted through counsel that he shot the victim, the mother of his son, on August 14, 2018. Evidence showed that earlier that day, the two were seen fighting in the front yard of their residence, and later the victim was seen walking down the road. Defendant eventually picked up the victim and brought her back to their home. Sometime after the victim and defendant were back home, defendant shot and killed the victim, wrapped her in a tarp, then buried her body at a burn pit in his grandfather’s back yard. Defendant also called the victim’s mother, who lived with them, to tell her juice had been spilled on her sheets and he had to launder them. After burying the victim, defendant told others that the victim had left him, and put up flyers trying to find her. Eventually defendant was charged with the murder; while in custody, he had conversations with another inmate about how he “snapped” and shot the victim after she described performing sex acts with other men, and where he hid the body. 

Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals explained that the State argued first-degree murder under two theories, premeditation and deliberation, and lying in wait. The court looked for sufficient evidence to support premeditation and deliberation first, noting that defendant’s actions before and after the murder were relevant. Although defendant and the victim fought before the killing, the court did not find evidence to support the idea that defendant was acting under “violent passion,” and defendant seemed to deliberately choose a small-caliber handgun that was not his usual weapon for the murder. Slip Op. at 10-11. Additionally, the court concluded that “Defendant’s actions following the murder demonstrate a planned strategy to pretend Defendant had nothing to do with the murder and to avoid detection as the perpetrator.” Id. at 12. The court dispensed with defendant’s argument that it should not consider acts after the killing as evidence of premeditation, explaining the case cited by defendant, State v. Steele, 190 N.C. 506 (1925), “holds flight, and flight alone, is not evidence of premeditation and deliberation.” Slip Op. at 14. Because the court found sufficient evidence to support first-degree murder under premeditation and deliberation, it did not examine the lying in wait theory. 

Turning to (2), the court explained that under Rule of Evidence 403, photos of a body and its location when found are competent evidence, but when repetitive, gruesome and gory photos are presented to the jury simply to arouse the passion of the jury, they may have a prejudicial effect, such as in State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279 (1988). Here, the court did not find prejudice from the photographs, as “[t]he photographs presented at trial depicted the culmination of the investigation to locate [the victim’s] body and provided evidence of premeditation and deliberation.” Slip Op. at 20. 

The court found error in (3), but not prejudicial error, when examining the prosecutor’s closing argument. First, the prosecutor mentioned the punishment for second-degree murder; the trial court sustained defendant’s objection but did not give a curative instruction. The court found no prejudice as previous instructions directed the jury to disregard questions to sustained objections, and not to acquit or convict based on the severity of punishment. Second, the prosecutor mentioned that defendant did not have to testify; the trial court initially sustained the objection but then overruled it to allow the prosecutor to make an argument about defendant not calling witnesses. The court found that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to “the evidence of Defendant’s motive for planning to kill [the victim], his confession, his use of the .22 caliber handgun, and his acts subsequent to the killing.” Id. at 25. Third, while the prosecutor misstated the applicable precedent regarding provocation, the court explained that a proper instruction by the trial court to the jury on “the required state of mind for premeditation and deliberation” cured the misstatement. Id. at 27. Finally, the court concluded that the prosecutor’s statements referencing defendant’s admission that he killed the victim were “directed at what was and was not at issue for the jurors to decide rather than an improper statement regarding Defendant’s failure to plead guilty.” Id. at 28. 

In this murder case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting photographs of the victim and crime scene. The trial court allowed the State to introduce approximately 20 photographs depicting various angles and details of the crime scene and the victim’s location and injuries. The photographs corroborated the defendant’s statement to officers that the victim was attacked at her kitchen, suffered a head injury, and was stabbed multiple times. The autopsy photographs illustrated the testimony of the medical examiner, who described the injuries as consistent with multiple particular weapons, the defensive characteristics of some injuries, and the deliberate and persistent nature of the attack.

In this multiple murder case the trial court properly admitted crime scene and autopsy photographs of the victims’ bodies. Forty-two crime scene photos were admitted to illustrate the testimony of the crime scene investigator who processed the scene. The trial court also admitted crime scene diagrams containing seven photographs. Additionally autopsy photos were admitted. The court easily concluded that the photos were relevant. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the photographs admissible over the defendant’s Rule 403 objection.

This Davidson County case involved the sexual abuse of a girl at ages 10 and 13. The defendant was the child’s grandfather. In addition to assaulting the child, the defendant also abused the child’s mother, his daughter. The child’s mother reportedly traded sex with her daughter for drugs from the defendant. The child’s mother cooperated with the investigation. She pled guilty pursuant to Alford to attempted felony child abuse on the condition that she truthfully testify against the defendant at his trial. Defense counsel thoroughly questioned the child’s mother regarding her plea arrangement, but the trial court sustained an objection to questions relating to the Alford aspect of the plea. It ruled that the evidence that the child’s mother took an Alford plea was not relevant and, if it was relevant, that it “did not survive the [Rule 403] balancing test.” Slip op. at 4. The defendant was convicted of all counts at trial and sentenced to a minimum term of 1200 months. The trial court also ordered lifetime sex offender registration and satellite-based monitoring without objection from the defendant. He appealed, challenging the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of the Alford nature of the plea. He also sought certiorari review of the SBM order, as he failed to preserve his direct appeal of that issue.

(1) The defendant’s objection to the evidentiary ruling was preserved. While the defendant failed to make an offer of proof by conducting voir dire of the witness, the plea transcript with the agreement between the State and the child’s mother was made a part of the record. Trial counsel’s extensive questioning about the plea deal also made the objection obvious from context, thus preserving the issue for appellate review.

(2) The defendant claimed that the Alford plea was relevant to the credibility of the witness and that the trial court erred in sustaining the objection to that line of questioning, causing prejudicial error. The court assumed that the Alford nature of the plea was relevant evidence, but found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence under Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence as potentially confusing to the jury:

Under the circumstances of this case, we agree with the trial court that evidence [the] mother entered an Alford plea would serve to confuse the jury regarding the legal details of her plea. In particular, someone would have to explain the meaning of an Alford plea, and [the] mother’s own understanding of the exact meaning of an Alford plea may have been different that the technical legal meaning or the intent Defendant assumes she had. Slip. op. at 14.

(3) The defendant failed to object on any basis to the order imposing SBM at the time of its entry and failed to give written notice of appeal of the order (as required for civil matters such as SBM orders). He sought review via petition for writ of certiorari and asked the court to invoke Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure to reach the merits of his unpreserved argument. The court declined both requests and dismissed the argument, finding the circumstances did not warrant the “extraordinary steps” of both granting certiorari and invoking Rule 2.  

Judge Murphy wrote separately to concur. According to him, the trial court erred in finding the Alford plea evidence irrelevant. The trial court further erred in conducting a Rule 403 balancing test after it found the evidence irrelevant and excluding the evidence on the basis of Rule 403 was an abuse of discretion. However, these errors were not prejudicial under the circumstances of the case.

In this Rockingham County case, defendant appealed his convictions for statutory rape, indecent liberties with a child, and sex act by a substitute parent or guardian, arguing error in admitting expert testimony that the victim’s testimony was not coached, in granting a motion in limine preventing defendant from cross-examining the victim about her elementary school records, and in admitting a video of defendant’s interrogation showing equipment related to a polygraph examination. The Court of Appeals found no error. 

In 2021, defendant was brought to trial for the statutory rape of his granddaughter in 2017, when she was 11 years old. At trial, a forensic interviewer testified, over defendant’s objection, that he saw no indication that the victim was coached. The trial court also granted a motion in limine to prevent defendant from cross-examining the victim regarding school records from when she was in kindergarten through second grade showing conduct allegedly reflecting her propensity for untruthfulness. The conduct was behavior such as cheating on a test and stealing a pen.  

The Court of Appeals noted “[o]ur Supreme Court has held that ‘an expert may not testify that a prosecuting child-witness in a sexual abuse trial is believable [or] is not lying about the alleged sexual assault.’” Slip Op. at 2, quoting State v. Baymon, 336 N.C. 748, 754 (1994). However, the court could not point to a published case regarding a statement about coaching like the one in question here. Because there was no controlling opinion on the matter, the court engaged in a predictive exercise and held, “[b]ased upon our Supreme Court’s statement in Baymon, we conclude that it was not error for the trial court to allow expert testimony that [the victim] was not coached.” Id. at 3.

The court also found no error with the trial court’s conclusions regarding the admissibility of the victim’s childhood records under Rule of Evidence 403. The court explained that the evidence showed behavior that was too remote in time and only marginally probative regarding truthfulness. Finally, the court found no error with the interrogation video, explaining that while it is well established that polygraph evidence is not admissible, the video in question did not show a polygraph examination. Instead, the video merely showed “miscellaneous items on the table and not the actual polygraph evidence,” and all references to a polygraph examination were redacted before being shown to the jury. Id. at 5-6. 

When a trial court properly determines, pursuant to Evidence Rule 403, that the probative value of evidence about a victim’s sexual history is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, the trial court does not err by excluding the evidence, regardless of whether it falls within the scope of the Rape Shield Rule. The defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual offense. On appeal he argued that the trial court erred by denying his ability to cross-examine the victim regarding the victim’s commission of sexual assault when he was a child. Specifically, the victim had told an officer that he had sexually assaulted his half-sister when he was eight or nine years old and thereafter was placed in a facility until he reached 18 years old. The defendant asserted that the victim’s statement about this assault was admissible for impeachment because it was inconsistent with the victim’s previous statements to law enforcement about how and when he was removed from his home as a child. The trial court found that the victim’s statement about sexually assaulting his sister was evidence of prior sexual behavior protected by the Rape Shield Law and also was inadmissible because any probative value is substantially outweighed by the likelihood of unfair prejudice and confusion to the jury. The court declined to address the defendant’s argument that a prior sexual assault committed by a victim is not protected under the Rape Shield law, concluding instead that the trial court properly excluded the evidence under Rule 403. The sexual behavior at issue occurred more than a decade earlier and involved no factual elements similar to the charges in question. The incident is disturbing and highly prejudicial and the circumstances of the victim’s removal from his family home as a child are of remote relevance to the offense charged. Moreover, other evidence, including testimony that the defendant’s DNA matched a swab taken from the victim shortly after the assault, render the victim’s inconsistent statements about facts less relevant to the contested factual issues at trial, namely the defendant’s denial that any sexual encounter occurred. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that exclusion of this evidence impermissibly prevented the jury from hearing evidence that the victim was not a virgin of the time of the offense, contrary to his statement to the defendant that he was a virgin. 

In this murder case, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the probative value of a recorded telephone call made by the defendant to his father was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. During the call, the defendant’s father asked: “Now who you done shot now?” and “That same gun, right?”

In a first-degree murder trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exclude, under Rule 403, evidence of the defendant’s mid-trial escape attempt. The court reasoned: “[T]he jury may have inferred from the fact that defendant attempted to escape that defendant was guilty of the charges against him. That inference is precisely the inference that makes evidence of flight relevant and it is not an unfair inference to draw.”

The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 by admitting a recording of phone calls between the defendant and other persons that were entirely in Spanish. The defendant argued that because there was one Spanish-speaking juror, the jurors should have been required to consider only the certified English translation of the recording. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 by admitting the defendant’s statement to an arresting officer that if the officer had come later the defendant “would have been gone and you would have never saw me again.”

The trial court committed plain error during the habitual felon phase of a trial by admitting into evidence plea transcripts for the defendant’s prior felony convictions without redacting irrelevant information pertaining to the defendant's prior drug use, mental health counseling, and lenient sentencing. However, no prejudicial error occurred. The court expressly declined to determine whether admission of the transcripts violated G.S. 15A-1025.

When a trial court properly determines, pursuant to Evidence Rule 403, that the probative value of evidence about a victim’s sexual history is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, the trial court does not err by excluding the evidence, regardless of whether it falls within the scope of the Rape Shield Rule. The defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual offense. On appeal he argued that the trial court erred by denying his ability to cross-examine the victim regarding the victim’s commission of sexual assault when he was a child. Specifically, the victim had told an officer that he had sexually assaulted his half-sister when he was eight or nine years old and thereafter was placed in a facility until he reached 18 years old. The defendant asserted that the victim’s statement about this assault was admissible for impeachment because it was inconsistent with the victim’s previous statements to law enforcement about how and when he was removed from his home as a child. The trial court found that the victim’s statement about sexually assaulting his sister was evidence of prior sexual behavior protected by the Rape Shield Law and also was inadmissible because any probative value is substantially outweighed by the likelihood of unfair prejudice and confusion to the jury. The court declined to address the defendant’s argument that a prior sexual assault committed by a victim is not protected under the Rape Shield law, concluding instead that the trial court properly excluded the evidence under Rule 403. The sexual behavior at issue occurred more than a decade earlier and involved no factual elements similar to the charges in question. The incident is disturbing and highly prejudicial and the circumstances of the victim’s removal from his family home as a child are of remote relevance to the offense charged. Moreover, other evidence, including testimony that the defendant’s DNA matched a swab taken from the victim shortly after the assault, render the victim’s inconsistent statements about facts less relevant to the contested factual issues at trial, namely the defendant’s denial that any sexual encounter occurred. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that exclusion of this evidence impermissibly prevented the jury from hearing evidence that the victim was not a virgin of the time of the offense, contrary to his statement to the defendant that he was a virgin. 

In this sexual assault case involving allegations that the defendant, a high school wrestling coach, sexually assaulted wrestlers, the trial court erred by excluding evidence that one of the victims was biased. The defendant sought to introduce evidence showing that the victim had a motive to falsely accuse the defendant. The trial court found the evidence irrelevant because it did not fit within one of the exceptions of the Rape Shield Statute. The court concluded that this was error, noting that the case was “indistinguishable” “in any meaningful way” from State v. Martin, __ N.C. App. __, 774 S.E.2d 330 (2015) (trial court erred by concluding that evidence was per se it admissible because it did not fall within one of the Rape Shield Statute’s exceptions). The court went on to hold, however, that because of the strong evidence of guilt, no prejudice resulted from the trial court’s errors.

In this sexual offense with a student case, the trial court committed reversible error by concluding that the defendant’s evidence was per se inadmissible under the Rape Shield Rule. The case involved charges that the defendant, a substitute teacher, had the victim perform oral sex on him after he caught her in the boys’ locker room. At trial the defendant sought to introduce evidence that when he found the victim in the locker room, she was performing oral sex on football players. He sought to introduce this evidence to show that the victim had a motive to falsely accuse him of sexual assault. After an in camera hearing the trial court concluded that the evidence was per se inadmissible because it did not fit under the Rape Shield Rule’s four exceptions. Citing case law, the court determined that “that there may be circumstances where evidence which touches on the sexual behavior of the complainant may be admissible even though it does not fall within one of the categories in the Rape Shield Statute.” Here, the defendant’s defense was that he did not engage in any sexual behavior with the victim but that she fabricated the story to hide the fact that he caught her performing oral sex on the football players in the locker room. The court continued:

Where the State’s case in any criminal trial is based largely on the credibility of a prosecuting witness, evidence tending to show that the witness had a motive to falsely accuse the defendant is certainly relevant. The motive or bias of the prosecuting witness is an issue that is common to criminal prosecutions in general and is not specific to only those crimes involving a type of sexual assault.

       The trial court erred by concluding that the evidence was inadmissible per se because it did not fall within one of the four categories in the Rape Shield Statute. Here, the trial court should have looked beyond the four categories to determine whether the evidence was, in fact, relevant to show [the victim]’s motive to falsely accuse Defendant and, if so, conducted a balancing test of the probative and prejudicial value of the evidence under Rule 403 or was otherwise inadmissible on some other basis (e.g., hearsay). (footnote omitted).

In the context of an appeal from a contempt proceeding, the court held that by asking the victim at trial about a possible prior instance of rape between the victim and a cousin without first addressing the relevance and admissibility of the question during an in camera hearing, defense counsel violated the Rape Shield Statute.

(1) In a child sex case, the trial judge did not err by limiting the defendant’s cross-examination of the prosecuting witness regarding inconsistent statements about her sexual history, made to the police and medical personnel. The evidence did not fit within any exception to Rule 412. The court went on to hold that any probative value of the evidence for impeachment purposes was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (2) The trial court did not err by refusing to admit the victim’s unredacted medical records containing statements regarding her prior sexual history, given that the records had little if any probative value.