Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
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In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court affirmed an unpublished Court of Appeals opinion denying defendant’s motion for appropriate relief (MAR) based upon ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel. The Court’s opinion reversed the holding in State v. Allen, 378 N.C. 286 (2021), that the factual allegations in a MAR must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in 1999 and sentenced to life without parole. Defendant appealed his conviction, but the Court of Appeals found no error. In April of 2020, defendant filed the MAR giving rise to the current case, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel from both trial counsel and appellate counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the MAR but did not state that the standard of review was in the light most favorable to defendant as called for by Allen.
After noting that Allen had created confusion for the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court first clarified that the Allen standard would no longer apply:
Reviewing a defendant’s asserted grounds for relief in the light most favorable to defendant is a departure from this Court’s longstanding standard of review. The mere fact that some ground for relief is asserted does not entitle defendant to a hearing or to present evidence. An MAR court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing if a defendant’s MAR offers insufficient evidence to support his claim or only asserts general allegations and speculation.
Slip Op. at 3 (cleaned up). The Court then turned to the applicable review in the current case, explaining that under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), defendant must show (1) deficient performance by his counsel and (2) prejudice from counsel’s errors.
Defendant argued that his trial counsel refused to allow him to testify, despite his desire to do so. The Court noted that the record did not support defendant’s argument, and “[a]t no point during trial did defendant indicate he wished to testify.” Slip Op. at 6. Moving to the appellate counsel issue, the Court explained that the trial court limited the testimony of defendant’s psychologist, prohibiting her from using legal terminology. The Court pointed out that the expert was permitted to testify about defendant’s mental health issues, and the limitations on her testimony were permissible. Because defendant could not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in either circumstance, the Court affirmed the denial of defendant’s MAR.
Justice Berger concurred by separate opinion and discussed the reversal of Allen. Id. at 9.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in part and dissented in part and would have found that defendant’s MAR lacked factual support for an evidentiary hearing, but would not have reversed Allen. Id. at 12.
The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to decide an appeal from a divided decision of the Court of Appeals reversing a trial court’s ruling denying a MAR. The defendant was convicted of armed robbery. He was unsuccessful on his direct appeal. The defendant then filed an MAR arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on appeal. The trial court denied the defendant’s MAR. A divided Court of Appeals reversed, with instructions to grant the MAR and vacate the conviction. The Supreme Court noted that G.S. 7A-30(2) provides an automatic right of appeal based on a dissent at the Court of Appeals. However, that automatic right of appeal is limited by G.S. 7A-28, which states that decisions of the Court of Appeals upon review of G.S. 15A-1415 MARs (MARs by the defendant filed more than 10 days after entry of judgment) are final and not subject to further review. However, the supervisory authority granted to the court by Article IV, Section 12 of the North Carolina Constitution gave the court a restriction to hear the appeal.
The Court of Appeals had subject-matter jurisdiction to review, pursuant to the State’s petition for writ of certiorari, a trial court’s grant of its own motion for appropriate relief (MAR). The defendant pleaded guilty to rape of a child by an adult offender and to sexual offense with a child by an adult offender, both felonies with mandatory minimum sentences of 300 months. Pursuant to a plea arrangement, the trial court consolidated the convictions for judgment and imposed a single active sentence of 300 to 420 months. The trial court then immediately granted its own MAR and vacated the judgment and sentence. It concluded that, as applied to the defendant, the mandatory sentence violated the Eighth Amendment; the court resentenced the defendant to 144 to 233 months. The State petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari to review the trial court’s MAR order. The defendant responded, arguing that under State v. Starkey, 177 N.C. App. 264, the court of appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review a trial court’s sua sponte grant of a MAR. The Court of Appeals allowed the State’s petition and issued the writ. The Court of Appeals found no Eighth Amendment violation, vacated the defendant’s sentence and the trial court’s order granting appropriate relief, and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. See State v. Thomsen, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 776 S.E.2d 41, 48 (2015). Before the supreme court, the parties disagreed on whether the trial court’s sua sponte motion was pursuant to G.S. 15A-1415(b) (defendant’s MAR) or G.S. 15A-1420(d) (trial court’s sua sponte MAR). The court found it unnecessary to resolve this dispute, holding first that if the MAR was made under G.S. 15A-1415, State v. Stubbs, 368 N.C. 40, 42-43, authorized review by way of certiorari. Alternatively, if the MAR was made pursuant to G.S. 1420(d), G.S. 7A-32(c) gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review a lower court judgment by writ of certiorari, unless a more specific statute restricts jurisdiction. Here, no such specific statute exists. It went on to hold that to the extent Starkey was inconsistent with this holding it was overruled.
Under G.S. 15A-1422, the court of appeals had subject matter jurisdiction to review the State’s appeal from a trial court’s order granting the defendant relief on his motion for appropriate relief. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that Appellate Rule 21 required a different conclusion. In the decision below, State v. Stubbs, 232 N.C. App. 274 (2014), the court of appeals held, over a dissent that the trial court erred by concluding that the defendant’s sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole violated of the Eighth Amendment.
The defendant was tried and convicted of first-degree murder in Gaston County. The evidence of the case largely consisted of mixtures of “touch” DNA profiles found on the victim’s car along with circumstantial evidence based on the defendant’s presence in the area at the time of the murder. The verdict was affirmed on direct appeal. The defendant later filed a motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) alleging his innocence based on new evidence, as well as claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and discovery violations. The MAR court conducted an extensive hearing on the motion. Evidence showed that the defendant’s trial counsel was aware of the defendant’s significant medical and psychological issues, some of which may have been relevant to the defendant’s ability to commit the crime. Trial counsel obtained authorization and funding for a psychological evaluation that never occurred and failed to obtain the defendant’s medical records. Trial counsel also obtained the services of a DNA expert for use at trial but failed to review the expert’s professional background or previous testimony. The expert informed trial counsel that the State’s science was “good” and advised counsel not to interview the prosecution’s DNA expert. Defense counsel did not obtain a final report from the expert and failed to question the State’s DNA expert with questions recommended by the defense expert.
At the MAR hearing, the defense presented a new DNA expert who testified that the SBI policies of interpreting mixture DNA at the time were “subjective,” outdated, and inaccurate based on current accepted practices. According to this expert, the DNA mixture relied upon by the State at trial could not be used for “any reliable matching” and that the defendant’s DNA profile was not a match. The trial court granted the MAR and ordered a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from trial counsel’s failure to investigate the defendant’s medical and psychological conditions, as well as trial counsel’s failure to properly prepare to meet the state’s DNA evidence. The post-conviction court also found that the defendant was entitled to a new trial based on new evidence stemming from the evolution of DNA science since the time of trial, finding that changes in the science rendered the State’s DNA evidence at trial “doubtful at best.” The State appealed.
The State generally does not have the right to appeal a defendant’s successful MAR. An exception exists for an MAR granted based on new evidence. In that case, the State may directly appeal, “but only on questions of law.” G.S. 15A-1445(a)(2). Where there is no appeal of right, the State may petition for writ of certiorari to obtain review of the trial court’s grant of the MAR. G.S. 15A-1422(c)(3). Here, the State argued that it was entitled to appeal the entire MAR order, since the order was based in part on new evidence. The Court of Appeals disagreed. Where a right to appeal exists as to one ground of an order and not others, the appealing party is generally limited to arguing only the issue from which the appeal of right lies. “[A] right to appeal those other issues exists only if this Court finds those issues ‘inextricably intertwined with the issues before this Court as of right.’” Carver Slip op. at 9 (citation omitted). Here, the issues of new evidence and ineffective assistance were not “inextricably intertwined.” According to the court:
The newly discovered evidence claim is based on evidence that was unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial. The ineffective assistance claim is based on other, separate evidence that the trial court found to be available to the defendant had his counsel exercised due diligence. Thus, these two claims are based on entirely separate facts and legal issues. Id. at 10.
Further, the exception for a State’s direct appeal of the grant of an MAR based on newly discovered evidence is limited by the “only on questions of law” language in G.S. 15A-1445(a)(2). The State’s argument that it can appeal all issues in the order ignored this limitation.
Finally, even after the defendant moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, the State failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari. The State’s appeal of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appeal of the new evidence claim was rendered moot as a result, leaving the trial court’s order intact.
On appeal from the denial of the defendant’s MAR, the court clarified that the appropriate standard of review is de novo with respect to conclusions of law.
The State could appeal the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s MAR.
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the State had no avenue to obtain review of a trial court order granting his G.S. 15A-1415 MAR (MAR made more than 10 days after entry of judgment) on grounds that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The court found that it had authority to grant the State’s petition for writ of certiorari. The court rejected the contention that State v. Starkey, 177 N.C. App. 264, 268 (2006), required a different conclusion, noting that case conflicts with state Supreme Court decisions.
State could appeal an amended judgment entered after the trial court granted the defendant’s MAR. The trial court entered the amended judgment after concluding (erroneously) that the 2009 amendments to the SSA applied to the defendant’s 2005 offenses.
Under G.S. 15A-1445, the State could appeal the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s MAR on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
Post-Conviction Proceedings > Motions for Appropriate Relief > Claims That Can Be Raised > Unconstitutional Conviction or Sentence
In this Cleveland County case, defendant appealed the result of his resentencing hearing for life without parole and the denial of his constitutional challenges to his sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s orders.
In 1999, defendant received a sentence of life without parole for a murder committed when he was 16 years old. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), holding that mandatory life without parole sentences for defendants under age 18 were unconstitutional, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), holding that Miller v. Alabama was retroactive. The General Assembly adopted G.S. 15A-1340.19A, referred to by the court as “the Miller statute,” to require a resentencing hearing for every defendant convicted of first-degree murder committed while under 18 and with a sentence of life without parole. Slip Op. at 2. Defendant’s Miller resentencing hearing in 2020 gave rise to the current case.
The Court of Appeals considered three arguments from defendant. First, defendant argued that the resentencing judge erred when he “impermissibly assessed the credibility of witnesses who testified during the 1999 trial, where he was not the presiding judge at that trial.” Id. at 3. The court disagreed, pointing to the language of the Miller statute as well as general practice allowing substitution of new judges during criminal trials. The court concluded “the judge thoroughly reviewed the record and could appropriately assess the credibility of the two co-defendants who testified against Defendant at the 1999 trial.” Id. at 6.
Defendant next argued that the trial court improperly weighed several mitigating factors: “(1) age, (2) immaturity, (3) reduced ability to appreciate risks and consequences, (4) family and peer pressure exerted upon the defendant, and (5) the defendant’s likelihood to benefit from rehabilitation.” Id. at 7. The court walked through the analysis for each factor, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when considering the mitigating factors.
Finally, the court reached defendant’s constitutional arguments that (1) the Miller statute was unconstitutional as it contained a presumption in favor of life without parole and lacks guidance for resentencing, and (2) that life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and North Carolina constitution. The court rejected both arguments, noting for (1) that State v. James, 371 N.C. 77 (2018), upheld the constitutionality of the Miller statute, and for (2) that State v. Conner, 381 N.C. 643 (2022), and State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558 (2022), upheld the constitutionality of life without parole sentences. Slip Op. at 10.
In this Cumberland County case, defendant appealed the superior court order sentencing him to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOPP) for two counts of first-degree murder committed while he was a juvenile. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order.
In 1998, defendant was convicted of murdering two law enforcement officers and was sentenced to death. Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the murders. Defendant’s convictions were upheld on direct appeal in State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364 (2000). After defendant was convicted, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), holding death sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), holding that a mandatory sentence of LWOPP was unconstitutional for a juvenile; and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), holding that Miller’sprohibition on mandatory LWOPP must be applied retroactively to those already sentenced to mandatory LWOPP. Defendant was initially resentenced to mandatory LWOPP in December of 2005, after filing a motion for appropriate relief (MAR) under Roper. In the current case, defendant filed a MAR in July of 2018, alleging his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller and Montgomery. A sentencing hearing was held in 2022, where the MAR court reviewed the nine mitigating factors from G.S. 15A-1340.19B and sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of LWOPP.
The Court of Appeals first explained the scope of its review was abuse of discretion, and that the relevant considerations were the mitigating factors from G.S. 15A-1340.19B(c), along with the additional factor from State v. Kelliher, 381 N.C. 558 (2022), that the sentencing court must make an express finding of “a juvenile’s permanent incorrigibility” before imposing LWOPP. Slip Op. at 12. The court then grouped defendant’s arguments in two categories, (1) that defendant’s sentence of LWOPP should be reversed based on Kelliherbecause he was capable of reform, and (2) the MAR court incorrectly weighed the mitigating factors of G.S. 15A-1340.19B. Taking up (1), the court quickly dispensed with defendant’s arguments, as defendant did not challenge the findings of fact as unsupported by the evidence and they were binding on his appeal.
Because defendant did not challenge the findings of fact, the court moved to (2), and specifically the weight the MAR court gave to each of the nine mitigating factors and the express finding of incorrigibility under Kelliher. A significant portion of the opinion (pages 15 to 30) were spent examining the factors and the weight given by the MAR court to each. The court ultimately concluded that “the Sentencing Order properly addressed each factor as required by [G.S.] 15A-1340.19A and Kelliher.” Id. at 31. After noting the possible differing views on the mitigating impact of the factors, the court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the order.
(1) The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the State had no avenue to obtain review of a trial court order granting his G.S. 15A-1415 MAR (MAR made more than 10 days after entry of judgment) on grounds that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The court found that it had authority to grant the State’s petition for writ of certiorari. The court rejected the contention that State v. Starkey, 177 N.C. App. 264, 268 (2006), required a different conclusion, noting that case conflicts with state Supreme Court decisions. (2) The defendant’s claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment was properly asserted under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(4) (convicted/sentenced under statute in violation of US or NC Constitutions) and (b)(8) (sentence unauthorized at the time imposed, contained a type of disposition or a term of imprisonment not authorized for the particular class of offense and prior record or conviction level, was illegally imposed, or is otherwise invalid as a matter of law).
The trial court erred by concluding that the defendant’s 1973 sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole on a conviction of second-degree burglary, committed when he was 17 years old, violated the Eighth Amendment. The defendant brought a MAR challenging his sentence as unconstitutional. The court began by noting that the defendant’s MAR claim was a valid under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(4) (unconstitutional conviction or sentence) and (8) (sentence illegal or invalid). On the substantive issue, the court found that unlike a life sentence without the possibility of parole, the defendant’s sentence “allows for the realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of his life.” In fact, the defendant had been placed on parole in 2008, but it was revoked after he committed a DWI.
Post-Conviction Proceedings > Motions for Appropriate Relief > Claims That Can Be Raised > Significant Change in the Law
The court reversed the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion for reconsideration and motion for appropriate relief (MAR), holding that the requirement that counsel advise the defendant of the immigration consequences of a plea agreement established by Padilla does not apply retroactively. The defendant pled no contest to a drug charge in 1997. In 2015 the defendant asserted a MAR claim under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), that he was not informed of the impact his conviction would have on his immigration status, particularly the risk of deportation. The trial court initially denied the MAR but subsequently granted a motion to reconsider and entered an order granting the MAR. Reversing, the court noted that it had previously decided, in State v. Alshaif, 219 N.C. App. 162 (2012), that Padilla does not apply retroactively.
The superior court judge erred by “retroactively” applying Structured Sentencing Law (SSL) provisions to a Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) case. The defendant was sentenced under the FSA. After SSL came into effect, he filed a motion for appropriate relief asserting that SSL applied retroactively to his case and that he was entitled to a lesser sentence under SSL. The superior court judge granted relief. The supreme court, exercising rarely used general supervisory authority to promote the expeditious administration of justice, allowed the State’s petition for writ of certiorari and held that the superior court judge erred by modifying the sentence. The court relied on the effective date of the SSL, as set out by the General Assembly when enacting that law. Finding no other ground for relief, the court remanded for reinstatement of the original FSA sentence.
On the State’s petition for writ of certiorari, the court reversed the trial court and held that no significant change in the law pertaining to the admissibility of expert opinions in child sexual abuse cases had occurred and thus that the defendant was not entitled to relief under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(7) (in a motion for appropriate relief, a defendant may assert a claim that there has been a significant change in law applied in the proceedings leading to the defendant's conviction or sentence, and retroactive application of the changed legal standard is required). Contrary to the trial court’s findings and conclusions, State v. Stancil, 355 N.C. 266 (2002),was not a significant change in the law, but merely an application of the court’s existing case law on expert opinion evidence requiring that in order for an expert to testify that abuse occurred, there must be physical findings consistent with abuse.
Declining to address whether State v. Garris, 191 N.C. App. 276 (2008), applied retroactively, the court held that the defendant’s MAR was subject to denial because the Garris does not constitute a significant change in the substantive or procedural law as required by G.S. 15A-1415(b)(7), the MAR ground asserted by the defendant. When Garris was decided, no reported NC appellate decisions had addressed whether the possession of multiple firearms by a convicted felon constituted a single violation or multiple violations of G.S. 14-415.1(a). For that reason, Garris resolved an issue of first impression. The court continued: “Instead of working a change in existing North Carolina law, Garris simply announced what North Carolina law had been since the enactment of the relevant version of [G.S.] 14-415.1(a).” As a result, it concluded, “a decision which merely resolves a previously undecided issue without either actually or implicitly overruling or modifying a prior decision cannot serve as the basis for an award of appropriate relief made pursuant to [G.S.] 15A-1415(b)(7).” It thus concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief for the reason requested and properly denied the MAR.
Post-Conviction Proceedings > Motions for Appropriate Relief > Claims That Can Be Raised > Illegal or Invalid Sentence
(1) The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the State had no avenue to obtain review of a trial court order granting his G.S. 15A-1415 MAR (MAR made more than 10 days after entry of judgment) on grounds that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The court found that it had authority to grant the State’s petition for writ of certiorari. The court rejected the contention that State v. Starkey, 177 N.C. App. 264, 268 (2006), required a different conclusion, noting that case conflicts with state Supreme Court decisions. (2) The defendant’s claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment was properly asserted under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(4) (convicted/sentenced under statute in violation of US or NC Constitutions) and (b)(8) (sentence unauthorized at the time imposed, contained a type of disposition or a term of imprisonment not authorized for the particular class of offense and prior record or conviction level, was illegally imposed, or is otherwise invalid as a matter of law).
The trial court erred by concluding that the defendant’s 1973 sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole on a conviction of second-degree burglary, committed when he was 17 years old, violated the Eighth Amendment. The defendant brought a MAR challenging his sentence as unconstitutional. The court began by noting that the defendant’s MAR claim was a valid under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(4) (unconstitutional conviction or sentence) and (8) (sentence illegal or invalid). On the substantive issue, the court found that unlike a life sentence without the possibility of parole, the defendant’s sentence “allows for the realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of his life.” In fact, the defendant had been placed on parole in 2008, but it was revoked after he committed a DWI.
Post-Conviction Proceedings > Motions for Appropriate Relief > Claims That Can Be Raised > Newly Discovered Evidence
Reversing the court of appeals, the court held that information supporting the defendant’s motion for appropriate relief (MAR) was not newly discovered evidence. After the defendant was convicted of drug possession offenses, his father told a probation officer that the contraband belonged to him. The trial court granted the defendant’s MAR, concluding that this statement constituted newly discovered evidence under G.S. 15A-1415(c). The court concluded that because the information implicating the defendant’s father was available to the defendant before his conviction, the statement was not newly discovered evidence and that thus the defendant was not entitled to a new trial. The court noted that the search warrant named both the defendant and his father, the house was owned by both of the defendant’s parents, and the father had a history of violating drug laws. Although the defendant’s father invoked the Fifth Amendment at trial when asked whether the contraband belonged to him, the information implicating him as the sole possessor of the drugs could have been made available by other means. It noted that on direct examination of the defendant’s mother, the defendant did not pursue questioning about whether the drugs belonged to the father; also, although the defendant testified at trial, he gave no testimony regarding the ownership of the drugs.
In this New Hanover County case, defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing error in (1) denying his motion to dismiss for lack of evidence he was the perpetrator; (2) overruling his objection that the trial court did not make necessary findings on reliability for expert testimony; (3) denying his post-conviction motion for appropriate relief (MAR) based upon newly-discovered evidence; (4) admitting evidence of his prior removal of an electronic monitoring device; and (5) overruling his objections to the State’s closing argument. The Court of Appeals found no error.
In January of 2016, officers responded to a call about a fourteen-year-old being shot. While accompanying the ambulance to the hospital, they received a report of additional shots fired, and diverted to the scene, where the officers found defendant running from the area. After arresting defendant, officers found he was carrying a 9mm handgun. The State Crime Laboratory later matched the bullet that killed the victim to this handgun. Defendant was subsequently convicted and appealed.
Taking up defendant’s argument (1), the Court of Appeals explained that because the evidence that defendant was the perpetrator was circumstantial, proof of motive, opportunity, and means were necessary to support the inference that defendant committed the crime. Here, the State admitted evidence that the shooting was in retaliation for a previous shooting two weeks prior, and that the shell casing found at the scene, the bullet in the victim, and defendant’s statements to police all tied him to the murder. As a result, “[a] reasonable juror could find Defendant had the opportunity and means to commit the murder.” Slip Op. at 8.
Turning to (2), the court noted that trial courts enjoy wide latitude when determining admissibility of expert testimony. Here, defendant argued that the State’s firearm expert did not utilize “reliable principles and methods” in violation of Rule of Evidence 702, as the State’s expert utilized a micro-analysis test instead of a lands and grooves test on the projectile, a method disputed by the defense’s expert. Id. at 10. The court found no abuse of discretion as “[t]he superior court made supported findings to resolve purported contradictions between the competing experts.”
Reviewing (3), the court explained defendant’s newly discovered evidence concerned the history of the State’s expert receiving a complaint from a superior court judge as well as a mistake during a firearm examination in a previous case. The court noted that the State was not in possession of the expert’s personnel records and was not aware of the purported mistake, and under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the State had not suppressed material evidence. The court further noted that defendant was not entitled to a new trial as the newly discovered evidence “merely questions the expert witness’ past, not the State’s evidence at this trial.” Id. at 14.
Arriving at (4), the court explained that the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of defendant removing his electronic monitoring device fifteen days before the shooting under Rule of Evidence 404(b) was not error. Defendant “disabled his electronic monitoring device approximately an hour after another murder was committed two weeks earlier in the same area of Wilmington . . . [t]he evidence and timing of these incidents and Defendant’s actions are part of the chain of events that contextualize the crime.” Id. at 16.
Finally, the court dispensed with (5), explaining that the prosecutor’s closing argument did not shift the burden onto defendant, as the statements merely referenced defendant’s failure to refute the evidence admitted at trial. Likewise, the prosecutor’s reference to a link between the murder and retaliation for a previous murder was not an improper reference to “gangs” and was supported by evidence and testimony admitted at the trial.
In this murder case, the trial court properly granted the defendant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. At trial one of the State’s most important expert witnesses was SBI Agent Duane Deaver, who testified as an expert in bloodstain pattern analysis. Deaver testified that the victim was struck a minimum of four times before falling down stairs. Deaver stated that, based on his bloodstain analysis, the defendant attempted to clean up the scene, including his pants, prior to police arriving and that defendant was in close proximity to the victim when she was injured. The court held that Deaver’s misrepresentations regarding his qualifications (discussed in the opinion) constituted newly discovered evidence entitling the defendant to a new trial.
Post-Conviction Proceedings > Motions for Appropriate Relief > Claims That Can Be Raised > DNA Testing
Because the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the defendant’s MAR claim alleging a violation of the post-conviction DNA statutes, the portion of the trial court’s order granting the MAR on these grounds is void. The court noted that the General Assembly has provided a statutory scheme, outside of the MAR provisions, for asserting and obtaining relief on, post-conviction DNA testing claims.
The court vacated and remanded an opinion by the court of appeals in State v. Williamson, 206 N.C. App. 599 (Sept. 7, 2010) (over a dissent, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to enter a written order with findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying the defendant’s MAR; the trial court’s oral order, containing findings of fact and conclusions of law and appearing in the transcript, was sufficient). The court noted that during review it became apparent that a written order actually was entered by the trial court, the existence of which apparently was not known to appellate counsel. The court remanded to the court of appeals to determine: (1) whether to amend the record on appeal to permit consideration of the order; (2) whether to order new briefs and/or oral arguments in light of its ruling on item (1) above; (3) whether to address defendant’s issues on the merits; and (4) whether to enter any other or further relief as it may deem appropriate.
The defendant was charged with four counts of engaging in sexual acts against a child under 13 and taking indecent liberties with a child. The defendant was alleged to have touched a child, A.M.D., in sexual manner on several occasions over a period of one to two years. The state’s evidence at trial consisted primarily of testimony from the victim, A.M.D., and corroborating testimony from other witnesses to whom she had disclosed the abuse. The state dismissed some of the charges prior to verdict, and the jury ultimately convicted the defendant of one count of sexual offense against a child under age 13.
Defendant filed an MAR seeking a new trial, based on the victim recanting her testimony. At a hearing on the MAR, the victim testified that she lied about the abuse at trial due to bribes and threats from another person. The trial judge denied the MAR, but failed to make sufficient findings of fact resolving the conflicts in the victim’s testimony between the trial and the MAR hearing. The trial court “abused its discretion by failing to expressly find which version of events it believed to be true,” so the matter was remanded with instructions to enter a new order making clear findings. Dissenting as to this part of the decision, J. Bryant would have found that the judge’s order was sufficient, since the defendant had the burden of proof at the hearing and the trial judge made a finding that the defense had not met that burden by stating she was “not satisfied that the testimony given by [A.M.D.] at the trial on this matter in December 2016 was false.”
The court per curiam affirmed the decision below, State v. Rollins, 224 N.C. App. 197 (Dec. 4, 2012), in which the court of appeals had held, over a dissent, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s MAR without an evidentiary hearing. The MAR asserted that the defendant “did not receive a fair trial as a result of a juror watching irrelevant and prejudicial television publicity during the course of the trial, failing to bring this fact to the attention of the parties or the Court, and arguing vehemently for conviction during jury deliberations.” Although the MAR was supported by an affidavit from one of the jurors, the court found that the affidavit “merely contained general allegations and speculation.” The defendant’s MAR failed to specify which news broadcast the juror in question had seen; the degree of attention the juror had paid to the broadcast; the extent to which the juror received or remembered the broadcast; whether the juror had shared the contents of the news broadcast with other jurors; and the prejudicial effect, if any, of the alleged juror misconduct.
The trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing before granting the MAR. An evidentiary hearing “is not automatically required before a trial court grants a defendant’s MAR, but such a hearing is the general procedure rather than the exception.” Prior case law “dictates that an evidentiary hearing is mandatory unless summary denial of an MAR is proper, or the motion presents a pure question of law.” Here, the State denied factual allegations asserted by the defendant. The trial court granted the MAR based on what it characterized as “undisputed facts,” faulting the State for failing to present evidence to rebut the defendant’s allegations. However, where the trial court sits as “the post-conviction trier of fact,” it is “obligated to ascertain the truth by testing the supporting and opposing information at an evidentiary hearing where the adversarial process could take place. But instead of doing so, the court wove its findings together based, in part, on conjecture and, as a whole, on the cold, written record.” It continued, noting that given the nature of the defendant’s claims (as discussed in the court’s opinion), the trial court was required to resolve conflicting questions of fact at an evidentiary hearing.
(1) Because the defendant’s motion for appropriate relief (MAR) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in this sexual assault case raised disputed issues of fact, the trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing before denying relief. The defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective by failing to, among other things, obtain a qualified medical expert to rebut testimony by a sexual abuse nurse examiner and failing to properly cross-examine the State’s witnesses. The defendant’s motion was supported by an affidavit from counsel admitting the alleged errors and stating that none were strategic decisions. The court concluded that these failures “could have had a substantial impact on the jury’s verdict” and thus the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The case was one of “he said, she said,” with no physical evidence of rape. The absence of any signs of violence provided defense counsel an opportunity to contradict the victim’s allegations with a medical expert, an opportunity he failed to take. Additionally, trial counsel failed to expose, through cross-examination, the fact that investigators failed to collect key evidence. For example, they did not test, collect, or even ask the victim about a used condom and condom wrapper found in the bedroom. Given counsel’s admission that his conduct was not the product of a strategic decision, an evidentiary hearing was required. (2) With respect to the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by denying his motion before providing him with post-conviction discovery pursuant to G.S. 15A-1415(f), the court remanded for the trial court to address whether the State had complied with its post-conviction discovery obligations.
The trial court did not err by rejecting the defendant’s G.S. 15A-1414 MAR without an evidentiary hearing.
At the MAR hearing, the trial court properly excluded the State’s expert witness, who did not testify at the original trial. The court viewed the State’s position as “trying to collaterally establish that the jury would have reached the same verdict based on evidence not introduced at trial.” It concluded that the trial court properly excluded this evidence:
Defendant’s newly discovered evidence concerned Agent Deaver, arguably, the State’s most important expert witness. Thus, the State could have offered its own evidence regarding Agent Deaver’s qualifications, lack of bias, or the validity of his experiments and conclusions. Furthermore, the State was properly allowed to argue that the evidence at trial was so overwhelming that the newly discovered evidence would have no probable impact on the jury’s verdict. However, the State may not try to minimize the impact of this newly discovered evidence by introducing evidence not available to the jury at the time of trial. Thus, the trial court did not err in prohibiting the introduction of this evidence at the MAR hearing.
(1) The trial court gave the State proper notice when it made a sua sponte oral MAR in open court one day after judgment had been entered. (2) The trial court did not violate the MAR provision stating that any party is entitled to a hearing on a MAR where the State did not request a hearing but merely requested a continuance so that the prosecutor from the previous day could be present in court.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for appropriate relief (MAR) made under G.S. 15A-1414 without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Given that the defendant’s MAR claims pertained only to mitigating sentencing factors and the defendant had been sentenced in the presumptive range, the trial judge could properly conclude that the MAR was without merit and that the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
The trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s post-sentencing motion to withdraw a plea without an evidentiary hearing. The defendant’s motion was a motion for appropriate relief. Evidentiary hearings are required on such motions only to resolve issues of fact. In this case, no issue of fact was presented. The defendant’s statement that he did not understand the trial court’s decision to run the sentences consecutively did not raise any factual issue given that he had already stated that he accepted and understood the plea agreement and its term that “the court will determine whether the sentences will be served concurrently or consecutively.” Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that the defendant’s plea was not the product of free and intelligent choice. Rather, it appears that his only reason for moving to withdraw was his dissatisfaction with his sentence.
In this Lee County case, the trial judge granted a motion for appropriate relief and awarded a new trial for a defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder committed when he was fourteen years old, largely on the basis of a confession made during a police interrogation conducted outside the presence of a parent or guardian. Years later, postconviction counsel located a new witness who claimed a different person had confessed to the crime, exculpating the defendant. The trial court found the new witness’s testimony credible and granted the MAR based on the newly discovered evidence and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, saying the trial court abused its discretion and erred in granting a new trial, in that the defendant’s affidavit failed multiple prongs of the seven-factor test for evaluating newly discovered evidence set forth in State v. Beaver, 291 N.C. 137 (1976). State v. Reid, 274 N.C. App. 100 (2020).
After allowing the defendant’s petition for discretionary review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, concluding that the trial court properly applied the Beaver test. First, the trial court did not err in concluding that the newly discovered evidence was “probably true,” despite the inconsistencies in the new witness’s testimony. It was the factfinder’s role—not the role of the Court of Appeals—to evaluate the credibility of the witness and make findings of fact, which are binding on appeal if supported by the evidence. The Court of Appeals thus erred by reweighing the evidence and making its own findings as to whether the new evidence was “probably true.”
Second, the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant’s trial counsel had exercised due diligence in attempting to procure the newly discovered evidence. The trial court’s findings that an investigator had earlier attempted to find the new witness and that those efforts were unsuccessful due in part to interference by the witness’s mother were supported by the evidence and binding on appeal. The Court noted that the “due diligence” prong of the Beaver test requires “reasonable diligence,” not that the defendant have done “everything imaginable” to procure the purportedly new evidence at trial. Where, as here, neither the defendant nor his lawyer knew whether the sought-after witness actually had any information about the victim’s killing, hiring an investigator was deemed reasonable diligence without the need to take additional steps such as issuing an subpoena or asking for a continuance.
Third, the Court concluded that the trial judge did not err in concluding that the new witness’s testimony was “competent” even though it was hearsay. The evidence was admitted without objection by the State, and was therefore competent. And in any event, the test for competence within the meaning of the Beaver test is not admissibility at the MAR hearing, but rather whether it would be material, competent, and relevant in a future trial if the MAR were granted. Here, the trial court properly concluded that the new witness’s testimony would have been admissible at trial under the residual hearsay exception of Rule 803(24).
Finally, the trial court did not err in concluding that the addition of the newly discovered evidence would probably result in a different outcome in another trial. Though the defendant’s confession was admissible, it was nonetheless the confession of a fourteen-year-old and might therefore receive less probative weight in a case like this where the other evidence of the defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a new trial.
Chief Justice Newby, joined by Justice Barringer, dissented. He wrote that the defendant failed to meet the “due diligence” prong of the Beaver test in that he did not take reasonable action at trial to procure the evidence he later argued was newly discovered. The Chief Justice disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that hiring an investigator was enough. Rather, he wrote, the defense lawyer should have gone to the trial court for assistance in obtaining testimony from the witness (such as through a material witness order), or spoken to other witnesses who likely had the same information (such as the sought-after witness’s brother).
(1) On review of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 797 S.E.2d 308 (2017), in this murder case, the court affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals that the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim was not procedurally barred under G.S. 15A-1419(a)(3) (a claim asserted in a MAR must be denied if, upon a previous appeal, the defendant was in a position to adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the present motion but did not do so). To be subject to the G.S. 15A-1419(a)(3) procedural default bar, the direct appeal record must contain sufficient information to permit the reviewing court to make all the factual and legal determinations necessary to allow a proper resolution of the claim. Here, the defendant was not in a position to adequately raise the IAC claim on direct appeal. A Strickland IAC claim requires a defendant to show both deficient performance and prejudice. The nature of the defendant’s claim would have required him to establish that his attorney was in a position to provide favorable testimony on his behalf, that her failure to withdraw from representing the defendant in order to testify on his behalf constituted deficient performance, and if she had acted as he asserts she should have, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been found guilty of murder. Here, the defendant would have been unable to make a viable showing based on the evidentiary record developed at trial.
(2) Reversing the Court of Appeals, the court found that the record contains adequate evidentiary support for the trial court’s findings that the factual basis for the defendant’s IAC claim did not exist. The defendant’s IAC claim alleged that his lawyer should have withdrawn from representing him at trial and testified on his behalf with respect to a conversation that she had with a witness. The trial court found as a fact that the defendant presented no credible evidence during the MAR hearing that the alleged conversation between defense counsel and the witness ever took place. After reviewing the evidence presented before the trial court, the court found that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of fact that the alleged conversation never occurred.
With one justice taking no part in consideration of the case and with the other members of the court equally divided, the court affirmed, without opinion, a ruling by the trial court on the defendant’s motion for appropriate relief. The case was before the court on writ of certiorari to review the trial court’s order. The question presented, as stated in the defendant’s appellate brief, was: “Whether the trial court erred in finding in a capitally-charged case that failing to disclose exculpatory SBI reports, testifying falsely as to what evidence was brought to the SBI and failing to preserve irreplaceable biological evidence did not violate due process?”
In this Scotland County case, defendant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing error in admitting several jailhouse phone calls, and appealed the denial of his motion for appropriate relief (MAR) based on prosecutorial misconduct in withholding exculpatory evidence. The Court of Appeals found no error with the conviction and denied defendant's MAR.
In October of 2017, a victim at a party in Laurinburg was shot from a car parked on the street. Eyewitness testimony put defendant in the car, and defendant was subsequently convicted of second-degree murder. After his conviction but prior to the current appeal, defendant filed an MAR arguing the prosecutor withheld evidence that a law enforcement officer who testified at defendant’s trial was under investigation for embezzlement at the time of the trial. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing on the MAR, and the trial court conducted a hearing and made findings on the MAR. Both matters form the basis of the current case.
Considering defendant’s arguments regarding the jailhouse calls, the Court of Appeals explained that under Rule of Evidence 401, the calls were relevant because they showed defendant discussing the circumstances around the shooting and a possible motivation for defendant to kill the victim. The court also pointed out that “[defendant’s] silence when told by the female caller that others in the neighborhood were saying that he fired the fatal shot is some evidence of guilt.” Slip Op. at 4-5. Applying Rule of Evidence 403, the court did not see the calls as unfairly prejudicial, especially in light of the limiting instruction given by the trial court regarding hearsay statements in the calls. The court also dispensed with defendant’s constitutional arguments as his “silence was not in response to questions by State actors” and the jury was free to make reasonable inferences from defendant’s statements and silence. Id. at 7.
Moving to the MAR, the court explained that while a former district attorney in the office was aware of the investigation into the officer, those working on defendant’s case were not aware until after the trial. Although the court acknowledged U.S. Supreme Court precedent that knowledge from the former district attorney was likely imputed to those working the case, the court did not find any prejudicial effect from the failure to disclose the investigation. To support this conclusion the court pointed out the abundance of evidence supporting defendant’s guilt outside of the officer’s testimony, such as the jailhouse calls and eyewitness testimony. This led the court to deny defendant's MAR.
In this Robeson County case, the defendant was found guilty after a jury trial of second-degree murder, aggravated felony death by vehicle, and other offenses based on a motor vehicle crash that resulted in the death of a passenger. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charge of second-degree murder based on insufficiency of the evidence on malice. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting evidence that showed the defendant, who had a history of impaired driving convictions, drove after consuming alcohol, continued to consume alcohol while driving over several hours, had a BAC that may have been as high as 0.20, and drove recklessly by engaging the emergency break and falling asleep while driving. Viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to submit the charge of second-degree murder to the jury.
The defendant also argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion for appropriate relief (MAR) alleging that a witness had recanted his trial testimony indicating that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle. That witness testified at an evidentiary hearing on the MAR that his trial testimony was false, but later asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on cross-examination, and then eventually failed to show up at all for a final hearing on the motion. The trial court found that the witness waived his privilege by testifying at the first hearing, but then substantially prejudiced the State’s ability to present its argument by failing to reappear and undergo cross-examination. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court properly applied the rule from State v. Ray, 336 N.C. 463 (1994), by striking the witness’s direct evidence in its entirety. Without that testimony, the defendant failed to meet his burden of proof, and the trial court thus properly denied the motion.
The defendant was convicted of statutory rape and sex offense in Rockingham County. That verdict was affirmed on appeal in an unpublished decision, and the defendant sought post-conviction relief. He filed a motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) and a request for post-conviction discovery, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain Department of Social Services (“DSS”) records on the victim from Rockingham and Guilford counties. Specifically, the MAR stated that the DSS records would establish multiple prior false accusations by the victim. The trial court denied the request for discovery and denied the MAR. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed, ordering the trial court to obtain the DSS records and to conduct an in camera review. The State provided what it alleged to be the complete DSS files relating to the case to the trial court. Reviewing those records, the trial court found that the files did not contain information relevant to the defendant’s case. It also found that the records were incomplete and that the court was unable to complete its review without additional files. The trial court ordered Rockingham DSS (and later Guilford County DSS) to produce records on the victim from three specific time frames. The defendant complained to the trial court that limiting the order to these specific ranges of time was too narrow and would miss relevant records (including the records of the accusation against the defendant himself), but the trial court did not alter its order. When the trial judge ultimately obtained the ordered records and reviewed them, it found the information was not likely to have impacted the verdict and was therefore not material. The motion for post-conviction discovery of the DSS records was consequently denied for a second time. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari again and again reversed and remanded.
The court agreed with the defendant that the trial court improperly limited the scope of the request for DSS records. The defendant’s original request was for DSS records of prior accusations by the victim. While the Court of Appeals order remanding the case for an in camera review of the records mentioned specific time frames as examples, its order was not limited to those time frames and encompassed any and all relevant records. On remand a second time, the trial court was ordered to conduct an in camera review of any DSS records pertaining to prior accusations of abuse by the victim. The court declined to review the DSS records sealed in the file before the trial court has had an opportunity to complete a full review of the relevant records. It noted that the defendant would be entitled to a new trial if the records are deemed material.
Judge Arrowood sat on the panel initially remanding the case and dissented. He believed that the trial court had complied with the original remand order and would have affirmed the trial court’s order denying post-conviction discovery.
The defendant, who had underlying health conditions, was not entitled to relief on a MAR under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(8) on the basis of his prison sentence being invalid as a matter of law as a form of cruel and unusual punishment due to the coronavirus pandemic. The Court of Appeals explained that the defendant’s 77 to 105 month term of imprisonment was lawful at the time it was imposed before the pandemic began and that the defendant had identified no precedent indicating that requiring a person to serve an otherwise lawful sentence during pandemic times makes the sentence cruel and unusual. The defendant was not entitled to state habeas relief because of procedural deficiencies in his MAR.
The trial court did not have jurisdiction to resentence the defendant for obtaining property by false pretenses, where the defendant’s motion for appropriate relief (MAR), which was granted by the trial court, challenged only his conviction for possession of stolen goods, a separate CRS case that was not consolidated with the fraud conviction.
The Ninth Circuit erred by concluding that the California “Dixon bar”--providing that a defendant procedurally defaults a claim raised for the first time on state collateral review if he could have raised it earlier on direct appeal—was inadequate to bar federal habeas review. Federal habeas courts generally refuse to hear claims defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule. State rules are “adequate” if they are firmly established and regularly followed. California’s Dixon bar meets this standard.
A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a state court if the state court decision rests on an adequate and independent state law ground. The Court held that a state rule is not inadequate for purposes of this analysis just because it is a discretionary rule.
In this child sexual assault case, the court reversed the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR) seeking a new trial for ineffective assistance of counsel related to opinion testimony by the State’s expert. The defendant was convicted of sexual offenses against Kim. On appeal the defendant argued that the trial court should have granted his MAR based on ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel regarding expert opinion testimony that the victim had in fact been sexually abused.
(1) The court began by concluding that the testimony offered by the State’s expert that Kim had, in fact, been sexually abused was inadmissible. The court reiterated the rule that where there is no physical evidence of abuse, an expert may not opine that sexual abuse has in fact occurred. In this case the State offered no physical evidence that Kim had been sexually abused. On direct examination the State’s expert testified consistent with governing law. On cross-examination, however, the expert expressed the opinion that Kim “had been sexually abused.” And on redirect the State’s expert again opined that Kim had been sexually abused. In the absence of physical evidence of sexual abuse, the expert’s testimony was inadmissible.
(2) The court went on to hold, however, that because the defendant failed to raise the issue on direct appeal, his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move to strike the expert’s opinion that victim Kim had in fact been sexually abused was procedurally defaulted. The record from the direct appeal was sufficient for the court to determine in that proceeding that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel failed to object to testimony that was “clearly inadmissible” and the court could not “fathom any trial strategy or tactic which would involve allowing such opinion testimony to remain unchallenged.” And in fact, the trial transcript reveals that allowing the testimony to remain unchallenged was not part of any trial strategy. Moreover trial counsel’s failure to object to the opinion testimony was prejudicial. Because the “cold record” on direct appeal was sufficient for the court to rule on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the MAR claim was procedurally barred under G.S. 15A-1419(a)(3).
(3) The court continued, however, by holding that the defendant was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel in his first appeal when appellate counsel failed to argue that it was error to allow the expert’s testimony that Kim had, in fact, been sexually abused. The court noted that the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was not procedurally barred. And, applying the Strickland attorney error standard, the court held that appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The court thus reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting the defendant’s MAR.
One judge on the panel concurred with the majority “that appellate counsel was ineffective”; concurred in result only with the majority’s conclusion that the claim regarding trial counsel’s ineffectiveness was procedurally barred; but, concluding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the expert’s testimony, dissented from the remainder of the opinion.
(1) On review of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 797 S.E.2d 308 (2017), in this murder case, the court affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals that the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim was not procedurally barred under G.S. 15A-1419(a)(3) (a claim asserted in a MAR must be denied if, upon a previous appeal, the defendant was in a position to adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the present motion but did not do so). To be subject to the G.S. 15A-1419(a)(3) procedural default bar, the direct appeal record must contain sufficient information to permit the reviewing court to make all the factual and legal determinations necessary to allow a proper resolution of the claim. Here, the defendant was not in a position to adequately raise the IAC claim on direct appeal. A Strickland IAC claim requires a defendant to show both deficient performance and prejudice. The nature of the defendant’s claim would have required him to establish that his attorney was in a position to provide favorable testimony on his behalf, that her failure to withdraw from representing the defendant in order to testify on his behalf constituted deficient performance, and if she had acted as he asserts she should have, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been found guilty of murder. Here, the defendant would have been unable to make a viable showing based on the evidentiary record developed at trial.
(2) Reversing the Court of Appeals, the court found that the record contains adequate evidentiary support for the trial court’s findings that the factual basis for the defendant’s IAC claim did not exist. The defendant’s IAC claim alleged that his lawyer should have withdrawn from representing him at trial and testified on his behalf with respect to a conversation that she had with a witness. The trial court found as a fact that the defendant presented no credible evidence during the MAR hearing that the alleged conversation between defense counsel and the witness ever took place. After reviewing the evidence presented before the trial court, the court found that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of fact that the alleged conversation never occurred.
(1) On remand from the state Supreme Court, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by concluding that he was procedurally barred from reasserting in his MAR a dual representation conflict of interest ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to attorney Smallwood. Because this court on direct appeal addressed the merits and rejected this claim, the trial court properly concluded that it was procedurally defaulted under G.S. 15A-1419(a)(2) (claim previously determined on the merits).
(2) The court then turned to the defendant’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from attorney Warmack at the evidentiary remand hearing because Warmack had a dual representation conflict arising from having previously represented codefendant Swain. The court held that the trial court erred by finding that this claim was procedurally barred under G.S. 15A-1419(a)(3) (failure to raise on appeal), reasoning that the defendant was not in a position to adequately raise the claim on direct appeal. The court further found that the record was insufficient to establish that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived Warmack’s potential conflict and that the trial court erred by concluding otherwise.
The trial court erred by summarily denying the defendant’s motion for appropriate relief (MAR) and accompanying discovery motion. In the original proceeding, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress in part because it was not filed with the required affidavit. After he was convicted, the defendant filed a MAR asserting that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file the required affidavit. The trial court denied the MAR and the court of appeals granted certiorari. The court rejected the State’s argument that because the defendant failed to raise the ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, he was procedurally defaulted from raising it in the MAR. The court reasoned that the record did not provide appellate counsel with sufficient information to establish the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness test. Specifically, proof of this prong would have required appellate counsel to show that the defendant had standing to challenge the search at issue.
The court suggested in dicta that on a motion for appropriate relief (as on appellate review) a defendant may be deemed to have waived errors in jury instructions by failing to raise the issue at trial. However, the court did not decide the issue since it concluded that even when considered on the merits, the defendant’s alleged instructional error lacked merit.
In this Wayne County case, defendant appealed the order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to felony possession of cocaine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order.
In January of 2005, defendant was indicted for felony possession of cocaine; subsequently defendant “entered a plea of guilty to felony possession of cocaine in order to receive a conditional discharge pursuant to [G.S.] 90-96.” Slip Op. at 2. In February of 2006, the trial court determined defendant had satisfied the conditions imposed for a conditional discharge and dismissed the charges under G.S. 90-96. During these events, defendant was an undocumented immigrant married to an American citizen and father to one child through the marriage. In 2021, defendant was detained by immigration officials and sent to a detention center in Georgia, where he was held without bond as a result of his guilty plea to a felony in 2005. In January of 2022 defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the possession charge, arguing he was “confused” and did not know the guilty plea would continue to constitute a conviction for federal immigration purposes. Id. at 3. After holding a hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion, treating it as a motion for appropriate relief (MAR).
The Court of Appeals first established that the trial court was correct in interpreting the motion as a MAR, explaining the dismissal of charges in 2006 was “final judgment” in the matter, and defendant’s subsequent motion was “a post-sentence MAR requiring Defendant to show manifest injustice in order to withdraw his guilty plea.” Id. at 9. The court then noted the six factors recognized in North Carolina case law justifying withdrawal of a plea, and that defendant argued “misunderstanding the consequences of the guilty plea, hasty entry, confusion, and coercion.” Id.at 10. Here, while the court expressed sympathy to defendant’s situation, it explained that he had not shown manifest injustice, as the federal immigration consequences were collateral, not direct consequences of entering his plea that he failed to understand. Sumarizing the situation, the court stated “[w]hile Defendant may now regret the consequences of his guilty plea in light of its implications under federal law, his remorse does not reflect a misunderstanding of the guilty plea at the time he entered into it.” Id. at 15.
The defendant’s assertions in his MAR, filed more than seven years after expiration of the appeal period, that his plea was invalid because the trial court failed to follow the procedural requirements of G.S. 15A-1023 and -1024 were precluded by G.S. 15A-1027 (“Noncompliance with the procedures of this Article may not be a basis for review of a conviction after the appeal period for the conviction has expired.”).
In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court affirmed an unpublished Court of Appeals opinion denying defendant’s motion for appropriate relief (MAR) based upon ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel. The Court’s opinion reversed the holding in State v. Allen, 378 N.C. 286 (2021), that the factual allegations in a MAR must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in 1999 and sentenced to life without parole. Defendant appealed his conviction, but the Court of Appeals found no error. In April of 2020, defendant filed the MAR giving rise to the current case, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel from both trial counsel and appellate counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the MAR but did not state that the standard of review was in the light most favorable to defendant as called for by Allen.
After noting that Allen had created confusion for the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court first clarified that the Allen standard would no longer apply:
Reviewing a defendant’s asserted grounds for relief in the light most favorable to defendant is a departure from this Court’s longstanding standard of review. The mere fact that some ground for relief is asserted does not entitle defendant to a hearing or to present evidence. An MAR court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing if a defendant’s MAR offers insufficient evidence to support his claim or only asserts general allegations and speculation.
Slip Op. at 3 (cleaned up). The Court then turned to the applicable review in the current case, explaining that under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), defendant must show (1) deficient performance by his counsel and (2) prejudice from counsel’s errors.
Defendant argued that his trial counsel refused to allow him to testify, despite his desire to do so. The Court noted that the record did not support defendant’s argument, and “[a]t no point during trial did defendant indicate he wished to testify.” Slip Op. at 6. Moving to the appellate counsel issue, the Court explained that the trial court limited the testimony of defendant’s psychologist, prohibiting her from using legal terminology. The Court pointed out that the expert was permitted to testify about defendant’s mental health issues, and the limitations on her testimony were permissible. Because defendant could not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in either circumstance, the Court affirmed the denial of defendant’s MAR.
Justice Berger concurred by separate opinion and discussed the reversal of Allen. Id. at 9.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in part and dissented in part and would have found that defendant’s MAR lacked factual support for an evidentiary hearing, but would not have reversed Allen. Id. at 12.
The defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 2003. The defendant challenged his conviction and sentence on direct appeal, but the Supreme Court unanimously found no error. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR) in Superior Court in July 2007. Six years later, and before the MAR court ruled on his MAR, the defendant filed a supplemental motion for appropriate relief (SMAR) amending some of his previous claims and adding two additional claims. The MAR court dismissed each of the defendant’s claims, and the defendant appealed to the state Supreme Court.
(1) Of the twelve total claims raised in the defendant’s MAR and SMAR, five of them directly related to his allegation that his trial attorneys rendered unconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) during the guilt-innocence phase of his trial by failing to investigate, develop, and utilize various sources of exculpatory evidence. The Supreme Court held that the MAR court erred in summarily dismissing the defendant’s guilt-innocence phase IAC claims without an evidentiary hearing because “some of his asserted grounds for relief required the [MAR] court to resolve questions of fact.” Slip op. at ¶ 3. The Court concluded that because the defendant presented evidence which, if proven true would entitle him to relief, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in accordance with statutory mandate.
(2) The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in summarily ruling that the defendant’s claim alleging he was impermissibly shackled in view of the jury was procedurally barred because the record did not contain facts necessary to a fair resolution of the claim. The Court vacated the relevant portion of the MAR court’s order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to obtain the facts necessary to determine whether his claim is procedurally barred and, if not, whether it has merit.
The Court affirmed the MAR court’s disposition of all other claims raised in the defendant’s MAR and SMAR.
In this Brunswick County case, the defendant appealed from an order denying his motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) filed after his conviction for robbery with a firearm and related offenses. The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred by (1) denying his MAR because law enforcement’s loss of an eyewitness statement was a Brady violation; (2) denying his MAR because the State presented false testimony, (3) failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claims, and (4) barring the defendant from filing future MARs.
(1) The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling deny the defendant’s due process claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that the State suppressed favorable evidence. Noting that to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that the suppressed evidence was material, the Court of Appeals concluded that the lost statement from an eyewitness did not meet this standard. Central to the Court’s conclusion was trial counsel’s ability to cross-examine the witness about inconsistencies in his statements and to impeach him with other testimony.
(2) The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying the defendant’s due process claim under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S .264 (1959), that the State knowingly presented false evidence. The Court concluded that the record did not support the defendant’s contention that the State knew testimony from one of the eyewitness victims was false as opposed to simply inconsistent with other testimony.
(3) The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s IAC claims as the defendant stated facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief. Focusing its analysis on defendant’s claim that trial counsel failed to investigate a known alibi witness – defendant’s son, who claimed to have been with him the morning of the crime – the Court noted that the record did not reveal whether defendant’s trial counsel made a strategic decision not to investigate this alibi witness. The Court reasoned that this factual issue could only be appropriately resolved at an evidentiary hearing.
(4) The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling that the defendant’s failure to assert other grounds in his MAR “shall be treated in the future as a BAR to any other motions for appropriate relief [in this case].” The Court relied upon its holding in State v. Blake, 275 N.C. App. 699 (2020), that G.S. 15A-1419 does not authorize a trial court to bar MAR claims in advance and that gatekeeper orders normally are entered only when a defendant has previously asserted numerous frivolous claims. The Court noted that the current case was not one in which the defendant had filed many frivolous MARs asserting the same claims.
Judge Murphy concurred, with the exception of a sole paragraph discussing precedent from other jurisdictions related to whether an attorney’s representation is deficient for failing to contact and interview prospective alibi witnesses. Judge Griffin concurred by separate opinion, expressing his disagreement with North Carolina Supreme Court precedent requiring an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s IAC claim, which he said was not supported by statute and allowed a petitioning party to take away the gatekeeping function of the trial judge.
The court held that the trial court erred by summarily denying the defendant’s MAR alleging ineffective assistance. Because the State did not contest that trial counsel’s failure to attach the requisite affidavit to a suppression motion constituted deficient representation, the focus of the court’s inquiry was on whether the defendant’s MAR forecast adequate evidence of prejudice. On this issue, it concluded that the MAR adequately forecast evidence on each issue relevant to the prejudice analysis: that the defendant had standing to challenge the search and that the affidavit supporting the warrant contained false statements.