State v. Walker, 202PA22, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 22, 2024)

In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court affirmed an unpublished Court of Appeals opinion denying defendant’s motion for appropriate relief (MAR) based upon ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel. The Court’s opinion reversed the holding in State v. Allen, 378 N.C. 286 (2021), that the factual allegations in a MAR must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. 

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in 1999 and sentenced to life without parole. Defendant appealed his conviction, but the Court of Appeals found no error. In April of 2020, defendant filed the MAR giving rise to the current case, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel from both trial counsel and appellate counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the MAR but did not state that the standard of review was in the light most favorable to defendant as called for by Allen. 

After noting that Allen had created confusion for the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court first clarified that the Allen standard would no longer apply: 

Reviewing a defendant’s asserted grounds for relief in the light most favorable to defendant is a departure from this Court’s longstanding standard of review. The mere fact that some ground for relief is asserted does not entitle defendant to a hearing or to present evidence. An MAR court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing if a defendant’s MAR offers insufficient evidence to support his claim or only asserts general allegations and speculation.

Slip Op. at 3 (cleaned up). The Court then turned to the applicable review in the current case, explaining that under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), defendant must show (1) deficient performance by his counsel and (2) prejudice from counsel’s errors.

Defendant argued that his trial counsel refused to allow him to testify, despite his desire to do so. The Court noted that the record did not support defendant’s argument, and “[a]t no point during trial did defendant indicate he wished to testify.” Slip Op. at 6. Moving to the appellate counsel issue, the Court explained that the trial court limited the testimony of defendant’s psychologist, prohibiting her from using legal terminology. The Court pointed out that the expert was permitted to testify about defendant’s mental health issues, and the limitations on her testimony were permissible. Because defendant could not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in either circumstance, the Court affirmed the denial of defendant’s MAR.  

Justice Berger concurred by separate opinion and discussed the reversal of Allen. Id. at 9. 

Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in part and dissented in part and would have found that defendant’s MAR lacked factual support for an evidentiary hearing, but would not have reversed Allen. Id. at 12.