Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

Smith's Criminal Case Compendium


This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.

Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.


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E.g., 06/14/2024
E.g., 06/14/2024

The defendant, along with two others, went to the home of an individual to whom they paid cash to provide them with controlled substances. The individual neither obtained the illegal drugs nor returned any of the drug purchase money to the defendant. At the home of the individual, the individual was assaulted, accompanied by a demand for the return of the money. While leaving, the defendant fired a shot into the residence. The defendant was arrested and charged with first-degree burglary, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, and discharging a weapon into an occupied property. At trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of the evidence, and the trial court denied the motion. The defendant was found guilty on all charges.

The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and felonious breaking or entering. The Court of Appeals relied on State v. Spratt, 265 N.C. 524 (1965), and State v. Lawrence, 262 N.C. 162 (1964), in concluding that the defendant could not be guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon because the defendant did not have the requisite felonious intent when attempting to take property from the individual, under a bona fide claim of right to the money which had been given on defendant’s behalf. The Court of Appeals also held that the lack of felonious intent negated the defendant’s ability to be convicted of the offense of felonious breaking or entering, and remanded the matter in order for the trial court to enter judgment against defendant for misdemeanor breaking or entering, which does not require felonious intent.

The Supreme Court held that the case precedent on which the Court of Appeals relied did not apply to the facts at hand. The Court concluded that “neither Spratt, nor Lawrence, nor any other case in this state has heretofore authorized a party to legally engage in ‘self-help’ by virtue of the exercise of a bona fide claim of right or title to property which is the subject of an illegal transaction,” and therefore held that there was no error in the defendant’s convictions of the offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery with a dangerous weapon and the offense of felonious breaking or entering.

The basic facts of this case are as follows: Marvin Price closed his account at the Mountain Credit Union, withdrawing $25,000 in cash. He put $300 to $400 in his wallet and the remainder in an envelope. When he arrived home and got out of his car, he was robbed at gunpoint by Michael Angram, who asked Price, “Where is the $25,000?” Price claimed that he deposited it at another bank, although he had not actually done so, and Michael Angram took the wallet only. In a separate case, Michael Angram was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon. The defendant in this case is Michael Angram’s brother. He was tried jointly with Ms. Robinson, who worked at the credit union and with whom the defendant had a child, on charges of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and aiding and abetting robbery with a dangerous weapon. They were acquitted of conspiracy and found guilty of aiding and abetting. This appeal concerned the defendant only.

The question addressed by the Court of Appeals was whether the State offered sufficient evidence to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss, which the trial judge had denied. At trial, the State called Michael Angram, who testified that he did not remember the robbery and did not know why he had been convicted. He did not testify to anything incriminating about the defendant. The State then called a detective to impeach Michael Angram. The detective testified that Michael Angram said that the defendant told him about the $25,000 bank withdrawal and drove him to Price’s home. The Court of Appeals recognized that the detective’s testimony was limited to impeaching Michael Angram’s credibility. The only substantive evidence offered by the State was that Ms. Robinson had a relationship with the defendant, that she was working at the credit union along with three other employees when Price withdrew the $25,000, and that she talked on the phone with the defendant while Price was at the credit union. The State argued that the jury could infer from this evidence that Ms. Robinson told the defendant of the withdrawal and that the defendant then arranged with his brother to rob Price. The Court found that while circumstantial evidence may support conviction of a crime, the State’s argument was speculative. The Court concluded that without the information from the detective’s testimony, which was not admitted for substantive purposes, there was not substantial evidence to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have granted the defendant’s motion and reversed the judgment. [Note: The Court found it unnecessary to address the defendant’s other issue on appeal—that the trial judge erred in permitting the detective to testify about Michael Angram’s statements because the State was aware that Michael Angram would not be forthcoming as a witness; the real purpose of the detective’s testimony was to get otherwise inadmissible hearsay before the jury in violation of State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. 343 (1989); and the testimony was unduly prejudicial and not cured by the trial judge’s limiting instruction.]

The evidence showed that the defendant was in a car with two other men that arrived in a church parking lot near the victim’s house at the same time as another car driven by a female. The female then drove to the victim’s home and beeped her car horn. Shortly after the victim came out of his house and  told the woman to leave, the defendant approached the victim with a gun and said, “Don’t f**kin’ move.” After the victim and the defendant exchanged gunfire, the defendant and two other man ran from the victim’s house. The defendant got back into the car in the parking lot. This evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant agreed with at least one other person to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant’s actions were substantial evidence of his intent to rob the victim, and his arrival at the victim’s home with the weapon was an overt act to carry out his intentions.

State v. Todd, ___ N.C. App. ___, 790 S.E.2d 349 (Aug. 16, 2016) rev’d on other grounds, 369 N.C. 707 (Jun 9 2017)

Over a dissent the court held that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for armed robbery where it consisted of a single partial fingerprint on the exterior of a backpack worn by the victim at the time of the crime and that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise this issue on the defendant’s first appeal. Evidence showed that the assailants “felt around” the victim’s backpack; the backpack however was not stolen. The backpack, a movable item, was worn regularly by the victim for months prio`r to the crime while riding on a public bus. Additionally, the defendant left the backpack unattended on a coat rack while he worked in a local restaurant. Reviewing the facts of the case and distinguishing cases cited by the State, the court concluded that the circumstances of the crime alone provide no evidence which might show that the fingerprint could only have been impressed at the time of the crime. The court went on to reject the State’s argument that other evidence connected the defendant to the crime.


In an armed robbery case, the trial court did not commit plain error by failing instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense of “aggravated common law robbery.” The court rejected the defendant’s argument that Apprendi and Blakely created a North Carolina crime of aggravated common law robbery.

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