Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.

Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.

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E.g., 09/26/2021
E.g., 09/26/2021

On appeal from a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 795 S.E.2d 374 (2016), the court reversed, holding that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment claims regarding the traffic stop are not reviewable on direct appeal, even for plain error, because the defendant waived them by not moving to suppress the evidence discovered during the stop before or at trial. The defendant did not move to suppress the evidence before or at trial, but instead argued for the first time on appeal that the seizure of the evidence—here cocaine--resulted from various Fourth Amendment violations. Deciding this issue of first impression, the court held that plain error review is not available when a defendant has not moved to suppress at the trial level. It noted that when a defendant does not move to suppress in the trial court, the evidentiary record pertaining to the suppression issue is not fully developed, and may not be developed at all. Without a fully developed record, and appellate court lacks the information necessary to assess the merits of a defendant’s plain error arguments. Here, for example, the Court of Appeals reviewed the officer’s body camera footage and determined that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. However, the officer never testified at a suppression hearing, and thus never gave testimony regarding whether he had reasonable suspicion, including testimony about facts that were not captured on the camera footage. The court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the defendant’s claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress the evidence in question.

State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264 (Oct. 5, 2012)

The court reversed State v. Oates, 215 N.C. App. 491 (Sept. 6, 2011), and held that the State’s notice of appeal of a trial court ruling on a suppression motion was timely. The State’s notice of appeal was filed seven days after the trial judge in open court orally granted the defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress but three months before the trial judge issued his corresponding written order of suppression. The court held that the window for filing a written notice of appeal in a criminal case opens on the date of rendition of the judgment or order and closes fourteen days after entry of the judgment or order. The court clarified that rendering a judgment or an order means to pronounce, state, declare, or announce the judgment or order and is “the judicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of the law upon the facts in controversy.” Entering a judgment or an order is “a ministerial act which consists in spreading it upon the record.” It continued:

For the purposes of entering notice of appeal in a criminal case . . . a judgment or an order is rendered when the judge decides the issue before him or her and advises the necessary individuals of the decision; a judgment or an order is entered under that Rule when the clerk of court records or files the judge’s decision regarding the judgment or order.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of manufacturing methamphetamine after the trial court denied his motion to suppress items seized during a search. The case came back before the court of appeals on remand from the supreme court for reconsideration in light of State v. Ledbetter, ___ N.C. ___, 814 S.E.2 39 (2018), and State v. Stubbs, 368 N.C. 40 (2015). (1) The court of appeals dismissed the defendant’s direct appeal because the defendant failed to provide notice to the State of his intent to do so before plea negotiations were finalized as required under State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 732 (1990). (2) The court of appeals denied the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari, rejecting his contention that it should be granted under State v. Davis, 237 N.C. App. 22 (2014). Davis, the court of appeals concluded, failed to address prior binding court of appeals authority. As a result, the court deemed itself obliged to follow the supreme court’s guidance in State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 473 (2004), that when faced with inconsistent opinions from separate panels, a subsequent panel of the court of appeals must follow the earlier opinion. Following that rule, the court concluded that earlier decisions (including State v. Pimental, 153 N.C. App. 69 (2002) (holding that the court of appeals cannot grant a writ of certiorari when a defendant pleads guilty without first notifying the State of his or her intent to appeal a suppression, because that is not a “failure to take timely action” within the meaning of Appellate Rule 21) compelled it to deny the writ. The court viewed Ledbetter and Stubbs as clarifying the court of appeals’ jurisdiction to hear petitions for writ of certiorari, but not as relieving the court of its obligation to follow binding substantive precedent. A concurring judge would have denied the defendant’s petition for certiorari, but as a matter of discretion, and not pursuant to prior court of appeals cases that the judge did not view as binding after Ledbetter and Stubbs.

In this drug case, the defendant failed to preserve her argument that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte conduct a hearing to confirm that the defendant’s in-custody statements to law enforcement were knowing and voluntary. The defendant did not move to suppress the statements before or at any time during trial. When the State first asked about the statements at trial, defense counsel stated “objection.” The trial court overruled the objection, and defense counsel said nothing more. When no exception to making a motion to suppress before trial applies, a defendant’s failure to make a pretrial motion to suppress waives any right to contest the admissibility of evidence at trial on constitutional grounds. Thus, the trial court properly overruled the defendant’s objection as procedurally barred.

In this indecent liberties case, the defendant waived any right of appellate review with respect to his arguments challenging admission of his inculpatory statements (he had asserted a Miranda violation and that the statements were involuntary). The defendant has the burden of establishing that a motion to suppress is made both timely and in proper form. Here, the defendant failed to meet that burden and thus waved appellate review of these issues. The court continued, however, holding that the record was insufficient to consider the defendant’s related ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and dismissed that claim without prejudice to the defendant’s right to file a motion for appropriate relief in superior court.

In a case where the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement without notifying the State of his intent to appeal the suppression ruling and failed to timely file a notice of intent to appeal, the court dismissed the defendant’s untimely appeal and his petition for writ of certiorari. Acknowledging State v. Davis, 237 N.C. App. 22 (2014), a recent case that allowed, with no analysis, a writ in this very circumstance, the court found itself bound to follow an earlier opinion, State v. Pimental, 153 N.C. App. 69, 77 (2002), which requires dismissal of the defendant’s efforts to seek review of the suppression issue.

The denial of a motion to suppress does not preserve the issue for appellate review in the absence of a timely objection made when the evidence is introduced at trial.

The defendant gave sufficient notice of his intent to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress so as to preserve his right to appeal. The State had argued that defense counsel’s language was not specific enough to put the trial court and prosecution on notice of his intention to appeal the adverse ruling. Immediately following an attempt to make a renewed motion to suppress at the end of the State’s evidence, defense counsel stated “that [the defendant] would like to preserve any appellate issues that may stem from the motions in this trial.” The court noted that the defendant had only made five motions during trial, two of which were motions to suppress, and that following defense counsel’s request, the trial court reentered substantially similar facts as he did when initially denying the pretrial motion to suppress. Clearly, the court concluded, the trial court understood which motion the defendant intended to appeal and decided to make its findings of fact as clear as possible for the record.

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