Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

About

This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.

Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.

Instructions

Navigate using the table of contents to the left or by using the search box below. Use quotations for an exact phrase search. A search for multiple terms without quotations functions as an “or” search. Not sure where to start? The 5 minute video tutorial offers a guided tour of main features – Launch Tutorial (opens in new tab).

E.g., 10/04/2022
E.g., 10/04/2022
State v. Pabon [Duplicated], 273 N.C.App. 645, 850 S.E.2d 512 (Oct. 6, 2020) modified and affirmed on other grounds, 2022-NCSC-16, 867 S.E.2d 632 (Feb 11 2022)

In this Cabarrus County case, the defendant was convicted of first-degree kidnapping and second-degree rape. After developing a friendship with the victim, he drugged her without her knowledge, took her to a friend’s house and raped her. The defendant appealed, raising numerous challenges.

(1) The defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that his motion to dismiss should have been granted. He did not raise an argument about the rape conviction on appeal. Any argument as to the sufficiency of evidence for that offense was therefore deemed abandoned and waived. As to the kidnapping conviction, the defendant argued he could not be sentenced for both kidnapping and the rape as a matter of double jeopardy, since the rape was used to elevate the kidnapping to first degree. “The proper remedy in the event of conviction of first-degree kidnapping and the sexual assault that constitutes an element of first-degree kidnapping is to arrest judgement on the first-degree kidnapping and resentence the defendant for second-degree kidnapping.” Slip op. at 10-11 (citation omitted). While the defendant correctly noted this rule, the court found it inapplicable to the defendant’s case. The State’s evidence showed at least two distinct sexual assaults. In addition to the rape, the defendant also committed a separate sexual battery, and that offense was used to elevate the kidnapping offense to first-degree (and not the rape). Following the sexual battery in one room, the defendant moved the victim to another room to commit the rape. This showed separate and distinct offenses. The trial court also correctly instructed the jury on these principles and its instructions required the jury to find a separate and distinct sexual battery in support of the first-degree kidnapping. Because the defendant was not convicted of the underlying sexual battery used to support the first-degree kidnapping, double jeopardy did not preclude separate punishments for the distinct rape and kidnapping.

(2) The was also sufficient evidence to support the aggravating factor that the defendant took advantage of a position of trust to accomplish the crimes. The Court of Appeals noted it “has upheld a finding of the ‘trust or confidence’ factor in very limited factual circumstances.” Id. at 18 (citation omitted). Here, the State presented sufficient evidence of the factor in aggravation. The defendant was a family friend and was close with the victim. Evidence showed the defendant gave the victim’s family Christmas gifts, checked on family members, frequently spent time with the victim and advised her on various matters, among other connections. This was sufficient to demonstrate a position of trust over the victim which the defendant exploited in order to commit the crimes.

(3) The two sisters of the victim testified to prior instances of sexual assault by the defendant towards each of them. The trial court admitted this evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence as proof of a common plan or scheme by the defendant. The defendant raped one of the sisters in a nearly identical manner as the victim and committed sexual battery upon the other sister “in a manner indicating an intent to go further.” Id. at 21. Like with the victim, the defendant developed a position of trust with each of the sisters before committing sexual assaults on them. The trial court therefore correctly determined the prior bad acts were substantially similar to the circumstances of the current offense. The assaults occurred 10 and 8 years before the events of the current case. The court agreed with the trial judge that this evidence was not too remote in time to satisfy the requirements of Rule 404(b):

Our Supreme Court has held that ‘[w]hen similar acts have been performed continuously over a period of years, the passage of time serves to prove, rather than disprove, the existence of a plan’ rendering the prior bad acts ‘not too remote to be considered as evidence of defendant’s common scheme to abuse the victim sexually.’ Id. at 22 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

 The evidence showed the defendant’s acts were continuous over the course of time and therefore not too remote in time to be admitted under Rule 404(b). The trial court also conducted the necessary balancing under Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence to determine the testimony was not more prejudicial than probative and instructed the jury about the limited purpose of the evidence. The admission of this evidence was therefore not error or an abuse of discretion.

(4) The defendant argued that the admission of toxicology results by way of a substitute analyst violated his Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation. The court disagreed, noting the rule on substitute analyst testimony:

[A]n expert witness may testify as to the testing or analysis conducted by another expert if: (i) that information is reasonably relied on by experts in the field in forming their opinions; and (ii) the testifying expert witness independently reviewed the information and reached his or her own conclusion in this case. Id. at 26 (citation omitted).

The evidence showed that the substitute analyst reviewed the results of the testing done by the non-testifying analysts and formed his own opinion about the results. “Thus, [the analyst’s] opinion was based on his own analysis and not merely surrogate testimony for an otherwise inadmissible lab report . . .” Id. at 31. Under these circumstances, the defendant was not entitled to cross-examine the analysts who actually performed the testing. According to the court, "when an expert gives an opinion, the opinion is the substantive evidence, and the expert is the witness whom the defendant has the right to confront.” Id. Because the expert opinion was properly admitted and the defendant was able to cross-examine that expert, there was no violation of the defendant’s confrontation rights.

(5a) The indictment for second-degree rape identified the victim only by reference to her initials, and the defendant argued this constituted a fatal indictment defect for failure to identify the victim.  He pointed to a recent case holding that “Victim #1” was insufficient to identify the victim. State v. McKoy, 196 N.C. App. 650, 654 (2009), foreclosed this argument. Citing from that case, the court observed: 

[W]here the statutes defining second-degree rape and second-degree sexual offense require the offenses to be against ‘another person,’ the indictments charging these offenses do not need to state the victim’s full name, nor do they need to add periods after each letter in initials in order to accomplish the common sense understanding that initials represent a person. Id.

Unlike the situation where the indictment names only a “victim,” the use of initials sufficed to identify the victim and did not constitute a fatal defect. [Jeff Welty blogged about the use of initials in charging documents here.]

(5b) The first-degree kidnapping indictment was also not defective. The defendant claimed a fatal flaw based on the indictment’s failure to identify the specific crime constituting the sexual assault for purposes of first-degree kidnapping. There is no requirement that an indictment for first-degree kidnapping identify the felony used to enhance the offense to first-degree. The indictment was otherwise sufficient to put the defendant on notice and was valid in all respects. 

(6) The trial court’s instructions to the jury on the existence of the aggravating factor violated G.S. § 15A-1340.16(d). That statute provides in pertinent part that evidence used at trial to support the existence of an element of the offense may not thereafter be used to prove a factor in aggravation. The jury instructions permitted the jury to consider “all of the evidence,” rather than limiting its consideration to evidence not used to support the intent requirements for the two crimes. The defendant did not object to the instructions at the time and alleged plain error on appeal. Plain error requires that the defendant demonstrate “a reasonable possibility that, had the instruction been given, the jury would have failed to find the existence of the aggravating factor.” Id. at 36. The court noted that occupying a position of trust is not an element of either of the crimes at issue and rejected the contention that the same evidence was used to prove both the intent to commit the crimes and the aggravating factor. The defendant could not demonstrate the possibility of a different result absent the instructions on the aggravating factor, and accordingly could not demonstrate prejudice for plain error.

(7) The defendant’s argument that his objections to an order requiring him to enroll in satellite-based monitoring (“SBM”) were improperly overruled were abandoned on appeal, because the defendant failed to raise any argument for this issue.

A majority of the court determined there were no reversible error in the trial and the convictions were affirmed.

Judge Murphy dissented in part. He wrote separately to note his disagreement with the majority’s analysis of the Confrontation Clause issue. Judge Murphy would have granted a new trial based on the Sixth Amendment violation and would have held the plain error jury instruction issue in (5) above, as well as the SBM issue in (6), were therefore moot. He otherwise concurred in the majority’s judgment.

Reversing State v. Beckelheimer, 211 N.C. App. 362 (Apr. 19, 2011), the court held that the trial judge did not err by admitting 404(b) evidence. The defendant was charged with sexual offense and indecent liberties. At the time of the alleged offense the defendant was 27. The victim was the defendant’s 11-year-old male cousin. The victim testified that after inviting him to the defendant’s bedroom to play video games, the defendant climbed on top of the victim and pretended to be asleep. He placed his hands in the victim’s pants, unzipped the victim’s pants, and performed oral sex on the victim while holding him down. The victim testified that on at least two prior occasions the defendant placed his hands on the victim’s genital area outside of his clothes while pretending to be asleep. At trial, witness Branson testified about sexual activity between himself and the defendant. Branson, then 24 years old, testified that when he was younger than 13 years old, the defendant, who was 4½ years older, performed various sexual acts on him. Branson and the defendant would play video games together and spend time in the defendant’s bedroom. Branson described a series of incidents during which the defendant first touched Branson’s genital area outside of his clothes while pretending to be asleep and then reached inside his pants to touch his genitals and performed oral sex on him. Branson also related an incident in which he performed oral sex on the defendant in an effort to stop the defendant from digital anal penetration. The court found that Branson’s testimony was properly admitted to show modus operandi. The conduct was sufficiently similar to the acts at issue given the victim’s ages, where they occurred, and how they were brought about. The court of appeals improperly focused on the differences between the acts rather than their similarities (among other things, the court of appeals viewed the acts with Branson as consensual and those with the victim as non-consensual and relied on the fact that the defendant was only 4½ years older than Branson but 16 years older than the victim). The court went on to conclude that given the similarities between the incidents, the remoteness in time was not so significant as to render the prior acts irrelevant and that the temporal proximity of the acts was a question of evidentiary weight. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence under Rule 403.

In this Wake County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree rape of a child and first-degree sexual offense with a child based on error in the admission of testimony regarding a prior alleged assault and in sentencing. The Court of Appeals found no error in the admission of evidence under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b), but improper considerations in sentencing that justified remanding the matter for resentencing. 

The State filed a pretrial notice of Rule 404(b) evidence, and defendant countered with a motion in limine to preclude the State from introducing any evidence related to sexual assaults in Durham, NC. At trial, the State offered testimony from the victim in this matter regarding the sexual assaults she experienced in or around August or September of 2015. The State then called the Rule 404(b) witness to testify about an alleged sexual assault by defendant that she experienced in in February of 2015, in Durham. Both the victim and the other witness were students at middle schools where defendant was a teacher. The trial court allowed testimony from the Rule 404(b) witness in front of the jury. 

The Court of Appeals considered defendant’s argument that the Rule 404(b) testimony was not similar to the crime charged and was unduly prejudicial, noting that Rule 404(b) is generally an inclusive rule if the evidence is relevant to any issue besides propensity to commit the crime charged. Slip Op. at ¶ 17. Additionally, the court noted that North Carolina precedent regarding the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence in sexual assault cases has been “very liberal.” Slip Op. at ¶ 20, quoting State v. White, 331 N.C. 604, 612 (1992). Because the crimes charged in this matter and the assault described by the Rule 404(b) witness were sufficiently similar and not too remote in time, the court found no error in admitting the testimony. 

Considering defendant’s second argument regarding sentencing, the court found error due to the trial court’s improper consideration of defendant’s choice to receive a trial by jury. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court addressed defendant regarding the victim and 404(b) witness, saying “[a]nd in truth, they get traumatized again by being here, but it’s absolutely necessary when a defendant pleads not guilty. They didn’t have a choice and you, Mr. Pickens, had a choice.” Slip Op. at ¶ 32. Immediately after this quote, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences. The Court of Appeals found a clear inference that the trial court imposed consecutive sentences because defendant did not plead guilty and went to trial. As such, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. 

Judge Murphy dissented by separate opinion.

In this Wake County case, the defendant was charged with incest and second-degree forcible rape for an offense committed against his niece. The defendant pled guilty to incest, but had a jury trial on the rape charge. At trial, the State offered testimony from a witness, Brittany Mack, who alleged that she had previously been forcibly raped by the defendant numerous times, including five days prior to the acts giving rise to the defendant’s current charge. The defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude that testimony under Rule 404(b). The trial court heard arguments on that motion but reserved ruling on it until after the victim in the present case testified at trial. After the present victim testified that the defendant had intercourse with her while she was blacked out after drinking alcohol, the trial court ruled that the 404(b) evidence of the defendant’s sexual assault on Brittany Mack would be admissible for the limited purposes of showing the absence of mistake, lack of consent and intent. The trial court also conducted a Rule 403 balancing test and concluded that the proffered evidence was sufficiently similar and close in time to be more probative than prejudicial. After Mack testified, the trial court instructed the jury that her testimony could be considered solely for the purpose of showing an absence of mistake or that the defendant had the intent to commit the crime charged in this case. The defendant was convicted. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding the prior alleged rapes because they were not relevant to any material element of the present charge of second-degree forcible rape, and that the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the testimony’s prejudicial effect.

(1) The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err when it deemed Mack’s testimony relevant under Rule 401. Though the type of force allegedly applied in the prior incident (Mack testified that the defendant “threw her on his bed” and forced her to have sex against her will) was different from the evidence of physical helplessness at issue in the present case, the Court of Appeals noted that physical helplessness still implies force and a lack of consent. Because force and consent are relevant issues in any second-degree forcible rape case, the Court held that the testimony about the prior alleged offense was relevant to prove that the defendant did not mistake the present victim’s actions and inactions as consent.

(2) The Court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when weighing the probative value of Mack’s testimony against the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial judge heard testimony on voir dire, instructed the jury on the limited purpose of the testimony, and acknowledged that the prior alleged acts most recently occurred five days prior to the present offense. The Court of Appeals thus found no error and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual offense with a child by an adult, rape of a child, first-degree kidnapping, and two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child in Wake County, stemming from the assault of a six-year-old child at a church.

(1) In regard to one of the indecent liberties convictions, the defendant argued that the State did not present sufficient evidence that the defendant acted inappropriately when touching the victim’s chest and that such evidence was only offered for corroborative purposes. The victim’s testimony discussing the touching of her chest was only presented by way of her videotaped forensic interview and was not raised in the victim’s trial testimony. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the videotaped forensic interview of the victim “was properly admitted under Rule 803(4) as her statements were made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, and the statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” Slip op. at 8. Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury to consider the video as substantive evidence. The Court of Appeals therefore determined that “[t]he evidence was sufficient to support denial of the motion to dismiss the challenged charge of taking indecent liberties with a child.” Id.

The defendant also argued that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant forcibly removed the victim to facilitate the offense, an essential element of the crime of kidnapping. Specifically, the defendant argues the evidence does not show that he used actual force, fraud, or trickery to remove the victim. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument as well, finding that the defendant’s act of taking the victim to a secluded place to continue the sexual assault was sufficient to support removal for purposes of kidnapping.

(2) Concerning the defendant’s convictions of first-degree kidnapping and sexual offense with a child, the defendant argued “that the trial court erred by instructing on first-degree kidnapping and by failing to instruct on sexual offense with a child by an adult.” Id. at 10. The Court of Appeals found no prejudicial error in the instruction given on first-degree kidnapping because “[t]he evidence at trial was consistent with the allegations in the indictment,” even though the language of the jury instruction varied from the indictment. Id. at 11. The kidnapping indictment stated that “[D]efendant also sexually assaulted [Maya]” while the jury was instructed “that the person was not released by the defendant in a safe place.” Id. at 11-12. The Court of Appeals noted that such variance is usually prejudicial error but determined that the evidence here supported both the theory of the indictment and that of the jury instructions. On plain error review, the court rejected the defendant’s argument and concluded “it is not probable that the jury would have reached a different result if given the correct instruction.” Id. at 12.

The defendant also argued that the trial court erred by entering judgment on sexual offense with a child by an adult after instructing the jury on first-degree sex offense, a lesser offense. The Court of Appeals agreed. Because “[t]he jury instruction clearly outlined the lesser included offense of first-degree sexual offense . . . it was improper for the trial court to enter judgment for two counts of sexual offense with a child.” Id. at 17. The trial court did not instruct on the essential element of age as to the sexual offense with a child by an adult charge. The defendant was therefore impermissibly sentenced beyond the presumptive range for the lesser included offense of conviction. The Court of Appeals determined this was prejudicial error and vacated the defendant’s conviction of sexual offense with a child by an adult, remanding for resentencing on the first-degree sexual offense charge.

(3) The defendant argued that the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings. First, the defendant alleged that expert testimony regarding the DNA profile from the victim’s underwear (matching to the defendant) should not have been admitted because there was an insufficient foundation to satisfy the requirements of Rule 702(a)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the witness was “a qualified expert in the field of forensics and an employee at the North Carolina State Crime Lab, [who] testified to her qualifications in the area of DNA analysis as well as her training and experience in gathering evidence for DNA profiles.” Slip op. at 19. Further, the Court explained:

[The witness] thoroughly explained the methods and procedures of performing autosomal testing and analyzed defendant’s DNA sample following those procedures. That particular method of testing has been accepted as valid within the scientific community and is a standard practice within the state crime lab. Thus, her testimony was sufficient to satisfy Rule 702(a)(3). Id. at 21.

The defendant also argued that it was plain error to allow prior bad acts evidence under Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, claiming that the prior incident was unrelated to the current offense. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not err because the facts in both cases were similar enough to be admitted for 404(b) purposes. The trial court’s findings that “both females were strangers to defendant; they were separated from a group and taken to a more secluded location; they were touched improperly beginning with the buttocks; and they were told to be quiet during the assault,” supported the admission of this evidence under Rule 404(b). Id. at 23.

(4) Finally, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing cross-examination of his father and contends the State elicited irrelevant testimony from his father. Specifically, the defendant objected to the admission of questions and testimony about whether the defendant’s father warned members of the church about the defendant’s potential dangerousness. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and determined “the questions on cross-examination elicited relevant testimony and were well within the scope of defendant’s father’s direct testimony that defendant needed frequent supervision for basic activities.” Id. at 27-28.

Judge Murphy authored a separate opinion concurring in part, concurring in result only in part, and dissenting in part. Concerning the sexual offense jury instruction, Judge Murphy believed “the trial court erred in instructing the jury, however, since the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt Defendant was at least 18 years old in another portion of its verdict and all the charges against Defendant occurred on the same date, there was no plain error.” Slip op. at 5 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Judge Murphy also pointed out that “[h]ad the jury been correctly instructed on the first-degree kidnapping indictment language and found Defendant guilty of first-degree kidnapping based on sexual assault the trial court could not have sentenced Defendant for all the sexual offenses and the first-degree kidnapping offense without violating double jeopardy.” Id. at 13. Following the guidance of State v. Stinson, 127 N.C. App. 252, Judge Murphy believed that the court should have arrested judgment on the first-degree kidnapping conviction and remanded for resentencing on second-degree kidnapping to avoid double jeopardy issues. Lastly, Judge Murphy did not believe the defendant preserved the issue of his father’s testimony for review and would have refused to consider that argument.

In this child sexual assault case, the trial court did not err by admitting 404(b) evidence. In 2016, the victim reported to law enforcement that the defendant sexually assaulted her many times when she was a child, including a final incident on or about May 2004 when she was 12 years old. During the ensuing investigation, the victim recorded the defendant making incriminating statements. The defendant was indicted for first-degree sex offense with a child for the 2004 incident. At trial, the victim testified to the May 2004 incident, describing digital penetration. The victim also testified to an incident of digital penetration by the defendant that occurred a month or two prior to the May 2004 incident (“the bed incident”), and to another incident of digital penetration about two years earlier (the “Lick Mountain incident”). The victim also testified about watching pornography with the defendant on multiple occasions prior to the May 2004 incident during which the defendant would put her hand on his penis. Additionally the recorded conversation between the victim and the defendant was introduced at trial. In that recording the defendant asked the victim if she remembered “[t]he first hand [ride] you ever took” and admitted remembering watching pornography with the victim. The defendant was found guilty and he appealed.

          The court found that evidence of the bed incident and the Lick Mountain incident were properly admitted under Rule 404(b). All three incidents involved the same victim, the same type of penetration, and all occurred while the victim was under the defendant’s supervision. Thus the incidents were sufficiently similar to the one in question to show a common scheme or plan to take advantage of the victim by digitally penetrating her while she was under his control.

          The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Lick Mountain incident was too remote in time to the May 2004 incident. Although that incident occurred 2 or 3 years prior, that period of time did not eliminate the probative value of the incident, particularly in light of its striking similarity to the May 2004 incident.

         The court also rejected the argument that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of the bed incident and Lick Mountain incidents over a Rule 403 objection.

         With respect to the portion of the recording regarding the “hand ride,” the defendant argued that this evidence was inadmissible because the date of the incident was not provided. The court concluded however that because of the similarity of this incident to the other events, the trial court did not err by admitting the statement on grounds of temporal proximity.

         With respect to the evidence regarding watching pornography together, the court held that even assuming this evidence was erroneously admitted, the defendant failed to establish prejudice in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

In this child abuse case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence regarding consensual sexual activity between the defendant and his wife. Here, after the child described to the wife a sexual act performed by the defendant, the wife signed a statement indicating that she and the defendant had engaged in the same act. The act in question was to turn her over on her stomach and “hump” and ejaculate on her back. The wife’s testimony was admissible to show common scheme or plan, pattern and/or common modus operandi and was sufficiently similar to the child’s allegation of sexual abuse. The court distinguished this case from one involving “a categorical or easily-defined sexual act” such as anal sex. Here, the case involved “a more unique sexual act.” 

In this felony indecent exposure case where the defendant exposed himself to a 14-year old boy, his mother and grandmother, the trial court did not err by admitting 404(b) evidence from two adult women who testified that the defendant exposed himself in public on other occasions. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the other acts were insufficiently similar to the charged conduct and only “generic features of the charge of indecent exposure,” noting that the 404(b) testimony revealed that the defendant exposed himself to adult women, who were either alone or in pairs, in or in the vicinity of businesses near the courthouse in downtown Fayetteville, and each instance involved the defendant exposing his genitals with his hand on or under his penis. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that because the current charge was elevated because the exposure occurred in the presence of a child under 16 and the prior incidents involved adult women, the were not sufficiently similar, noting that the defendant acknowledged in his brief that in this case he did in fact expose himself to an adult woman as well. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the evidence should have been excluded under the Rule 403 balancing test.

In this child sexual abuse case, the trial court properly admitted 404(b) evidence from several witnesses. As to two of the witnesses, the defendant argued that the incidents they described were too remote and insufficiently similar. The court concluded that although the sexual abuse of these witnesses occurred 10-20 years prior to trial, the lapses of time between the instances of sexual misconduct involving the witnesses and the victims can be explained by the defendant's incarceration and lack of access to a victim. Furthermore, there are several similarities between what happened to the witnesses and what happened to the victims: each victim was a minor female who was either the daughter or the niece of the defendant's spouse or live-in girlfriend; the abuse frequently occurred at the defendant's residence, at night, and while others slept nearby; and the defendant threatened each victim not to tell anyone. When considered as a whole, the testimony shows that the defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct of sexual abuse over a long period of time and the evidence meets Rule 404(b)’s requirements of similarity and temporal proximity. Testimony by a third witness was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) where it “involved substantially similar acts by defendant against the same victim and within the same time period.” The trial court also performed the proper Rule 403 balancing and gave a proper limiting instruction to the jury.

In a sexual exploitation of a minor case, the trial court did not commit plain error by admitting evidence that the defendant set up a webcam in a teenager’s room; videotaped her dancing in her pajamas; and inappropriately touched her while they rode four-wheelers. Although the court had an issue with the third piece of evidence, it concluded that any error did not rise to the level of plain error.

In a child sex case, the trial court did not err by allowing a child witness, A.L., to testify to sexual intercourse with the defendant. The court found the incidents sufficiently similar, noting among other things, that A.L. was assaulted in the same car as K.C. Although A.L. testified that the sex was consensual, she was fourteen years old at the time and thus could not legally consent to the sexual intercourse. The court found the seven-year gap between the incidents did not make the incident with A.L. too remote.

State v. Walston, 229 N.C. App. 141 (Aug. 30, 2013) rev’d on other grounds, 367 N.C. 721 (Dec 19 2014)

In a child sex case, the trial court did not err by admitting 404(b) evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual conduct. The court found the prior acts sufficiently similar and that the requirement of temporal proximity was met. 

In an involuntary manslaughter case where the victim, who was under 21, died from alcohol poisoning and the defendant was alleged to have aided and abetted the victim in the possession or consumption of alcohol, the trial court did not err by admitting 404(b) evidence that the defendant provided her home as a place for underage individuals, including the victim, to possess and consume alcohol; that the defendant offered the victim and other underage persons alcohol at parties; that the defendant purchased alcohol at a grocery store while accompanied by the victim; and the defendant was cited for aiding and abetting the victim and other underage persons to possess or consume alcohol one week before the victim’s death. The evidence was relevant to prove plan, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident.

In a child sex case involving a female victim, the trial court did not err by admitting 404(b) evidence in the form of testimony from another female child (E.S.) who recounted the defendant’s sexual activity with her. The evidence was relevant to show plan and intent. Because the defendant’s conduct with E.S. took place within the same time period as the charged offenses and with a young girl of similar age, it tends to make more probable the existence of a plan or intent to engage in sexual activity with young girls. Additionally, the defendant’s plan to engage in sexual activity with young girls was relevant to the charges being tried. Finally, there was no abuse of discretion under the Rule 403 balancing test. On the issue of similarity, the court focused on the fact both E.S. and the victim were the same age and that the defendant was an adult; there was no discussion of the similarity of the actual acts.

In sexual assault case involving a child victim, no error occurred when the trial court admitted 404(b) evidence that the defendant engaged in sexual contact with another child to show common plan or scheme. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the acts were not sufficiently similar, concluding that both incidents occurred while the victims were in the care of the defendant, their grandfather; the victims were around the same age when the conduct began; for both victims, the conduct occurred more than once; and with both victims, the defendant initiated the conduct by talking to them about whether they were old enough for him to touch their private parts. The court also determined that the acts met the temporal proximity requirement.

In a case in which the defendant was charged with sexual offense, indecent liberties and crime against nature against a ten-year-old female victim, no plain error occurred when the trial court admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts against two other teenaged females. The evidence was introduced to show common scheme or plan, identity, lack of mistake, motive and intent. The defendant’s acts with respect to the victim and the first female were similar: the defendant had a strong personal relationship with one of their parents, used the threat of parental disbelief and disapproval to coerce submission and silence, initiated sexual conduct after wrestling or roughhousing, digitally penetrated her vagina, and forced her to masturbate him. Only two years separated the incidents and both involved a similar escalation of sexual acts. As to the evidence of the prior bad acts with the second female — that the defendant kissed her when she was thirteen — the court held that admission of that testimony was not plain error. 

In a child sexual abuse case involving a female victim, the trial court did not err by allowing testimony from four individuals (three females and one male) that the defendant sexually abused them when they were children. The events occurred 14, 21, and 27 years prior to the abuse at issue. Citing State v. Jacob, 113 N.C. App. 605 (1994), and State v. Frazier, 121 N.C. App. 1 (1995), the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the evidence lacked sufficient temporal proximity to the events in question. The challenged testimony, showing common plan, established a strikingly similar pattern of sexually abusive behavior by the defendant over a period of 31 years in that: the defendant was married to each of the witnesses' mothers or aunt; the victims were prepubescent; the incidents occurred when the defendant's wife was at work and he was watching the children; and the abuse involved fondling, fellatio, or cunnilingus, mostly taking place in the defendant's wife's bed. Although there was a significant gap in time between the last abuse and the events in question, that gap was the result of defendant's not having access to children related to his wife and thus did not preclude admission under Rule 404(b). Finally, the court held that trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting this evidence under Rule 403.

Show Table of Contents